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This thesis seeks to identify and examine the dynamics and processes underpinning the 
emergence and protraction of British-led escape activities in France during the period 
1940-42. From the outset of this research, it quickly became clear that Second World 
War escape histories had, rather ironically, captured popular imagination. For five 
years, when explaining the research to those curious enough to ask, quips about movies 
such as The Great Escape and Von Ryan’s Express or long- running sitcoms such as 
’Allo ’Allo quickly worked their way into the conversation. Admittedly, this had one 
advantage; it provided a discussion point and frame of reference for the topic and 
piqued general interest. Yet such popular impressions of escape activities during the war 
had a number of downfalls; the subject of escape was not considered ‘real’ or ‘serious’ 
history. One local journalist ventured to describe the study of such history as ‘barmy’. 
In a way, this response is understandable particularly considering that researchers in the 
field have done little to correct this interpretation. This problem is further compounded 
by the lack of academic research on the topic, as will be discussed later. Much of the 
written popular histories on British escape activities and civilian efforts to help these 
men retain an element of a Hollywood-meets-history appeal. This is not to argue that 
the facts of these popular histories are necessarily inaccurate but the aim is often related 
to glorifying the individuals involved rather than understanding why and how such 
organisations developed. 
 
In order to move away from such histories, this research focuses on the social, political, 
diplomatic and military factors leading to the development of escape organisations 
aiding British servicemen and airmen during the period 1940-42, after which time 
escape activities were severely curtailed with the German occupation of the whole of 
France in November 1942. The primary focus of this thesis is centred on one 
organisation, commonly known as the ‘Pat Line’, so named after a nom de guerre of 
one of its chief organisers, Pat O’Leary (Albert Guerisse). The ‘Pat Line’ developed in 
early 1941 to pass men across the Pyrenees and into Spain. Arguably, ‘Pat’ reached its 
apogee in the summer of 1942 with connections not only across France but also with 
London. Through its connections with the latter, the ‘Pat Line’ also established links 
with the Coastal Watching Flotilla (CWF), a Polish group operating in the 
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Mediterranean.1 In tandem with the CWF, the leadership of the Pat Line successfully 
arranged a serious of sea evacuations of British military personnel in hiding along the 
south western French coastline, at Canet Plage. 
 
For the most part, the ‘Pat Line’ or, in French, ‘le reseau Pat’ is understood as a 
resistance network. Resistance scholarship usually distinguishes between ‘networks’ 
and ‘movements’.2 A movement was considered as inspiring a wide appeal and was 
usually associated with distribution of a newspaper. In this respect, movements often 
had political overtones with newspapers acting as a medium to disseminate ideas. This 
was opposed to networks which were involved in more specific, covert, military-type 
activity such as committing acts of sabotage, gathering intelligence or aiding escape. 
Yet the use of the word ‘network’ in relation to escape activities is problematic. 
Applying the term network to describe ‘Pat’ oversimplifies the development of the 
organisation giving the idea of a small group of individuals in one area coming together 
to form an escape line. This was not the case with ‘Pat’ stretching from Pas de Calais 
right to Marseilles and into the Pyrenees. Instead, ‘Pat’ developed from the separate 
work of small ,localised escape efforts concentrated in cities such as Lille, Paris and 
Marseilles that eventually connecting with one another.  
 
Establishing connections outside local areas was not an easy task. The Franco-German 
Armistice, although ending hostilities, compounded these difficulties. France was 
loosely divided into two zones, the Occupied Zone in the north which also ran along the 
west coast and the Unoccupied Zone in the south of France. While German military 
authorities administered the Occupied Zone, the Unoccupied Zone retained some 
semblance of sovereignty with a nominally independent French government located at 
the spa town of Vichy. A third division of France included the Forbidden Zone, 
                                                            
1 Brooks Richard, Secret flotillas volume II: clandestine sea operations in the Mediterranean, North 
Africa and the Adriatic 1940-1944 (London and Oregon, 2004). 
2 See Julian Jackson, France; the dark years 1940-1945 (Oxford, 2001), pp 408-10. According to another 
researcher, Phillip Le Blanc, the term ‘network’ and ‘movement’ are contestable. In a private 
communication Le Blanc informed this author that ‘networks were called organisations until 1945’. His 




encapsulating the Nord and Pas de Calais region and governed by the German military 
administration of Belgium (see figure 1).3  
 
 
Fig 1. Map of France 1940-42: Eric Alary, La ligne de démarcation (Paris, 2009) p. 468. 
 
Thus, even in terms of geography, crossing various frontiers made the emergence of a 
unified escape network difficult. As will be demonstrated in chapter two, it was only 
when a number of British officers reached the Unoccupied Zone, organising escape 
                                                            
3 Eric Alary, La ligne de démarcation (Paris, 2009), pp 33-4. In addition to these zones, Alsace-Lorraine 
was annexed directly to Germany. Italy also received a small portion of French territory in the south-west 
along the Franco-Italian border. However, these zones will not be looked at in detail in this study as there 
is no evidence of significant British escape activity.  
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activities there and maintaining links with civilian helpers in the north that an escape 
network, which ultimately after the war became known as the ‘Pat’ line or the Pat 
O’Leary network, developed. Considering this, it is important to understand that for a 
significant period during its development, the ‘Pat Line’ consisted mainly of loosely- 
connected smaller groups in the Forbidden and Occupied Zone. These groups passed 
men across the demarcation line into unoccupied France. The ‘Pat Line’ did not emerge 
until the summer of 1941 when British escape organisers in unoccupied France began to 
connect with, and direct the activities, of these northern groups. This view is supported 
by a contemporary and French intelligence agent who had dealings with the 
organisation, André Postel Vinay (see chapter four).  During the war Postel Vinay 
considered the ‘Pat Line’ as simply a British organisation charged with helping men left 
behind after Dunkirk to escape from France, commenting that it only became known as 
‘le réseau Patrick O’Leary’ (Patrick O’Leary network) after the war.4 In this thesis the 
term ‘British-led escape organisation’ is used when referring to the escape activities of 
British officers in the Unoccupied Zone, and the term ‘Pat Line’ used when referring to 
the fully-fledged escape network as a whole, that is, as it stretched from the Forbidden 
Zone to the Pyrenees. 
 
Before continuing, it is also necessary to address issues surrounding the categorisation 
of escapees as either ‘escaper’ or ‘evader’. An ‘escaper’ referred to a man captured by 
the Germans but who managed to escape. An ‘evader’ was a man who avoided capture 
and remained at large. 5  These definitions were contemporary under the Geneva 
Convention 1929 and had important legal ramifications (for more details on the Geneva 
Convention see chapter two). The Convention protected the rights of prisoners of war 
and was relatively well respected by the Germans fighting on the western front. In 
relation to the term, ‘escapers’ or ‘evaders’, escapers, on reaching neutral territory, were 
given the right to return to their country while evaders were subject to internment.6 This 
distinction, for the most part, is not necessary and therefore, for the purposes of 
convenience and simplicity the term ‘escapee’ has been adopted to refer to either an 
escaper or evader in the occupied zones or unoccupied France. 
 
                                                            
4 André Postel-Vinay, Un fou s’évade: souvenirs de 1941-1942 (Paris, 1997), p. 9. 




Moreover, while this thesis focuses on men who escaped or evaded captivity, it must 
also be acknowledged that the majority of British servicemen left behind after Dunkirk 
and airmen shot down over occupied territory remained prisoners for the duration of the 
war. The common experience of capture and imprisonment has been dealt with in 
countless autobiographies, biographies and histories such as Adrian Gilberts, POW, 
Allied prisoners in Europe or Charles Rolling’s Prisoner of war voices from behind the 
wire.7 Both of these authors deal with the deprivations, hardships and boredom of camp 
life. Another book, The barbed-wire university: the real lives of Allied prisoners of war 
in the Second World War takes a more focused approach, dealing with the efforts of 
both officers and rank and file to educate themselves.8 This helped counteract and 
distract from the harsh realities of prison life. Perhaps one of the most harrowing books 
on prisoners of war in western Europe, The last escape, examines the effect of the 
Russian advance on Allied prisoners.9 On Hitler’s orders, and in the depths of winter, 
thousands of prisoners were marched westward away from the approaching Soviets. 
Hundreds of prisoners, poorly clad and undernourished, died from exhaustion. Thus, by 
focusing on escape, the aim of this thesis is not to downplay or ignore the hardships 
experienced by men who remained in captivity. This, as already stated, was the fate of 
the majority of Allied servicemen and airmen in occupied Europe.  
 
Yet escape, and the ramifications of escape, is an important area of research. Such 
activities directly affected the families and communities who chose to harbour these 
men. In France, civilian interaction with escapees led to the improvisation of various 
escape organisations, which in turn paved the way for the emergence of the ‘Pat Line’. 
The main objective of this thesis is to offer an insight into the growth of these escape 
activities and the development of the ‘Pat Line’, an area of research that has been 
significantly under-investigated and generally forgotten. In order to achieve this, this 
author identified three phases underpinning the development of the ‘Pat Line’. Firstly, 
there was the beginnings of British escape activities in the Nord, Pas de Calais region 
coupled with the willingness of French civilians to assist escapees into unoccupied 
France. The second phase was characterised by the arrival of a number of British 
                                                            
7 Adrian Gilbert, POW: Allied prisoners in Europe, 1939-1945 (London, 2006) and Charles Rolling, 
Prisoners of war, voices from behind the wire in the Second World War (London, 2008). 
8 Midge Gillies, The barbed wire university; the real lives of Allied prisoners of war in the Second World 
War (London, 2012). 




officers in the Unoccupied Zone who proved willing to remain in France and establish 
an escape organisation. During this second phase, these officers (namely two officers, 
Captain Charles Murchie and Captain Ian Garrow) consolidated connections they had 
made during their time in the Forbidden and Occupied Zone. In doing so, these officers 
were in a position to help civilians in the north continue to pass men into the 
Unoccupied Zone. The third phase relates to the final stage of escape, that is, arranging 
the passage of men across the Pyrenees and into Spain. Again, a number of British 
officers, including the officers mentioned above, played a crucial role in forging these 
escape routes. In order to achieve their goal, these officers connected with various 
friendly consulates including the Czech, Polish and American diplomatic services. In 
addition to these, connections were established with the British Consulate in Barcelona, 
which offered practical support for escapees once they reached Spain.  
 
These three important phases are examined in turn, forming chapters one to three of this 
thesis. The final chapter shifts the spotlight onto Vichy, focusing on the French military 
and intelligence services in unoccupied France.  The French military authorities, 
responsible for the internment of the British, gave both officers and servicemen 
considerable freedom to leave internment camps and to interact with locals. They often 
turned a blind eye to escapes. Equally, French intelligence knew about, and often had 
dealings with, individual escape organisers. It is, therefore, argued in chapter four that 
the French authorities implicitly helped to promote a culture of escape. The freedom 
given to, in particular, officers and the willingness of the French authorities to turn a 
blind eye, also contributed to the development of the ‘Pat Line’. 
 
Primary Sources 
The main source for this thesis was the War Office’s collection of Escape and Evasion 
reports. When British servicemen or airmen sucessully reached neutral territory, they 
were required to give an official account of their actions and experiences. These 
accounts are available in a number of volumes arranged in loose chronological order. 
The earliest accounts date to late May/early June 1940 and continue right throughout the 
war providing regular insights into the situation in France as the war progressed. The 
Escape and Evasion reports, to be hereafter referred to simply as escape reports, proved 
an invaluable source of information. The men making these reports lived among the 
civilian population and as a result these accounts reveal rich details on ordinary 
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families, their communities and their daily struggles under occupation. These often 
provide insight into how civilians became involved in aiding escape activites. 
  
Other sources consulted did not provide the same level of detail. For instance, Foreign 
Office papers are useful in relation to the contribution of diplomatic services in Spain to 
escape activities in France but are limited in relation to the actual development of 
escape organisations in France, coming into contact with such organisations only when 
they were relatively well established. Therefore, in terms of revealing details on the 
development of the ‘Pat Line’, escape reports continued to provide the prinicipal 
material for this research. Yet the escape reports also have a number of significant 
limitations. These reports could only be derived from people who managed to escape, as 
opposed to men who were recaptured, those who never managed to escape and also men 
who remained in hiding for the duration of the war. While it is perhaps impossible to 
account for these experiences, it is worth noting that the majority of successful escapees 
had been re-captured numerous time and so this research was able to explore the issue 
of failed escapes and recaptures. 
 
Historian Philippe Le Blanc, raised another concern in relation to the escape reports 
during his research on the Belgian escape organisation, le réseau Comète or the Comet 
network.10 Le Blanc, who in recent years worked with Belgian military intelligence, 
claimed in a personal communication that for every escape report there was another one 
taken that remained, and apparently still remains, secret. This statement is almost 
impossible to confirm and was initially treated with a degree of scepticism. However, as 
this research progressed, two reports stood out as lending a degree of credibility to Le 
Blanc’s assertion, that of Captain D.B. Lang and Captain R.N. Brinckman. Captain D.B. 
Lang, was a British officer, who not only managed to escape German captivity in late 
summer 1940 but eventually made his way to Marseilles and from there to North Africa. 
In his official escape report, Lang referred to an earlier report he had made to his 
superiors on his experiences.11 There is, as of yet, no trace of this report. As historians, 
all that can be said with certainty is that an earlier account was made of Lang’s 
experience. This does not mean Lang’s first report was necessarily secret but could 
                                                            
10 The Comet network remains outside the scope of this thesis as the focus is on escape activities in 
France and the Comet line developed in Belgium. 
11 Detailed Report by Captain DB Lang, Jan/Feb. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3301). 
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easily have been misplaced or filed elsewhere. There is nothing to suggest, in Lang’s 
official account, that the earlier report was purposefully held back. 
 
This is where Captain R.N. Brinckman’s account is of particular importance. 
Brinckman escaped German captivity in Belgium in November 1940 and similar to 
Lang managed to travel to Marseilles before crossing to North Africa in January 1941. 
Written on top of Brinckman’s official escape report is the following: ‘expungated 
copy- most secret bits- see original for what was deleted’.12 This handwritten note 
appears to confirm Le Blanc’s claim that, in some cases at least, certain escape reports 
were vetted and potentially still remain unavailable to the public. If this is the case, what 
does this mean for historians studying British escape activities? Firstly, it is important to 
consider these reports in context and the nature of the information withheld. 
Brinckman’s report suggests that he had valuable intelligence gathered from his time in 
Brussels. According to Brinckman, his Belgian helpers gave him  
 
Certain particulars to take to England and important information about a Belgian 
working for the Belgian Government in England, and suspected to be working for 
the Germans. I was also entrusted with 30 negatives which included message to 
certain men in London, photographs of gun positions and German tank-carrying 
barges.13 
 
Considering the above, Brinckman’s report appears to have been of value to British 
intelligence. This is problematic if the primary concern of research is to determine the 
impact of escape activities at a purely military, or more particularly, intelligence 
gathering level. In Le Blanc’s communications with this author, his primary concern 
related to intelligence and therefore, his frustration at withheld information specific to 
intelligence is understandable. 
 
Determining the military impact of escape activities is not the objective of this thesis. 
However, Brinckman’s report and Le Blanc’s comments illustrated the importance of 
treating the escape reports with a level of caution. In addition to Le Blanc’s 
observations, it must also be noted that a substantial number of appendices which often 
accompanied escape reports and contained information such as lists of helpers and 
                                                            





intelligence are missing. Reasons for this are unknown, particularly as the vast bulk of 
missing appendices are for the early period 1940-42. Appendices for 1942-45 are 
archived separately and available to researchers.  
 
Nevertheless, in spite of missing appendices and some files, the existing reports provide 
a wealth of information on the period and subject under review in this thesis. In fact,  
the problem was not the lack of material but the wealth and volume of it.14 The number 
of extant reports paved the way for the next stage of the research which was to ensure 
the integrity of the existing escape accounts. This was done by constructing a database 
containing information from over five hundred reports and cross referencing each report 
where possible. This approach also proved useful in both establishing the veracity of the 
reports and also in allowing this author to place individual experiences within the wider 
collective experience of escapees in France. 
 
Autobiographies, both from French civilian helpers and British escapees, were used to 
supplement and clarify information in the escape reports. French memories, like that of 
Natalis Dumez, a resister in Lille, were useful in revealing the motivation of individuals 
involved in escape. However, such accounts were written with the advantage of post 
war hindsight and as such had to be treated with some degree of caution. It was also 
necessary to be cautious in using autobiographies as memories tend to fade and details 
are often forgotten, misplaced or interpreted differently. For instance, in a memoir 
written by escapee James Langley, he referred to the sea evacuations launched by the 
British escape-led organisation in the summer of 1942.15 Langley’s recollection of the 
sequence of the events has a number of inconsistencies in terms of chronology.16 Such 
discrepancies do not draw into question the personal integrity of the authors involved 
but do convey the difficulties in relying solely on memoirs for an accurate description 
or depiction of events. Where memoirs were used, efforts were made to cross reference 
information with available contemporary records. Where discrepancies were recognised, 
this has been highlighted, and addressed where relevant. 
 
                                                            
14 Historian Simon Kitson noted the same problem in his research. Simon Kitson, The hunt for Nazi spies; 
fighting espionage in Vichy France (Chicago and London, 2008), p. 4.  
15 See J.M. Langley, Fight another day (London, 1974), p. 169 & compare with Brooks Richard’s 
chronology of these sea evacuations. Brooks Richard, Secret flotillas, p. 193 & pp 368-72. 
16 Foot and Langley, MI9, p. 19. 
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In relation to French archival material, the Service Historique de la Défense, Vincennes 
holds documentation relating to groups involved in escape activities including the ‘Pat 
Line’. However, these files proved disappointing. The archive on the ‘Pat Line’ were 
composed mainly of lists of helpers and reflected the French determination to both 
establish the fact that resistance did indeed exist in France during the war, and to 
support the entitlement to pensions of resisters, rather than giving a true depiction on the 
development of the ‘Pat Line’ .17 For instance, helpers gave dates on which they joined 
the organisation with some individuals listing their date of entry as early as June/July 
1940.18 This is interesting considering the ‘Pat Line’ did not exist at that time. This does 
not mean that helpers gave the wrong dates in terms of when they became involved in 
escape activities. This is not argued here. Yet it is important to point out that it is more 
likely that these individuals participated in escape activities at a local level at this time 
as opposed to being part of a wider escape network spanning Pas de Calais to 
Marseilles. In this respect, these archives can be misleading but once the difficulty with 
these dates in terms of their relationship to the ‘Pat Line’ is highlighted there is no 
known reason to question the dates individuals gave for their participation in escape 
activities. This is not a trivial observation but in point of fact gets to the heart of this 
thesis, that is the importance of producing a scholarly work that examines the 
complexities of the development of escape activities and organisations. In relation to 
this archival source, it proved useful in terms of identifying individuals engaged in 
escape activities.  
 
Nevertheless, the Service Historique de la Défense archive on the ‘Pat Line’ did not 
reveal the motivations or means by which various individuals became involved in 
escape activities. Finding contemporary sources on the motivations of French helpers 
proved a pressing problem. In 1940-42, it was dangerous to keep a record of one’s 
activities and therefore, it was not until the war was over that civilians recorded their 
experiences, often in the form of autobiographies. Considering this, it was difficult to 
establish the contemporary French perspective on early escape activities. However, 
French newspapers proved useful in helping to address this imbalance. Resistance 
newspapers strove to justify Britain and connect ordinary French civilians to the British 
                                                            
17 Historian Eric Hobsbawm argued that in post war France emphasising resistance was crucial as it 
promoted the idea that  ‘the eternal France had never accepted defeat’. Eric Hobsbawm, The age of 
extremes 1914-1991 ((London, 1994), p. 164. 
18 Pat O’Leary, 1946 (SHD, 17P187). 
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war effort. Arguably, this connection, or sense of connection, to the British war effort, 
was a motivating factor in civilian willingness to assist escapees. Yet in making this 
point, it is important to acknowledge that these newspapers did not reflect the views of 
the general population. In order to overcome this limitation, only groups publishing 
resistance newspapers and who had members engaged in escape activities were selected 
for review. In this way, it was considered possible to gain some insight into the early 
motivations of civilians willing to engage in escape activities. 
In the course of this research, other repositories were visited including Le Mémorial de 
Caen in Caen and the National Library of Scotland. For various reasons, material from 
these repositories did not end up in the final thesis. Le Mémorial de Caen related to 
those who were deported from France by the German authorities. This was the fate of 
many civilians engaged in escape activities, particularly in the latter years of the war, 
1943-44. Acknowledging these experiences is important but a detailed study remains 
outside the remit of this research. The National Library Scotland holds letters written by 
a Presbyterian minister, Reverend Donald Caskie who was based in Marseilles since the 
German occupation of northern France. Caskie wrote to the families of escapees he 
knew in Marseilles. This collection is indeed interesting and merits further investigation 




As already noted, the escape lines have generated interest even outside the field of 
history. Due to the breadth of this interest it is practically impossible to give a 
thoroughly comprehensive review of the field. The following is a brief overview of the 
main publications in relation to escape activities, the nature of existing research and the 
current gaps in the historiography. To date, the main contribution to escape history is 
M.R.D. Foot’s MI9, the British secret service that fostered escape and evasion 1939-
1945 and its American counterpart.19 M.R.D. Foot co-authored this work with James 
Langley, an escapee from France who on his return to Britain worked for the British 
secret services. This book centres on the work of MI9, the British secret service set up 
in autumn 1940 with the aim of promoting escape activities among members of the 
British armed forces. Foot’s work gives a good overview of the escape organisation in 
                                                            
19 Foot and Langley, MI9. 
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Europe and as such it is the foundational text when it comes to the history of escape 
lines. Foot’s work focuses on the successes and failures of escape organisations and 
military contributions to the war rather than fully establishing how such networks came 
to exist.  
Moreover, Foot examines various escape lines in terms of their relationship with the 
British secret service, MI9. As the focus is on MI9 and London’s official efforts to 
assist escape activities in France, there is a tendency to neglect the complexities of such 
activities as they developed on the ground. This is one of the primary reasons this thesis 
focuses on the escape reports as these men were living with civilians and their accounts 
provide an insight into events as they unfolded and developed in France. 
This is not to take from Foot’s work but merely to establish the contribution of this 
thesis to existing scholarship. Moreover, this lack of depth in terms of research on the 
emergence of escape organisations may also be explained by the fact that Foot did not 
have access to the extensive archives that are now available today. This neglect has 
continued. It is difficult to venture any specific reasons for this but there appears to be 
an over-reliance on Foot’s research with few researchers willing to go beyond what he 
has accomplished. In a recent work undertaken by Edward Stourton, Cruel crossing, 
escaping Hitler across the Pyrenees, Stourton interviewed Foot as a source for his 
book.20 Stourton relied heavily on published literature such as autobiographies. In terms 
of archival material, this was limited and it would appear that the author did not 
examine any escape reports. Similarly, Sherri Greene Ottis, and Herman Bodson 
provided an overview of a number of escape organisations but relied mainly on 
published sources. Ottis consulted a number of escape reports but only in the United 
States.21 However, the United States commenced operations over France only in late 
summer 1942 and therefore, any escape reports made by American aircrews to their 
superiors occurred relatively late in the context of this research. At this point in the war, 
the ‘Pat Line’ was already relatively well established. 
 
                                                            
20 Edward Stourton, Cruel crossing: escaping Hitler across the Pyrenees (London, 2013). 
21 Sherri Greene Ottis, Silent heroes: downed airmen and the French Underground (Kentucky, 2001) and 
Herman Bodson, Downed Allied airmen and evasion of capture: the tale of local resistance networks in 
World War II (North Carolina, 2005); also see John Nichol, and Tony Rennell, Home run: escape from 
Nazi Europe (London, 2007). 
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Considering the above, it would appear that most of the researchers in the field have not 
made full use of the available primary sources, namely the escape reports. The main 
exception to this is Oliver Clutton Brock’s work on escape activities which makes 
extensive use of archival material.22 However, in spite of this, Brock’s work shares a 
similar characteristic with Ottis and Bodson in that it is, by and large, a commemorative 
history. It is important to reiterate that the intention is not to put down these histories 
but to note that these histories are more concerned with recounting the brave actions of 
helpers rather than rigorously examining how escape organisations came to exist. There 
is a strong online community devoted to the study of escape lines. ‘Conscript Heroes’ is 
of particular use to those seeking information on the ‘Pat Line’. Its creator, Keith Janes, 
had a personal connection with the ‘Pat Line’. Janes’ father, Peter Janes, escaped France 
via French helpers working under the umbrella of the British-led escape organisation in 
Marseilles. This site has continued to grow with interested researchers posting articles 
relating to various aspects of the organisation. In terms of archival material, the website 
‘Conscript Heroes’ has posted details of all the men known to have been helped by the 
‘Pat Line’. This information is based on the escape reports. Nevertheless, little 
information is given in relation to how and where these men came under the guidance of 
the ‘Pat Line’ and, as will be demonstrated in this thesis, these details are necessary in 
tracking the development of the organisation.  
 
Equally, this website acts in a commemorative capacity with the main aim being to 
highlight the courage of the individuals involved and the achievements of the ‘Pat 
Line’. These aims are not just refined to this type of history but mirrored in academic 
circles. Researchers in fields such as moral psychology, sociology and political science 
have displayed an interest in ‘rescuer’ activities, that is, those who helped Jews escape 
Nazi detection.23 Although this is a different field to the study of civilians helping 
                                                            
22 Oliver Clutton Brock, RAF evaders: the comprehensive story of thousands of escapers and their escape 
lines, western Europe 1940-1945 (London, 2009), Kindle edition. 
23 Bar-Tal, Daniel, ‘Altruistic motivation to help: definition, utility and operationalization’ in Humboldt 
Journal of Social Relations, xiii No. 1&2 (Fall/Winter and Spring Summer, 1986), pp 3-14; Manus I. 
Mildarsky, ‘Helping during the Holocaust: the role of political, theological and socioeconomic 
identifications’ in Humboldt Journal of Social Relations, xiii No. 1&2 (1985-1986), pp 285-305; Kirsten 
Renwick Monroe, Ethics in an age of terror and genocide: identity and moral choice (Princeton, 2012); 
Kristen Renwick Monroe, ‘The ethical perspective: an identity theory of psychological influences on 
moral choice’ in Political Psychology, xxx No. 3 (2009), pp 419-44; Kirsten Renwick Monroe, The hand 
of compassion; portraits of moral choice during the Holocaust (Princeton, 2004), Kristen Renwick 
Monroe, ‘The ethical perspective: an identity theory of psychological influences on moral choice’ in 
Political Psychology, xxx No. 3 (2009), pp 419- 44 & Kristen R. Monroe, Barton, Michael C., 
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British service and airmen, the principle prompting the study appears to be similar to 
that of the commemorative histories outlined above. One such researcher, Kirsten 
Renwick Monroe, a political scientist, has written numerous papers and books on this 
subject and uses her research on ‘rescuers’ in her work on ‘altruistic’ personality types. 
Monroe’s later work takes her research on rescuers during the Holocaust right up to 
more modern conflicts such as the genocide in Rwanda. In this respect, academics are 
interested in the courage displayed by those who risked their lives to save others and 
have gone to some lengths to explain these behaviours, going so far as to develop 
theoretical frameworks in order to best understand these actions. 
  
In contrast historians, aside from the popular histories discussed above, have not yet 
ventured to examine escape activities in depth. Yet most historians would agree that 
aiding British soldiers was a form of early resistance. Julian Jackson makes this 
acknowledgement in his book France the dark years 1940-1944 before noting that the 
‘first resisters did whatever seemed possible’.24 Jackson’s comments reflect a broader 
trend in terms of the approach of academic histories to resistance activities in France. 
Historians focused more on grappling with the nature of resistance, pointing out that 
‘Resistance was a territory with maps, and sometimes developed differently from what 
the first pioneers had expected’.25 Socially-minded researchers attempted to construct a 
sociology of resistance arguing that those engaged in resistance were supported by a 
wider circle of complicity.26 Historian H.R. Kedward’s research on the communist 
resistance illustrated that those engaged in subversive activities before the war 
continued this behaviour following French defeat. In such cases, individuals engaged in 
resistance were not breaking with the past but rather their continued opposition to 
authority was a continuation of past behaviour.27 Another more recent contribution to 
the historiography is Robert Gildea’s Fighters in the shadows: a new history of the 
French resistance. Gildea’s work forms part of a growing trend among researchers to 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Klingemann, Ute, ‘Altruism and the theory of Rational Action: rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe’ in 
Ethics, ci No. 1 (Oct., 1990), pp 103-22; Samuel P. Oliner and Pearl Oliner, The altruistic personality 
rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe what led ordinary men and women to risk their lives on behalf of others 
(New York, 1992).  
24 Julian Jackson, France; the dark years 1940-1945 (Oxford, 2001), p. 408. 
25 Ibid., p. 406. 
26 Francois Marçot, ‘Pour une sociologie de la Résistance: intentionnalité et fonctionnalité’ in Antoine 
Prost (ed.), La Résistance, une histoire sociale (Paris, 1997), pp 21-42. 
27 HR. Kedward, Resistance in Vichy France, a study of ideas and motivation in the southern zone 1940-
1942 (Oxford, 1972), pp 47-81. 
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focus the lens on non nationals (often political refugees) within the French resistance. 
From this perspective, Gildea argues that instead of focusing on traditional terms such 
as French resistance, it is perhaps more appropriate to speak of resistance in France as 
more reflective of the multipicity of such activities.28 
 
Insights provided by these historians have contributed to the understanding of the period 
and framed the research for this thesis. Although escape activities came to be considered 
part of the French resistance, the reality is far more complex. In studying escape 
activities, it is necessary to adopt Gildea’s perspective and consider the emergence of 
escape organisations as ‘resistance in France’ as opposed to ‘French resistance’. Yet 
even this perspective undermines the complexity of the emergence of an escape 
organisation such as the ‘Pat Line’.  
 
The existence of the Unoccupied Zone, the presence of diplomatic missions in Vichy 
France, and the attitude of the French military and secret services all contributed to the 
emergence, expansion and protraction of British escape activities. Yet individuals 
working within these institutions, particularly within the French military and secret 
services, may not have perceived their actions as acts of resistance. Simon Kitson, in his 
research on French counter-espionage noted that it seems to have been mainly anti-
German. According to Kitson, 
 
Whenever the Vichy secret services had to choose a camp, they opted for the anti- 
German option. In this their attitude differed from the government which employed 
them.29 
Yet Kitson also cautioned that French counter-espionage in the Unoccupied Zone must 
not be seen in terms of resistance but directly related to efforts at asserting French 
independence. 30  Kitson’s research is mirrored in the military and secret services 
attitudes to British escape activities, that is, tolerating such activities was both a means 
of expressing an anti-German attitude and a way of asserting independence. 
 
However, it is important to assert, as Kitson also noted in the introduction to his 
research, that this thesis does not seek to challenge the work of Robert Paxton who 
                                                            
28 Robert Gildea, Fighters in the shadows: a new history of the French Resistance (London, 2015). 
29 Kitson, The hunt for Nazi spies, p. 86. 
30 Ibid., p. 152. 
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argued that Vichy actively collaborated with Germany. Paxton led the way in terms of 
scholarship on Vichy France and his work is one of the foundational texts in the field. 
This research acknowledges that Vichy did actively collaborate with the Germans but 
there were also efforts made, as Kitson highlighted in terms of counter espionage 
activities and as will be illustrated in this thesis in relation to the attitude to British 
prisoners of war, on the part of Vichy to assert its independence.31 This will be 
addressed more fully in chapter four, suffice to say here that this thesis recognises, 
works within and seeks to add to the existing scholarship of the period. 
 
Historians have remained fascinated by the fall of France and the occupation. Most 
agree that the occupation elicited complex and multifaceted responses both on a national 
and individual level. While this thesis explores the development of the ‘Pat Line’ in the 
summer of 1940, few French civilians or British military personnel considered the 
possibility of establishing an escape organisation stretching from Nord Pas de Calais to 
Marseilles. Yet it was the response of both British servicemen and French civilians to 
the confusion of invasion, defeat, occupation and, in the British case, being taken 
prisoner, that ultimately, as will be explored in the coming pages, set the stage for the 
emergence of escape activities as an act of resistance. 
                                                            





  Aiding escape as resistance: the impact of the British presence 
 
This chapter will examine the development of escape organisations in northern France 
and the social processes contributing to their formation. This chapter argues that the 
French civilian contribution to the successful escapes of British soldiers, from both 
German internment and the Forbidden and Occupied Zones, to unoccupied France, were 
some of the first gestures of resistance on French soil. Some historians have pointed to 
early signs of resistance or gestures of resistance in the first weeks of occupation. In this 
context, the historical debate between Hanna Diamond and Jean Vidalenc is 
noteworthy. In her book, Fleeing Hitler, Diamond examined the refugee exodus from 
the north in the wake of the advancing German army. Diamond took issue with the 
work of Vidalenc who argued that those fleeing civilians were demonstrating their faith 
in the French army and its ability to stop the German advance.1 Moreover, by fleeing, 
refugees also indicated their unwillingness to live under German occupation. According 
to Vidalenc, this was resistance. 
  
While Diamond agreed that some French men headed south in the belief that the French 
army were forming another front, she pointed out that, for the majority, the exodus was 
a time of anguish and suffering. Diamond argued, rather, that some of the first ‘gestures 
of resistance’ were the civilian response to the exodus (as opposed to the exodus itself) 
and it was ‘born of helping distressed refugees’.2 Diamond pointed out that, in some 
cases, in aiding refugees, civilians had their ‘first contact with political life.’3 As a 
result, they were more likely, to use Diamond’s expression ‘poised’, to engage in acts of 
resistance at a later stage of the occupation.4 
 
Diamond’s focus on resistance in the south of France leads her to overlook the political 
awakening or, more specifically, the ‘resistance awakening’ of northerners who 
remained in their homes. Civilians in the north witnessed the final stages of the defeat 
of France and the large marching columns of French and British prisoners. 
                                                            
1 Hanna Diamond, Fleeing Hitler, France 1940 (Oxford, 2007), p. 81. 
2 Ibid., p. 195. 
3 Ibid., p. 195. See also Hanna Diamond, Women and the Second World War in France 1939-1948: 
choices and constraints (Harlow, 1999), p. 2 & 116. 
4 Diamond, Fleeing Hitler, p. 195. 
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Approximately 40,000 British (and c. 1.5 million French prisoners5) were taken and 
marched from battlefields in Dunkirk, Calais and St Valery towards Germany. Similar 
to civilians opening their homes to refugees, French men and women strove to help 
these prisoners with offers of food and water. Arguably, these actions were more 
obvious and committed gestures of resistance than those discussed by Diamond, and it 
will be established in this chapter, that such action often led civilians into deeper acts of 
resistance. This view is supported by historian, Dominique Veillon, who argued that the 
first opposition to the occupation came from civilians helping French and British 
soldiers to avoid capture or assisting the passage of the young to England.6 This was 
particularly the case with aid given to the British. From the earliest stages of occupation 
helping British escapees was punishable by death which strongly suggests that the aid 
extended to the British was more than an act of kindness (as in the case of assisting 
refugees) but also a demonstration of resistance. (Interestingly, according to Ronald 
Modras, giving help to persecuted peoples, such as the Jews, did not carry the death 
penalty, at least in Western Europe).7 
 
Nevertheless, while it is important to recognise early resistance on the part of French 
civilians, this research suggests that emphasis on civilian aid must also be balanced with 
the understanding that aid was often predicated on British action, that is, the British 
actively sought civilian assistance. This argument is supported by research undertaken 
by sociologist (and Holocaust survivor) Samuel P. Oliner and a professor of education, 
Pearl M. Oliner, on helpers and rescuers across Europe during the Second World War. 
Oliner and Oliner discovered that in their research sample the majority of these rescuers 
or helpers (some 68%) were approached directly for help (as opposed to seeking people 
to help).8 Such statistical analysis does not undermine the risks for those involved or the 
                                                            
5 Julian Jackson, The fall of France, the Nazi invasion of 1940 (Oxford, 2003), p. 180. 
6 Dominique Veillon, ‘Les réseaux de résistance’ in Jean Pierre Azéma and François Bédarida (eds), ‘La 
France des années noires, tome 1:  de la défaite à Vichy’  (Paris, 1993), p. 387. 
7 Ronald Modras, ‘Jewish citizenship in emerging nation states: Christian anti-semitism, nationalism, and 
Nazi ideology’ in Judith H. Banki and John T. Pawlikowski (eds), Ethics in the shadow of the Holocaust 
Christian and Jewish perspectives (Chicago, 2001), p. 94. See also report by C. Hillier ‘All houses in 
Calais bore a notice saying that the penalty for sheltering escapers was death’ Account of escape of 
1509075 Gnr. Hillier, C., 2 S/L Regt. R.A., 51 Div., 13 April 1941 (N.A., WO208/3303). 
8 The Oliners’ study was international in scope interviewing over 700 people (406 rescuers, 126 non 
rescuers and 150 survivors) from countries right across Europe. Samuel P. Oliner and Pearl Oliner, The 
altruistic personality: rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe (New York, 1992), p. 2. Samuel Oliner and Pearl 
Oliner research conclusions were also quoted in Jane Allyn Piliavin and Hong-Wen Charng, ‘Altruism, a 
review of recent theory and research’ in Annual Review of Sociology, xxvi (1990), p. 35. 
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gravity of the decision to help, but it does shed light on a civilian’s entrance into escape 
as resistance. 
 
These insights frame the central theme of this chapter, that early resistance gestures 
were the result of a continual interaction between the British soldiers and French 
civilians, particularly in the first weeks of occupation. These weeks were crucial to the 
emergence of nascent escape organisations. The physical British presence, combined 
with their continued presence in the war (maintained in the minds of the French 
population through resistance and BBC propaganda), were essential components 
influencing civilian willingness to help. The escape reports indicate that, for the most 
part, the British were the first to initiate contact with civilians, rather than the other way 
around. Nevertheless, while the first gestures of resistance may have been precipitated 
by British escapees seeking aid, the support was sustained by an intention to resist, and 
to give assistance on the part of civilians. It may have been that the trauma of defeat 
robbed the civilian population of the ability to take the initiative, such that it was often 
the British requests that invoked a reaction and directed early gestures of resistance. 
Their requests, and responding to them, offered an opportunity to resist. It was not until 
civilians started to come to terms with the reality of occupation that considerable efforts 
were made to maintain contact with the British imprisoned on French soil. 
 
First encounters: German efforts to undermine confidence in the British  
Before it can be established that early resistance gestures, and the emergence of some of 
the first resistance organisations, were the result of continual interaction between the 
British and French, it is important to set this action within the context of German 
actions and agenda. This contextualisation is necessary in order to understand the 
power, form and significance of early resistance and the role of the British presence in 
precipitating it. This research has identified that from the first stages of the occupation, 
the Germans realised that prisoners, and in the context of this research notably British 
prisoners, could potentially become a focal point of resistance. The main evidence for 
this comes from early escape reports which detailed German attempts to prevent the 
forging of connections between prisoners and French civilians; this they likely saw as 
the most effective way of preventing opportunities for civilians to use prisoners to 
demonstrate their opposition to German authority. From the available evidence it would 
appear that in order to achieve this, the German authorities sought to undermine and 
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discourage, through isolation, fear and intimidation, any demonstration of civilian 
support for the British. Isolating the British was, perhaps, one of the most passive, but 
nevertheless effective, ways of realising this objective. It is unclear if isolating these 
men was part of official German policy but its impact was experienced by the British 
from the first moments they were taken as prisoners of war.  
 
The forced marching columns were the primary flashpoints for the implementation of 
this policy. For instance, a report by three British officers, Lieutenant W. Millet, 
Captain Denis Edmund Blacquiere and Captain E.A.W Williams, recounted an incident 
when the column rested in Hucqueliers where the Germans ordered ‘inhabitants of the 
village… to feed the officers and the French troops but the English troops received 
nothing’.9 On separate occasions, two British officers and two privates recounted 
circumstances where the French were allowed to buy food from locals but this privilege 
was denied to the British.10 In consideration of the above and similar accounts in the 
escape reports, this markedly different treatment towards British prisoners suggests 
there was a deliberate policy to engender a sense of isolation in these men and prohibit 
any form of contact with the French population. 
 
This policy of isolation was further reinforced by attempts to emasculate the British in 
the eyes of French civilians. This was achieved through visual acts of aggression. Men 
who attempted to break ranks to talk to or accept food from civilians were beaten with 
rifle butts or whips. On some reported occasions, shots were fired at the feet of 
stragglers.11 Such treatment left a strong impression on the minds of those who 
experienced it. Lance Corporal A.M. Garden recounted the horror of leaving the 
marching column to ‘make a purchase’ in a chemist only to be beaten by one of the 
                                                            
9 Account of escape of three officers p/w in Northern France, captured 26th May 1940, June 1940 (N.A., 
WO208/3298). 
10 Account of escape of Major John Ronald Mackintosh-Walker, M.C., Seaforth Highlanders 
commanding 4/Bn. Cameron Highlanders and Major Thomas Gordon Rennie, Black Watch, G.2.51st 
Div., 5 Aug. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3298); Account of escape of 2930870 Sgt. Robert Duncan and 2931298 
Pte Donald Edward Pearce. 4th Bn. Cameron Highlanders, 51st Div., 5 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300). 
11 Account of escape of No. S/103035 Pte. Brown F.W., R.A.S.C. H.Q. 51st (H) Division, 30 Oct. 1940 
(N.A. WO208/3299); Account of escape of No. 1072762 L/Bdr. J. Dixon, 237 Battery, R.A., Sept/Oct 
1940 (N.A., WO208/3299); Account of escape of No. 2571954L/Cpl. Garden, A.M., 51st (H) Div. Sigs., 
No.1 Coy,  29 Sept. 1940 (N.A. WO208/3299); Account of escape of 5110625 Pte. Astley, C., 
2/R/Warwickshire Regt., 48th Div. and 76610 Dvr. Craig, A., 526 (Petrol) Coy., R.A.S.C., 52st (H) Div., 
19 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300); Account of escape of 2930870 Sgt. Robert Duncan and 2931298 Pte 
Donald Edward Pearce. 4th Bn. Cameron Highlanders, 51st Div., 5 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300); 
Account of escape of 2870129 A/C.S.M. A. Moir, 1/Gordon Highlanders, 153 BDE., 51st Div., 5 Dec. 
1940 (N.A., WO208/3300). 
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guards by a rifle butt.12 On this occasion, Garden witnessed a number of his colleagues 
experience a similar fate. These physical assaults were combined with verbal insults and 
jeers as reported by three lieutenants who observed German troops laughing, jeering and 
taking photographs of British prisoners at they approached civilians for water.13 
Arguably, this type of aggression not only emasculated the British and was in violation 
of the Geneva Convention protecting prisoners of war but when committed in full view 
of the French population represented a ‘double isolation’ in that it fed into a visual 
display of subjugation and reinforced the magnitude of German victory. It effectively 
removed any remaining vestiges of hope in British military prowess.  
 
Moreover, it would appear that German attempts to isolate the British did not end with 
French civilians as the Germans also took great pains to generate resentment between 
French and British prisoners. The evidence indicates that on any given day the Germans 
cultivated antipathy in a number of ways. Rations were a common concern with reports 
claiming the French were deliberately favoured by the Germans.14 French prisoners 
were fed first, given greater freedom and allowed more interaction with civilians.15 
Another German method of differentiation was to excuse the French from work parties. 
In one report, a British soldier complained that the British were forced to form work 
parties, carrying out tasks like burying the dead (including dead horses) while ‘the 
                                                            
12 Account of escape of No. 2571954L/Cpl. Garden, A.M., 51st (H) Div. Sigs., No.1 Coy,  29 Sept. 1940 
(N.A. WO208/3299). 
13 2/Lt Tinn, 2/Lt Hardey and 2/Lt. Campbell Highland Light Infantry Captured at about 4.30am on 30th 
May 1940, near Rex Poede, 12 June 1940 (N.A., WO3298). 
14 Account of escape of Major John Ronald Mackintosh-Walker, M.C., Seaforth Highlanders 
commanding 4/Bn Cameron Highlanders and Major Thomas Gordon Rennie, Black Watch, G.2.51st Div., 
5 Aug. 1940 (N.A, WO208/3298); Account of escape of No. S/103035 Pte. Brown F.W., R.A.S.C. H.Q. 
51st (H) Division, 30 Oct. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3299); Account of escape of three officers p/w in Northern 
France, captured 26th May 1940, June 1940 (N.A., WO208/3298); No. 1547071 Bdr. George Melas 
44/101 Light A.A. end A/T/ R/A, 5 Aug. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3298); Account of escape of Lt. H.S.M. 
Hogg, R.E., 26th Fd. Coy., 28 Oct. 1940 (N.A., 3299); Account of escape of 56146 Capt. Mills, C.F.P., 
97th Kent Yeomanry Field Regiment, Attd. 1st R.H.A., 31 Dec. 1941 (N.A.,WO208/3300); Account of 
escape of 2930870 Sgt. Robert Duncan and 2931298 Pte Donald Edward Pearce. 4th Bn. Cameron 
Highlanders, 51st Div., 5 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300); Account of escape of 281982 Cpl. Norman 
Miller 2nd Bn. Seaforth Highlanders, 51st Div., 5 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300); Account of escape of 
7603667 Cpl. Rennie, I.H.C., 14th Army Field Workshop, R.A.O.C., 27 Oct. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3307). 
15 Two officers, Major John Ronald Mackintosh-Walker and Major Thomas Gordon Rennie, reported that 
the French were allowed to ‘send out’ and obtain food from local civilians. Account of escape of Major 
John Ronald Mackintosh-Walker, M.C., Seaforth Highlanders Commanding 4/Bn. Cameron Highlanders 
and Major Thomas Gordon Rennie, Black Watch, G.2., 51 Div., 5 Aug. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3298). 
22 
 
French were not given any work to do’.16 Signalman D.W. Herring escaped from a 
marching column and on watching it pass observed   
 
The French troops did not look as if they had done any fighting and had British 
blankets and gasmasks, and our troops had only what they stood up in.17 
 
This resentment illustrates the effectiveness of German efforts in promoting discord. 
The impact of this policy is best exemplified in the report of Wing Commander Basil 
Embry. Embry was captured at the end of May 1940 and interned in a football stadium 
with four thousand other prisoners. He quickly discovered that relations between the 
various nationalities were difficult and reported being warned by some British officers 
that many of the French and Belgians were fifth columnists.18 As Embry indicates, the 
effect of German policy not only weakened individual morale but also destabilised 
previous loyalties and engendered distrust. 
 
Responding to German hegemony: British efforts to assert morale 
In light of the above, the available evidence suggests that there was a German agenda to 
undermine British morale and alienate these men from the French prisoner and civilian 
populations. Against this backdrop, the first challenges to German authority within 
these marching columns, therefore, were not necessarily escape attempts but British 
efforts to overcome German attempts to isolate them from their fellow prisoners and 
potential civilian support. The escape reports illustrate that the first step in challenging 
German authority were efforts to reinforce a sense of group cohesion. Thus, in order to 
understand the emergence of early escape activities, it is first necessary to examine the 
importance of the support of colleagues or what in British military circles was more 
readily labelled ‘morale’.  
 
Such terminology was common parlance in the reports. It referred to the sense of group 
cohesion.19 When morale was ‘high’, men were more willing to act together as a unit, 
compared to ‘low’ morale which was closely linked to despondency. Writing on the 
importance of military morale in 1941, American Brigadier General James A. Ulio 
argued that morale (in this case high morale) was ‘brought to life by a spirit of mutual 
                                                            
16 Account of escape of three officers p/w in Northern France, captured 26th May 1940, June 1940 
(N.A.,WO208/3298).  
17 Account of escape of Signalman D.W. Herring No.2328065 Royal Corps of Signals. Attd. 51 Highland 
Division sigs., 29 Sept. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3299). 
18 Basil Embry, Confidential report, 12 Aug. 1940 (N.A., W308/3299). 
19 Account of escape of 7604901 Cpl. C. Fagg, R.A.O.C., 17 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300). 
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respect and co-operation’.20 Other contemporaries writing on morale such as Arthur 
Upham Pope and Charles I. Glickberg declared that ‘morale wins wars’21 and its 
importance cannot be ‘overestimated’. 22  According to these writers, morale was 
considered as a unifying force which could be the basis for overcoming difficulties and 
encouraging action. Notwithstanding that such writers were somewhat removed from 
the experiences of defeat suffered by these men, it must be noted that the British were 
familiar with the concept of morale and went to some lengths to reinforce it. 
 
Efforts to assert morale not only helped men overcome a sense of isolation but also laid 
the groundwork for the first challenges to German authority within these marching 
columns. This was progressive as, initially, attempts to boost morale were largely 
symbolic and relatively tame. These involved marching ‘in step’ and ‘singing the old 
songs’ (songs long associated with the British such as ‘A long way to Tipperary’).23 
Indeed, to the observer, such activities may appear relatively passive with little intrinsic 
value; they hardly inspired terror in German guards. Moreover, it could also be argued 
that while efforts to reinforce morale such as singing and displaying a disciplined front 
granted a certain dignity to the situation, in reality by continuing to march into captivity 
these men did in fact co-operate with the Germans. However, this stance overlooks a 
crucial aspect of such exercises. Marching ‘in step’ and ‘singing the old songs’ were 
essentially attempts to bolster morale and the fact that such actions appear innocuous or 
‘passive’ does not undermine their importance. This type of behaviour marked the 
spawning of a unity. Once men conveyed a willingness to work together, braver 
challenges to German authority could emerge.  
 
Mutual cooperation was needed to mount more visible challenges to German authority. 
Complicity was important in helping to thwart punitive measures taken by the Germans 
                                                            
20 James A. Ulio, ‘Military morale’ in American Journal of Sociology, xlvii No. 3 (Nov. 1941), p. 321. 
21 Arthur Upham Pope, ‘Civilian morale’ in Journal of Educational Sociology’, xv No. 4 (Dec. 1941), pp 
195-205. 
22 Charles I. Glicksberg, ‘Morale promotion in wartime’ in Phi Delta Kappam, xxv (Sept. 1942), pp 7-16.  
See also Henry Durant, ‘Morale and its measurement’ in American Journal of Sociology, xlvii No. 3. 
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23 Account of escape of 7604901 Cpl. C. Fagg, R.A.O.C., 17 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300). 
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against individual offenders. From the evidence available, there appears to have been a 
number of activities, besides marching in step and singing in unison, which required the 
cooperation of colleagues. Communal acts of indiscipline included slowing the march 
down or getting out of line. These acts were designed to frustrate the German guards.24 
On any given day, and as a consequence of efforts to boost morale, a column of 
prisoners engaged in challenging German guards acted either as a disciplined unit or 
deliberately sought to undermine discipline. 25 
 
Other acts of indiscipline referred to in the reports included acts of sabotage; these were, 
however, rare as they were serious and if discovered such actions would have carried 
harsh penalties.26 An account given by three officers, Captain Denis Talbot, Lieutenant 
W. Millet and Captain E.A.W. Williams, referred to acts of sabotage committed by 
prisoners. Talbot wrote 
 
They could tell at quite an early stage that they were on a main line and looked out 
for chances to effect damage. Captain Williams cut a cable and Lieutenant Millett 
knew of a Sgt. who had cut it three times.27 
 
With high risks attached to sabotage, it may be concluded that sabotage was not 
associated with large numbers of men. However, when acts of this nature were 
combined with other acts of indiscipline, the desire by some prisoners to assert some 
form of independent action emerges. Moreover, it must also be acknowledged that these 
actions were witnessed by others and required the colleagues of offenders to either 
distract German guards, give some degree of cover or, at the very least, to turn a blind 
eye to the behaviour. 
 
Arguably, the ultimate challenge to German authority within these marching columns 
was escape. On a personal level, individual escapees required tenacity and courage but 
equally they needed opportunity. Opportunity was often connected to, and depended 
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upon, other challenges to authority within the marching column and therefore escape 
depended on a wider collective complicity. For instance, colleagues were often called 
upon to challenge the authority of the guards (through acts of indiscipline) to distract 
the Germans and make escape possible.28 While only a small number of men escaped, 
Ulio’s identification of morale as a source of ‘mutual respect’ and ‘co-operation’ was 
significant in that each escape required a wider support network. Men, even if reluctant 
to escape, suffering fatigue or struggling to come to terms with the situation, continued 
to cover for colleagues. As Talbot, Millet and Williams observed 
 
It was impossible to slip away without being seen by someone, and if possible, it 
would undoubtedly pay to do so from the middle of a party of British soldiers.29 
 
These three officers took for granted the support from fellow British officers and troops. 
It was expected. 
 
This support was based on a sense of a shared experience and common bond. Singing 
the ‘old songs’ bolstered this sense of commonality and contributed to Talbot, Millet 
and Williams’ expectation that an escape in front of fellow British soldiers ‘would 
undoubtedly pay’. The importance of support from colleagues and a sense of unity may 
also be perceived in the fact that most men escaped in groups of twos and threes, rarely 
alone. Notwithstanding the idea that they may later have agreed to separate, men found 
a certain solace in facing the unknown with colleagues.30 Given this backdrop, it could 
be argued that escaping with colleagues was a means of reinforcing that ‘high’ morale 
needed for this ultimate challenge to German authority. 
 
The British presence and civilian solidarity 
The evidence suggests that prisoners’ experience with civilians was equally important in 
terms of encouraging men to attempt to escape the marching columns. Efforts to bolster 
morale within the columns combined with demonstrations of civilian kindness to 
prisoners (despite German efforts to discourage it) underpinned the British willingness 
to attempt escape. It is important not to underestimate the effect of such kindness or 
empathy, particularly in the light of ongoing academic research. Moral psychologists 
                                                            
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 See volumes WO208/3298-3300: Most escapes were undertaken in twos or threes (rarely higher than 
this number). Some men escaped alone (including the Earl of Cardigan) but this was unusual. 
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and political scientists Kirsten Renwick Monroe and Samuel P. Oliner examined rescuer 
behaviour during the Second World War and identified the importance of compassion 
and empathy as a starting point for resistance and escape activity.31 These observations 
are particularly relevant in gaining insight into some of the first civilian-assisted escape 
efforts. For instance, in the context of the experience of the marching columns, historian 
Robert Gildea noted the ‘surge of solidarity’32 the sight marching columns engendered 
in onlookers. Numerous escape reports affirm this assessment. British non- 
commissioned officer (NCO) Bombardier George Melas reported being ‘treated kindly 
by the French inhabitants’.33 Other reports declare that civilians were ‘wonderfully 
kind’ or ‘hospitable’.34 Considering the above, Oliner and Monroe’s observations are 
important in that evidence from the escape reports suggest that displays of kindness 
were not only important in helping to forge connections between both prisoners and 
civilians but also laid the ground work for escapes. Men seeking to escape did so in the 
knowledge that some sort of help from French civilians was likely to be forthcoming. 
 
Numerous accounts given by successful escapees suggest that there were certainly 
aspects of civilian behaviour which encouraged this belief. For instance, when the 
Germans ordered local civilians in Hucqueliers to feed French officers and troops, these 
civilians also obtained food for the British.35 As Gildea noted, civilians lined routes 
taken by prisoners with offers of food and water which was, as a soldier, Private F.W. 
Brown observed, particularly welcome, especially considering prisoners experienced a 
lack of the latter.36 Through these efforts, which appear to have been prolific, British 
                                                            
31 Oliner and Oliner, The altruistic personality; Kirsten Renwick Monroe, Ethics in an age of terror and 
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‘Altruism and the theory of rational action: rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe’ in Ethics, ci, No.1 (Oct., 
1990), pp 103-22. See also Manus I. Mildarsky, ‘Helping during the Holocaust: the role of political, 
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32 Odette Goxe quoted in Robert Gildea, Marraine in chains (London, 2002), p. 70.  
33 No. 1547071 Bdr. George Melas, 44/101 Light A.A. and A/T, R.A., 5 Aug. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3298). 
34 Account of escape of three officers p/w in Northern France, captured 26th May 1940, June 1940 (N.A., 
WO208/3298); Account of escape of No. 70802 F/O/ R/Hawkins, 103 (B) Squadron, B.E.F. (Fairey 
Battle), 10 Oct. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3299). 
35 Account of escape of three officers p/w in Northern France, captured 26th May 1940, June 1940 (N.A., 
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prisoners experienced at first-hand civilian empathy and compassion, actions which 
appear to have had a bearing (albeit perhaps even subconsciously) on ideas of escape. 
The influence of such gestures is illustrated in the escape plans of a number of British 
officers including Talbot, Williams, Millet and Wing Commander Basil Embry. All four 
carefully assessed their situation and the direction of marches. While the march was 
moving south they were willing to continue but once there was a change in direction 
escape became a pressing matter. An easterly direction was of grave concern to those 
planning their escape as it indicated a push towards Germany. In Germany men could 
not expect civilian support for escape efforts. Therefore, those desiring an escape 
needed to do so before reaching permanent camps or the German frontier. Escapes 
needed to take place in territory where some level of support for the British presence 
was likely. 
 
French civilians had already demonstrated this support and the planning of these four 
officers suggests that they took this into account. This is indicated in the concern 
expressed in their respective reports in relation to the direction of the march. For Talbot, 
Williams and Millet, the march from Hucqueliers to Hesdin suited their interests but at 
Hesdin they 
 
Were informed that they were going to Frevent and they heard a rumour that at 
Frevent was the first P/W collecting Camp. They were then moving an easterly 
direction and they determined to get away that day.37 
 
Embry was of a similar mind set. While he was determined to escape, Embry decided 
that as long as the march was moving in a south-easterly direction (towards the Somme 
and as he thought near the British front) he would keep with it.38 However, as soon as 
the marching column began moving in an easterly direction towards Germany, Embry 
determined to escape at the first available opportunity and continue his journey south. 
Considering such accounts, it may be argued that the determination to escape in the 
French countryside was based on the assumption that it would be easier to get help in 
the French countryside than it would be after crossing the German frontier. 
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Such expectations of assistance in the French countryside were not wholly unfounded as 
is indicated in one particular case where there evidence to suggest that in early June a 
small number of civilians were already organised and assisting British soldiers to 
escape. This evidence is based on the report of a French lieutenant, Jean Bouvier 
d’Yvoire. In early June 1940, d’Yvoire reported encountering ‘an organisation and 
collecting centre for escaped British soldiers in an isolated farm’ in Matringhem.39 This 
report is sparse on details, recording only the fact that an organisation existed and also 
that it was discovered by German ‘agents, disguised as refugees’.40 While Bouvier 
d’Yvoire escaped and left France around the 14 June 1940, it is unclear if the 
organisation arranged his departure. In many ways, the report leaves more questions 
than answers: how large was the organisation? How many men did it help? Did it help 
French as well as British soldiers? Why did Bouvier d’Yvoire identify it as an 
organisation specifically set up to help the British? These questions remain unanswered. 
The lack of detail notwithstanding, d’ Yvoire does provide evidence that civilians, from 
the earliest stages of the invasion, intentionally and specifically sought out and aided 
British soldiers.  
 
Yet it also must be added that this report is singular and there is no way of knowing 
how extensive the activities of this organisation in Matringhem were. It seems that the 
extent of organisation was limited to the immediate locality, an assumption based on the 
lack of evidence for the organisation elsewhere.  For the most part, civilians in general 
do not appear to have been in a position to be as pro-active as the group in Matringhem; 
rather it seems that the British, by directly requesting help, played the leading role in 
precipitating civilian resistance in order to effect British escapes. 
 
This assertion must be balanced with the recognition that civilian acts of support and 
kindness often opened the door for the British to make requests or to ask for help. This 
in turn drew civilians who were willing to enter into deeper forms of anti-German 
activities or resistance. For instance, Bombardier George Melas noted the kind 
treatment he received from the French, which most likely encouraged him to request a 
map from one French man. This man 
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Sent someone to find one and eventually produced a calendar map which he folded 
up and pushed inside the front of my battle dress.41 
 
This map was given to Melas in the knowledge that he desired to escape. There are 
strong arguments for considering this man’s actions as resistance. He had no objection 
to Melas’ request, responding to it with alacrity. Alternatively, it could be argued that 
this man’s intention was not necessarily to resist or subvert German authority but rather 
to express that surge of ‘solidarity’ referred to by Gildea. Nevertheless, even if such 
actions represented nothing more than a surge of ‘solidarity’, these types of request and 
the response to them changed the dynamics of kindness and pushed civilians closer to 
resistance. In this regard, arguably, the British directed some of the first gestures of 
civilian resistance in that they pushed willing civilians across the rubicon of a ‘surge of 
solidarity’ towards aiding an escape. 
 
British morale meets resistance: British escape efforts and civilian support 
Though it was not always immediately obvious, when men escaped the marching 
columns the nature of the aid given often changed from open gestures of empathy, such 
as giving food which was regularly done in front of German onlookers, to more covert, 
committed actions of support for these escape activities. This ranged from silent 
complicity (turning a blind eye to escapes) to civilian willingness to harbour men.  
Escape reports suggest that civilian assistance was often crucial to the success in the 
first moments of an escape. In one incident particular case, that of Basil Embry, civilian 
help proved vital to his escape. On the 29 May, Embry managed to leave the column 
and hide in a ditch along the roadside.42 As he was preparing to cross the road 
 
A French woman milking a cow signalled me to drop, as I did some German motor 
patrols passed, when they were out of sight she gave me an all clear signal, but she 
signalled to me twice more to take cover before I reached a position 200 yards 
from the road where there was adequate cover.43 
 
In this case, the woman did not seek out opportunities to resist but her actions, as simple 
as they may seem, subverted German authority. In this regard, early gestures of civilian 
resistance, similar to initial resistances inside the marching columns, were small 
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symbolic actions rather than an open challenge to the German authorities. However, this 
does not mean that there was any less awareness of the dangers attached to such actions.  
 
Moreover, while early civilian resistances may have been directed by British requests 
for assistance, civilians interpreted their actions in the light of resistance (even before 
the word was coined)44 or perhaps, more correctly, as an anti-German action. For 
instance, shortly after meeting the woman milking the cow, Embry encountered a 
French farmer keen to help him. This man had fought in the First World War and 
informed Embry that he believed Britain and France were still fighting a common 
enemy. In his memoir, Embry recounted the following conversation 
 
If I had thought you were running away to escape being a prisoner, I should not 
have troubled and taken the risk to help you, for that would have been the easy 
way. But I know in my heart that you are taking this harder way so that you can 
join your friends once more, and be given another aeroplane, and then fly over 
again and kill more Germans.45 
 
This man, ‘Monsieur Paul’, felt too old to fight but recognised that Embry could still 
make a contribution to the war. While Monsieur Paul had not sought to resist, when the 
opportunity to do so arose he attached a personal interpretation and meaning to his 
actions in the light of his desire to respond to the German occupation; he connected the 
help he gave to Embry to the wider war. Indeed, it would appear in light of Embry’s 
experiences and similar accounts that whether help given was the result of an accidental 
encounter or not, does not undermine the act of helping, the commitment involved in 
this assistance or the significance helpers might attach to it. 
 
As in the case of Monsieur Paul, the French response to men seeking help was crucial. 
In this respect, the evidence may suggest that escapees may have been the first to 
initiate contact with civilians but without civilian support British escape efforts were 
futile. While it is difficult to assess the extent of this early civilian support, it would 
appear that it was enough to allow the British to establish a foothold in French 
communities especially along marching routes near Bethune and Lille. There are no 
accurate statistics as to the number of escapees or the numbers of men in hiding in 
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northern France but the British estimated between 2,500-3,500 British soldiers were in 
hiding and were being supported by the civilian population.46 Corporal J.A. Martin 
proposed a modest estimate of a few hundred men.47 These two vastly different 
estimates give a sense of the care needed in reporting numbers as it is not simply 
possible to substantiate these figures from available documentation. Moreover, accurate 
statistics may never be fully ascertained. There are a number of reasons for this. Some 
men may have remained in hiding for the duration of the war; certainly there is a 
discrepancy in the number of men reaching Britain in this period and the higher-end 
estimates for those in hiding. In addition, some men may have reached the Unoccupied 
Zone but never left France.  
 
In spite of the lack of proper statistics, the impact of these early escapes continued well 
beyond this initial early period. This argument is supported by the escape reports which 
indicate that most successful escapes from France in 1941 were dominated by men who 
had managed to remain in hiding after escaping German captivity in the summer of 
1940 and had slowly been making their way south to the Unoccupied Zone. This 
consideration further illustrates the importance of the marching columns and the ‘surge 
of solidarity’ such sights invoked among the civilian population. These men were 
assisted south by civilians willing to provide food, clothing and sometimes shelter. In 
this respect, for the civilian population the act of helping, or the desire to help, became 
foundational to a political or resistance awakening. Against this backdrop, and similar 
to the research carried out by Hanna Diamond on the impact of refugees fleeing south, 
this research argues that the marching columns, to use Diamond’s term, were a 
‘consciousness-raising’ experience and ‘politicising influence’.48 Similarly, sympathy 
for the marching columns became a key contributory factor in the protraction of escape 
activities, particularly, as will be demonstrated, when prisoners disappeared from public 
view into internment camps or were removed to Germany. 
 
                                                            
46 Lieutenant James M. Langley estimated that were 2-2,500 men in hiding in northern France but also 
noted that the French suspected that the numbers were higher at c.3,500 men in hiding. Account of escape 
of Lt. J.M. Langley, M.C., 2nd Bn. Coldstream Guards, 1st Division, 22 Mar. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3301). 
According to Captain A. Irvine Robertson and Lieutenant R.D.W Griffin, French helpers in Lille 
estimated that between 4,000-7,000 men were in hiding in the region. Account of escape of Captain A. 
Irvine-Robertson, 7/A &S.H., 51 Div. and Lieutenant R.D.W Griffin, 2/Dorsets 2 Div., 10/12 Feb. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3301). 
47 Account of escape of 3191176 Cpl. J.A. Martin, 8/D.L.I., 50th Div., 27 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3299). 
48 Diamond, Women and the Second World War in France, p. 116. 
32 
 
Civilian resistance: building on a tradition of escape as resistance 
In order for ‘consciousness-raising’ to move beyond a nebulous existence in the minds 
of those who helped escapees, there needed to develop clearly defined and well 
understood objectives to such actions. Civilians offering men such as Melas a place to 
stay until the end of the war may have interpreted their outreach as an act of resistance 
but also may not have connected it with a wider war effort. Indeed, it cannot be 
established if early civilian gestures of help were or were not ‘imagined’ or understood 
in terms of their contribution to the war effort. In contrast, Embry’s helper, Monsieur 
Paul was much more in tune with the potential impact of aiding British escapees. Thus, 
while a ‘consciousness-raising’ experience or ‘politicising influence’ may result from 
action, there was still a need for escape to have some direction and focus. 
  
It is argued that one of the major components in framing and directing escape as 
resistance, beyond the initial weeks of the war in France, was a previous tradition of 
such activities stemming from the First World War. This tradition dated to the German 
occupation of Belgium and parts of France including Lille in 1914. In Lille, a small 
resistance cell, le Comité Jacquet, helped a French garrison, stationed in the town, back 
to the front lines and later continued to help both French and British soldiers return to 
the frontlines. The German authorities became aware of these activities and arrested and 
executed the leaders, Slyvére Verhulst, Ernest Deconinck, Georges Maertens, Eugène 
Jacquet, in 1915.49 Another more famous case, which received much international 
attention at the time, involved an English woman Edith Cavell, living in German- 
occupied Brussels. Cavell helped British and French soldiers reach neutral Holland. In 
1915, she was captured by the Germans, tried by a military court and executed. This 
region, Nord Pas de Calais, therefore had a tradition of aiding escape which provided a 
frame of reference for similar resistance in the occupation of 1940. One of the first 
escape organisations, referred to in the report of Jean Bouvier d’Yvoire (mentioned 
earlier), was based in Matringhem just over eighty kilometres from Lille. D’Yvoire 
discovered the organisation at the beginning of June 1940 when it was likely the 
organisation sought to return men to the front. This effort was not necessarily out of 
sync with the situation considering escapees, such as Embry, were also attempting to 
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return to the front, unaware of the order to evacuate at Dunkirk.50 More importantly, it 
could be argued that the Matringhem group were aware of the tradition in the region and 
perceived their actions as continuing the struggle against occupation. 
 
This hypothesis is supported by evidence elsewhere in the reports (and secondary 
sources) which illustrate the power of previous memories and commemoration of past 
resistances. Living memory and lived experiences played a role in reinforcing the 
influence of the past. A lived connection to the past helped bridge the gap between 
knowledge of previous resistances and the practical application of this resistance in 
1940. Journalist Brendan Murphy, biographer of a British serviceman Sergeant Harold 
Cole, noted the impact of tradition. Murphy writes that northerners had not forgotten the 
‘rules of a generation before’.51 To reinforce his point he draws on the Widow Samiez, 
who had lived through the First World War in Lille and in 1940 ‘spread the word’, that 
is, ‘We must collect the English and send them home!’52 Besides this, Murphy does not 
offer much evidence to reinforce his point. Yet there is other evidence to support this 
claim and to connect the lived experiences of the First World War with resistances in 
1940. According to the report of Lieutenant A.R.P.K Cameron, on the 23 October 1940 
Cameron escaped from hospital with Major H.M. Curteis. Both men spent time hiding 
in the home of an old woman who engaged in resistance during the First World War.  
According to Cameron,  
 
This house was the headquarters of an organisation which was to get us out of 
France, but as the old lady (who had worked with Nurse Cavell in the last war) was 
very old and extremely deaf and plans of escape were being shouted all over the 
house, we decided that we would be better working independently.53 
 
The key significance of this report is Cameron’s identification of and connection 
between ‘the old lady’s’ activities in the First World War and her activities in 1940. Her 
past actions shaped the direction of her resistance in 1940. 
                                                            
50 Embry was shot down at the beginning of May 1940 when fighting was still on-going. See Basil 
Embry’s confidential report and lessons learned, 12 Aug. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3299). 
51 Brendan Murphy, Turncoat the true case of traitor Sergeant Harold Cole (London, 1988), p. 46. See 
also Natalis Dumez, Le mensonge reculera (Lille, 2006), p. 32. 
52 Murphy, Turncoat (London, 1988), p. 46. 
53 Account of escape of Lieut. Cameron, A.R.P.P.K., 4 Cameron Hrs., 51 (H) Div., 2 Feb. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3308). It is quite possible that the woman referred to by Lieutenant Cameron was Widow 
Samiez. However, this cannot be corroborated with certainty. The only evidence linking Cameron’s 
helper to Murphy’s description of Widow Samiez is scant respect for the German authority, her 




Cameron also referred to her home as headquarters of ‘an organisation’. This claim 
suggests that she was active in the role of helper for some time. Her home as 
headquarters was also likely to have resulted from her previous involvement in anti-
German activities. Additionally, it could be argued that this woman was proud of her 
activities in the last war: proud enough to share her knowledge and expertise. In sharing 
her experiences of previous occupation, or more importantly allowing her actions in the 
summer and autumn of 1940 to be guided by her past activities, this woman played a 
role in propagating escape activities in her local community. Such incidences illustrate 
that in some cases at least individual experiences of past occupation directly framed 
early entry into resistance activities.  
 
However, it is easy to propound the importance of tradition without giving some 
recognition to the fact that enthusiasm from helpers influenced by public memory or 
actions taken in their youth needed to be tempered with the reality of occupation and the 
practicalities of aid. Notwithstanding Cameron’s account highlighting the importance of 
the historical legacy of Cavell, it must be noted that his report also illustrates the 
difficulties in translating history and tradition into practice. In relation to Cameron’s 
experience, both Cameron and Curteis felt their position with this ‘organisation’ was 
untenable and left for Paris alone. In this sense, while tradition and public memory of 
previous resistance helped support their position, it did not guarantee safety or ensure 
that helpers would act responsibly. These early escape efforts, although given direction 
by past tradition, still had to account for the realities of 1940. 
 
During the First World War men were helped back to the frontlines near Lille but with 
the occupation in 1940 there was no frontline or, if assisted to the Unoccupied Zone 
(over 400 kilometres away) created by the signing of the Armistice, 22 June 1940, there 
was no guarantee men would reach England. In this regard, celebrating a heroic 
tradition was different to living it. On the other hand, it also must be pointed out that 
acknowledging difficulties does not undermine the importance of public memory of 
previous resistance. As a result of this legacy, there was a complicit understanding that 




In addition to living memory, these acts of civilian bravery exerted a powerful influence 
on the commemoration of the war in Lille and Brussels while also forming part of the 
historical tradition of the region. This is significant as it created a public forum for 
perceptions of civilian heroism and bravery. In 1940, even if civilians were too afraid to 
help, they could at least understand the motivations of those who did. Arguably, 
tradition did not only guide the actions of a few enthusiasts but also by praising this 
type of civilian action during an earlier occupation, paved the way for an understanding 
of this activity by the general public. Commemoration was important in the interwar 
period and, in areas occupied by Germany, civilian bravery was commemorated. For 
instance, monuments were erected in Cavell’s honour on the continent and throughout 
the Commonwealth.54 Commemorations to Cavell culminated in 1939 with a movie 
based on her activities in Brussels.55 Similarly, the four men executed in Lille were also 
commemorated but to a somewhat lesser extent. Michelin tourist brochures of Lille 
recounted the details of their actions.56 Their names were inscribed on the Roll of 
Honour of the Army57 and on the 18 December 1918 the Journal Officiel announced 
that the Legion d’Honneur was conferred on Eugène Jacquet.58 A statue, the Fusillé 
Lillois, was commissioned in their honour and completed in 1929. Thus, it may be 
argued that commemorations played a role in defining civilian bravery and praiseworthy 
behaviour in times of occupation. 
  
Indeed, if one is inclined to doubt the importance of public memory and 
commemoration in pushing the concept of escape as resistance into the public 
imagination, the German reaction to commemoration forces a reflection of this position. 
The German authorities sought to dominate commemoration and directed their efforts to 
the destruction of these memorials. Two incidents in particular highlight German efforts 
to control public memory. The first incident occurred in June 1940 when Hitler 
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personally ordered the destruction of two war memorials in Paris, a statue of General 
Charles Mangin and a memorial to Edith Cavell. The Mangin statue was destroyed as a 
result of the general’s involvement in the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. Mangin used 
colonial troops to occupy the Ruhr and also pressurised local mayors to provide brothels 
for his men. Mangin’s use of colonial troops was considered an insult to Nazi racial 
ideology.59 In contrast, the Edith Cavell memorial was destroyed because of her 
involvement in escape activities. The second incident took place a number of weeks 
later, in August 1940. The Germans destroyed the war memorial, the Fusillé Lillois in 
Lille. Given that the German authorities generally respected French memorials, this 
alone makes the destruction of these monuments noteworthy.60 These monuments were 
targeted for what they represented and in the case of Cavell and Fusillé Lillois they 
honoured actions the Germans were determined to discourage.  
 
In destroying these monuments the Germans were recognising the power of history and 
tradition and seeking to dominate it. As writer and contemporary George Orwell 
famously stated, ‘He who controls the past, controls the future. He who controls the 
present controls the past’.61 Orwell identified the past as a source of contending ideas 
and interpretations. Equally, German efforts to assert control over the French 
interpretation of the past, notably its commemoration of civilian resistance, was an 
attempt to control the present. In attacking the statue the German authorities were 
sending a clear message in relation to the German position on unacceptable civilian 
behaviour. The message was both pointed and powerful.  
 
Nevertheless while the destruction of the memorials indicated the dominance of the 
Germans, another viewpoint is that by destroying the memorial the Germans in reality 
added significance to past resistance tradition. This is particularly suggested by the 
French response to the destruction of the Fusillé Lillois. The civilian reaction to the 
monument’s destruction was threefold. Firstly, the mayor of Lille sent a letter of 
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protest. 62  This represents the official French response and merits some attention 
considering the irony of defending to the Germans the right to honour civilian resistance 
to their previous occupation of the region. Added to this irony is the fact that the escape 
report of British sergeant, J.W. Phillips, implicates the mayor of Lille, in the autumn 
and winter 1940, in escape activities. Phillips was provided with false identity papers by 
the mayor of Lille.63 However, the unofficial reaction is of particular interest and this 
appears to have taken two forms, namely, the pieces of the statue were collected and 
hidden by civilians until the end of the war64 and according to Captain D.B. Lang ‘the 
French… dug up newly-made graves of Germans killed near Lille in this war’.65   
 
Moreover, this destruction not only drew public attention to these memorials and what 
they represented but also aroused a defence of these memories. In relation to the latter 
action, which appears the most shocking, it is difficult to interpret digging up graves of 
German soldiers in the light of resistance but when set in the context of an ideological 
struggle over historical memory such actions sent a powerful message. The message 
was clear: the German desecration of the Fusillé Lillois precipitated the desecration of 
German graves. Perceived in this light, hiding the broken monument pieces also 
conveys the importance attached to the monument and the determination, in the face of 
German aggression, to honour this memory. All three reactions to the destruction of the 
memorial indicate that the German response to this past resistance legacy meant that 
public memorials were not only a reference point for resistance but became sites of 
resistance. The destruction of the memorial gave it a renewed significance in the context 
of the second occupation of the region. 
 
Propaganda and escape activities 
The power of tradition lay in the fact that assisting escapees was not a novel idea. It was 
already understood as a contribution to the war, that is, returning men to the front. 
However, as the occupation intensified, the difficulty lay not in propagating the idea of 
aiding escape as resistance but in continuing to maintain a positive perception of the 
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British. In other words, in order for escape to continue, French helpers needed to remain 
connected to the British war effort. As the war progressed and the population had time 
to reflect on defeat, maintaining support for the British was difficult, particularly in the 
face of increasingly entrenched German propaganda that blamed British policy such as 
the blockade for food shortages and also thrived on the British bombing of industrial 
targets in France. To maintain support for the British and by extension British escapees 
in France, it was important to propagate an alternative view to that propounded by the 
German authorities. Accordingly, the struggle to maintain support for the British 
continued as a propaganda or ideological struggle between the official and resistance 
press. On one hand, the German authorities strove to convince the French public that 
Britain did not serve their interests and on the other hand, the resistance press strove to 
reconnect French interest with their former ally. 
 
According to Paul Jankowski, the ‘leaders of the Resistance were proselytizers, trying 
to develop at least tacit mass support for their ideas.’66 Certainly, early resisters needed 
to find an outlet for their ideas but those harbouring British soldiers were not in a 
position to draw attention to their activities. As a result, they depended on other forms 
of resistance such as the emerging clandestine press and also the BBC to offset the 
power of the official German voice. Most resistance historians emphasise the 
importance of propaganda in establishing, to use a term borrowed from Hanna 
Diamond, ‘a counter culture’.67 In relation to early escape activities, it is necessary to 
narrow the focus of this propaganda study to the struggle over perception of the British 
in both the collaborationist and resistance press. The main reason for this is to recognise 
the fact that escape activities did not occur in a vacuum and civilians were influenced by 
the ideas and struggles of the society in which they lived. In general, escape histories do 
not address the importance of a positive perception of the British and the lengths taken 
to maintain this perception by the resistance press. This resistance propaganda was 
important in continually reminding civilians of the British presence in the war and 
providing reasons why the population should support the British. An understanding of 
the struggle of the resistance press contributes to a deeper appreciation of the 
ideological struggles of those engaged in escape.  
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Without a sense of connection and support for the British, aiding escapees would not 
have survived as a resistance activity. While some historians point to the small 
circulation of resistance newspapers, it must be noted that these newspapers were 
passed around, therefore, the true extent of their circulation is difficult to ascertain.68 
Moreover, newspapers reflect and shape the ideas of a society and the struggles of that 
society. Equally, and as will also be addressed, the efforts of the BBC in France and the 
leaflet drops by the R.A.F. all fed into efforts to maintain a positive perception of the 
British in the minds of French civilians. This is significant as ideas influenced decisions 
to help or alternatively to support the German position and report the presence of British 
escapees hiding in communities across the Forbidden and Occupied zones. 
 
However, in order to appreciate the significance of pro-British propaganda it is 
necessary to first establish the nature of the German propaganda being countered. For 
the Germans, the first course of action was to emphasise the scale of the defeat and the 
futility of a British victory. This was done without delay. On the 17 June 1940, after a 
five-day closure, the French newspaper, Le Matin, published Le Communiqué Official 
Allemand. This was the first indication of German acquisition of the newspaper. In the 
communication the prowess of the German army stood in sharp contrast to the ‘fleeing 
and exhausted’ Allies.69 However, instead of a large article announcing German victory, 
the Communiqué was relatively unobtrusive and readers would be excused for missing 
it at first, lost as it was amid the plethora of war articles cramming the front page. That 
is until the reader went to turn the page, in which case the Communiqué was 
unavoidable, located on the bottom right hand corner. The following day there was little 
room for subtlety with the Le Communiqué Official Allemand taking centre stage. It left 
no doubt as to the occupied status of France and recounted details of recent German 
advancement. The Communiqué ended with a detailed listing of German navy victories 
against the British (a quick calculation places British losses at 114,900 tonnes of 
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shipping).70 In this respect, the Communiqué served a dual purpose, reminding the 
French of their recent losses and underscoring the hopelessness of the British cause.  
 
With recent losses established, the Germans attempted to disconnect British and French 
interests. This was the start of a common theme that emerged early in German 
propaganda. This was done in a number of ways, including attempting to convince the 
French public of the perceived hypocrisy of the British war effort and shift blame for 
the war onto Britain. In the collaborationist newspaper, Le Matin, the first major attack 
on the British focused on the prime minster, Winston Churchill, who came to embody 
the perceived callousness and hypocrisy of the British. On the 19 June 1940 Churchill 
was quoted as stating ‘England never engaged all her air force in the battle waged on the 
French front’.71 Warming up to its theme, the article continued to ‘quote’ Churchill and 
his promise that final victory would come by starving countries dominated by Hitler. 
This was followed by Churchill’s refusal to release France from its obligations to the 
British. The article continued to highlight the seeming hypocrisy of the British by 
pointing to its refusal to release France from her war commitments (the implication 
being that Britain clearly did not live up to her obligations and was willing to see France 
starve). In the coming weeks, Churchill remained the subject of attacks and a 
personification of British betrayal. On the 24 June the headlines opened with a 
statement from Pétain declaring that ‘M. Churchill judges the interest of his country. It 
is not our interest’.72 The official message was clear, Britain had already gambled with 
France, and if allowed, would continue to do so. By the 26 June 1940 the newspaper left 
no doubt as to its stance on Britain,  
 
While it appears an absolute fact that the king and Churchill are insane, it only 
remains for us French, to regret having put our security into the hands of 
individuals who would have, if they were French, been sent to a special hospital.73 
 
Articles such as those undermined the credibility of the British leadership and formed 
part of a concerted German effort to destroy any positive perception of the British war 
effort.  
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It was also reflective of the third element in Germany’s anti-British propaganda 
campaign that is, shifting responsibility for the war and the French defeat onto Britain. 
German propagandists and the collaborationist press lost no time in attempting to 
achieve this end as on the 1 September 1940, when Le Matin encouraged readers to 
continue reading the newspaper and discover how Britain both ‘wanted and triggered’ a 
European war.74 In addition to the above, Britain also provided the fodder for German 
propaganda attacks especially in relation to episodes like the Oran affair (the killing of 
almost 1,300 French sailors by the British). Incidences like this provided 
collaborationist newspapers with opportunities to attempt to gain the moral high ground. 
The affair allowed Le Matin to declare ‘a total rupture’ in diplomatic relations between 
France and Britain. Britain was accused of ‘always deceiving the world’.75 In this 
regard, collaborationist propaganda consistently endeavoured to break any sense of 
French connection with the British war effort.  
 
A sense of French connection to the British war effort was crucial to civilian 
willingness to aid escapees. Consequently, British escapees were vulnerable to changing 
perceptions of the British and French attitudes to the war. Events like Oran put positive 
perceptions to the test. Captain W.G. Stuart-Menteth reported a positive attitude to 
Britain among the French officers until news of the Oran affair filtered through. 
Menteth observed that these officers 
 
Were under the impression that the French Fleet had been fired on after only three 
hours’ notice and I met one who was convinced that the British had machine 
gunned French sailors when leaving their ships.76 
 
Menteth added that several of these officers had intended travelling to Britain until this 
affair forced them to reconsider. He witnessed first-hand how quickly positive attitudes 
changed and how this change shaped willingness to support Britain’s war effort. The 
event framed the French officers’ interaction with Menteth and on a wider scale did not 
endear the British to the French public.  
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Yet despite the continual onslaught of German propaganda, the majority of escapees 
reported receiving help from civilians in the Forbidden and Occupied Zone. Perhaps one 
escapee, Bombardier George Melas, was a little over zealous in his claims that the 
French in the Pas de Calais region were ‘very loyal’ and were ‘looking forward’ to the 
time when they ‘will belong to the British empire’.77 Nevertheless, such accounts 
convey that the British were frequently positively received.  While Melas’ account  
refers to his short period as an escapee in the summer of 1940  at a time where there was 
virtually no resistance press, it must be recognised that as the war progressed it became 
increasingly important to defend the British action, particularly in light of incidences 
such as Oran or British bombing campaigns. Equally, and perhaps just as important, 
resistance propaganda was also necessary in defending the British against the consistent 
mundane attacks of German propaganda which was quick to blame Britain for the 
everyday harsh realities of war . 
 
George Orwell, through his work with the British propaganda office, identified the 
dangers of continual propaganda and spoke about it on the airwaves in 1942 warning 
listeners, 
 
To the Axis powers, propaganda is an actual weapon, like guns or bombs, it 
is as important as taking cover during an air raid.78 
 
The continual and relentless stream of collaborationist and German propaganda with its 
aim to disconnect French and British interests needed to be addressed by the resistance 
press. Julian Jackson commented, ‘In 1941, resistance meant above all propaganda’.79 
Ian Ousby observed,  
 
Whatever else resistance might have lacked when it started - and in lacking 
numbers, experience, arms, equipment and money, it seemed to lack almost 
everything - it had language. And language had assumed critical power.80 
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Ousby’s assessment is a valid one as language, that is propaganda, had ‘assumed critical 
power’.  In relation to resistance propaganda or ‘language’ and its impact on escape 
activities, resistance newspapers continually strove to re-connect French interest with 
that of Britain. Sustaining sympathy for the British cause in France was vital for 
escapees in their daily encounters with civilians.  
 
In fact, often resisters engaged in printing or distributing newspapers were involved in 
helping escapees. This is exemplified in the actions of a young woman, Suzanne 
Warenghem. In April 1941 she became involved with the British-led escape 
organisation in Marseilles (discussed later in this chapter and chapter two). Towards the 
end of 1941 she was also engaged with distributing the early resistance newspaper, 
Pantagruel.81 This newspaper was strongly pro-British. It defended Britain against the 
collaborationist press on a number of key issues, and by so doing, it strove to re-connect 
French with British interests. 
 
An examination of resistance newspapers suggests that they sought to defend the British 
in several key areas, namely, food shortages, British responsibility for the war and RAF 
bombing campaigns where German and collaborationist press sought to undermine 
British credibility.82 As already noted, one of Le Matin’s first attacks on Churchill was 
the claim he intended to defeat Hitler by starving Europe. The British blockade was 
continually given as proof of British intent. Food shortages informed most people’s 
experience of war, therefore, the German authorities and early resisters had a vested 
interest in directing blame. For the Germans and advocates of collaboration, blaming 
the British for food shortages was a crucial strategy in destabilizing their support. Julian 
Jackson highlighted the importance of the food issue by pointing out that, ‘When 
prefects listened to popular opinion, the loudest sounds they heard were not political 
slogans but rumbling stomachs’.83 
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The resistance newspapers re-directed blame for the war and the resulting hardships on 
Germany. While the full impact of resistance propaganda on civilians may never be 
fully realised, it still must be recognised that resistance movements and their 
newspapers, such as Libération Nord, were crucial in attempting to establish and defend 
the British perspective of the war. Libération Nord was founded in the occupied Zone 
by socialist journalist Jean Texcier and trade unionist Christian Pineau.84 On the 29 
December 1940 the newspaper’s leading article, La Vérité sur le ravitaillement, accused 
German exploitation for the shortage of meat, butter, cheese, potatoes (and coal).85 The 
Vichy government was accused of colluding with the Germans. After each paragraph 
presenting the ‘facts’ the reader was asked: Tout cela est-il la faute de Vichy ou des 
Anglais? (whose fault is it Vichy or England?).86 On the 19 January 1941 the newspaper 
justified the British blockade in the following terms,  
 
The blockade was inspired by a simple principle: We want to supply France, say 
the English, but we do not want produce destined for the French to fall into 
German hands and help them to continue the war.87 
 
Libération Nord aimed to vindicate Britain by pointing out that the British could not be 
expected to hand over cargo destined for their enemies. The article concluded with an 
indictment against German motives, arguing that ‘the Germans prefer, for their 
propaganda needs, to see a famine in France and to try and lay responsibility on the 
English.’88 Challenges like this laid down the gauntlet to German propaganda. Over the 
course of the next few months Libération Nord consistently defended British action, 
claiming French deliverance depended on a British victory.89 The newspaper also 
consistently attacked the Vichy government for passing on materials to the Germans.  
 
One of the many accusations levelled at the British was particularly sensitive, namely, 
that Britain had abandoned France to her fate. The resistance newspaper, La Voix du 
Nord, sought to tackle this sensitive topic but took this defence a step further and 
claimed that, in fact, it was the French who had defected in June 1940. The newspaper 
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went on to add that the British were continuing the ‘struggle’.90 This deliberately 
challenged collaborationist newspapers’ efforts to re-assert the concept of the 
‘perfidious albion’ (essentially meaning treacherous English). On the 20 September 
1941, La Voix du Nord, condemned the German use of the slogan ‘The English fight 
until the last French man’.91 This continual defence of the English by La Voix du Nord 
is particularly noteworthy considering it was founded in Lille in April 194192 and 
described by Julian Jackson as a newspaper ‘with a specifically regional appeal’.93 Its 
appeal was rooted in a region with a strong tradition of aiding escape as resistance. 
Indeed, some members of La Voix du Nord were also aware of, and involved in, hiding 
escapees in Lille, and one of its founders, Natalis Dumez, was acquainted with the 
Widow Samiez.94 This goes some way to explaining La Voix du Nord’s efforts to 
continually engage with and challenge the anti-British slogans of collaborationist 
newspapers. 
 
The resistance press and its ability to challenge and invert such slogans illustrate the 
dynamism of these newspapers.  This dynamism was not confined to challenging  the 
slogans discussed above, but also through the resistance press’s direct response to 
specific articles in collaborationist newspapers. For instance, on the 9 February 1941 
Libération Nord took issue with photographs published in Paris Soir. Paris Soir had 
published a picture of ‘French’ military planes attacking refugees including a mother 
clutching her baby. Libération Nord accused Paris Soir of not consulting its archive. It 
pointed out that the pictures had appeared in the paper in May and that the refugees 
were actually ‘strafed by German planes’.95 These types of articles convey the extent of 
the continual engagement of resisters with political and military events and their 
determination to challenge the claims and rhetoric of the occupation authorities. The 
inability of the collaborationist press to directly counter claims of the resistance 
newspapers was perhaps related to the possibility that such action would have extended 
some legitimacy to alternative interpretations and perceptions of the war and Britain. 
The resistance press, therefore, was crucial in establishing an alternative perspective to 
that presented in official news outlets.  
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This alternative perspective or justification grew gradually more important to British 
escapees as the war progressed. Increasingly, the high number of French casualties 
killed or injured in Royal Air Force (RAF) raids posed a real threat to a positive 
perception of the British.96 This was particularly problematic considering that RAF 
planes were bombing French targets, and aerial war meant that shot-down aircrews were 
dependent on civilian aid if they were to escape the German search parties. The 
collaborationist press were quick to exploit any opportunity to portray British attacks as 
senseless. Collaborationist newspaper Les Nouveaux Temps97 published almost daily 
accounts of bombing campaigns which were not only incredibly biased but also 
repetitive. It is not difficult to sum up nearly four years of Les Nouveaux Temps 
coverage on both German and RAF bombing campaigns; it consistently informed 
readers that German bombing campaigns hit industrial and military installations and in 
contrast, bombs dropped by the RAF hit civilian targets. There has been some historical 
research carried out on the effect of the British bombing campaigns in France. Research 
undertaken by the Centre for the Study of War, State and Society at the University of 
Exeter noted that the French reaction to these bombings was ‘ambiguous’.98 According 
to the Centre, there were fears in London that such action could alienate the local 
population. However, London eventually came to consider the bombings as ‘politically 
beneficial’ as they were ‘seen as showing the French that Britain could and would hit 
their occupiers hard.’99 
 
An examination of the resistance newspapers shows that London’s fears were shared by 
resistance propagandists in France. Justifying British bombing was one of the first tasks 
assumed by some of the early resistance newspapers. Pantagruel, which was possibly 
the first resistance periodical, claimed as early as October 1940, that British bombing 
paralleled the actions of French soldiers destroying French bridges. It all amounted to a 
‘painful necessity inherent to war’.100 It reminded civilians that in spite of British 
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destruction they would ‘certainly save us’.101  On the 14 July 1941, the resistance 
newspaper, Le Voix du Nord, blamed the devastation caused by British bombing on ‘the 
politics of collaboration and the government of Vichy’.102 According to this paper, the 
British had no other choice as French factories were used for the German war effort and 
a denial that French factories were not producing war material was in effect German 
propaganda. The significance of this type of propaganda lies in the fact that not only 
was it justifying British action but portraying it as a necessity, one in France’s interest 
and one which would contribute to her ultimate liberation. In this way, newspapers 
attempted to reinforce the connection between the British war effort and French 
interests. 
 
While the occurrence of propaganda is not in dispute, the effect of such propaganda is 
difficult to gauge. Escape reports suggest that in relation to the bombing campaign, 
aircrews shot down over France were treated well. Grenadier C. Hiller who witnessed 
the aftermath of R.A.F. raids on Calais between June-November 1940, reported that the 
‘raids had been very effective and were welcomed by the inhabitants, although few of 
them had shelter’.103 Private Peter Scott Janes met a man injured in a raid who informed 
him it did ‘not matter it was the English’.104 On occasion, entire villages were complicit 
in hiding R.A.F. personnel. On the 8 July 1941 Pilot Officer H.P. Duval was on a 
‘sweep’ over northern France when he was shot down by a German Messerschmitt.  He 
bailed out and landed in the village of Tincques. French children hid his parachute while 
Duval hid in an abandoned house. Within fifteen minutes German troops arrived and 
forced villagers to search for the pilot. No one gave him up and the following day he 
was taken to a safe house in Abbeville.105 These accounts illustrate cases where a sense 
of shared connection to the British war effort helped underpin civilian willingness to 
help escapees.  
 
Connecting with the British: The importance of philanthropy  
Yet while resistance propaganda strove to reconnect British and French interests, the 
visible, physical presence of the British in France all but disappeared towards the end of 
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the summer of 1940. Men were interned in temporary camps in France, waiting removal 
to prisoner of war camps in Germany or they were receiving treatment in hospitals 
across northern France (in places like Bethune or Lille) or they were in hiding. 
Consequently, the initial ‘surge of solidarity’ experienced by those who had witnessed 
the marching columns was replaced with the struggle to come to terms with the vast 
number of French prisoners taken. This  ‘surge of solidarity’ and civilian efforts to cope 
with the French prisoner of war situation shaped the civilian response to the defeat. In 
the weeks and months following German occupation, there was an increase in demand 
for the services of existing philanthropic societies such as the Red Cross. Equally, there 
was a dramatic demand for, and development of, prisoner of war aid societies across 
France. These organisations represented a means by which civilians, or at least those 
desiring to do so, could remain connected to the British. 
 
Philanthropic activities, similar to the civilian response to the marching columns, were a 
means of coping with or reacting to the occupation. Such actions were driven by a 
deeper sense of frustration at the German occupation and as such they were an early 
indication of a potential desire to engage in some sort of resistance (even if for the 
civilian the concept or the means to resist was not yet tangible). This was particularly 
important in relation to those who deliberately sought to connect with the British. 
Consider the opinion of early resister, Yvonne Odden who dated her ‘anti-German 
activities’ to ‘the occupation of Paris’.106 Odden defined these activities as including 
‘sending books and clothes to prison camps around Paris’.107 Odden measured her ‘anti-
German activities’ in terms of her motivation to engage in philanthropy and not in the 
action of philanthropy. Sending items to prisoners offered an outlet for her to channel 
personal dissatisfaction. She attached significance to these actions as they were part of 
her ‘consciousness-raising’ experience and an initiation into a more active role within 
the occupation. For Odden, her charitable endeavours were anti-German and the 
beginning of her resistance activities. 
 
Odden’s behaviour as resistance, however, needs to be balanced with the fact that 
sending parcels to prisoners remained within acceptable social boundaries. Historians 
such as Hanna Diamond have argued that philanthropic societies aiding prisoners 
                                                            




neutralised resistance. Diamond wrote that far from challenging the status quo these 
types of prisoner of war activities supported the status quo. According to Diamond, 
 
What could be more reassuring than meeting up with other women in the same 
position? What could seem more legitimate than the Red Cross? These women, 
who would apparently have strong reasons to be hostile, were arguably being 
socialised into supporting the Vichy regime.  
 
Perceived in this light, it is possible to argue that Odden overstated her parcel-sending 
as ‘anti-German actions’? In order to address this question it is important to 
acknowledge that while philanthropic agents may have acted as a socialising influence, 
in certain cases there are exceptions to this. This chapter does not challenge or 
contradict the research of historians like Diamond but simply adds another dimension 
and interpretation to it. In this incidence, it is important to argue that while 
philanthropic agents may have acted as a socialising influence, there are exceptions to 
this. Individuals such as Odden engaged in philanthropic activities in order to respond 
to the shock of occupation but this does not mean that their activities socialised them to 
support the current situation or Vichy. In point of fact, it may be argued that it had the 
opposite effect in cases where civilians undertook philanthropic activities to channel 
anti-German sentiments into a more positive response to the situation. Where civilian 
accounts such as Oddens are corroborated in the escape reports the suggestion is that the 
earliest escapes from internment were indeed led by civilians acting under the 
philanthropic banner. 
 
Therefore, while sending parcels or visiting the wounded may not appear as grand 
gestures of resistance, historians are faced with the reality that some participants 
considered such modest actions as ‘anti-German’. In this, Odden was not alone. Some 
took clearer steps in establishing their anti-German stance and visited wounded British 
prisoners in civilian hospitals across the occupied zones. Hospitals were not heavily 
guarded and some men were being treated in civilian hospitals which made visiting 
possible. The entry of Suzanne Warenghem into resistance, the person mentioned earlier 
as a distributor of the resistance newspaper, Pantagruel, was fostered through her ‘habit 
of visiting wounded British prisoners’.108 In autumn 1940, Warenghem sought out these 
prisoners and discussed her desire to continue resisting with them. She informed them 
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that she was ‘anxious to join the forces of General De Gaulle’.109 Warenghem continued 
to visit the wounded and in June 1941, when it came to her attention that several French 
visitors facilitated escapes, she endeavoured to do the same and helped five men escape 
in early 1941. In the summer of 1941, she travelled with two of these men to Marseilles 
and became involved with the British-led escape organisation there (for more details see 
chapter two). 
 
In this way, Warenghem’s visits, although motivated by her desire to resist, were not 
necessarily illegal. Furthermore, these visits became the gateway for her more 
committed resistance activities. In the above cases, Odden and Warenghem perceived 
communicating with prisoners as an outlet for their frustration at the German 
occupation and in this sense their philanthropic endeavours were the beginning of their 
resistance activities. In Odden’s case, she later became a member of the resistance 
group Musée de l’Homme, while Warenghem progressed to working for the British-led 
escape organisation in Marseilles (see chapter two). Considered in this light, their initial 
philanthropic actions allows them to be perceived as what Hanna Diamond labelled 
‘proto’-resisters, that is, resisters in mind if not in deed.110 Philanthropy was not a 
resistance activity but in the case of Odden and Warrenghem, philanthropic activities 
were part of their progression to more committed resistances such as aiding escapes. 
 
British accounts reinforce Odden and Warrenghem’s experiences and declarations that 
philanthropic activities often acted as the gateway to resistance. British reports indicated 
that wounded prisoners in French hospitals regularly received civilian visitors. This is 
particularly the case when one considers the report of Captain G.F. Collie who sheds 
some light on the importance, extent and frequency of visits to British prisoners. Collie, 
a wounded prisoner in hospital in Paris, estimated that he received five hundred visitors, 
a hundred of whom visited on a regular basis. In 1942, in the midst of food rations, 
Collie was able to report receiving ‘fresh grape-fruit for breakfast every morning’ and 
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always having fresh butter.111 Who were his visitors? Did they have to go without in 
order to provide him and his companions with food? While in some respects Collie’s 
experience raises more questions than answers, it highlights two important points: these 
visits occurred regularly and on a sizeable scale. Equally, while it is almost impossible 
to determine the extent of this phenomenon, Collie’s report makes it difficult to dismiss 
the importance of prison visits to civilians seeking an outlet for the sense of helpless 
experienced in the aftermath of the German occupation. At the same time, similar to 
Odden’s initial ‘resistance’ activities, visiting wounded prisoners remained within legal 
parameters. This was further supported by the fact that hospitals could only offer 
nominal security. In some cases, hospitals were run by the Royal Army Medical Corp or 
by civilian administrators.112 This lax security allowed civilians to regularly visit 
wounded men like Collie and encouraged schemes such as the marraine de guerre. 
 
Philanthropy, marraine de guerre and early improvised escape networks  
The concept of the marraine de guerre was crucial in establishing connections between 
potential helpers and men seeking a means of escape. The marraine de guerre was one 
means by which the British not only maintained a sense of the outside world but in 
some cases accessed a solid support base of civilians willing to aid their journey to the 
Unoccupied Zone. The scheme combines two of the elements discussed in the previous 
section: the British presence in France as a stimulant to resistance and the importance of 
local tradition. According to Margaret H. Darrow, the concept of marraine de guerre 
developed in the course of the First World War, in ‘the spring of 1915’113 as a ‘wartime 
penpal scheme’.114 The original aim of the movement was to bolster the morale of 
soldiers, especially soldiers whose families were cut off by the occupation of Lille in 
1914.115 Darrow described the movement as a ‘peculiarly French creation without close 
parallels in Britain and Germany.’116 The scheme involved a marraine (godmother) 
adopting a filleule (godson) and encouraging the patriotism of their filleule. It was 
hugely popular with soldiers placing advertisements in newspapers seeking a 
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marraine.117 On the whole, the movement earned high praise from the press and some 
commentators wrote 
 
By knitting hats, writing letters, collecting money, sending treats and aiding war 
victims, French women were making an important contribution to the war effort.118 
 
In the interwar period, the concept of marraine de guerre disseminated across popular 
culture and became the subject of many books and films. Arguably, this contributed to 
the enduring legacy of the original movement as it is clear from the escape reports that 
the movement was resurrected in the summer of 1940.  
 
According to Margaret H. Darrow, the original marraine de guerre movement was 
driven by a strong patriotic fervour and propelled forward by humanitarian and 
philanthropic concerns. In the Second World War, and in the context of aid given to the 
British, marraine were often motivated by resistance under the guise of caring for sick 
prisoners. However, there is a lacuna in current research on the marraine movement 
about the women involved. While Darrow’s interest in the movement is rooted in the 
First World War, Julian Jackson identified the presence of ‘marraine’ in relation to the 
later resistance activities of the maquis in southern France (1942-44).119 He observed 
that 
 
Maquis groups were adopted by ‘Godmothers’, who provided food and medical 
help, and organized shelter.120 
 
In the context of aid given to the maquis, the marraine helped sustain but did not drive 
resistance activities. Despite the paucity of research on the movement, the evidence 
suggests that the marraine shaped the experiences of wounded British prisoners and in 
some cases the marraine, by their escape activities, were drivers of early resistance 
(1940-42).  
 
The work of the marraine was facilitated by the German authorities’ willingness to turn 
a blind eye to civilians visiting the wounded. Visits became an acceptable part of life in 
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hospitals so much so that some friendly competition developed between various British 
prisoners as to who could acquire the most accommodating marraine. Langley reflected 
on the support of his marraine and wrote  
 
No Marraine de Guerre could compete with Madame Caron, who adopted me. 
Nearer 50 than 40, she was married to a French gendarme, who regarded her 
enthusiasm for the British with a jaundiced eye, largely, I suspect, due to the effect 
it had on his meals.121 
 
When security was tightened and civilians temporarily banned from the hospital, Mme 
Caron convinced a number of German guards to continue bringing Langley his meals.  
This suggests there was an eagerness to help British prisoners and yet much of this aid 
had an innocuous, seemingly innocent basis. In Langley’s case, the German guards even 
indulged it. 
 
The British seem to have acquired a marraine in various ways. Sergeant E.G. Hillyard, 
wounded and in a hospital in Angers, received visits every Sunday from an Irish and 
Scottish governess.122 As illustrated by Hillyard, marraines actively sought out men to 
‘adopt’ but as noted previously men also canvassed for a marraine. In late summer 1940 
Sergeant J.W. Phillips was in the Faculté Jean d’Arc, Lille and, prompted by other men 
receiving visits from French civilians, wrote his details on a piece of paper, attached it 
to a piece of lead and threw it from a window.123 His methods worked and an Irish nun 
brought him letters from a woman he named ‘Mme X’.124 Some men tried more 
traditional routes and placed advertisements in newspapers, even in the collaborationist 
newspaper Le Matin.125 These advertisements were notably ambiguous, merely stating a 
name and location of the prisoner. However, in the cases stated above, once 
communication was established the association slowly progressed to aiding escape. 
Hillyard was supplied with gifts by his marraine and when it became clear he was well 
enough to be transferred to Germany in October, both the Irish and Scottish governesses 
arranged his escape. Phillips maintained a written communication with his marraine 
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and by this means ascertained that she was willing to help him escape. Knowing that 
civilian clothes were a prerequisite for any successful escape, she sent food to the 
hospital wrapped in civilian clothing. In all cases, the British were entirely dependent on 
the marraine to maintain communication. The topic of escape was approached 
tentatively by all parties involved but when the marraines responded positively, plans 
quickly progressed. In this regard, it is not enough to point out that the marraine simply 
acted as a support for escape but rather she could enable escape, perhaps even, canvass 
for it.  
 
Arguably, by their willingness to help, marraine contributed to the spawning of 
improvised escape groups. The evidence suggests that through marraine, men escaping 
hospitals often gained access to other potential helpers, usually close family and friends. 
For instance, in August 1940, Phillips left the hospital and went to a meeting point 
arranged by his marraine where he was greeted by a French man.126 This man hid 
Phillips, obtained identity papers for him from the mayor of Lille (discussed in more 
detail later in this chapter) and eventually, on the 19 January 1941, Phillips travelled to 
the Unoccupied Zone with a French youth. In Phillips’ circumstances he was in constant 
communication with a number of individuals while in hiding. Besides the direct 
assistance he received in his journey to the Unoccupied Zone, there was a wider 
network of individuals that knew and assisted Phillips during his time in hiding. In 
Phillips’ case, he also communicated with several clandestine organisations in an 
attempt to arrange his passage to the demarcation line.  
 
Interestingly, Phillips’ account also refers to his personal efforts and determination to 
make connections with other potential helpers while in hiding. In most of the histories 
on escape networks the British are referred to as ‘parcels’.127 This suggests a passive 
role and belies the nature of early resistance. Indeed, it must be recognised that in many 
cases the British were not passive but played an important role in preparing for their 
escape. A report by Captain G.F. Collie illustrates the forward thinking and detail 
involved in planning an escape. During his time in hospital in Paris, Collie along with 
two of his colleagues, Driver E. Flack and Sergeant R.E Aston, co-ordinated the 
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activities of their various visitors in order to facilitate their own escape. Their planning 
took four months, running from January until their eventual escape on the 8 April 1942. 
Through their visitors they received food, which they, with the help of other patients, 
traded on the black market in order to raise the necessary funds. They arranged for their 
photographs to be taken and recruited visitors to prepare identity papers. They planned 
their route and as their time to leave approached they sent food parcels to helpers along 
their chosen track and letters to friends warning them not to visit. In addition, a wider 
community within the hospital was complicit in keeping their presence secret from the 
German authorities who were removing men to Germany. According to Collie 
 
The German military service in Paris, which was run by Czech and Austrians, had 
not allowed us to be sent to Germany, where we would not have been able to 
obtain the special medical treatment we required. The medical service also 
refrained from telling the Kommandatur in Paris of our presence.128 
 
Their escape plans were supported by an Algerian patient and a number of French 
patients. A French surgeon was taken into their confidence so that outstanding surgeries 
would be performed on time.  
 
On the basis of this evidence, it seems fair to suggest that there were three pillars to 
successful escapes in occupied France. Firstly, British commitment to escape; the level 
of detail and planning undertaken by Collie and his colleagues highlights that often 
these men were not passive bystanders but carried responsibilities in both the planning 
and execution of their escapes. Secondly, civilian support was often built on friendships 
(Collie continual referred to these visitors as ‘friends’). Thirdly, the wider circle of 
complicity was important in executing an escape, as for example in Collie’s case, where 
proper medical attention was received on time. Collie’s meticulous planning paid off 
and within twelve hours of leaving the hospital he crossed over into unoccupied France 
with his colleagues. Thus, in this way early escape activities were predicated on 
continued interaction and negotiation between British escapees and their helpers.  
 
Hospital visits provided the initial basis for communicating with prisoners and were 
effective in aiding escapes like that of Collie and his colleagues but on numerous 
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occasions philanthropic organisations were also important for men already in hiding. 
For instance, evidence from the reports suggest that on at least one occasion agents for 
the Red Cross helped link both escapees and their helpers in the countryside with a 
support base in cities like Lille. Rural helpers, unless they had connections in nearby 
cities or trusted members of the community with connections, were limited in their 
ability to help men beyond their immediate locality. Therefore, in order to move men on 
effectively, trustworthy connections between urban and rural helpers was essential. 
Arguably, the occupation had left a vacuum in the ability of French civilians’ 
willingness to trust but the historically established philanthropic organisation, the Red 
Cross was regarded as trustworthy. 
 
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that members of the Red Cross helped forge 
connections between the town and countryside. This may have been the result of its 
longstanding position in France with the Red Cross’s involvment in both the Franco- 
Prussian War and the First World War cementing its reputation as both a humanitarian  
and a patriotic organisation. This reputation appears important in allowing Red Cross 
agents access to rural communities. The available evidence, which will be addressed in 
detail later in this chapter, indicates that in at least one small rural community Red 
Cross agents were almost immediately active in aiding civilians hide British officers 
and soliders.  
 
In order to fully assess the reasons for this it is important to consider the position of the 
French Red Cross in the context of German occupation. Essentially, the French Red 
Cross oscillated between three contending demands: it had to balance its accountability 
to the French (or German) authorities; it had to preserve its neutrality; and it had to 
maintain its appeal to the local community. With regards the first of these, the Red 
Cross was highly praised for its philanthropic efforts in collaborationist newspapers.129 
This philanthropic role was important to both the authorities, in the face of increased 
rationing, and to the Red Cross and its agents in terms of the connections it established 
between prisoners and the local communities. Historians, such as Robert Gildea, noted 
the Red Cross’s role and the ambiguities surrounding some of its members’ activities 
                                                            




when he pointed to one case in particular where, in February 1941, a subprefect of 
Saumur, Robert Milliat, called a meeting in which 
 
The police, gendarmerie, and Catholic and Protestant church leaders ... put pressure 
on individuals, notably in the Red Cross, who were suspected of helping 
escapees130 
 
Despite the fact that authorities were aware individuals in the Red Cross were engaged 
in clandestine activities, there was a reluctance to be heavy handed with them. The 
French authorities, in this case Robert Milliat and other notable local leaders, 
recognised that aid workers were involved in escapes and attempted to deal with, or 
contain, the situation without German interference. Incidences such as this one illustrate 
not only the importance of the Red Cross within the community but also reinforce the 
concept that close connections forged with prisoners under the banner of philanthropy 
were instrumental in promoting escapes. In this case, members of a longstanding neutral 
organisation like the Red Cross were willing to participate in escape activities. 
 
The latter point was particularly important in relation to gaining the trust of rural 
communities. This trust was cemented by civilian perceptions of the Red Cross. 
Because it was long associated with patriotism and played a visible role in French 
military conflicts from the Moroccan crisis 1907,131 the Red Cross was associated with 
‘Frenchness’ and patriotism (as well as maintaining the support of French and German 
authorities).132 This position is supported by Max Huber, president of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross 1928–44, who wrote that the Red Cross has ‘never been 
uninfluenced by the social structure and political, philosophical and religious ideas of 
the different countries’.133 Furthermore, he pointed out that the organisation sustained 
support by regularly undertaking work far beyond its primary function (namely, 
services performed during war time) and thus, became ‘a popular organization... gaining 
the support of the community as a whole’.134 In relation to the Red Cross and 
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nationalism, political scientist D. P. Forsythe reached similar conclusions to Huber, 
writing that the Red Cross 
 
Is part of an international network officially devoted to universal humanitarianism, 
but one characterized historically by strong nationalism.135 
 
Arguably, as a result of this tradition, isolated communities were open to trusting 
members of the Red Cross. 
 
The primary evidence for the importance of the Red Cross in building trust in rural 
communities is based on the report of Captain D.B. Lang. While this may appear a 
narrow basis for this assertion, Lang’s report is particularly detailed in relation to the 
role of the Red Cross within the community in which he lived. In this respect, as will be 
demonstrated, Lang’s account proves illuminating in helping to develop an 
understanding of how civilians engaged in philanthropic organisations like the Red 
Cross were in a position to bridge the gap between rural and urban France. Therefore, 
while Lang may be the main source in relation to the Red Cross, his experience 
illustrates the importance of philanthropy as a gateway to, and means of extending 
escape activities. 
 
Lang’s accounts focused on the actions of one particular Red Cross agent, Mme Siauve 
Evausy and her role in helping rural families hiding British escapees to connect with 
supporters in Lille. According to Lang, agents regularly visiting isolated farms and rural 
communities raising money for French prisoners in early autumn 1940.136 Lang, who 
was in hiding in Pont Thibault with a colleague, referred to the visiting Red Cross agent 
as ‘our Red Cross lady’, Mme Siauve Evausy. Through these visits she came to know 
the family on a more intimate level, that is, close enough to know about the presence of 
Lang and Buckingham. While Mme Siauve was based in Lille, her position as a 
member of the Red Cross and her aid work gave her access to, and helped her earn the 
trust of, this rural community. Because of her position as a Red Cross worker, she did 
not represent a threat to rural families but instead, by promoting the interests of 
prisoners of war was able to establish trust among these communities. 
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Besides the work of Mme Siauve, Lang’s report provides evidence that other members 
of the Red Cross performed a similar role. As Lang reported, he, along with his 
companion, Lieutenant John Buckingham 
 
Heard of many other British hiding in the area, but we were not in a position, rather 
naturally, to visit them. If they were not actually on farms, they were hiding in 
woods, and were fed by local villagers or agents for the Red Cross.137 
 
It is perhaps possible to envisage the forging of these bonds of trusts as cyclical, where 
civilians receiving regular visits from Red Cross agents revealed the presence of 
soldiers in hiding. The support then received from these agents reinforced this trust and 
in turn drew them into deeper confidences within the community and eventually deeper 
into resistance. 
 
In the incidences highlighted above, these confidences not only enabled communities to 
sustain aid given to British escapees but also, given their intimate knowledge of 
communities, such as the farms harbouring Lang and his colleagues, Red Cross agents 
were in a position to establish when it was best to move men on. This in turn paved the 
way for Red Cross agents to assist these farmers to engage in escape activities and 
hence, agents like Mme Siauve acted as a bridge between town and countryside. Lang’s 
report illustrates this point with Mme Siauve eager to move Lang and Buckingham to 
Lille when it became clear that too many people knew of their presence. Her intimate 
knowledge of the community facilitated this assessment but equally important, her 
position as a Red Cross worker contributed to her ability to arrange their removal to the 
city.  Lang gave the following account of the move: 
 
We did the journey from the farm to Lille by bicycle, guided by one of Mme. 
Siauve’s agents and reached our new hiding place without mishap. The next 
fortnight we spent virtually in one room, though we visited the flat where our 
guardians lived, to wash plates etc. Once again too many people got to know about 
us, and we had to be moved.138 
 
Lang’s statement indicates that Mme Siauve’s connections in the city, combined with 
her organisational efforts, were the catalyst for the move to the city. Mme Siauve took 





the lead in these plans, organising adequate and safe accommodation and sourcing 
guides to bring the men to the various safe houses. Effectively, Mme Siauve acted as the 
liaison, drawing on knowledge as a Red Cross worker to expand her personal 
connections and contacts in order to create a network of helpers. 
 
Mme Siauve’s actions are a prime example of how civilians working under the banner 
of charitable organisations drove escape activities forward. She effectively connected 
helpers in Lille with their rural counterparts. On the other hand, in spite of progress in 
making such connections, these early improvised escape organisations encountered 
severe difficulties. Often civilians engaged in assisting an escape or hiding men had no 
set plans beyond keeping men from German internment and returning them to England. 
The practicalities of achieving this objective were overlooked. This was by and large the 
experience of most escapees in northern France throughout 1940 and early 1941 with 
the main aim being to pass men into unoccupied France. In order to illustrate these 
difficulties and attempts to overcome them, the focus will remain on Mme Siauve’s 
efforts to help Lang, Buckingham and the two private British soldiers. While Mme 
Siauve provided these men with a base in the city there was still no set plan on how they 
should proceed south, cross from the Forbidden Zone and into the Occupied Zone and 
from there make their way to the Unoccupied Zone. Lang reported hearing many 
different schemes in Lille to return men to Britain during his time in hiding, including 
an aeroplane scheme.139 
 
This rumour appears to have been in common circulation, as a number of escapees on 
their return to Britain report hearing plans for such a scheme around this time.140 
Moreover, these accounts indicate that these rumours were believed by helpers and 
shaped their behaviour. Some men were moved to collecting points or sent to Paris in 
order to wait for planes.141 In Lang’s case, rumours of this scheme were taken as 
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credible and on the 11 October 1940 it prompted Lang and Buckingham’s departure to 
Paris with Mme Siauve’s husband, a French commandant. On their arrival in Paris, the 
three men were to meet a pre-arranged contact but no help arrived. With an hour before 
curfew the men just about managed to find accommodation with their false papers. In 
relation to these aeroplane schemes, most escapees lost faith in them relatively quickly 
although they noted that their helpers were sincere in the belief that such schemes were 
in progress. To date, there is no evidence available that gives these rumours substance 
or sheds light on their source. 142  In this regard, despite philanthropic activities 
contributing to forging connections, it is evident that key problems remained namely, 
communication breakdowns, security problems and extending activities over 
considerable distances, in this case Lille to Paris (over 200km). 
 
These concerns jeopardised the welfare of the men but also the lives of those involved 
in assisting them. The experiences of Lang were not singular but common in early 
improvised escape lines, particularly when men were given details of contacts in Paris 
and arrived there from the Forbidden Zone. Often, these connections were ill advised or 
did not show up. In some cases, they were incredibly dangerous. For instance, before 
Lieutenant James Langley travelled from Lille to Paris with two colleagues and a 
French guide, he had been given the address of a police union office in Paris and told to 
seek assistance there. When he arrived not only did he cause consternation among the 
French officers who had no idea what he was talking about or why he was directed to 
the building but they also informed Langley that this was not the first time that this had 
happened.143 Needless to say Langley and his colleagues made a quick departure.144 
Eventually Langley established contact with helpers in Paris under arrangements made 
by helpers in Lille and they proceeded south, successfully crossing the demarcation line.  
 
For Lang, another Red Cross connection, Mme Bonnefous, aided his journey to the 
Unoccupied Zone. He met Bonnefous at the American Embassy and eager to help she 
took Lang, Buckingham and Mme Siauve’s husband to her apartment in Paris where she 
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arranged their passage to the Unoccupied Zone. Bonnefous’ presence at the Embassy 
appears to have been in her official capacity as Red Cross worker. Yet there is evidence 
to suggest that her presence at the Embassy was expressly to make contact and assist 
British prisoners and that her philanthropic work was designed as a cover for this 
objective. There are a number of factors behind this assumption, one of which was her 
nationality. Bonnefous was a British woman married to a Frenchman and her shared 
nationality may have engendered some degree of sympathy. This is reinforced by her 
assertion to Lang that she had helped other men escape. This claim is supported by 
Lieutenant C.D. Hunter and Corporal G. Hood-Crees who both named Bonnefous in 
their reports. In Hunter’s case, in September 1940, Bonnefous acted as his marraine de 
guerre whereas G. Hood-Crees encountered her through the ‘French Prisoner Aid 
Society’.145 She helped both men, separately, to escape a hospital in Doullens and took 
them to her apartment in Paris. From here, Bonnefous organised their passage to the 
demarcation line and on to Marseilles.  
 
In all of the above cases, Bonnefous used her charitable endeavours to connect with 
British prisoners and assist their escape. On at least one occasion, she enlisted the help 
of her colleague.146 While her efforts were, similar to other marraine de guerre or 
charity workers, in that they were limited to a small number of men, her ambitions were 
much bigger. Whereas, most civilian-aided escapes terminated at the demarcation line, 
an assessment of the escape reports suggests that Bonnefous was one of the first 
civilians to attempt to create an escape organisation stretching from Paris to Marseilles. 
According to Hunter, at the end of November 1940, Bonnefous arrived in Marseilles.147 
It was clear from this meeting that she not only wanted to see how the men were doing 
but intended to continue and extend her activities. She secured Hunter’s assistance in 
raising money to cover the cost of sending men south. Up until that point, she was using 
her personal finances. Both Hunter and Bonnefous succeeded in raising money, 
including 35,000 francs from an Englishman in Cannes. In addition to seeking to defray 
her personal costs, she intended using this money to expand her support base and had 
earmarked 20,000 francs for two priests who were assisting her escape activities.  
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Before her plans were realised Bonnefous heard of the arrest of an American colleague 
loosely involved in her activities. This was followed by her own arrest on her way back 
to Paris, a journey undertaken to warn other helpers and arrange for the arrival of more 
British soldiers. Bonnefous’ experiences exemplify the problems facing civilian escape 
activities. From the Bonnefous example, it is evident that her actions were initially on a 
minor scale, however, when she took on the role of aiding an escape she was forced to 
expand her activities and draw on the support of those around her. In augmenting her 
activities, Bonnefous increased the risk and it is possible that in her eagerness to 
connect with prisoners through the Red Cross, American Embassy, prisoner of war aid 
societies and in her role as marraine, she drew the attention of the authorities and 
exposed herself to suspicion. However, the significance of Bonnefous’ actions shows 
the extent to which philanthropic endeavours potentially played an important role in 
early escape activities. Equally, her ultimate arrest demonstrates the limitations of early 
escape organisations. While philanthropic efforts were important in forming 
connections, civilians were still living within the limits of occupation and this put 
restrictions on the scope of escape activities. Civilians had to work within these limits 
and find ways to overcome them. All this took time and therefore even arranging the 
passage of a small number of men across the demarcation line was an achievement. 
 
In light of the above, it is feasible to argue that that there was, on occasion, a connection 
between early philanthropic efforts and those desiring to seek stronger ways to engage 
in anti-German resistance activities. By extension, during the early years of occupation, 
philanthropy contributed to the formation of escape organisations. However, it is also 
important to recognise that while aid organisations assisted civilians in forging 
connections with the British in the towns and countryside, new problems emerged with 
the reality of border crossings, communication breakdowns and security issues which 
rendered the extension of these activities across France increasingly difficult. 
 
Philanthropy and escape: a gendered resistance? 
The reports suggest that, for the most part, French women were the means by which 
contact was established between the civilian population and the British, particularly 
British prisoners. There were, perhaps, a number of reasons for this. While, men were in 
the process of being demobilised and forced into a more passive role (that is, in hiding, 
taken prison or disarmed), women could still perform roles that were socially acceptable 
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but emphasised and directed their patriotism. This ability was underpinned by the 
perception of acceptable codes of feminine behaviour. Organisations like the Red Cross 
helped women combine ‘feminine versions of patriotism’ with ‘national service in war 
time’.148 The First World War added credibility to this tradition with women’s work in 
the Red Cross, according to Margaret H. Darrow, combining femininity, virtue and 
patriotism.149 Darrow pointed out that ‘Red Cross promoters were the first to pose 
squarely the question of what French women should do in case of war and to provide an 
answer’.150 Women became nurses and care givers. This role, reinforced by the fact that 
over a thousand Red Cross nurses received the Croix de guerre, set the tone for 
women’s involvement in the war.151  
 
However, it is important to note that when women like Mme Bonnefous or Mme 
Siauve, went beyond the limits of philanthropy and engaged in resistance activities, they 
needed male assistance to extend these activities. Male support was crucial as it offered 
both moral and material help in assisting an escape and the harbouring of men. This was 
particularly important in overcoming some of the social limitations placed on female 
behaviour. A number of historians including Diamond and Gildea address the subject of 
women and the high level of social scrutiny they endured during the occupation. 
Vichy’s National Revolution reinforced the concept of femininity and its links to the 
home. Awareness of this scrutiny and the importance of appearing to conform also 
shaped the decisions of various marraines who were aware that harbouring men would 
engender some degree of scrutiny among neighbours. In these cases, women living 
alone who were seeking to aid escapes, turned to male friends or family members for 
assistance. Sergeant J.W. Phillips experienced such a situation when he escaped a 
hospital in Lille on the 27 August 1940 with the help of his marraine. He made his way 
to a prearranged ‘rendez-vous’ where 
 
I was met by a man, Monsieur Y who had a tandem cycle with him, and on this we 
rode to his place. I did not actually stay with Mme X. as she lived alone and it 
might have created suspicion.152 
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Phillips’ account offers an interesting insight into the social expectations framing these 
early escape activities. Arguably, on one hand, ‘Mme. X’ position as a first point of 
contact between Phillips and potential helpers was facilitated by the acceptability of 
women’s philanthropic work. On the other hand, her willingness to help Phillips was 
limited by her concerns over social decorum. ‘Mme. X.’ was aware that any deviation 
from what was expected of her as a woman living alone would have generated suspicion 
among neighbours. Her acceptance of these social expectations, combined with her 
continued desire to assist Phillips, contributed to her need for male support. In recruiting 
male acquaintances, ‘Mme X’ attempted to overcome these social limitations. 
Ironically, while ‘Mme X’s’ consideration of her social position, based on her gender, 
may have limited the action she took in aiding Phillips, it could be argued that her need 
to recruit male support did in fact contribute to and effectively extend the scope of her 
escape activities. 
 
When male support was lacking women were reluctant or unable to give assistance. 
Two accounts in particular exemplify the role of gender politics in early escape 
activities. The first account, given by James Langley, refers to his marraine de guerre, 
Mme Carron.153 As already mentioned, Mme Carron proved an invaluable asset to 
Langley during his time in the Faculté Catholique. However, while Carron informed 
Langley she was personally willing to aid his escape, her husband disapproved. Her 
husband, a gendarme, tolerated Mme Carron’s enthusiasm for helping Langley and her 
desire to associate with wounded British soldiers but it appears he was also keen to curb 
the extent of her activities. As a result, Mme Carron offered Langley alternative types of 
assistance such as money which he refused. He eventually escaped the Faculté and went 
to an address given to another prisoner by a female visitor.  
 
Mme Carron’s reluctance to help Langley without the full support of her husband was 
not an isolated phenomenon and was mirrored in the experiences of Corporal G.R. 
Wheeler. Wheeler was involved in a St Nazaire raid in March 1942, where he evaded 
capture and travelled the French countryside. He observed that 
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It is no good in France going to houses when the women are there alone, as they 
will not give shelter without the consent of the man of the house.154 
 
Wheeler’s account suggests that it was not that women did not want to help but that 
they were reluctant to do so without their husband’s approval. In the above accounts (of 
Langley and Wheeler), one can see that often a woman’s resistance was tied to her 
husband’s approval. Women may have expressed an interest in supporting an escape but 
a husband’s disapproval was a weighty factor that merited due consideration. As 
indicated by Mme Carron, the predominantly female role of marraine or other such 
philanthropic work was a gateway to escape activities which needed the support of the 
husband. A husband’s sense of resistance and support for his wife’s endeavours was an 
important precursor to the extension of women’s activity beyond philanthropy and into 
resistance. In the case of women like Mme Bonnefous or Mme Siauve, both their 
husbands supported and equally participated in assisting escapees. In Mme Bonnefous’ 
case her husband used business connections to help men cross the demarcation line. 
Mme Siauve’s husband acted as guide and journeyed with Captain D.B. Lang and 
Lieutenant John Buckingham from Lille to Marseilles.  
 
This is not to suggest that women espoused only the views or opinions of their 
husbands, or relied on their husbands for a personal sense of resistance. Rather, it 
demonstrates that agreement between husband and wife was necessary to sustain escape 
activities. Escape involved entire families and therefore a certain amount of harmony in 
the home was crucial to its success; disharmony in the household created unnecessary 
risk. For the most part, there is relative silence in the reports on the family life of 
helpers and this may be taken to reinforce the claim that family members, husband and 
wife, had mutually agreed to share the risk and open their homes to these men. 
However, some reports record martial and family disputes which endangered not only 
escapees but potentially the lives of their helpers. 
 
Occasionally, escapees were drawn into these marital and familial disputes.  In an 
account given by Private Sydney Fullager (owing to Fullagher’s interference), marital 
conflict led to the breakup of the family unit. The conflict was centred on assistance 
given to Fullager and his companion, Private Coshal. In the summer of 1940, Private 
                                                            




Sydney Fullager and his companion were hidden by a French family in Pont St Pierre. 
A number of months later Fullager 
 
Discovered that the husband was collaborating with the Germans. On one occasion 
a party of 30 Germans turned up to collect timber. The officer in charge put the 
husband in charge of them and then left. This man spoke German and I discovered 
he was acting as interpreter for the enemy. I told Madame what had taken place; 
she apparently knew nothing about it.155 
 
‘Madame’ as a result of Fullager’s ‘discovery’ left her husband and advised Fullager to 
do the same. This advice was duly followed, with Fullager leaving for a hotel in Rouen 
shortly after her departure. Interestingly, her husband continued to harbour Coshal, a 
circumstance which suggests that his collaboration with the Germans was superficial, 
perhaps intended to hide his resistance activities. Notwithstanding his motivations, his 
wife saw the matter in a different light and it was the impetus for her departure from the 
family home. The break-up of the family unit left Fullager and his colleague vulnerable, 
forcing them to re-consider their position. While it appears both men remained in 
hiding, this incident illustrates the importance of agreement between husband and wife 
in relation to harbouring men. Safe houses needed harmony, that is trust needed to exist 
between family members. Immediate family members, husbands and wives needed to 
share the same political outlook or sense of resistance as men in hiding depended on the 
support of the entire household. Both men and women carried the weight of this 
responsibility.  
 
Beyond gender and philanthropy: community relationships and escape 
In many respects, given the above discussion, the family and the home, that is, the safe 
house; was the nucleus of escape activities. Equally, the extension of escape beyond the 
family unit needed the support of wider community networks. Philanthropy was one 
means of connecting potential helpers but families hiding men also took the initiative 
and formed personal connections and support networks within their communities. 
 
In rural areas, community leaders such as priests, mayors, teachers and doctors were 
equally important in establishing connections in neighbouring towns and thus, in a 
similar way to philanthropic organisations, their activities aided the development of 
embryonic escape organisations. The importance of local leaders to the resistance in 
                                                            




general has been noted by several historians. John F. Sweets observed the high numbers 
of middle class leaders in the resistance writing ‘leadership was essentially middle class, 
but recruitment of militants stressed the little man’.156 Elsewhere he states that,  
 
Although the resisters ranged over the full spectrum of society, certain elements 
were noticeably more prominent than others. Completely satisfactory statistics on 
the social composition of the Resistance are lacking, but available evidence 
provides a good estimate of the nature of the leadership elite. The leaders were 
largely from the middle class, and members of the liberal professions played a 
major role in the early organizations.157 
 
John Merriman espoused Sweets’ view but expands on the reasons for this 
phenomenon. Merriman recognises the power of local elites in the resistance who were 
‘opinion makers and engaged in sorting out local problems’.158 According to Merriman 
 
Whether they were Gaullist, communist or not affiliated with a party, Resistance 
depended on neighbourhoods, small towns, above all village networks, thus, the 
role of the school teacher or some kind of local leader.159 
 
Merriman’s argument emphasises the importance of existing social structures in shaping 
resistance activity. Both Merriman and Sweets suggest that the leadership of early 
improvised escape organisations was essentially middleclass. Mayors, priests, teachers 
or doctors quite often assumed responsibility for organising the removal of men from 
one safe house to the next. Nevertheless, an analysis of the escape reports sheds light on 
one crucial point; this middle or professional class leadership was recruited by the 
‘lower’ or working classes and peasants. 
 
British action was instrumental in shaping this dynamic as it was easier for an escapee 
to approach a peasant farmer or a member of the working class rather than a prefect de 
police, local mayor or various professionals who, as a result of their social position, 
were more likely to have regular contact with Germans. Captain E.A.W. Williams 
indicated a second reason for British escapees favouring peasants or the working class 
when he contrasted help he received from inhabitants of a chateau and a French family 
of ‘lower class’ in the summer of 1940.160 The latter, Williams observed, ‘had much less 
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respect for law and order’ and this made them more likely to be ‘persuaded to help’.161 
This disrespect for law and order or ambivalence towards the authorities (either French 
or German) was recognised by Williams as beneficial, and in many ways it made it 
easier for this family to help him.162 Williams’ report is singular in directly making this 
observation and therefore it is impossible to establish its validity outside his personal 
experiences. However, support for this assumption or position is reinforced by the fact 
that, according to evidence in escape reports, the majority of early escapees consistently 
approached the lower classes or peasants rather than professionals or the middle classes 
for assistance.  
 
The impact of these British preferences for the first contact reinforces the importance of 
the working classes and peasants throughout the occupation. The first escapees to return 
home reported their experiences; these accounts were in turn incorporated into escape 
lectures for RAF crews flying over France and commandos embarking on raids. It is 
interesting to compare the advice extrapolated by the War Office from the experiences 
of the first escapees 1940, to the advice given to commandos about to embark on the St 
Nazaire Raid in April 1942. In 1940, the War Office recognised the importance of the 
‘poor people’,163 a position which, two years later, did not change. In the briefing given 
to commandos about to set off for St Nazaire they were warned to ‘never approach any 
official and, for choice, go for help to poor people rather than the well-to-do’.164 This 
advice was also communicated to RAF crews who were also lectured on escape and 
evasion. Evidence from the reports indicated that shot down aircrew continued this 
pattern and approached small, isolated farmsteads. This behaviour had an impact on the 
development of escape activities as it meant that the lower classes, particularly peasants, 
continued to be the first point of contact for escapees. Once contact was established, and 
help given, peasants and lower classes turned to trusted local leaders or ‘opinion 
makers’ such as the school teacher or mayor.  
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In this way, peasants and the lower classes acted as the drivers of escape activity. They 
were pro-active in discerning potential helpers and connecting with the local community 
leader. As a result, help (and escape as resistance) usually followed a bottom up 
development with peasants drawing in local elites. In one particular case in Honfleur, 
one of the local leaders or opinion makers was the Prefect de Police, Monsieur Edmond 
Bailleul whose help contributed to the successful escape to the Unoccupied Zone of 
seven soldiers and their officer, Lieutenant Richard Broad.165 This case is interesting in 
that connections were not only established with the Prefect de Police but they also went 
to the upper echelons of French society and drew in the support of French aristocrat, 
Pierre d’Harcourt. D’Harcourt was already working with Vichy intelligence and secretly 
passing information to the British.166 Yet Broad and his men’s initial contact with the 
community was through local farmers. For a number of days Broad and his men were 
hidden in barns in the area before their helpers recruited the support of an English 
Mother Superior in the local convent. These connections quickly spiralled upwards and 
by the 4 July the Prefect of the Police was appraised of the situation. The involvement 
of the Prefect de Police proved crucial for Broad and his men as an anonymous letter 
sent to him revealing their whereabouts required timely intervention.167 It was through 
the Prefect of Police that a wider circle of complicity was drawn to support the 
escapees. The Prefect was also in a position to call on the assistance of one of the local 
elites, the well-to-do Mme Bouchet de Fariens who agreed to hide the escapees for a 
short period. With this lady’s help assured, the circle of helpers in Honfleur gained 
access to a wider network of connections. These connections included an aristocratic 
circle from which contact was established with d’Harcourt through one of his 
relatives.168 
 
While involving aristocrats such as d’Harcourt represents one of the more unusual and 
most dramatic elements of this upward spiral, the pattern of social escalation of support 
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in the reports remains consistent. In most cases, this came through local leaders or 
‘opinion makers’ who were mayors, school teachers, doctors or priests. To reiterate 
Merriman’s argument, these figureheads were crucial in sustaining escape activities as 
they were perceived as problem solvers. Mayors were of notable importance, often 
providing vital information on the whereabouts of German troops or safe places to hide. 
In all reported connections with helpful mayors, introductions were provided by 
ordinary civilians. For instance, after finding shelter in Lille, Corporal N.J. Hogan, 
reported that in September 1941, he made contact with and hid in the house of the 
mayor of Louvril.169 It appears he was sent there by his helpers in Lille to verify 
rumours about an aeroplane to return men to England. Hogan was in a position to 
approach the mayor as a result of connections he had already established. Similarly, 
while Sergeant J. W. Phillips escaped from hospital with the help of his marraine, his 
circle of helpers widened to include the mayor of Lille who provided him with an 
identity card.170 
 
Equally, teachers were viewed as ‘opinion makers’ and problem solvers in 
communities. A.R. Evans, an RAF sergeant, recalls that one elderly couple he 
approached for help on the 28 September 1942 thought nothing of calling on a school 
teacher171 given his capacity as a local ‘problem solver’. In this instance, while the 
couple were willing to take Evans in, they were unsure of how best to proceed. In each 
of the above cases, teachers, doctors, priests and mayors were called upon by ‘the lower 
classes’ to organise safe houses and they established communication with potential 
helpers in neighbouring towns and villages. The school teacher helping Evans passed 
him on to another safe house where he was assisted to the Unoccupied Zone.172 This 
was mirrored in the experiences of Private H. Coshal and Private J. Bregan who were in 
hiding in rural communities in Pont St Pierre and Bonnemare for a number of months 
(June 1940-February 1941). In February their passage to unoccupied France was finally 
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arranged by a French doctor.173 Another doctor arranged for a woman to guide Corporal 
H.W.C. Surridge to the demarcation line from his safe house in Radepont.174 
 
Priests also proved useful as they more often than not had connections outside the 
community and were therefore in a position to help move men to the next safe house.175 
On one occasion, a priest living close to the demarcation line used his local knowledge 
to find a guide and assist two men into the Unoccupied Zone.176 Similarly, mayors were 
also approached to give assistance on the basis of their connections outside of the 
community. For instance, the mayor of Sirod was approached by helpers assisting men 
across the demarcation line, and using his connections, arranged the safe passage of two 
escapees into the Unoccupied Zone. The common link between these professionals and 
their involvement in escape activities was their position of trust, their intimate 
knowledge of local communities and their ability to strengthen and broaden the circle of 
helpers surrounding these men.  
 
Non-nationals and British escape activities 
Escape organisation involved helpers from a wide social spectrum which was a 
challenge considering that, according to Julian Jackson, France was virtually in a class 
war throughout the 1930s.177 However, Jackson noted resistance activities were marked 
by a willingness to overlook old rivalries. He writes ‘Catholics found themselves 
                                                            
173 Account of escape of 6082710 Pte. Coshall, H., Queen’s Royal Regt. Att. 11 A.M.P.C. 6082585 Pte. 
Breagan, J., Queen’s Royal Regt, att. 11 A.M.P.C., 17 July 1941 (N.A., WO208/3304). 
174 Account of escape of 6284682 Cpl. Surridge, H.W.C., 111 A.M.P.C., 15 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304). 
175 Priests (and nuns) played an important role in escape organisations and performed many functions, 
including harbouring and in the case of the Abbé Carpentier, forging papers. See Statement by P.0118 
F/O Taras, M., 300 (Polish Squadron, R.A.F., 9 May 1942 (N.A., WO208/3308). See also Statement by 
P)325 P/O Groyecki, Z., 300 Polish Squadron, R.A.F., 22 Jan. 1942 (N.A., WO208/3307), Account of 
escape of T/95011 Dvr. Smith, J. 3 G.H.Q. R.A.S.C., attached 51 (H) Div., 7 Jan. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3307), Statement by P.1693 P/) J. Tyszko, 301 (Bomber) Sqn, R.A.F., 7 Oct. 1940 (N.A., 
WO208/3310), Account of escape of 5110625 Pte. Astley, C., 2/R. Warwickshire Regt., 48th Div. 76610 
Dvr. Graig, A. 526 (Petrol)Coy., R.A.S.C., 51st (H)Div., 19 Dec. 1940 (N.A.,WO208/3300), Statement by 
1191521 Sgt. Obs. Reid, Hawthorn. 115 Sqn. Bomber Command, R.A.F., 27 Jan. 1943 (N.A., 
WO208/3312), Account of escape of 6135552 Sgt. G. Roskell, 226 Bmbr. Sqdn., R.A.F. and B/73568 
Pte. Thompson, G., 1 Can. Inf. H.W., 1 Can. Div., 1 Apr. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3302), Summary of a 
report by Lieut. R.L. Broad, 2/Seaforths, 51 Div., 18/25/26 May 1941 (N.A., WO208/3303); Account of 
escape of 2931814 Pte. Donald McKenzie, 4/Camerons, 51st Div., 5 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3299), 
Statement by 792693 Sgt. Polesinki, E., 307 Polish (Bomber) Sqn., R.A.F., 13 July 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3309). 
176 Account of escape of 2931814 Pte. Donald McKenzie, 4/Camerons, 51st Div., 5 Dec. 1940 (N.A., 
WO208/3299). 
177 Jackson, France the dark years, p. 65. 
73 
 
alongside anti-clericals, Socialists alongside conservatives’.178 John F Sweets offers an 
explanation for this willingness pointing out that  
 
Occupation troops and German police in the northern zone made resistance activity 
extremely dangerous, but their presence clearly defined the enemy. Resistance in 
the occupied areas meant resistance to the Boches179 
 
The identification of a common enemy was important for the final crucial component in 
the development of escape organisations in northern France, namely, the presence of 
non-nationals. There was a strong non-national contribution to escape activities and 
various national groups were cited in reports as being helpful including Americans, 
Belgians, Swiss, Portuguese, Polish, Irish and British all of which contributed to the 
protraction of escape activities (not all of which can be examined here). 
 
Non-nationals in France, for the purposes of this study, may be divided into loosely into 
three main groups; non-neutrals or countries that experienced occupation, that is, Polish, 
Belgians.; neutrals for example, Irish, Americans, Swiss; and help given by German and 
Italian civilians and soldiers. This final category was rare but not unknown. In relation 
to the Occupied Zone there is only one direct reference to German soldiers supporting 
an escape effort. This reference comes from the report of Gunner J.H. Clapham who 
recounted 
 
In one house, where I lived for five or six weeks, there were two German soldiers 
billeted. They knew I was in the house, and, in fact, I actually had my meals with 
them and used to play football with them in the yard. Both were telephonists in the 
Signals: one of them was about 42 years of age and the other about 30. They used 
both to speak to me in French, and one used sometimes to try talk English with me. 
They had been living in the house for some time, and though other British soldiers 
had been sheltered there before me, they did not make any attempt to denounce any 
of us. One of them said to me he did not care which country won the war, because 
the condition of the working class would not be any better.180 
 
These two German soldiers although not actively participating in assisting Clapham and 
his colleague, Private A. Neill, by their silence contributed to the continuation of escape 
activities. For non-neutrals and neutrals, aid given to the British depended on their 
perception of the British and their experiences of conflict. Non-neutrals such as the 
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Poles, Czechs and Belgians who had already fled or experienced occupation, were, on 
the whole, usually willing to help British soldiers.181 Yet, apart from the occasional 
reference to these nationalities, there appears to have been no attempts at organised 
assistance. The Polish were the most frequently cited non-neutral grouping outside the 
British community. In some incidences it appears Polish communities formed or had the 
potential to form escape networks. This is elucidated in the report of RAF Sergeant E. 
Polesinki. Polesinki was shot down on the 28 April 1942 and on avoiding capture 
approached a small farm in Villers. This farmer drew on the support of a local priest 
who gave Polesinki contact details of a Polish priest in Troyes. On his arrival, Polesinki 
was cared for by a Polish gardener and an English woman before he left for Le Creusot 
by train. In Le Creusot, he was taken into the care of a Polish teacher who arranged for a 
Polish youth to guide him across the demarcation line.182 Polesinki’s report appears to 
suggest that there was a certain amount of collusion between his helpers on the various 
stages of his journey, yet his report never made these connections explicit. Therefore, it 
cannot be conclusively established that Polesinki was passed from helper to helper 
based on their prior knowledge of one another.  
 
Apart from Polesinki’s experience there was no suggestion that aid given by the Polish 
community went beyond sporadic assistance, which was more often than not prompted 
by escapees taking the initiative. Yet the Polish community remained a significant 
presence in escape reports especially for shot down Polish pilots fighting with the RAF. 
Many of these pilots having already served in France before fleeing to Britain still 
retained some connections in the country. There are a number of reports from such 
pilots who, on hearing Polish, approached the speakers seeking, and expecting, to 
receive help.183 In these reported cases men obtained shelter, were given material 
assistance for a continued journey and/or were guided across the demarcation line.  
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The Poles, having experienced occupation, shared that common enemy but neutrals also 
offered assistance to escapees and thus, contributed to the success of individual escapes. 
Neutrals such as Irish civilians were approached or sought out by British soldiers for 
assistance. The impact of the Irish contribution was a small one but it is argued that not 
only the presence of Irish civilians but also the perception of ‘Irishness’ contributed to 
some successful escapes.  David Murphy has uncovered details of a number of Irish in 
the French Resistance including Katherine Anne McCarthy, who became involved in 
British escape activities.184 However, relatively little is known in relation to her entrance 
into this type of resistance or the extent of her involvement, although reports indicate 
that a number of Irish women, including nuns, acted as marraine and later engaged in 
assisting escapes.185 It is possible that McCarthy followed a similar path to resistance. 
Donald Darling’s memoir pinpointed another Irish man, Joe Balfe who set up an escape 
line with the aid of his family. Darling described Balfe and his two sons ‘as looking so 
Irish they might have been born on the ‘Ould Sod’, except for the fact that they also 
very French’.186 Similarly, there is a paucity of research on the Balfe line but researcher 
Keith Janes dated Balfe’s involvement in escape organisation to 1943.187 In relation to 
Balfe’s ‘Irishness’, it could be argued that Joe Balfe’s connections with Britain were 
stronger than those with Ireland. This assessment takes into account the fact that Balfe, 
although of Irish descent, was born in Manchester and served in the Great War.188 
 
Although it is difficult to measure the Irish contribution to escape organisation, one 
point is worth considering, the German perception of Ireland’s tenuous relationship with 
Britain proved useful to escapees. The Germans considered the Irish as potentially anti-
British. Collaborationist newspapers certainly played on negative aspects of Britain’s 
                                                                                                                                                                              
R.A.F., 13 July 1942 (N.A., WO208/3309); Statement by P. 0400 F/O Wacinski, J.T., 304 (Polish) 
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186 Donald Darling, Secret Sunday (London, 1975), p. 133. 
187 Keith Janes, ‘The Joe Balfe escape line’ available at Conscript Heroes (http://www.conscript-




relationship with Ireland to discredit Britain by continually predicting the occupation of 
Ireland by the British. On one occasion, Basil Embry was arrested and questioned by 
the Germans but released on the strength of his claim that he was an IRA leader. This 
preferential treatment of Irish nationals in France worked to the advantage of at least 
two escapees. In November 1941, Sergeant O.B. James and Sergeant W.J. McGrath 
approached an Anglican Church in Paris and on finding it closed and under the 
protection of the American Embassy, turned instead to an Irish Catholic Church. Not 
only was this church allowed to remain open but both men were assisted to the 
demarcation line by an Irish priest.189 
 
Equally, American nationals and the American Embassy played a small role in early 
escape activities. Almost without exception, men arriving in Paris from the Forbidden 
Zone throughout the summer and autumn of 1940 called upon the American Embassy. 
Notwithstanding the lack of an official policy towards the British, Embassy staff 
discretely referred soldiers to the ‘English section’. There are even some extreme 
examples of staff agreeing to harbour men for a short period of time. Embry was  
 
Taken to the English section where I was introduced to the English wife of a 
Russian Count (White Russian) working in the American Consulate.190 
 
The report of Sergeant S.G.C Park related an analogous experience. Park attested to 
being harboured by an Embassy employee for a month in November 1940. However, 
Embry’s and Park’s experiences appear to have been the exception rather than the rule. 
On the whole, the Embassy’s ability to help was restricted to its capacity to discreetly 
forward money to arriving soldiers and/or refer men to hostels such as the Salvation 
Army. There are three separate accounts of Embassy referrals to the Salvation Army, 
one of these being Private J. Lee Warner.191 While there, Warner counted the presence 
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of at least seven other men, possibly referred by the Embassy.192 By late autumn 1940 
the ability of the Embassy to offer any kind of assistance was increasingly precarious 
and accounts are varied as to ability and type of aid received. In spite of this, men 
continued to attempt to contact the Embassy and, where possible, staff offered 
assistance. One of the last accounts of such help was August 1941 when officials aided 
Wing Commander Whitney Straight. Straight reached Paris shortly after being shot 
down and was somewhat surprised at, not only finding the Embassy closed, but a sign 
declaring that all queries be addressed to the American Embassy in Berlin. In spite of 
this, Straight had the presence of mind to continue his efforts and ring the Embassy, a 
move which was duly awarded. An official met Straight in a café nearby, handing him 
1000 francs which he used to reach the Unoccupied Zone. 
 
Straight’s experience, and that of other escapees assisted by non nationals, illustrates the 
contribution of these various nationalities to escape activities in France. In this 
consideration of non-national involvement in escape, the British contribution to such 
activities must not be overlooked. Indeed, as will be demonstrated, the efforts of British 
officers, namely Captain Charles Murchie and later Captain Ian Garrow, helped 
crystallise escape activities in the occupied zones and facilitated the expansion of these 
efforts beyond the demarcation line. 
 
The main account of Murchie’s activities come from three primary sources: his report, a 
letter he wrote to the British ambassador Sir Samuel Hoare while imprisoned in Spain 
and the report of his colleague Sergeant H. Clayton. In order to counteract the bias 
inherent in personal accounts it was necessary to cross reference Murchie’s account 
with the experiences of other British escapees.  Five men, Private J.T. Clarke, Second 
Lieutenant R.E.H. Parkinson, Private R.W. Rankine, Captain A. Irvine Robertson and 
Lieutenant R.D.W. Griffin, loosely corroborate Murchie’s claims and provide 
credibility to his chronology. From these accounts it is evident that Murchie’s activities 
extended from Frévent, where he remained in hiding until August 1940, to Lille. As 
early as July 1940 it appears from Parkinson’s report that Murchie intended to form an 
escape organisation. According to Parkinson, he heard of Murchie from his hiding place 
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in Burbure-sure-Conchie and went to see him.193 Murchie informed him of the existence 
of an organisation and told him to remain in hiding until summoned. Parkinson duly 
followed this advice and at some point in August, Murchie reported he left for Lille. It 
is unknown where he stayed but his presence there at this time was substantiated by 
Clarke. Clarke met Murchie in September and also noted a meeting with Lieutenant 
James Langley.194 Langley had escaped from the Faculté Catholique in October and 
was hidden by a number of French civilians active in escape activities (including Mme 
Samier). This indicates that not only was Murchie in Lille as he claimed but that he was 
also actively involved with French helpers. 
 
Clayton’s report goes one step further and claims that Murchie was one of the main 
organisers behind escape endeavours. Clayton stated that he met Murchie in September 
and immediately put himself ‘under his orders’.195 Clayton had previously worked as an 
interpreter for the British and had a French wife. According to Clayton, he used his 
language skills to expand the scope of Murchie’s efforts which extended to a thirty mile 
radius around Lille and also involved connections in Dunkirk and Ghent, Belgium. As a 
result, Clayton managed to raise 50,000 francs for Murchie. In the meantime, Parkinson 
reported that Murchie kept in continual contact with him and his colleague, Sergeant 
Bell at their hiding place in Frévent.  
 
There is no explanation as to how such connections were extended or maintained. 
Equally, it is difficult to substantiate Clayton’s claims that Murchie was indeed 
strengthening ties with helpers in Dunkirk and Ghent. In addition to this, Rankine’s 
report noted that Murchie had established connections in St Omer but his information 
was based on Murchie’s account of his activities.196 Yet there is evidence to suggest that 
there is substance to Clayton’s account. This mainly comes from Clarke and Parkinson. 
Parkinson did profess that by October 1940 he had lost faith in these schemes, 
especially when he heard three other servicemen in the area, Boyd, Knight and Poole, 
had set off. On arrival in Lille later in that month Parkinson appears to have re-
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established contact with ‘the organisation’ which he noted ‘now’ had its headquarters in 
Roubaix. Parkinson’s report implied that three weeks after his arrival in Lille this 
organisation arranged his journey to the Unoccupied Zone and Marseilles. Parkinson’s 
reference to ‘the organisation’ appears to link it to the one associated with Murchie. 
This is reinforced by the reference to Roubaix as an arrest of a helper in October forced 
Clayton and Murchie to leave for Paris (Clarke’s account stated he went to Paris with 
both men at this time). This incident may possibly have precipitated the removal of the 
remaining organisation to Roubaix. Moreover, when Murchie arrived in Marseilles he 
claimed he sent for Knight and Boyle (possibly meaning Boyd) suggesting he also 
organised their departure to the Unoccupied Zone. These two men were also most likely 
the two men referred to in Parkinson’s report. This indicates that all men, Parkinson, his 
colleague Bell (with whom he travelled), Knight and Boyd (Boyle) were in contact with 
the helpers working with Murchie and that Murchie played a role in extending this 
organisation. 
 
Murchie’s move south, prompted as it was by an arrest, enabled him to bring knowledge 
of these connections with him. By his account, in both the letter to Sir Samuel Hoare 
and his escape report, he records his preoccupation with passing men from the Occupied 
to the Unoccupied Zone after his arrival in Marseilles in October 1940. His knowledge 
of helpers in the north and his continued connections with them is further corroborated 
by Griffin and Robertson as Murchie was able to inform them of the fate of an arrested 
helper in Lille.197 These accounts indicate that Murchie was, if not among the main 
organisers, heavily involved in escape activities. In the course of his work he engaged 
with locals willing to assist the British and, according to Clayton, carefully selected 
people for this role. He contributed to strengthening, expanding and linking various 
helpers in the Lille region and by doing so contributed to crystallising early escape 
organisations in northern France. 
 
To conclude, the physical British presence in France was both a focal point and catalyst 
for some of the first gestures of resistance where the experiences of witnessing the 
marching columns were crucial to later involvement in escape activities. The 
sympathetic responses and kindness of civilians to prisoners in the marching columns 
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encouraged escape activities which in turn propagated the development of escape as a 
form of resistance within communities along or near routes marched. As the occupation 
progressed and men disappeared from public view, connecting with the British became 
increasingly difficult. However, the British presence remained the focal point of 
resistance and civilians, like Mme Bonnefous, seeking a means to resist German 
occupaton, deliberately sought to connect with prisoners. As demonstrated in this 
chapter, this was often achieved under the guise of philanthropy and caring for wounded 
prisoners. Philanthropic organisations were often used by civilians as a cover for their 
escape activities. This chapter has also illustrated that philanthropic organisations, on 
occasion, not only helped civilians connect with the British but played a role in 
connecting helpers in rural communities with helpers in the city and thus, expanding the 
scope of such activities. Communities, however, did not solely rely on philanthropic 
organisations but also had internal support structures and those hiding men drew on 
these resources to move men to the safety of the Unoccupied Zone.  
 
Support often drew in family members expanding outwards to include trusted members 
of the community. Those harbouring British servicemen assumed responsibility for 
recruiting the support network necessary to sustain these men in hiding. As British 
servicemen were more likely to approach poorer civilians and isolated farmsteads, this 
support network was more often than not recruited from this group. Teachers, priests, 
doctors and mayors were regularly drawn into escape activities by seeking to assist 
poorer members of their community pass on British servicemen. In this manner, a point 
heretofore often overlooked in studies on escape activities, recruitment for such 
resistance actions appears to have come from below. Equally, non national communities 
such as Irish, American and Polish civilians living in France were important in the 
success of early escapes. British servicemen identified members of these communities 
as potentially sympathetic and approached them for help. These individuals also 
contributed to the success of a number of early escape activities. In this way, other 
nationalities engaged in escape activities, indicating that it is important not to consider 
assistance to British soldiers as restricted to a French resistance but as part of a wider 
European resistance that, in the cases discussed above, happened to take place in 
France.198 
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However, on a practical level early improvised organisations had serious limitations; 
few went beyond the Forbidden or Occupied Zones. Communication break downs and 
security issues were a continual problem making it impossible to establish or 
consolidate a centre for escape activity. As a result of these problems, the British in 
hiding assumed some of the responsibility for organising their own passage south. In 
doing so, organisers like Captain Charles Murchie became important in crystallising 
support despite the German occupation in the north hindering his ability to organise. As 
a result, a shift to the south to the Unoccupied Zone was essential. As will be 
established in chapter two, it was only with the shift in escape organisation south of the 
demarcation line that organisers, north and south, were in a position to consolidate 






Overcoming isolation: British escapees in unoccupied France 
 
The previous chapter examined the development of escape organisations in the north 
and the social processes contributing to their formation; this chapter shifts its focus to 
the Unoccupied Zone and the social, political and military factors contributing to the 
emergence of a British-led escape organisation, more commonly known as the “Pat 
Line”, in Marseilles. The focal point of this chapter is not so much how the British, on 
arriving in the Unoccupied Zone, sought to continue their journey out of France via the 
Pyrenees or ports (see Chapter Three), but on how the British established a presence and 
foothold in the Unoccupied Zone and how this foothold ultimately laid the foundation 
for an organised escape network.  
 
First encounters in the Unoccupied Zone 
Although it is agreed that the British appeared to be in a better position in this zone, 
mainly due to liberal parole terms (discussed later in this chapter), they were initially 
unable to connect with or recognise a potential support base in unoccupied France. The 
reports suggest that there was reluctance on the part of French civilians in the 
Unoccupied Zone to assist British escapees. In contrast to recorded experiences in the 
Occupied Zone, there is a notable absence of references to an outpouring of civilian 
support. While officers such as Captain D.B. Lang asserted the willingness to help 
matched his experiences in occupied France, such assertions were singular.1 In an 
account given by Corporal George Shepherd Newton in autumn 1940 he described 
inhabitants of the Unoccupied Zone as ‘not unfriendly’. 2  Newton clarifies his 
assessment, reporting that in unoccupied France ‘we had to buy all our food and, 
sometimes, had to stay in hotels and pay for our accommodation’.3 In doing so, he 
implicitly implies that this was not the case in occupied France, a point reinforced by 
the fact that his statement was proceded by descriptions of help he received in the north. 
Newton’s assessment is bolstered by similar references to this difference, with one 
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British soldier proclaiming civilians in occupied France as ‘kind’ and the attitude in 
unoccupied France as ‘the opposite’.4 
 
This attitude difference, or more correctly the British sense of this contrast in attitude 
between the Occupied and Unoccupied Zone, endured throughout the period under 
review, 1940-42. Therefore, while the examples cited in the above paragraph reflect the 
early months following the establishment of Vichy, this change in attitude continued as 
a recurrent theme in the reports. In this respect, escapees such as Squadron Leader 
E.P.P. Gibbs, who crossed the demarcation line in June 1941, was struck by the 
reluctance of civilians in unoccupied France to render him assistance. Gibbs, an R.A.F. 
pilot, had made a forced landing near Fruges, Pas de Calais in June 1941 before making 
his way, with assistance, across the demarcation line. Gibbs noted 
 
It was most noticeable that the attitude of the civilian population in the Unoccupied 
Zone was very different from that which I had experienced in the Occupied Zone.5 
 
Another British officer summed up this reluctance to give assistance, as a result of a 
population ‘thankful that they have been saved’ and a feeling that ‘the war for them is 
over’.6 This sentiment echoes what many historians consider Robert Paxton’s ground 
breaking research on Vichy France. Paxton, in relation to resistance in Vichy, observed 
that the absence of the Germans made it difficult for the population in the Unoccupied 
Zone to recognise a ‘clear target’ for their resistance. 7 Paxton argued that it was not 
necessarily evident to anti-German Frenchmen that the Vichy government was also an 
enemy.8 H.R. Kedward’s work on resistance in Vichy France also accepts Paxton’s 
assessment adding that under the terms of the Armistice the Germans actually withdrew 
troops from areas such as Lyon, Saint-Étienne, Mâcon and parts of the Indre.9 Both 
historians argue that resistance in the Unoccupied Zone took time to develop as it not 
only had to address the German presence in the north but also come to terms with the 
question of Vichy. In practical terms, this meant that civilians in the Unoccupied Zone 
were reluctant to engage in resistance activities, including aiding escapees. The reports, 
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and British observations in relation to this attitude, reinforce this position. Whereas in 
the north, where Corporal J. A. Martin could boldly make the general claim that in his 
experience French civilians considered British victory as their ‘only hope’10, there is a 
notable absence of similar claims in relation to the Unoccupied Zone. Equally, and in 
contrast to the Occupied Zone, there was no evident outpouring of civilian support for 
escapees arriving in the Unoccupied Zone. This is not to argue that there was no 
sympathy or empathy for the British but that it was difficult for arriving men to identify 
potential helpers. The resulting attitude difference contributed to the sense of alienation 
experienced by escapees in unoccupied France. 
 
The reaction of the French authorities helped compound this isolation. This was not as 
obvious a marginalising factor as the attitude of the general population but it was no less 
effective. Initially, the British experienced respect and good will from the French 
authorities on reaching the Unoccupied Zone. In relation to the Franco-German 
Armistice, which saw the formation of unoccupied France, the Vichy authorities were 
obliged to intern escapees but there were no stipulations or obligations to hand these 
men back to the Germans, which stood in sharp contrast to the Armistice’s position on 
political refugees.11 The French took this responsibility seriously and there is little 
evidence to suggest, unlike incidences on the Franco-Spanish frontier, that men were 
pushed back across the demarcation line or handed over to the Germans. On one 
occasion, there was a rumour that the French had transferred men from Chateauroux 
(Unoccupied Zone) to Lille (Forbidden Zone). This rumour made an appearance in the 
report of Sergeant I.T. Hughes who crossed the demarcation line in August 1940, was 
arrested by the French and sent to Chateauroux with a colleague.12 While there he met a 
number of escapees, one of whom he met in the north, Sergeant R.W. Lonsdale.13 
According to Hughes, and he does not clarify the source of his information, the French 
sent Lonsdale and two servicemen to an internment camp in Lille. However, there is 
evidence refuting the veracity of this rumour. Hughes does not refer to Lonsdale’s first 
name but his claim, based on hearsay, is contradicted by the report of Sergeant R.W. 
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Lonsdale.14 Details in Lonsdale’s report suggest that R.W. Lonsdale was the individual 
at the heart of this rumour. If this was the case, the events unfolded in an entirely 
different manner to that recounted by Hughes. Lonsdale continued to the Pyrenees but 
was re-arrested and spent time in a number of internment centres before managing to 
cross the Pyrenees at the end of December 1940. 
 
In spite of such rumours, which it must be noted were rare, the French authorities were 
not compelled and, to all intents and purposes, did not pass escapees back across the 
demarcation line. In this respect, men arriving in the Unoccupied Zone were safe from 
German internment. Moreover, and adding to the difficulty in tracing British isolation, 
there is plenty of evidence to suggest that French authorities, on an individual basis at 
least, were initially reluctant to make arrests. Numerous accounts from British escapees 
commented on French authorities, both military and civil, congratulating them on their 
escapes, turning a blind eye, and on occasion actively aiding their continued journey 
across the Unoccupied Zone. Sergeant I.T. Hughes’ first experience of the Unoccupied 
Zone illustrates this phenomenon. Hughes crossed the demarcation line in July 1940 
with two colleagues and was arrested by gendarmes. All three were handed over to the 
military authorities and congratulated by a French Colonel on their escape. They were 
given a free pass to Chateauroux, travelling there apparently without any guards. In 
Chateauroux, there is evidence to suggest they had a good deal of friendly contact with 
French authorities especially considering, as Hughes reported, 
 
We were warned that we were likely to be interned, cleared out and got a pass from 
a military guard, on the railway station, to Marseilles15 
 
This goodwill was a common experience for escapees arriving in the Unoccupied Zone 
throughout the summer of 1940.16 
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This goodwill was, it must be noted, at times expected by the British. For instance, two 
men, Sergeant F. Faith and Sergeant J.R. Nicholls, on crossing the demarcation line in 
August 1940, were approached and given assistance by a French captain who drove 
them fifty kilometres in the direction of Chateauroux.17 On another occasion, they were 
helped by a French Liaison officer who lodged them in his house. They were informed 
that they had ten days before the authorities would intern them. Continuing their 
journey south, both men approached and were given assistance in a French barracks on 
at least two, possibly three occasions.18 Given that Faith and Nicholls, arguably rather 
audaciously, sought assistance at a number of military barracks it is possible to assert 
that this was done in the expectation that they would receive help, or at the very least 
fair treatment. Taking this account in context it was not uncommon for escapees, on 
crossing the demarcation line, to seek some support or assistance from the local French 
authorities.19 This is perhaps indicative of some remaining faith in French empathy, 
especially in relation to British dealings with the military authorities. 
 
On occasion escapees even indicated their surprise following refusals on the part of the 
authorities to help. Yet disappointments mounted with the French under pressure to 
come to terms not only with prisoners of war but also the refugee crisis besetting the 
Unoccupied Zone. Even within early accounts there are suggestions that the French 
were attempting to assert a clear policy in relation to the treatment of the British. For 
instance, while the military authorities were aware of Hughes’ presence in Chateauroux 
                                                            
17 Account of escape of 808830 Sgt. Faith, A., 1/R.N.A. and 2927357 Sgt. Nicholls, F., 4/Camerons, 30 
Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300). 
18 Nicholls and Faith report being assisted at a French barracks in Alibi and again in Alban. At Alban it 
was indicated to both men that they could find help at the barracks in Belarbre. However, it is unclear if 
they continued to Belarbre and met the officer willing to help them. Account of escape of 808830 Sgt. 
Faith, A., 1/R.N.A. and 2927357 Sgt. Nicholls, F., 4/Camerons, 30 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300).  
19 In August 1940 Driver W. Davidson was given assistance by French gendarmes at Loches, a town near 
the demarcation line. It is, however, unclear if he directly sought assistance. Account of escape of 895205 
Dvr. W. Davidson, R.A., 23rd Field Rgt., 16 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300).  In July/AugustSergeant D. 
L. Phillips and his colleague reported to the Military Authorities at Lyon, no doubt seeking assistance. On 
this occasion both were imprisoned. Account of escape of No. 545177 Sgt. D.L. Phillips R.A.F. No. 150 
Squadron, 6 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300). In September 1940, Sergeant E. Watson was with a number 
of colleagues in Toulouse. A Red Cross worker approached the French military authorities for help on 
their behalf. Statement by No. 967923 Sgt. E. Watson, R.A.F. No 40 Squadron, 6 Dec. 1940 
(N.A.,WO208/3300). In the summer/autumn 1940 Private A. Sangster reported to a French military post 
on crossing the demarcation line. He was spent the night there and was sent to Chateauroux. Account of 
escape of 2753595 Pte. Alexander Sangster, 1/Black Watch (R.H.R.), 5 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300). 
See also Account of escape of Lieut. William Sillar, R.A.M.C. Attd. 178th Lancashire Fusiliers.2nd 
Division, 6 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300); Account of escape of Capt. F. Fitch, Royal Norfolk Regt. 
H.W. 4 Inf. Bde. Attached 2 Div., 17 Feb. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3301); Account of escape of 3525734 Pte. 
Morton, John, 1/Black Watch, 51st Div., 19 Jan. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3301); Account of escape of 
19275551 Dvr. Hall, W.T., 107 Army Fd. Coy., R.E. 1 Corps Tps., 12 Aug. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3305). 
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he was warned he was likely to be interned. Thus, by August, despite the personal 
sentiments of individual French officers and gendarmes, there was a loyalty to Vichy 
authority which made arrests increasingly more likely. This is also exemplified in the 
experiences of Faith and Nicholls who received assistance from a number of French 
officers but on arriving in Mont Louis were arrested by a gendarme and placed in the 
town jail. According to Faith and Nicholls, they were visited by a French Liaison officer 
who advised them to cross into Spain. However, in spite of the officer’s ‘pro-British’ 
tendencies both men were sent to an internment camp in St Cyprien. 
 
Similar to civilians, the French authorities had a vested interest in Vichy and did not 
necessarily see it as an enemy. Therefore, pro-British sentiment was progressively 
tempered with a duty to make an arrest. This experience is mirrored in numerous 
situations and contexts during the period 1940-42. In a particularly notable example in 
January 1941, the crew of an airplane which crash landed near Lyon had lunch paid for 
by a ‘nice and pro-British’ French commandant. The commandant seems to have had 
reservations about his role in interning the crew and informed them that 
 
If any other British machine should have trouble in that neighbourhood and needed 
medical help, they could land in the aerodrome and ask for him, personally, but 
that it is essential that they leave both engines running, so as to get off again. He 
would give them any help he could and possibly he and others would try to come 
over with them.20 
 
Yet despite this declaration of pro-British sentiment there was no question that the 
aircrew would be released and all were interned in St Hippolyte du Fort, near Nîmes 
(unoccupied France). 
 
Thus, the escape reports suggest that in relation to personal sentiments of the French 
authorities, and despite British appeals to the patriotism of arresting officers, the 
obligation to arrest appears to have triumphed in most cases. Analysing the reasons or 
motivations for this are beyond the scope of this thesis, although one member of the 
aircrew did attempt an explanation, noting that ‘every Frenchman’ he met was ‘100% 
Pétain’ but in the context of this chapter the significance of this attitude relates to its 
impact on the British. This impact is suggested in a number of ways, all of which 
illustrate the marginalisation and isolation experienced by British servicemen and 
                                                            
20 Statement by 742649 Sgt. S.M.F. Parkes, 9 Squadron, R.A.F., 19 June 1941 (N.A., WO208/3304). 
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officers in the Unoccupied Zone. There was a growing trend, in relation to both men in 
unoccupied France for a considerable period and those newly arrived, of avoiding the 
French authorities completely. This was combined with the lack of expectation in regard 
to assistance. As one officer put it, while the French authorities were friendly, they were 
‘not playing’21, that is, not helping men continue their journey south to either one of the 
major port cities such as Marseilles or across the Pyrenees. Therefore, while the British 
had been initially willing to accept, and in some cases actively sought, the assistance of 
the French authorities, this position was unsustainable.  
 
French authorities, parole and the growing isolation of British escapees  
Inevitably, as the German grip tightened the French authorities took a more hardline 
approach to escapees and men in unoccupied France were increasingly likely to be 
arrested. As some individual gendarmes continued to remain sympathetic to the British 
war effort, the push to intern British escapees was potentially a delicate issue. However, 
it could be argued that the French authorities’ willingness to introduce parole went some 
way to easing the concerns of individual sympathetic gendarmes at making arrests. To 
put it simply, the introduction of parole meant that sympathetic French gendarmes could 
make arrests in the course of their work in the knowledge that those they arrested could 
use their parole to plan another escape. In order to address this argument and convey the 
importance and impact of parole it is necessary to firstly address the concept itself. 
Parole refers to a handwritten or typed official agreement given by a British prisoner to 
the French (or German) authorities through his senior officer. In this agreement, the 
prisoner pledged he would not escape and in return for this guarantee he was granted 
certain freedoms.  
 
The origins of parole are relatively obscure but medieval historians suggest that it was a 
concept initially developed by knights participating in jousting tournaments and later, as 
a result of its association with knights, transcended the playing field into the 
battlefield.22 Paul Robinson’s book, Military honour and the conduct of war from 
ancient Greece to Iraq, traces the application of parole and its development from its 
                                                            
21Account of escape of Major John Ronald Mackintosh-Walker, M.C., Seaforth Highlanders 
Commanding 4/Bn. Cameron Highlanders and Major Thomas Gordon Rennie, Black Watch, G.2., 51 
Div., 5 Aug. 1940 (NA., WO208/3298). 
22 Private communication with medievalist David Collins. Collins has carried out extensive primary 




medieval roots to the modern day.23 Given the scope of his study he gives only cursory 
attention to the application of parole in the Second World War. Similar to Robinson’s 
study, Gary Brown also undertook a cursory examination of parole and argued that the 
concept was an enduring one associated with the upper echelons of society.24 His 
argument has merit particularly considering autobiographies such as that of George 
Halstead Boylan. Boylan was an American serving as an assistant surgeon major in the 
French Army during the Franco-Prussian War. He was captured by the Germans in 
November 1870 and informed by German general, General von Voigts-Rhetz that if he 
gave his word of honour, that is his parole, then the general would not ‘be obliged’ to 
place him in confinement.25 There has been some reference to parole in histories of 
escape networks such as M.R.D. Foot’s work on escape lines, which refers to the use of 
parole in the context of the Second World War. However, Foot does not distinguish 
between the different interpretations of parole and the impact of this different 
interpretation in areas such as unoccupied France.  
 
The power of parole and the ability of this concept to influence policy was underpinned 
not only by its long tradition but also by the fact that parole was given legal status in 
international law. One of the first attempts to codify the concept of parole in a European 
context took place in 1874 with the Brussels Convention; although this convention did 
not gain widespread international consensus, it paved the way for The Hague 
Conventions (1899 and 1907). Both Hague conventions recognised parole and, in fact, 
for the most part the same wording as the Brussels Convention was used in laying out 
both the obligations and parameters of parole.26 In 1929, parole was also recognised by 
                                                            
23 Paul Robinson, Military honour and the conduct of war from ancient Greece to Iraq (New York and 
London, 2006), p. 75. 
24 Gary D. Brown, ‘Prisoner of war parole, ancient concept, modern utility’ in Military Law Review, cxli 
(1998), p. 210. 
25 George Halstead Boylan, Six months under the Red Cross (Cincinnati, 1873), pp 228-29. 
26 Brown pointed to the Lieber Code, 1863, which he claims ‘articulated the rules of warfare’ during the 
American civil war. This preceded the Brussels Declaration by eleven years. Brown, ‘Prisoner of war 
parole’, p. 210. Brown’s argument is supported by an examination of the Brussels Declaration. The 
Declaration stated that prisoners of war were ‘bound, on their personal honour’ to fulfil the terms of their 
parole. The Hague Convention also asserted the place of parole in warfare. This Convention used 
language similar to the Brussels Declaration, reiterating that prisoners were ‘bound, on their personal 
honour’ to fulfil the terms of their parole. Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and 
Customs of War, Brussels, 27 Aug. 1874 available at the Cultural Policy Research Institute 
(http://www.cprinst.org/Home/cultural-property-laws/1874-brussels-declaration) (30 Apr. 2015); Hague 
Convention Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II): July 29, 1899 available at The 




the Geneva Convention27 propelling parole as a concept into the twentieth century. 
Thus, the tradition of parole, combined with its acceptance and presence in international 
treaties, lent it credibility but also provided a common platform from which signatories 
of those treaties, in this case specifically Britain, France and Germany, understood, 
appreciated and used parole.  
 
Parole, or more correctly the French interpretation of parole, had profound implications 
for the British in the Unoccupied Zone. In order to elucidate this position, it is worth 
having a point of contrast and therefore it is necessary to briefly outline the German 
application of parole in occupied territory. In relation to the escape reports, there are 
few accounts of parole in the Occupied Zone. However it is named in the account of 
Private Patrick J. Harper who noted that he was approved for parole in autumn 1940 in 
order to facilitate his work as an interpreter in a prison camp near Cambrai. Harper’s 
work required additional freedom, freedoms his colleagues did not have. His account 
reinforces the sense, that in this context at least, parole was task-orientated and 
restricted to Harper’s skills as interpreter. Another account, given by Sergeant E.G. 
Hillyard, suggests that on occasion the Germans took a liberal attitude to parole. 
Hillyard recorded receiving parole while wounded in hospital in Angers; he used parole 
to leave the hospital and visit the town.28 There is no indication that Hillyard fulfilled 
any duties or tasks and therefore it is difficult to determine the basis of his parole 
considering that few reports record receiving parole from the German authorities and 
fewer still noted receiving it without fulfilling some specific purpose such as forming 
work parties. However, the fact that Hillyard’s case is unusual does underscore the 
rarity of parole in the occupied zones. It seems that it did not play a major role in the 
daily lives of British prisoners and potential escapees.  
 
This stands in sharp contrast to the Unoccupied Zone and the French authorities’ liberal 
interpretation of parole. When men did find themselves interned by the authorities in the 
weeks following the defeat, it was often purely cursory. For instance, Lieutenant H.S.M. 
Hogg and Captain Raikes arrived in the Unoccupied Zone in mid July 1940 and 
                                                            
27 Brown, ‘Prisoner of war parole,’ p. 210.  See also Convention of July 27, 1929 Relative to Prisoner of 
War available at The Avalon Project, The Yale Law Library 
(http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/geneva02.asp) (30 Apr. 2015).  




‘reported’ to the French authorities at Loches, a town close to the demarcation line. 
Both men were ‘taken’ to Belabre along with five other British escapees where, Hogg’s 
account indicates, they were joined by at least five more men.29 All were lodged at a 
hotel at the expense of the local authorities and given what Hogg termed, surveillance 
libérée,30 which effectively allowed them the freedom of the town. There is no detail 
relating to the procedure behind this surveillance libérée but there is circumstantial 
evidence to suggest that it was relatively informal. Within days of giving it, a change of 
guard prompted the escapees to leave the area and all used their surveillance libérée to 
do so. Parole violation was taken seriously and men were aware of this. The escape 
reports provide one account of an escapee in the Occupied Zone violating his parole but 
he also personally changed the dates on his parole papers to cover his violation. This 
was done in order to prevent any ramifications for his actions in the event of re-
capture.31 Yet in the case of Hogg and his companions, no precaution was necessary, 
nor were there any concerns over consequences; they simply left before they were due 
to make their daily report to the authorities. This incident is mirrored in numerous 
similar accounts which equally reinforce the impression that there was a lack of formal 
arrests. This was often followed by an apparent equally informal parole, which it must 
be pointed out directly facilitated early escapes.32 
 
This type of behaviour denotes an early comaraderie between the British and French but 
as indicated officials, in spite of individual sentiment, were under increasing pressure to 
come to terms with the situation. This is particularly evident in relation to the reaction 
of gendarmes to British escapees in Marseilles.  Numbers of men had arrived in this 
port city in the hope of reaching Gibraltar or North Africa and while in the city found 
                                                            
29 In Hogg’s report, he noted the presence of Captain Bradford and five ordinary ranks on his arrival in 
Belarbre. Hogg reported that this number increased with the arrival of Captain Ian Garrow and another 
ordinary rank a few days later. This was followed by the arrival of Captain Fitch and Lieutenant Sillar. 
Account of escape of Lt H.S.M Hogg, R.E. 26th Fd. Coy., 28 Oct. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3299). 
30 This term is used in Hogg’s report and is reproduced here. 
31 Account of escape of 747947 Sergt. Hillyard, E.G.,150 Bomber Squadron, R.A.F., 30 Mar. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3302).  
32 There are numerous examples of this in volumes WO208/3298-WO208/3301 of the escape reports. One 
particularly extraordinary example occurred in July 1940. Flight Officer R. Hawkins arrived in Vichy and 
met Captain Waters, Major W.C.W. Potts and Captain C.R.I Besley. He was invited to dine with them so 
he accompanied them. They took him to a local internment camp. The officer in charge of the camp 
started asking him questions prompting Hawkins to leave. He left without difficulty and from Potts and 
Besley’s report, even though they were arrested in Vichy, they later left the internment camp without 
difficulty, continuing their journey to Marseilles. Account of escape of No. 70802 F/O R. Hawkins 103 
(B) Squadron, B.E.F. (Fairey Battle), 10 Oct. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3299); Account of escape of 2144 
Major W.C.W. Potts, 7/R/ Northumberland Fusiliers, 16 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300); Account of 
escape of 37810 Capt. C.R.I Besley, 7/R/ Northumberland Fusiliers, 6 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300). 
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shelter at the Seamen’s Mission, taken over by Reverend Donald Caskie (discussed in 
more detail later in this chapter). On the 24 July 1940 French gendarmes arrived at the 
Mission, the incident was recorded by an officer present, Major W.C.W Potts, who 
wrote  
 
The French Police … demanded to see the S.B.O. [Senior British Officer] who was 
myself. They informed me that they had orders to intern all British soldiers in Fort 
St. Jean.33 
 
Potts’ statement indicates that not only were the French authorities aware of the 
presence of escapees in Marseilles but they also knew that they were being harboured at 
the Mission, a claim reinforced by the fact that they knew exactly where to find these 
men. In spite of this knowledge, it appears they had not acted, one may argue they 
turned a blind eye, on this fact until they had received definite orders. Once these orders 
were received, a formal procedure was followed with this order transferred to the senior 
British officer. Yet, at this point, there is still evidence of a reluctance to follow through 
on immediate arrests as indicated by the report of Flight Officer R. Hawkins who was 
also at the Mission around that time; he suggests that men were required to appear at the 
fort at their personal volition.34 In Hawkins case, he chose this moment to leave 
Marseilles and cross the Pyrenees to Spain. However, these niceties were temporary in 
nature and throughout August it became a matter of course to intern men arriving in 
Marseilles in Fort St Jean, a French Foreign Legion barracks situated in the Vieux Port 
area of the city. By October, Marseilles, or more particularly Fort St Jean, became the 
focus of wider French efforts to come to terms with escapees with British interned or 
arrested elsewhere transferred to the city. 
 
Yet this tougher policy went hand in hand with generous parole terms. Initially, it 
appears that officers more so than ordinary ranks benefitted from parole. One 
serviceman, bemoaning his lot in August, complained that he was required to carry out 
‘fatigues’ (menial labour) in the morning and in the evening was not allowed outside 
                                                            
33 Account of escape of 2144 Major W.C.W. Potts, 7/R/ Northumberland Fusiliers, 16 Dec. 1940 (N.A., 
WO208/3300). 
34 Account of escape of No. 70802 F/O R. Hawkins 103 (B) Squadron, B.E.F. (Fairey Battle), 10 Oct. 
1940 (N.A., WO208/3299). 
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his barracks.35 However, a month later this situation appears to have changed and an 
officer newly arrived in the fort observed that ordinary ranks were allowed out on 
parole in the evenings for ‘recreational purposes’ and most used this time to visit the 
Seamen’s Mission.36 This is mirrored in the reports of this time with most men 
referring to parole as if it was expected as a matter of course. According to Captain 
D.B. Lang, who arrived in Marseilles from the Occupied Zone in October 1940 (his 
experiences were recounted in the previous chapter), the guards at Fort St Jean did not 
question the comings and goings of officers. This was confirmed by another officer 
who declared internment in Marseilles as ‘purely nominally’.37 Parole, in contrast to the 
Occupied Zone, played a defining role in the experiences of British prisoners in 
unoccupied France. 
 
While this freedom appears to the advantage of the British, it could also be argued, 
rather conversely, that it had an isolating impact on these men. Arguably, generous 
parole and internment conditions alleviated the responsibility of decision making or 
taking sides on the part of the French, particularly arresting gendarmes. In the early 
weeks following the defeat, as already demonstrated, the French authorities willingly 
tolerated, in some cases, actively aided soldiers to escape. Yet as time progressed, 
French gendarmes, even those expressing pro-British sentiments, were more likely to 
make arrests than turn a blind eye. The substantial majority of reports do not go into 
great detail concerning arrests by French gendarmes but on at least two known 
occasions there is evidence to suggest that the gendarme’s knowledge of lenient 
internment conditions reconciled his pro-British tendencies to his duty to make the 
arrest. Arrests were accompanied by escape advice. For instance, a British serviceman, 
D.W. Herring, was arrested attempting to cross the Pyrenees in August 1940.38 
According to Herring the arresting gendarme pointed out the correct route across the 
mountains should he have the opportunity to escape again. In the second incident which 
also took place in August 1940, a French officer with ‘pro-British tendencies’, advised 
                                                            
35 Account of escape of Signalman D.W. Herring, No. 2328065 Roayal Corps of Signals. Attd. 51 
Highland Division Sigs., 29 Sept. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3299). 
36 Account of escape of 56146 Capt. Mills, C.F.P., 97th Kent Yeomanry Field Regiment, Attd. 1st R.H.A 
50th Div., 31 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300). 
37 Account of escape of Lieut. William Sillar, R.A.M.C. Att.d 178th Lancashire Fusiliers. 2nd Division, 6 
Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300); Detailed Report by Captain DB Lang, Jan/Feb 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3301). 
38 Account of escape of Signalman D.W. Herring, No. 2328065 Royal Corps of Signals. Attd. 51 
Highland Division Sigs., 29 Sept. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3299). 
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two men, sergeants A. Faith and F. Nicholls, in his custody to ‘try to make for Spain’.39 
Thus, while arrests were made, in the cases discussed above, these arrests were 
accompanied by escape advice in the expectation that men would have the opportunity 
to escape again.  
 
Therefore, in giving advice, there was also an indication of a level of support for British 
escape efforts. Nevertheless, in spite of this support Herring, Faith and Nicholls were 
still arrested. All three experienced extra time in internment and had to rely on their 
personal tenacity to escape with little or no help. 
 
Incidences where French gendarmes were willing to assist the British short of 
entertaining escape was not limited to the experiences of Faith, Nicholls and Herring 
but were mirrored elsewhere and in a number of different contexts. Lang’s description 
of a French detective in Marseilles exemplifies this latter point. Lang wrote 
 
One French detective called Balleygran responsible to French officers for British in 
Marseilles - an excellent type all out to help - half English by birth, speaking 
English perfectly - could be approached with safety on any subject except actual 
methods of escape - always ready to get British out of trouble - even helped 
Britisher who got arrested after escaping to North Africa. He asked no questions if 
a Britisher returned after attempted escape, and when that Britisher had handed in 
his parole.40 
 
According to this account, ‘Balleygran’ appears to have had particular sympathies and 
empathy with the experiences of escapees and actively advocated on their behalf when 
plans failed or men ran into trouble. His actions earned him the attention of British 
officers and no doubt his views and actions were noted by his colleagues. However, he 
continued to act within the legal framework and did not move beyond that position. 
Arguably, this French detective was able to reconcile this pro-British outlook with his 
position of authority within the Vichy state apparatus.   
 
Thus, while Lang felt comfortable in broaching almost any topic with ‘Balleygran’, 
escape methods were essentially prohibited territory. In this sense, as Vichy came to 
grips with the situation, the British were isolated and deprived of direct support.  
                                                            
39 Account of escape of 808830 Sgt. Faith, A., 1/R.N.A. and 2927357 Sgt. Nicholls, F., 4/Camerons, 30 
Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3299). 




The continued impact of parole: isolation from British consular services 
In light of the above, it is argued that the British found it difficult to connect with and 
establish a solid French support base in unoccupied France. This sense of isolation was 
further compounded by lack of assistance of the British diplomatic services in the 
Unoccupied Zone.  
 
The occupation led to the withdrawal of official British diplomatic services from France 
but there remained an unofficial presence in both the Occupied and Unoccupied Zones 
under the protection of its American counterpart. In unoccupied France, two consular 
officials, Major Hugh Dodds and Arthur Dean were of particular importance. Evidence 
from one source suggests that Dean, who was initially posted close to the Franco-
Spanish frontier, played a role in supporting early escape efforts.41 However, it must be 
noted that beyond one reference to Dean’s presence on the frontier there is no 
confirmation of this in early escape accounts.42 Moreover, if this was the case it would 
also appear his presence there was short lived, at most a number of weeks in June or 
July 1940 as both Dodds and Dean were working under the protection of the American 
Consulate in Marseilles by the end of July. Again, Dean appears to have been initially 
particularly active and it was Dean who had ensured that Scottish Presbyterian minister, 
Reverend Donald Caskie took over the Seamen’s Mission. According to Caskie, this 
was done on the understanding that they would be helping soldiers arriving in 
Marseilles.43 Equally, Dodds and Dean appear to have originally had some faith in the 
French, reassuring one officer on the 14 July that he would be ‘sent back to England 
very soon and that there was no need to worry.’44 
 
Yet, and perhaps out of frustration or hopelessness at the situation, this attitude was 
quickly replaced by avoidance and an unwillingness to offer assistance. Dodds appears 
                                                            
41 Statement by 2nd Lt. A.D. McGregor, R.A. 51 Division, 22 Feb. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3301). 
42 McGregor was wounded and therefore does not appear to have personally journeyed to the frontier in 
the months of June or July. Therefore, his account of this may be second hand. There is a strong 
possibility he may be corrected but there is no way of confirming Dean’s role while near the Pyrenees and 
its impacton the men attempting to cross.  
43 Caskie went to the American Consulate, Marseilles where he met Dean who asked him if anything 
could be done to help the ‘chaps’ arriving in the city. Caskie then went to the police station and was told 
he could take over the Mission but that no British servicemen could be found there. Donald Caskie, The 
Tartan Pimpernel (Edinburgh, 1999), pp 32-5. 




to have spearheaded this shift in attitude and comes in for sharp criticism. One officer, 
Second Lieutenant A.D. McGregor, detailed an incident in either late summer or early 
autumn where the American consul, Hugh Fullerton, had to ask Dodds to visit him in 
hospital. Pleading illness, Dodds refused to go. According to McGregor, Dodds’ 
eventual visit only came to fruition as a result of the intervention of some American 
friends. In recounting this visit McGregor wrote 
 
I greeted Major Dodds, on his arrival, as British Consul, to his obvious dismay and 
fright. To my request for his help his reply was - “Young man, you must just resign 
yourself to being interned here”.45 
 
The unwillingness of the British diplomatic services to deal with the situation facing 
arriving men emerges as a common theme in this late summer and autumn 1940 period. 
Major Dodds in particular was criticised for avoiding men; McGregor’s experiences are 
mirrored elsewhere, for instance, another account declares that Dodds was ‘disinclined’ 
to give ‘any practical assistance’.46 
 
In other cases, rather than deal with the daily concerns of these men, the consular 
authorities referred them to The Seamen’s Mission. The extent of this practice is 
exemplified in the report of British private, Thomas Ford who provided the consulate 
with an intelligence report. On needing assistance with his paper work he was quickly 
‘directed’ to the Seamen’s Mission.47 This incident highlights the unwillingness of the 
Consulate to engage in the daily lives of escapees or internees. It remained aloof from 
the situation facing these men. It must be recognised that responsibilities to and 
concerns for British civilians in the region may have checked consular officials’ 
willingness to help escapees. 48 There was a serious reason for maintaining a distance 
from British servicemen in the city, particularly as engaging in escape activities would 
have further compromised the already precarious position of British diplomatic 
                                                            
45 Statement by 2nd Lt. A.D. McGregor, R.A. 51 Division, 22 Feb. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3301). 
46 Account of escape of Major J.C. Windsor Lewis, 2 Bn. Welsh Guards, 20th Gds. Bde., 13 Dec. 1940 
(N.A., WO208/3300). 
47 Statement by 3907214 Pte.Thomas Ford R.A.O.C., 19 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300). 
48 A number of reports indicate this, notably Captain C.F.P. Mills and Sergeant R.A.J Newman. Mills 
noted that a British official advised him to give himself  and that this was an order from the ‘home 
authorities’. However, it is doubtful that his stance reflected official British policy. Sergeant R.A.J. 
Newman related an incident in which Captain Besley advised him to report to Fort St Jean. Account of 
escape of ARM/S/Sgt. R.A.J. Newman, R.A.O.C., Attd Highlanders. No: 7583169, 20 Sept. 1940 (N.A., 
WO208/3299). Account of escape of ARM/S/Sgt. R.A.J. Newman, R.A.O.C., Attd Highlanders. No: 
7583169, 20 Sept. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3299) & Account of escape of 56146 Capt. Mills, C.F.P., 97th 
Kent Yeomanry Field Regiment, Attd. 1st R.H.A 50th Div., 31 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300). 
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officials. Nevertheless, equally, it must be acknowleged that, however justified this 
stance, it also contributed to the sense of alienation and feelings of resentment among 
internees towards their consular services. 
In essence, there was little or no practical assistance given to men seeking to leave 
France, either in terms of money or advice. Frustration at this lack of help emerged as a 
continual theme in escape reports. Dodds in particular came under constant criticism 
for his insensitivity to the needs of both British officers and servicemen. In one report, 
Captain C.R.I Besley went so far as to accuse Dodds of encouraging him to remain in 
France. Besley wrote 
 
I tried to discuss with him [Dodds] how we should escape and how he could assist 
us, but he would have nothing to do with it […] He asked us why we should want 
to escape, since we were as safe in Marseilles as anywhere else I am told that when 
one of the Sergeants asked him for a special allowance for clothing, he told him 
that if he had not thrown away his battle dress he would not need new clothes. I 
wrote to the British Embassy in Madrid, enclosing a list of the soldiers interned and 
asking for instructions. I received no reply, but I know the letter was received as an 
enclosure was sent to England.49 
 
Dodds’ unwillingness to engage with Besley is consistent with other accounts of his 
behaviour. This attitude is illustrated in another officer’s, Major J.C. Windsor Lewis, 
description of his experiences with Dodds. According to Lewis, Dodds informed him 
that 
 
200 English soldiers and some dozen officers were safely housed and well looked 
after by the French in Fort St. Jean, whom he recommended me to join.50 
 
In this respect, parole and the relative freedom granted by the French appears to have 
absolved or at the very least lessened the sense of responsibility of the consulate, or 
more particularly Dodds, for these men. 
 
                                                            
49 Account of escape of 37810 Capt. C.R.I Besley, 7/R/ Northumberland Fusiliers, 6 Dec. 1940 (N.A., 
WO208/3300). 
50 Account of escape of Major J.C. Windsor Lewis, 2 Bn. Welsh Guards, 20th Gds. Bde., 13 Dec. 1940 
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The British diplomatic service did attempt to cater for the material needs of each man 
through the payment of a stipend.51 Nevertheless, for British servicemen arriving in the 
city this offer fell far short of expectation and in general, the consular authorities were 
perceived as inactive and inept. Even the offer of a stipend reinforced the status quo in 
Marseilles with men being paid only if they reported to the French authorities. This 
often caused dismay considering the hardship many had experienced in arriving in the 
city. The idea of escaping German imprisonment in order to be willingly interned by the 
French was not part of many original plans. More specifically, the encouragement given 
by the British consul to escapees to report to the French caused some consternation and 
in effect alienated men from what should have been a natural support base.52 
 
During this period, the British were not alone in Marseilles as a dispossessed military 
service seeking a means out of France. Large numbers of Polish military personnel had 
joined the French army after the defeat and occupation of Poland in 1939. Many were in 
Marseilles seeking a means to leave France. The Polish leadership in Marseilles had 
already established a foothold in France and had managed to connect with the Free 
Poles in London. By the end of the summer 1940 were  attempting to acquire ships 
(discussed in more detail in chapter three). Yet, far from being a consolation, the 
organisation of the Poles only served to highlight for some officers like McGregor the 
defiencies in British planning. McGregor wrote  
 
There seemed to be considerable traffic in the Polish organisation between their 
headquarters in London and Marseilles. The general feeling amongst British 
military personnel was indignation, as, while the Poles were able to get their men 
out of France by various means, so very little was done for the British.53 
 
Such comparisons only served to compound the frustration of the British and, whether 
true or not, framed the actions of these men and forced them to rely on their personal 
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tenacity and the support of their colleagues rather than seek the help of or include their 
diplomatic authorities in Marseilles in their escape schemes.  
 
Reaction to isolation: the importance of British military cohesion 
Achieving cohesion among escapees in the Unoccupied Zone was a slow process. While 
many men were congregating in Marseilles, there was still a sense that in many respects 
they were scattered. Parole and its relaxed terms meant that many of the officers chose 
and had the means to live outside the Fort. In contrast, ordinary ranks remained in Fort 
St Jean and in the absence of officers willing to assume active leadership roles, these 
men were, as Private John Christie asserted,  
 
Very much a collection of individuals. We had reached Marseilles very much 
under our own steam, either singly or in pairs and none of us was very inclined to 
give up any part of control over our own destiny.54 
 
Christie’s comments refer to summer 1940 and reflect the absence of officers from the 
daily lives of men. Officers such as Potts and Besley, who were also in Marseilles at 
this time, were busy planning their escapes and lacked the connections or time to begin 
organising the escapes of others. Nevertheless, while Christie’s claims illustrate the lack 
of active leadership, it must also be balanced with the knowledge that officers were, 
even from July 1940, willing to advocate on behalf of the men.  
 
Most of this work was behind the scenes; for instance, it was through the efforts of 
Besley that the British consulate agreed on a stipend for each man.55 According to 
McGregor, it was his efforts, in spite of the lassitude displayed by the consulate on this 
matter, that led to the formation of the Mixed Medical Commission, a committee which 
under the Geneva Convention had the authority to repatriate wounded soldiers.56 The 
first Commission board convened in October 1940 with the first groups repatriated in 
January 1941. Thus, officers, although their work by and large went unrecognised in 
these early days, did have an impact on the experiences of those in Marseilles. The 
Mixed Medical Commission in particular was recognised by internees as relatively pro-
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British. It continued to send men home right throughout the period 1940-42, and 
beyond. 
 
In spite of these initial efforts and the establishment of the Mixed Medical Commission, 
there was still a lack of cohesion among the men. One of the key components in forging 
strong communal bonds was a shared military background and more importantly a 
shared sense of duty, notably a duty to escape. In Marseilles, or unoccupied France 
more generally, the concept of duty to escape was given a particular moral emphasis. 
This was true elsewhere but in unoccupied France it was especially important given that 
the immediate German threat was somewhat removed. As Dodds’ attitude highlighted, 
there were certain inducements to staying in the Unoccupied Zone and remaining out of 
the war. In addition, the British frequented bars and cafés in Marseilles getting caught 
up in an active social scene. Most men were lured by the bright lights of the city but 
there were still acceptable and unacceptable codes of behaviour. The presence and 
power of this value system or code of honour is evident in escape reports on occasions 
when men felt that such codes were breached by their fellow colleagues. 
 
The ambivalence around parole is a good example of such breaches. Parole was 
discouraged by the War Office but justified in the context of the Unoccupied Zone on a 
technicality, that is, as the British were not at war with the French then they were not 
prisoners of war.57 However, men who used parole for purely personal reasons, and not 
for the purposes of planning an escape, were marginalised and treated with derision by 
those who considered escape their duty. A number of men began to express concerns 
about the impact parole was having on the men. Driver W.B.A. Gaze, who arrived in 
Marseilles at the end of November, noted that 
 
Owing to the cosy conditions of life for the British internees in Marseilles, who are 
well fed, get clothes given and 85 frs. per week, many are becoming very 
demoralised on the many pleasures available, and will suffer permanently in life.58 
 
These moral judgements were not confined to Gaze’s report nor were they merely 
confined to judgement; they also framed action. Lieutenant James Langley (whose 
escape from the north was discussed in the previous chapter) became heavily involved 
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in escape activities on reaching unoccupied France at the end of October.59 On one 
occasion he participated in a plan to obtain a boat (discussed later in this chapter) with 
the aim of aiding the escape of as many men as possible. Although the plan ultimately 
failed, in his autobiography, Langley indicated that it had been decided to leave ‘self-
confessed deserters’ behind as it was considered better for the war that they would 
‘continue as a burden on their captors’.60 Langley’s sense of duty and moral superiority 
echo the tone taken by Gaze but in Langley’s case this moralising shaped important 
decisions that is, who should stay and who should go. Those not sharing the same 
values or portraying a commitment to duty were deliberately excluded and derided. 
Moreover, this derision and moralising has worked its way into the histories of the 
escape organisations, notably in the work of British military historian M.R.D. Foot. His 
work remains one of the main publications in this field but Foot, a war veteran himself,  
adopted a morally superior tone when referring to men unwilling to risk the uncertainty 
of escape as ‘Mr Fainthearted’. In Foot’s work ‘Mr Fainthearted’ stood in sharp contrast 
to those he termed as ‘Mr Valiant’, that is, men willing to risk the unknown and 
escape.61 
 
As indicated by Foot, this moralising went beyond the experiences of officers in 
Marseilles and was endemic across the armed forces. However, in unoccupied France, 
notably Marseilles, it had an added significance. As Dodds reminded a number of 
officers, there were certain inducements to staying in the Unoccupied Zone where men 
could opt out of the war while enjoying what Gaze described as the ‘cosy condition of 
life’. British internees frequented bars and cafés in Marseilles and enjoyed the 
amusements of Marseilles. In this respect, duty to escape had the added importance of 
reinforcing military cohesion and establishing a sense of purpose at a time when easy 
living conditions threatened this togetherness. The importance of military cohesion has 
been addressed by G.L. Siegbold, who argued that it  
 
Stabilizes relationship patterns and provides a sense of outside and above a person 
that there is something more than a collection of individuals’.62 
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60 Ibid. 
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While men like Gaze or Langley certainly expressed a notion they were connected to a 
great war effort, there was still the problem of stable relationship patterns.  
 
This was, in part, due to the high turnover rate of officers and potential leaders leaving 
for the Pyrenees. More specifically, even though officers such as Besley, McGregor or 
Langley were willing to assume responsibility for the welfare of their colleagues, they 
were also busy planning their personal departures from France. Thus, advocating on 
behalf of the men was coupled with personal self-interest. For instance, McGregor 
pushed for the formation of the Mixed Medical Commission knowing that, as he was 
wounded, it was likely he would benefit from it, as indeed he did. Equally, while Besley 
successfully ensured stipends would be paid to men arriving in Marseilles, he was also 
busy preparing for his departure and left France in early autumn. In fact, as far as can be 
established, nearly all the officers to arrive in Marseilles in the summer of 1940 
departed France at the earliest opportunity. This is understandable given that their 
intention in reaching the Unoccupied Zone was to return to Britain. However, this high 
turnover did not lead to a steady leadership or to a consolidated position in Marseilles.  
 
Nevertheless, by early September 1940 it is important to acknowledge that there were 
cursory attempts by a small number of officer to co-ordinate escape activities. These 
were initiated by Captain F. Fitch and Lieutenant William Sillar who arrived in 
Marseilles at the beginning of September. Fitch in particular appears to have been pro-
active in such efforts. Evidence of his activities do not come from his account but 
descriptions from other reports. One escapee, Captain H.B. Burn, who was present in 
Marseilles between September and October 1940, observed 
 
Escape organisation from this town was in the capable hands of Capt. Fitch 
(S/P.G.181) who worked hard and modestly to get men away.63 
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In fact, Fitch’s ability to organise left an impression on Besley who, at the end of 
September, appears to have sought his advice on leaving France. At this stage, Fitch and 
Sillar were attempting to work out a system of communication between Marseilles and 
the Pyrenees (discussed in more detail in chapter three). This system helped a small 
number of men to cross the Pyrenees at the end of September. In essence, the arrival of 
Fitch and Sillar in September signalled a shift from officers indirectly assisting their 
men to more direct and co-ordinated participation in escape activities. However, the 
success of this operation was short lived and it ended with Sillar’s departure to Spain in 
early October.64 
 
Moving beyond isolation: emerging British leadership 
While the efforts of Sillar show the growing potential of the British to organise, his 
early departure undermined the capacity for a more concerted effort. However, there 
were two key events at the end of October that led cumulatively to changing the 
situation in the leadership in Marseilles. The first was the arrival of Captain Charles 
Murchie at the beginning of November. Murchie was the first officer to arrive in 
Marseilles with the explicit intention of setting up an escape organisation. On his 
arrival, Murchie began the process of consolidating British connections with civilian 
resistance. 
 
In spite of Murchie’s early influence there is relative silence on his activities in the 
secondary source literature. As far as can be established, there is no valid reason for this 
and yet a discrepancy between the contemporary sources, subsequent autobiographies 
and histories of the period persists. For instance, James Langley, in his escape reports 
emphasises the importance of Murchie and his escape activities during Langley’s time 
in Marseilles. Langley’s report gave a detailed assessment of Murchie’s work (and will 
be discussed later in this chapter) and yet Langley’s autobiography, first published in 
1974, does not mention Murchie at all! This is carried through in M.R.D. Foot’s work 
on escape networks; this oversight may be explained in Foot’s works taken in 
conjunction with Langley.65 Memories fade overtime and it may be an oversight that 
Murchie’s work is eclipsed by later escape organisers. Foot’s work, however, forms the 
basis of most of the publications on escape history, excluding the recent extensive 
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research undertaken by Philippe Le Blanc on the Belgian escape organisation, the 
Comet line.66 The only substantial focus on Murchie comes from the work of Sean 
Longden in his book, Dunkirk the men they left behind.67 But even in this work the 
focus is on the Foreign Office records with no references to escape reports. Another 
researcher, Oliver Clutton Brock refers to Murchie’s activities in Marseilles but does 
not focus on the impact or significance of Murchie’s role in early escape activities68; 
consequentially there is no substantial assessment of Murchie’s work. A number of 
websites, including Conscript heroes, give accounts of Murchie’s activities but again 
his contribution in shaping the British-led escape organisation, which began to emerge 
in Marseilles in his time, is still largely overlooked in the mainstream literature.69 
 
Yet the evidence suggests that Murchie was crucial in helping British officers to 
connect with a civilian support base in Marseilles. In many respects, he was already in a 
strong position to begin this process when he arrived in Marseilles in early winter 1941 
having established connections with helpers in the north. His aim was to consolidate 
these connections and to continue the process of passing men across the demarcation 
line. His efforts to achieve this were aided by Sergeant H.K. Clayton, who arrived in 
Marseilles ahead of Murchie and immediately set to work on retaining British links with 
the north. In order to achieve this, both men needed to have a solid support base in the 
city which, according to Langley’s report, appears to have been the Seamen’s Mission. 
It would seem that Murchie was one of the first British officers to actively involve the 
Reverend Donald Caskie, keeper of the Mission, directly in escape activity. Langley 
informed the War Office that Caskie ‘undoubtedly’ worked ‘with Capt. Murchie, 
R.A.S.C., in helping people out of Occupied France’.70 Caskie acted as banker with 
Murchie using any funds available to cover the expenses of guides arriving from the 
north. Murchie described his system as follows: 
 
The method was self-developing and was simplicity itself. A guide arrived in 
Marseilles, bringing with him 3, 4 or 5 Britishers, submitted to me a list of his 
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expenses plus the cost of his return journey, which I settled, with this money he 
returned to the North of France and passed on the good word, with the result that I 
had at one time twenty-five such guides working.71 
 
Murchie continued to extend his activities throughout 1940-41, living in hiding in 
Marseilles but also connecting with officers officially interned in Fort St Jean. Clayton 
was one of his main agents and he worked closely with Murchie attempting to extend 
their contacts in Marseilles while maintaining connections with the north. 
 
Murchie’s success helped crystallise connections and support for the British in occupied 
France. There is no way of determining the extent of these connections but if his 
personal estimates are to be believed then as a result of these connections Murchie 
succeeded in bringing between three to four hundred men across the demarcation line. 
Even if these numbers are inflated, it still must be recognised that he facilitated the 
forging of vital contacts with helpers in the north and went so far as to continue 
recruiting support in occupied France from his base in Marseilles. Murchie’s real coup 
came in January with the arrival of a young Frenchman, Ronald Lepers in Marseilles. 
Lepers had guided a party of British soldiers to Marseilles. In Lepers’ account, there 
was no indication that he had heard of or encountered Murchie but in Marseilles he 
established contact with him. Lepers’ agenda in establishing this connection was 
personal; he planned on leaving France and joining the Free French. His aim was to 
acquire Murchie’s help. However, on meeting Murchie, Lepers discovered Murchie had 
a different agenda. Lepers wrote 
 
Captain MURCHIE and M. DELVALIER, an Englishman, whose real name was 
CLAYTON, suggested that I should not go to England but should work for their 
organisation, helping British soldiers and airmen to escape through Marseilles. I 
agreed and returned alone to La Madeleine in the middle of January 1941.72 
 
In establishing connections with Lepers, Murchie redirected attention to the north. 
Before his arrival, the focus of the British in Marseilles, almost without exception, was 
on their activities on the Franco-Spanish frontier or the port. There was, as referred to in 
chapter one, an attempt to establish a more stable escape line in autumn 1940. An 
officer recently arrived in Marseilles, Lieutenant C.D. Hunter, assisted his French helper 
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in Paris to acquire funds to pass men across the demarcation line. However, this attempt 
failed with Bonnefous’ arrest on her return to the Occupied Zone and Hunter did not 
pursue the matter further. With Murchie’s arrival in Marseilles, there was a more co-
ordinated attempt to connect with the north. Murchie’s work was crucial in re-directing 
attention of the British in Marseilles to the north and attempting to maintain connections 
with civilian helpers in the Forbidden and Occupied Zones. However, while Murchie 
pushed to expand connections in the Occupied Zone, he did not see the fruits of this 
vital connection with Lepers. Murchie left France shortly afterwards, in April 1941, in 
part due to fear of arrest but this connection was maintained by officers (notably 
Garrow) who took over Murchie’s work (discussed later in this chapter). In spite of this 
impromptu departure, Murchie’s success in recruiting Lepers help changed the nature 
and scope of such activities in unoccupied France. Murchie’s work in the north pushed 
British escape activities in Marseilles beyond their initial insular nature, expanding its 
scope and connecting it with resistance activities in the north.  
 
Despite the benefits that a focus on the north brought, it was this same strategy that 
proved to be one of the drawbacks of Murchie and Clayton’s work. Clayton arrived in 
Marseilles before Murchie, as Murchie was briefly detained by the French authorities en 
route. As Clayton spoke fluent French and had identity papers he chose to live as a 
civilian in the city. This self-imposed removal from the men, however, combined with 
his interest in soldiers arriving in the city, brought him under suspicion from internees. 
On this matter, Clayton reported 
 
I had my own civilian clothes and a certain sum of money and lived apart from the 
British Officers and men in Fort St Jean. Because of this and my interest in soldiers 
arriving from the north, I was immediately suspected by the British officers of 
being a German agent ...  an attempt was made on my life by the soldiers in Fort St 
Jean.73 
 
The British, both servicemen and officers, in Marseilles were determined to maintain 
group cohesion and the significant communication between internees helped them to 
identify Clayton’s interest. In Clayton’s case, his interest was perceived as a threat. In 
response to that threat a number of men were mobilised or motivated to take direct 
action. In many respects, it was Clayton’s determination to remain aloof from men 
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already experiencing isolation and relying on the support of colleagues that acted as the 
impetus for this reaction. In response to all of this behaviour, Clayton, instead of 
avoiding or reporting the men who attacked him, moved into Fort St Jean. Following his 
move to the Fort, there were no more threats on Clayton’s life and his plans were 
allowed to progress. Interestingly, the incident highlighted the presence of a quasi-
policing system among internees. Those working with the British were placed under 
some sort of implicit surveillance. Their activities needed to be recognised as being in 
the general interest of internees before they could progress. When Murchie arrived in 
Marseilles, some days later, it would appear that he followed Clayton’s lead and 
established connections with British officers staying at the Fort. In time, like a number 
of officers, he took private accommodation in the city.74 
 
An examination of the escape reports highlights another challenge with the focus on the 
north. The majority of escapees arriving from the north were not crossing the 
Unoccupied Zone unimpeded and assisted but rather were instead facing arrest and 
internment in Fort St Jean, Marseilles or, from January 1941, internment in St Hippolyte 
du Fort. Thus, most men arriving from the Occupied Zone during the period of 
Murchie’s tenure as leading escape organiser in Marseilles faced French internment.  
 
The difficulties notwithstanding, Murchie’s work re-directed attention to the north and 
in doing this, helped to broaden the vision of the British escape organisation in 
Marseilles. Murchie’s focus on connections with the north, which he did not notably 
replicate in Marseilles, was his legacy to escape activities when he left France in April 
1940.  
 
Having established Murchie’s contribution to escape activities in Marseilles, it is 
necessary to turn to the second key event that gave added impetus to such activities. In 
October 1940 the French, in an effort to come to terms with the British prisoner of war 
problem, transferred all the British interned in various locations in the Unoccupied Zone 
to Fort St Jean. This effectively placed all men determined and committed to escape in 
one location. This transfer also led to the arrival in Marseilles of a number of officers, 
notably Captain L.A Wilkins and Captain Ian Garrow.  
                                                            





Wilkins and Garrow had experienced a number of weeks of internment at the hands of 
the French before their arrival in Marseilles. Garrow crossed the demarcation and was 
interned in a prisoner of war camp at Monferran-Saves in August 1940.75 Wilkins 
crossed the demarcation line in September, was arrested by the French and interned in a 
concentration camp at Agde. According to Wilkins, he was placed ‘under close arrest 
for fifteen days on charges of inciting troops to escape’.76 Their removal to Marseilles in 
October contributed to this concentration of officers assuming responsibility for escape 
activities already building up in the city. The evidence suggests that they engaged in 
escape schemes almost immediately with accounts given to the War Office by returned 
British escapees indicating that both men were heavily involved in the planning and 
consolidating of escape activities in the city.77 
 
It would appear that there were two phases to this work namely, working on escape 
activities with officers such as Captain F. Fitch, who focused on passing men across the 
Pyrenees, and, by January 1941, working under the stewardship of Murchie. 78 
Murchie’s phase became particularly important following the departure of Fitch and 
Wilkins from Marseilles by the end of December leaving Garrow as one of the only 
officers in Marseilles assisting Murchie in forging an escape organisation. In contrast to 
Murchie, Garrow’s focus was not on consolidating the British position in the north (the 
Occupied Zone) but on strengthening the British position in the Unoccupied Zone. This 
proved increasingly difficult and in January 1941 they faced one of their toughest 
challenges.  
 
British internees in Fort St Jean were removed to St Hippolyte du Fort, some fifty 
kilometres from Nîmes. This move separated British internees from connections they 
had acquired in Marseilles; most likely, such a move was specifically designed to 
achieve this. Added to the physical removal from Marseilles, St Hippolyte du Fort was 
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also isolated from the main rail communication network. Thus, escapees seeking to 
cross the Franco-Spanish frontier had to first trek the fifty kilometres to Nîmes to access 
trains for Perpignan. Overcoming the isolating impact of this removal was crucial if 
escape organisers, at this stage Garrow and Murchie, were to maintain their activities. 
Both Murchie and Garrow managed to avoid the move but as a result were left without 
official status and living clandestinely in the city. In this respect, both men suffered a 
double isolation that is, removed from the support of colleagues and living as fugitives 
in Marseilles79. 
 
Garrow overcame his personal isolation and continued to forge connections with and to 
include internees in St Hippolyte du Fort in escape activities. In order to achieve this, he 
expanded and extended the strength of the burgeoning escape organisation, 
responsibility for which fell increasingly to Garrow. As a result of continued difficulties 
connecting with a solid civilian support base, Garrow initially confined his activities to 
British internees and recruited within that group. One of his first moves, on learning that 
men were to be moved to St Hippolyte du Fort, was to approach another officer, Second 
Lieutenant W.M. Hewitt. Hewitt intended to leave France at the first available 
opportunity but reconsidered after a discussion with Garrow in January. According to 
Hewitt, both men agreed Hewitt ‘should go to St Hypolyte [St. Hippolyte] in charge of 
the men’.80 The motivation for this decision was directly related to Garrow’s efforts to 
maintain communication with the men in St Hippolyte. Hewitt was to act as the main 
contact in the camp and all communication was directed to him. The willingness of 
Hewitt to accept this scheme, and it is perhaps worth noting he continued in this role 
until November 1942, marks the growing importance of the escape organisation in the 
lives of British internees. 
 
Without the assistance of the British escape organisation in Marseilles there was little 
opportunity to execute or plan an escape beyond discussions with colleagues. St 
Hippolyte du Fort, a relatively small town, was removed from significant escape 
connections established in Marseilles and was within easy reach of the Pyrenees. The 
                                                            
79 Langley noted this in his autobiography or, to use his words, parole gave the men ‘official’ status in 
Marseilles. Langley, Fight another day, p. 104. 
80 Hewitt retained the position of escape organiser until the end of 1942 and the German occupation of the 
Unoccupied Zone. Statement by 67606 Lieut. Winwick Miller Hewitt, 5/2 S.L. Regt. Royal Artillery, 29 
Jan. 1943 (N.A., WO208/3312). 
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appointment of officers such as Hewitt and their continued connection to escape 
organisers in Marseilles helped overcome this enforced isolation and extend their escape 
activities in St Hippolyte du Fort. There is evidence to suggest that Garrow’s efforts to 
maintain connections with internees through officers like Hewitt met with success and 
several methods of communications were accounted for in escape reports. For instance, 
one report indicates that, on one occasion, when men were up for review with the Mixed 
Medical Board, permission was given for an officer to accompany these men to 
Marseilles. The opportunity was seized to make contact with escape organisers in the 
city.81  This is supported by two more references to Hewitt accompanying men, cleared 
by the Mixed Medical Commission, to the Franco-Spanish frontier; presumably, 
although it is not made explicit, he did this in an official capacity before turning back at 
the border!82 There is also evidence of obvious and open methods of communication. 
One particularly impressive example of direct communication came within days of the 
arrival of internees in St Hippolyte du Fort. In January 1941, an RAF bomber crew 
crash landed in Meserieux, between Lyons and Macon, with the crew subsequently 
interned in St Hippolyte. One of the crew, Sergeant S.M.P Parkes, recounted that 
shortly after their arrival they were informed by an officer at the fort that a call had 
come through from Marseilles wanting to get the crew to the city.83 Apart from these 
details, Parkes does not expand on this communication, but his account does suggest 
that there was, on occasion at least, telecommunications between officers in St 
Hippolyte and presumably Murchie and Garrow in Marseilles. Beyond this report there 
is nothing to substantiate this idea.  
 
While details are sketchy, incidences such as these show the growing extent of 
Garrow’s activities and his ability to consolidate escape in the Unoccupied Zone. 
However, these achievements were tempered by problems balancing Murchie’s escape 
activities and men arriving in the city from the north, with Garrow’s interests and 
concerns for men already interned in the Unoccupied Zone. In some cases, there was a 
lack of foresight resulting in the Marseilles leadership occasionally alienating British 
internees in St Hippolyte du Fort. This is highlighted in an account of the situation 
                                                            
81 Account by S/Ldr. E/P.P. Gibbs, R.A.F., No. 616 Sqdrn., No. 11 Group, Fighter Command, 18/19 Sept. 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3306). 
82 Account of escape of 514724 Sgt. Berry, H. 150(b) Squadron R.A.F., 3 June 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303); Statement by 6144709 Pte. Small, E.J., 2/6 East Surrey Regt, 15 July 1941 (N.A., 
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83 Statement by 742649 Sgt. S.M.F. Parkes, 9 Squadron, R.A.F., 19 June 1941 (N.A., WO208/3304). 
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given by Lieutenant Richard Broad (referred to in chapter one). Broad arrived in 
Marseilles in February 1941 with seven ordinary ranks. He intended continuing his 
journey with these men across the Pyrenees but all, excluding Broad, were arrested and 
removed to St Hippolyte du Fort on arrival in Marseilles. Broad established contact with 
Garrow and began planning the escape of his men. Though communication was a 
difficult, Broad overcame this by personally travelling to the camp, spending the night 
there and leaving unobserved the next morning.84 Broad’s plans proved a success and he 
managed to arrange the continued escape and removal of all the men he had 
accompanied to unoccupied France, with the exception of one, Private Osbourne, as he 
was wounded. However, his experience of the internees required him to alter and 
expand the scope of his scheme. Explaining the reasons behind this, Broad wrote, 
 
A party of men headed by Sgt. Bell had recently left for Spain […] The officers at 
the Camp were highly indignant since Murchie unthinkingly had made up the party 
from men lying low in Marseilles, whereas the men at the Fort felt that, as they had 
done as they had been asked and voluntarily gone to the Camp, they should have 
been chosen for the trip.85 
 
Broad’s actions were, thus, framed by the strong feeling in the camp. By Broad’s 
account, it would appear, men went to St Hippolyte du Fort willingly or ‘voluntarily’ 
either on the advice of their leadership or on the understanding that from there, there 
were opportunities to escape; at the very least Murchie and Garrow would keep the men 
informed through Lieutenant Hewitt. In Hewitt’s case, his departure for the camp was 
on Garrow’s instructions and linked directly to expanding escape activities there.  
 
The communication breakdown referred to by Broad shows the impact of perceived 
neglect and also the determination of officers in the camp to hold the Marseilles 
leadership accountable to their interests. In this case, in order to mollify interested 
parties, Broad had to alter his plan and include men from the camp. Therefore, while 
officers in the camp may have been willing to accept a degree of isolation from the 
former active Marseilles escape scene, they were not willing to accept being 
                                                            
84 Summary of a report by Lieut. R.L. Broad, 2/Seaforths, 51 Div., 18/25/26 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303). See also William Moore, The long way round: an escape through occupied France 
(London, 1986), p. 140. This account gives more details. One of the men who travelled with Broad, 
Sergeant Chalmers, was ‘called from his quarters and told that an officer wanted to see him in a café in St 
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marginalised from the plans of Murchie or Garrow. Two sources indicate Garrow’s 
early involvement in intelligence gathering activities namely, a number of escape 
reports and James Langley’s autobiography. In the escape report, Private J Graham 
details giving Garrow a map of the German coastal defences in May 1940. On a number 
of occasions Garrow and Murchie prioritised the passage of individuals they considered 
important.86 Historian Simon Kitson, who has undertaken extensive research on Vichy 
intelligence services, noted that Garrow came to the attention of the French for his work 
on behalf of the British secret service.87 It is difficult to gauge exactly when Garrow 
began working for British intelligence but evidence from Langley’s autobiography 
indicates that they were interested in him as early 1941. Langley had been repatriated 
back to Britain by the Mixed Medical Commission arriving in Liverpool in March. 
According to Langley, his interrogator indicated to him he was interested in Garrow’s 
activities and had already had some idea of his activities in Marseilles. 88  His 
interrogator informed him that Garrow had sent a number of messages to the War 
Office, presumably through the unofficial British consulate. 
 
Langley’s arrival in Liverpool was well-timed in that he was the first with inside 
information on the workings of the burgeoning escape organisation. Langley had also 
been deeply involved in these activities with Murchie and Garrow. He had, during his 
time in Marseilles, requested that Dodds write to the British military attaché and appoint 
him head of escape activities in the city.89 Nothing came of this request and it is 
doubtful that it was taken seriously. However, the situation changed with Langley’s 
arrival in England in March 1941. Within weeks Langley received a request, which he 
accepted, to join the British Secret Intelligence Service, otherwise known as MI6.90 His 
                                                            
86 Account of escape of Capt. R.N. Brinckman, 3/Grenadier Guards, 1st Div., 3 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304); Report by Lieut. Colonel F.A.A., R.A., Military Attaché Brussels, on events subsequent to 
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87 Kitson, The hunt for Nazi spies, p. 64 & 77. 
88 Langley, Fight another day, p. 119. 
89 Account of escape of Lt. J.M. Langley, M.C. 2nd Bn. Coldstream Guards, 1st Division, 22 Mar. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3301). 
90 It would appear that MI9 was controlled by MI6 or SIS. Donald Darling, who did some work for MI9 
was an MI6 agent. Furthermore, according to Phillippe Le Blanc, James Langley, who worked for MI9 
when he returned to England, was more an MI6 agent than MI9 (private communication with the author). 
For more details on this relationship see also Keith Jeffery, MI6: the history of the Secret Intelligence 
Service 1909-1949 (London, 2010), pp 409-10. 
113 
 
objective in this new post was to maintain connections with escape lines in France, 
particularly the activities of the British escape organisation in Marseilles.  
 
MI6 and the secret service responsible for British prisoners of war, MI9, made efforts to 
set up an escape line along the Pyrenees in June but this had been a failure.91 It 
remained difficult for MI6 agent Donald Darling to maintain connections with escape 
efforts in Marseilles and, given the attitude of the British consulate, there was little or 
no official support for British escape activities. The appointment of Langley, as it seems 
he was the first escapee to be appointed to such a post, signalled a change in this 
attitude. The War Office was beginning to take events in Marseilles seriously and were, 
as indicated by Langley, making efforts to establish the extent of escape efforts 
including those associated with Garrow. This appears to have culminated in Garrow 
achieving an official position in Marseilles shortly after Langley’s arrival and 
appointment to MI6/MI9 in March. This is confirmed in a War Office file which 
recommended Garrow for a DSO (Distinguished Service Order) in 1943. According to 
this recommendation, Garrow was ‘under definite orders to remain in France and 
perform this work’ from April 1941, the month of Murchie’s departure to Spain,.92  
  
However, while contact had finally been established with London, Murchie’s departure 
meant that Garrow was one of the only officers remaining in Marseilles assuming 
responsibility for escape activities. Garrow needed to consolidate this leadership but it 
would take a further two months before he achieved this. As part of this process, 
Garrow took the lead in recruiting members of the British escape organisation. 
Historians and researchers such as Foot generally agree that Garrow’s recruitment of a 
Belgian, Albert Guerisse, was crucial in crystallising the growing escape network and 
bolstering the leadership of the escape organisation.93 Garrow, in the early days, appears 
to have favoured British military personnel for key roles within the burgeoning 
organisation. Guerisse, in spite of his Belgian nationality, was no exception to this. 
Guerisse was a Belgian military doctor who made his way to London following the 
collapse of Belgium and joined the Royal Navy, under the pseudonym Patrick O’Leary. 
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This name, or more correctly the abbreviated version, Pat, later became synonymous 
with the British escape organisation in Marseilles; Pat or O’Leary rather than Guerisse 
will be used from this point on in this thesis. During his time with the Royal Navy, 
O’Leary was involved in a number of clandestine operations off the French coast, one 
of which in April 1941 led to his arrest and internment by the French. Claiming he was 
French Canadian, O’Leary was removed to St Hippolyte du Fort where he displayed a 
tenacity for escape activities making a number of attempts before eventually succeeding 
and reaching Marseilles in the summer of 1940. 
 
According to his biography, written by Vincent Brome, O’Leary headed escape 
activities in the camp. This may have been an exaggeration, particularly in the light of 
Hewitt’s report which claims he, Hewitt, remained one of the main organisers and 
senior escape organiser until August 1941.94 Brome also states that O’Leary escaped 
from St Hippolyte du Fort in summer 1941 with the intention of organising an escape 
organisation. Further on in his book, Brome contradicts this by asserting that Garrow 
convinced O’Leary to stay in France once he reached Marseilles.95 No escape report 
from this period places O’Leary as head of escape activities in St Hippolyte du Fort. It 
is therefore, most likely that O’Leary escaped the camp intending to reach Britain and it 
was only his encounter with Garrow that led to his later recruitment into the escape 
organisation.  
 
There is another significant point surrounding O’Leary’s appointment beyond Garrow’s 
efforts to consolidate the escape organisation. O’Leary sought official British approval 
for his appointment, and approval was signalled by a previously-agreed cryptic message 
aired via the BBC. Donald Darling, the MI6 agent in Spain responsible for maintaining 
connections with the British in Marseilles (discussed in chapter three) recounted hearing 
the official approval while at a dinner party.96 This particular incident has been 
mentioned in a number of histories on escape organisation. However, its significance 
has been under played as though the approval were a matter of course. In seeking this 
approval, Garrow and O’Leary successfully moved escape beyond the isolation 
                                                            
94 Whitney Straight was senior in rank to Hewitt but Hewitt still remained active in organising escape and 
when Straight left Hewitt continued to help men escape. See the following: Statement by W/Cdr. W/W/ 
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experienced by early escape organisers such as Fitch and placed the burgeoning British 
escape organisation on an official footing. Garrow’s orders had signalled this shift but 
O’Leary’s approval reinforced the escape organisation’s growing connections with the 
War Office.  
 
By July 1941, tentative communication was established with London and Garrow, with 
O’Leary’s assistance, successfully bolstering the organisation’s leadership. 97  The 
British escape organisation needed to gain the approval of London and the support of 
civilian helpers. Continued alienation from a civilian support base would have made the 
emergence of an escape organisation untenable especially considering the removal of 
the British to St Hippolyte du Fort in January 1941.  
 
Garrow continued Murchie’s activities and took over his northern connections. When 
French helper Ronald Lepers guided a number of British escapees to Marseilles after 
Murchie’s departure, Garrow met with Lepers instead. The specific dates of Lepers’ 
second arrival is difficult to establish; Lepers claims he made at least four trips to 
Marseilles between January and March 1941.98 In this period, Lepers was told that 
Murchie had departed from France but Murchie did not leave until April. It is possible, 
considering the increased pressure Murchie was under, that Garrow took over the 
northern connection before Murchie’s departure. Despite some inconsistencies in the 
chronology, Garrow’s action in meeting Lepers is significant in that Garrow, following 
Murchie’s lead, proved equally determined to maintain connections with helpers in the 
Occupied Zone. 
 
Moreover, Garrow demonstrated a determination to assist Lepers in expanding these 
northern connections. Lepers recommended that Garrow establish contact with Sergeant 
                                                            
97 There is a suggestion that Garrow in fact ceded control to O’Leary at this time. The documents 
recommending Garrow for the D.S.O. placed Garrow’s involvement in escape activities between April to 
July 1941. However, Garrow remained in Marseilles and it is possible that he was increasingly concerned 
with intelligence. This assessment is supported by the recommendation for the D.S.O which refers to 
Garrow’s intelligence activities. See also: Account of escape of 5726306 Pte. Graham J., 2/Dorsets, 2 
Div., 19 Mar. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3302); Moreover, historian Simon Kitson carried out extensive work 
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Harold Cole, a British escapee in hiding near Lille. Cole was living under false papers 
and had already a number of useful French contacts. Garrow successfully forged this 
connection with Lepers’ help and in crystallising this support forwarded a sum of fifty 
thousand francs to be distributed to French helpers by Cole. In this respect, although 
Lepers established this connection, Garrow was in effect placing Cole as head of 
operations in the Lille area.99 This was done at the suggestion of and in agreement with 
Lepers. This action conveys the determination of Garrow to attain British control over 
northern escape activities and stands in sharp contrast to Murchie’s more casual 
approach to French helpers arriving in Marseilles guided by rumour of his presence and 
seeking him out by name. Garrow was attempting to consolidate these more casual 
escape efforts and, in gaining the support of Lepers, he effectively established a support 
basis that remained virtually unchanged throughout the summer, autumn and early 
winter 1941, until Cole’s betrayal in November 1941 (discussed in chapter four). 
 
Although Garrow managed, through Lepers, to consolidate the British connections in 
the Occupied and Forbidden Zones, he still faced difficulty in identifying potential 
helpers in the Unoccupied Zone. This problem was not solely confined to Garrow’s 
earlier efforts led by Fitch, Wilkins and Murchie all appear to have experienced 
difficulty in relation to extending a British support base in Marseilles. This difficulty, 
perhaps, goes some way to explaining why some of the earliest connections forged in 
Marseilles were not with willing helpers but criminal gangs eager to capitalise on the 
British position. It is difficult to establish specific reasons for this but arguably the 
physical location of Fort St Jean and also the Seamen’s Mission was a contributing 
factor. As Caskie observed, the Old Port was a notorious area and ‘an ideal place for 
criminals hiding from the police’.100 It may be worth considering, in relation to the Old 
Port, that the Germans when they occupied all of France in November 1942 ordered that 
the population of a substantial proportion of the Old Port be evacuated for security 
reasons such was it’s reputation. Consequently, it was perhaps difficult for ordinary 
French civilians, seeking to assist the British, to venture into this part of the city. The 
secondary source literature, and notably Foot’s work, remains silent on British dealings 
with criminal gangs and yet in order to fully understand the development of British 
escape activities in the Unoccupied Zone it is necessary to address these early 
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connections. The fact remains that the British in Marseilles were not only isolated from 
their consular authorities but also removed from and initially at least unable to recognise 
or connect with committed civilian supporters. 
 
Given their physical location in the Old Port and their presence in bars and cafés in their 
immediate environs, it is hardly surprising that the first efforts to organise and co-
ordinate escape activities involved some level of complicity with local criminal gangs. 
The earliest escape plans were made with such assistance, a point often neglected in 
mainstream escape histories despite it being a recurring theme in the primary sources, 
both in terms of the escape reports and autobiographies.101 
 
While the British were through these associations, in effect connecting with a well-
established underworld, this did not necessarily pave the way for success. More often 
than not, these connections had disastrous results. For instance, in early autumn 1940, 
shortly after his arrival in Marseilles, Fitch attempted to pursue a number of boat 
schemes with the aim of removing as many men from Marseilles as possible.102 In one 
such scheme, organised in tandem with Varian Fry an American assisting political 
refugees to leave France, Fitch lost a considerable sum of money. According to Fry, 
Fitch questioned the trustworthiness of the ship’s crew and as a safely measure divided 
the money for the scheme among the men.103 His intention was to ensure that the money 
could not be robbed or taken from any one man before they boarded the ship. However, 
those organising the ship insisted on the full amount before departure leaving the British 
officer with no other option than to produce the full amount. Once they had the money, 
the chief organisers absconded leaving Fitch, his selected passengers and Fry’s 
passengers without a ship. 
 
This incident highlights the lack of perceived options on the part of the British. Fitch’s 
action in dividing the money indicates his distrust of the financial motives of those 
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willing to assist him. Equally, his willingness to cede on this point and hand over the 
money in these circumstances suggests the lack of better alternatives. The criminal 
underworld was the only one willing to actively engage with British internees. This 
argument is supported by continued British engagement with schemes they knew were 
dubious and held no guarantee of success, an engagement which could not have 
continued if officers such as Fitch were in a position to tap into another support base. 
Other officers, similarly, recognised the ambiguous support offered by criminals with 
Hunter noting that during his time in Marseilles, October to December 1940, the ‘most 
remunerative trade in Marseilles at the time was swindling British who wanted to get 
away’.104 This conclusion is borne out elsewhere. In Langley’s autobiography he 
recounts two separate escape schemes involving criminal organisation. On one 
occasion, Langley took the lead attempting to gain the support of a woman whom he 
claimed was involved in the infamous Blue Train robbery before the war.105 Similar to 
Fitch’s experience, no men escaped and money was lost. On the second occasion, 
according to Langley, a criminal organisation led by the infamous Paul Carbonne made 
overtures to the British via Langley. Langley was promised a ship to bring all the men 
in Marseilles out on the guarantee that the British government would not interfere with 
Carbonne’s smuggling operations. It is hard to grasp the audacity of such a proposal but 
Langley considered it genuine and, whether known to the British government or not, 
committed them to the proposal! While Langley claimed the scheme progressed 
significantly it never came to fruition. According to Langley, the French government 
offered Carbonne a better deal on the condition he would not help the British. 
 
These schemes seem far-fetched but the willingness of the British to engage with 
various criminal organisations marks the desperation and frustration experienced by 
these men. In some cases, if Langley’s account in relation to Carbonne is to be believed, 
it would appear that the British were probably pawns in a ‘turf’ war.106 While Langley’s 
account may appear extraordinary, particularly with regard to the French government’s 
role in the proceedings, which it must be added Langley learned through second hand 
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accounts, it fits with the general trend of British officers striking deals with various 
dubious individuals and criminal gangs.   
 
Overcoming isolation: identifying a civilian support base 
Murchie continued these associations with criminal organisations as evidenced in 
reports, relating to two separate escapes in January and February 1941.107 The latter 
escape involved Lieutenant Richard Broad who noted that 
 
Clayton [Murchie’s associate] was extremely well in with all the Marseilles 
gangsters and in consequence was able, at times, to be very useful.108 
 
In spite of this usefulness, as already indicated by Fitch and Langley’s experiences, this 
reliance on the criminal underworld ultimately threatened British escape activities and 
the burgeoning British-led escape organisation. There is evidence to suggest that these 
connections, combined with the harassment they received from the French authorities, 
were the impetus behind Murchie’s and Clayton’s departure from France. In April 1941, 
the month of Murchie’s departure, Murchie acquired a sum of fifty thousand francs to 
fund his escape efforts. Soon afterwards, Murchie’s apartment was robbed and the 
money stolen. Murchie, in a letter to Sir Samuel Hoare, the British ambassador to Spain, 
detailing the incident, did not venture any insight or offer suggestions as to who was 
possibly involved in the robbery. However, a number of Murchie’s contemporaries 
noted that he was indiscreet, flamboyant and flashy with money.109 Fry placed blame for 
the robbery on a number of mutual connections with whom Murchie had recent 
dealings.110 Whoever the culprit, the episode prompted Murchie’s departure from 
France a few days later.  
 
While the location of the British internees in the Old Port may have initially prevented 
them from establishing a solid support base with sympathetic French helpers, there were 
examples of help given without expectation of return or monetary gain. This sympathy 
was not so much directed at the British internees but rather appears to have been 
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channelled through the Seamen’s Mission. The Mission appears to have quickly become 
associated with British servicemen and on at least two separate occasions men, on 
hearing English spoken, approached speakers for help and were directed to the 
Mission. 111  The main evidence for this draws on Reverend Donald Caskie’s 
autobiography which suggests that the Mission became a focal point for those 
sympathetic to the British.  
 
In his autobiography Caskie credited several groups of helpers with the first show of 
support coming from Greek and Cypriot merchants working in the harbour. According 
to Caskie, these merchants on learning he was a Scottish clergyman helping British 
soldiers; ‘went to extraordinary lengths to find us provisions. Without them I could not 
have fed the men’. 112 Equally, Caskie, in his position as minister, succeeded in 
expanding the Mission’s support in both spiritual and philanthropic terms by tapping 
into a number of local Christian communities. In spiritual terms, Caskie sought to cater 
for the needs of Catholic soldiers and in so doing, acquired the support of a Polish 
chaplain. It is unclear if this chaplain provided any additional practical assistance but 
another Catholic religious community, an ‘Irish order of Roman Catholic Sisters’ 
supplied the Mission with clothing collected from locals.113  A local Presbyterian 
minister, and through him members of his congregation, supplied the Mission with 
practical assistance; collections were specifically taken up to provide the British at the 
Mission with various essentials including clothing.114 
 
As far as can be established this support was not given directly to British internees but 
instead channelled through Caskie via the Seamen’s Mission. Because the only 
evidence of this assistance comes from Caskie’s autobiography it is difficult to 
determine the extent of the donations and the manner in which they were distributed. 
There was however one source of assistance referred to by Caskie and also indicated in 
numerous escape reports. This support came from the British living along the French 
Riviera. Caskie writes highly of the British community and their financial donations, 
listing the individuals sponsoring his work and their commitment to his cause, that is, 
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the welfare of soldiers. Captain D.B. Lang also pays tribute to this help writing that 
‘comforts and clothing for British troops in Marseilles’ were ‘provided where possible 
by British civilians’.115 
 
Arguably, a shared heritage and a sense of common cause lay at the root of this 
assistance but it may not have been entirely one way. The evidence of this is limited to 
one account, that of Captain A.R. Thackrah, who in August 1940 took personal 
responsibility for a number of British civilians being evacuated from France. According 
to Thackrah, he ‘conducted’ as a singular officer this party to the Franco-Spanish 
frontier.116 It is more likely that British civilians living in the Riviera were in a position 
to offer assistance. Being civilians, it was also easier for them to travel unimpeded to 
the frontier and to do so legally. 
 
The main contribution of these British civilians was financial support which, it may be 
argued, was not solely given out of an overriding sense of patriotism but on the 
understanding that it would be repaid. Contributions by British civilians are indicated in 
a number of sources including Caskie’s autobiography and there are several incidences 
of help recorded in Hunter’s, Langley’s and Lang’s escape reports. However, in spite of 
this, details of such support remain relatively sparse making it impossible to determine 
the scope of this support network. For instance, as referred to in the last chapter, 
according to Hunter, when Mme Bonnefous arrived in Marseilles seeking funds in 
autumn 1940, he went to Cannes to raise the funds which were given to him by ‘an 
Englishman’ on the understanding that it was a loan.117 Hunter does not expand on how 
he originally came into contact with this Englishman nor how he managed to raise 
35,000 francs on short notice. This is particularly significant given that Hunter 
personally recognises that the ‘situation of the British in unoccupied France in regard to 
francs was very difficult’.118 This is mirrored in the experiences of Lang, another officer 
in Marseilles in the autumn of 1940, who referred to the assistance of British civilians in 
the south of France. Lang noted that these civilians provided comforts for the ‘troops’ 
but that funding was a problem. Lang, in his report, appears to suggest that the War 
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Office should fill this breach stating that ‘further supplies’ to these troops would be 
‘nearly impossible unless more money is made available’.119 
 
The theme of repayment for assisting escape efforts and the manner of this repayment is 
exemplified in Langley’s account of his dealings with Britain’s wealthy subjects living 
in France. According to Langley, he negotiated a deal towards the end of autumn 1940 
with Mr Jurgens Price, a businessman attached to the multinational corporation Jurgens 
of Unilever. This company had strong British and Dutch connections. Price was in 
Cannes and was prepared to support Langley’s escape efforts; in order to do this he was 
willing to advance five thousand pounds to Reverend Caskie but it would appear that 
this was far from a charitable venture. As Langley reported 
 
None of the money will be released … until such time as word is received from 
me, in code to Caskie ... that this sum has been paid back into Mr Price’s account at 
East Sheen.120 
 
Considering the above, while British civilians sought to actively assist troops in the 
cases mentioned above, it appears that financial motivation or, at the very least, 
financial reimbursement was an important consideration in this type of support. Though 
this claim cannot be asserted as a general rule, one researcher on the topic, Helen Long, 
goes one step further and suggests that 
 
British residents along the Riviera formed a committee to raise funds to help their 
own nationals. They came up with loans against promises of repayment by the War 
Office ... It became a good investment and was returned with interest after 
victory.121 
 
Long is the author of Safe houses are dangerous, and niece to Dr George Rodocanachi 
one of the French helpers in Marseilles (discussed later in this chapter).122 She does not 
reveal her sources for this information but claims firmly that assistance from British 
residents, most likely wealthy, was predicated on, or at the very least concerned by 
financial considerations. There is nothing in the escape reports to confirm or deny 
Long’s assessment of the situation. Her claim serves to highlight the self-interested 
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nature of this support base but it also highlights the fact that British residents along 
Riviera were still one of the first sources of civilian assistance. Despite the necessity to 
repay the support, British civilians were perceived as trustworthy and unlikely to rob or 
betray those they assisted unlike the criminal gangs with whom British officers also 
dealt. As British residents they were easily recognisable as potential supporters and 
money forwarded by them to officers like Langley came at vital times when officers 
were seeking to consolidate escape efforts but unable to tap into a French civilian 
support base. 
 
It took some time before British officers, notably Garrow, established a solid French 
civilian support base. In some cases, British escapees arriving in the Unoccupied Zone 
were given addresses by their helpers in the Forbidden or Occupied Zones. For instance, 
Mme Bonnefous gave Hunter, Hood-Crees, Lang and Buckingham details of an 
acquaintance in Marseilles which proved useful on their initial arrival in the city. Yet 
such connections were often one-off events or relatively short lived. In the case of Mme 
Bonnefous, following her arrest in October-November 1940, her contacts and safe 
houses appear to have dissolved. This is difficult to prove with absolute certainty but no 
further references are made to indicate her connections remained intact in Hunter’s 
report or other escape accounts from this period. 
 
It would appear that it was not until late spring or early summer 1941, around the time 
Murchie and Garrow were assuming control over British escape activities and British 
internees were removed to St Hippolyte du Fort, that there was progress in tapping into 
a solid support base in Marseilles. It is difficult to trace this change through the escape 
reports given the lack of details; autobiographies and biographies fill this breach, though 
such sources of information, given their nature, must be treated with some 
circumspection. 
 
Robert Paxton’s ground-breaking research on Vichy France argues that in relation to the 
composition of the French resistance 
 
Only the young and the already outcast can adopt easily to a life of extended 
rebellion and that is why the Resistance in France contained a disproportionate 
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share of the young, Communists and old streetfighters from the prewar protofascist 
leagues.123 
 
This appears to hold true for some of the first genuine and committed helpers in 
Marseilles. The burgeoning escape organisations’ initial connections were with those 
‘already outcast’ and/or experiencing a sense of alienation under the regime. A number 
of the first crucial connections established by British officers were with those who were 
what may be termed ‘outcast’ or experiencing a life of ‘extended rebellion’. Evidence 
from one such helper, Elizabeth Haden Guest, indicates that British officers were 
becoming increasingly discerning on who to approach for assistance. In her case, 
introductions were made with Lieutenant James Langley through the offices of the 
unofficial British Consul, Major Dodds. Haden Guest was married to a British MP and 
was living in France at the time of the invasion with her son, Anthony. Haden Guest 
was also German and a former communist. She had fled Germany in the 1930s and was 
heavily involved in assisting other communists to do the same. Shortly after German 
occupation, she was arrested but managed to escape with her son and cross the 
demarcation line. 
 
Haden Guest had experienced life as an outcast and endured years of extended rebellion. 
Langley, in approaching Haden Guest, appears to have had some awareness of her 
background which arguably paved the way for these overtures. He knew that Haden 
Guest was bilingual, a skill he was specifically interested in. The dates of Haden 
Guest’s entry into the British-led escape organisation are unclear but Langley arrived in 
Marseilles at the end of October and left on the 21 February 1941. It is likely that she 
began assisting their activities sometime between November and February. Her main 
point of contact was Garrow with her mission being to accommodate British soldiers. 
Haden Guest’s autobiography suggests she was comfortable living an underground 
lifestyle and went so far as to move into a brothel, a move which she points out meant 
she could ‘have a room without registering’.124 Haden Guest’s activities highlight the 
validity of Paxton’s argument. She was one of the first civilian helpers and adapted to 
the lifestyle required with relative ease. Her willingness to live as an outcast aided her 
work with the emerging organisation. However, escape organisations need stability 
almost as much, if not more, than those willing to live lives of extended rebellion. 
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Haden Guest’s activities were still rooted in the Marseilles underworld which was far 
from a solid support base on which to build an escape organisation. 
 
It was not until British escape organisers connected with French helpers, notably middle 
class helpers, that the British eventually moved beyond their isolation in Marseilles and 
stabilized escape activities. 
 
Garrow appears to have been the main officer driving this recruitment, however, he did 
so slowly and only after establishing the credentials of potential helpers. In the cases 
which will be illustrated below, helpers went to considerable trouble to accommodate 
and show support for the British. These helpers were not necessarily aware of British 
escape activities but their continued support demonstrated to Garrow their amenability 
to the British cause. This paved the way for recruitment. For instance, Nancy Fiocca 
(née Wake), an Australian married to a French industrialist, began entertaining British 
officers in her home after an accidental encounter with one in a bar in Marseilles.125 
Fiocca opened the doors of her home to British officers signalling her support and 
empathy for these men. In continuing this activity she drew the notice of Garrow which 
eventually paved the way for her, and her husband’s, recruitment as helpers in early 
1941. In this manner, recruitment was far from spontaneous and took place over a 
number of weeks, indicative of the growing caution of Garrow who was determined and 
recognised the importance of establishing a solid support basis.  
 
Recruitment progressed in the same manner for a number of other key helpers. Helpers 
such as Dr George Rodocanachi and Louis Nouveau joined the organisation in late 
spring but had signalled their pro-British sympathies long before they were approached 
for assistance. Rodocanachi, a doctor working with the Mixed Medical Commission, 
had already come to the attention of at least one British officer in late 1940.  McGregor 
identified Rodocanachi as sympathetic to the British; in his case it was Haden Guest and 
not a British officer who approached him to work for the organisation in April.126 In 
Nouveau’s case, his apartment overlooked Fort St Jean which meant he was well aware 
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of the British presence.127 Nouveau, a rich industrialist, approached officers in Fort St 
Jean. He was seeking a way of helping his son to England to join the Free French. In 
doing this, he signalled his antipathy towards the status quo. A letter written by Murchie 
on his arrival in Spain to the Spanish ambassador Sir Samuel Hoare indicates that by 
April Nouveau had advanced considerable sums of money to the British in 
Marseilles.128 His published diaries also assert that by May 1941 Nouveau, alongside 
his wife, had already hidden between twenty to thirty men in his apartment.129 
 
While the British took the lead in recruiting support, potential helpers were active in 
seeking their company and later, similar to the process in the north, became involved in 
more committed escape activities. More importantly, officers like Garrow, in seeking to 
recruit such individuals, sought to give the growing British escape organisation stability. 
Paxton’s argument that resistance consisted of a disproportionately high number of 
outcasts and youth may reflect broader trends in unoccupied France within the 
resistance as a whole but in relation to escape activities middle class support proved a 
crucial stabilising factor for the British-led escape organisation. 
 
This middle-class support formed the core of Garrow’s network in Marseilles. 
Moreover, once the British-led organisation, later known as the ‘Pat Line’, established a 
foothold, recruitment continued through these connections. This is exemplified with 
Rodocanachi whose wife, Fanny, and subsequently their extended family, became 
heavily involved in the escape organisation. The Fioccas and Nouveau funded Garrow’s 
activities. Men arriving in Marseilles from the north or from St Hippolyte du Fort were 
hidden in various locations including Nouveau’s and Rodocanachi’s homes. In addition, 
both Garrow, and later Pat, in the spring and summer of 1940 lived in the Rodocanachi 
home. Another important middle-class connection was with Gaston Negre in Nîmes 
whose fourteen-bed apartment acted as a bridge between the leadership in Marseilles 
and the men in St Hippolyte du Fort, located fifty kilometres away. All these 
connections helped Garrow, and later Pat, to crystallise his support base in Marseilles. 
                                                            
127 Researcher Brendan Murphy also says that Nouveau was introduced to Garrow and Langley at a 
dinner party in December 1940. Brendan Murphy, Turncoat, the true case of traitor Sergeant Harold 
Cole (London, 1987), p. 72. 
128 ‘Letter from Charles Murchie to Sir Samuel Hoare’, 15 Aug. 1941 (N.A.,FO371/26949a). 
129 See Louis Nouveau’s autobiography. His published diary has a list at the beginning of men hidden in 
his flat. Before he compiled this list he had already hidden approximately twenty men. L.H. Nouveau, 
Des captaines par milliers (Paris, 1958). 
127 
 
The veneer of respectability offered by this middle-class support enabled escape 
organisers to stabilise and expand their organisation and, by harbouring its leaders, 
allowed the escape organisation to retain a presence in Marseilles.   
 
The motivation for this support appears to have been driven by a sense of alienation. 
This alienation was referred to in both autobiographies and biographies of individuals 
such as Nouveau. In Nouveau’s published diaries he spoke of a family tradition of 
challenging the status quo with his father supporting Dreyfus in the Dreyfus Affair. This 
left a deep impression on Nouveau, leading him to challenge the indifference or 
attentisme of his peers. His willingness to help his son join the Free French conveys the 
extent of his disillusionment with the situation. In this regard, while Nouveau may not 
appear as an ‘outcast’ or to have lived a life of obvious ‘extended rebellion’, he felt 
alienated from his class, that is, he was essentially an outcast. Similarly, Rodocanachi, 
according to his biographer Helen Long, experienced a similar sense of alienation.130 He 
worked with the American Consulate in assessing the health of Jewish refugees for 
American visas and that of the British wounded for the Mixed Medical Commission. 
The former acquainted him with the excesses of fascism and the latter revealed his 
sympathy to the British. This was mirrored in Nancy Fiocca’s personal opposition to 
fascism which was based on her past as a journalist. In this capacity, Fiocca witnessed 
the treatment of the Jews first hand in Austria.131 Arguably, in helping the British to 
overcome their isolation, their supporters gave voice to their frustration at and alienation 
from the status quo. 
 
British escapees arriving in the Unoccupied Zone were forced to be more self-reliant 
and take an active approach to organising their continued journey from France than their 
counterparts in occupied France. This ability to remain pro-active was facilitated by, 
and contrasted with the Forbidden and Occupied Zones where there was greater reliance 
on civilian help and generous parole terms. Parole enabled the British to take the lead in 
organising their personal escapes from the Unoccupied Zone. However, to some extent, 
parole and the relatively comfortable conditions in unoccupied France threatened British 
escape endeavours. Military cohesion and concepts of duty, sense of purpose and 
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leadership were particularly important in countering the allure and promise of an easy 
life in Marseilles. Moreover, while parole contributed to individual escape schemes, 
connecting with a civilian support base was necessary in order to progress such schemes 
beyond individual endeavours.  
 
The British in the Unoccupied Zone were slower to identify and connect with resistance 
in the south. Difficulties in connecting with civilian helpers were compounded by the 
high turnover rate of British officers in Marseilles and their departures by various routes 
from France. While there were escape-oriented officers such as Potts, Besley, 
McGregor, Hunter, Sillar and Fitch willing to assist the escape of others, these men 
were also engaged in planning their personal departures and had no intention of 
remaining in unoccupied France long term. Consequently, the British, not in a position 
to consider establishing and maintaining long term connections, relied, for want of a 
better term, on ‘quick fix’ solutions including engaging with criminal gangs and 
resorting to bribery in order to organise their exit from France. Such an approach 
became untenable and was unlikely to have contributed long term to the protraction of 
escape activities. Connecting with local resistance was crucial in order to consolidate 
the British position in the Unoccupied Zone.  
 
It was only with the establishment of a more solid leadership, which was reinforced by 
the War Office’s official recognition of Garrow’s role in Marseilles, were the British in 
a position to connect with a more committed support base. Garrow, and later O’Leary, 
learning from the mistakes of officers such as Murchie, were determined to move 
beyond criminal connections in Marseilles and recruit civilian helpers. The credentials 
of helpers like Nouveau and Fiocca appear to have been carefully tested and established 
before Garrow sought their assistance in escape endeavours. Once such support was 
vetted and received it gave the British-led escape organisation a stability it previously 
lacked. This was the final component in the success of the British escape organisation 
with its impact going beyond simply consolidating the British position in Marseilles. 
This support underpinned the British ability to maintain and strengthen connections in 
the north and also to continue the push to establish connections along the Pyrenees. 
Securing support for escape efforts in this region and in Spain was crucial for the 






Crossing the Pyrenees: diplomacy in Vichy France and British escape activities 
 
 
While the previous chapter focused on the British in the Unoccupied Zone, this chapter 
shifts attention to British efforts to escape unoccupied France and the means by which 
these men returned to Britain. British attempts to leave France concentrated on both 
land and sea routes, with efforts directed towards the Pyrenees and into Spain or by sea 
to North Africa. In spite of the multiplicity of early escape efforts, the common theme 
of diplomacy emerges as particularly influential in shaping not only British efforts to 
leave France but also the journey back to Britain.  
 
Diplomacy helped sustain and expand British escape efforts in the Unoccupied Zone. 
For the purpose of this chapter, diplomacy is used as an umbrella term to refer to the 
numerous embassies, consulates and legations from various countries, which had a 
presence in or contributed to British escape activities in unoccupied France. Before 
continuing, it is worth pointing out that not only did neutral countries such as Ireland, 
and until December 1941 America, retain a diplomatic presence in the Unoccupied 
Zone, but for a time countries occupied by Germany such as Czechoslovakia, Poland 
and Belgium also preserved some form of official or ‘diplomatic’ presence in 
unoccupied France. All of these in some way, had dealings with British escapees. The 
continued presence in France of various diplomatic services emerged as particularly 
important in terms of providing information to escapees and in some cases actively 
assisting in escape activities. Ultimately, it will be demonstrated in the course of this 
chapter that the diplomatic services, notably the American diplomatic service in France 
and the British diplomatic presence in Spain and Switzerland, contributed to sustaining, 
maintaining and expanding British escape activities in Marseilles. 
 
Neutral diplomacy: Escape activities and the Irish Legation 
This chapter begins with a brief assessment of the role of neutral diplomatic services 
notably those of Ireland, in British escape activities. In addition to Ireland, the United 
States for a time was neutral and its diplomatic services played a crucial role in assisting 
British escape efforts. The role of the United States embassy and consular services in 
British escape activities, however, will be addressed separately and extensively later in 
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this chapter. The focus here remains on assessing British use of the Irish diplomatic 
presence in the Unoccupied Zone. While assistance was minimal, evidence for Irish 
involvement is recorded in two known cases, that of Major James C. Windsor Lewis 
and that of Flight Lieutenant W.P.F Treacey.1 These cases are significant in that British 
escapees approaching the Irish diplomatic service were aware of their actions and did so 
with the intention of gaining a neutral passport to leave France. Moreover, it is 
important to highlight that in both of these cases British use of the Irish diplomatic 
presence contributed to the success of escapes. Though the Irish role should not be 
overstated, the Irish Legation is one of the few mentioned in the reports that as a 
neutral, issued passports to British servicemen. In relation to the Irish Legation’s 
experience in France, research undertaken by historian Niall Keogh on the Irish 
diplomat in France at the time, Con Cremin, highlights the difficulties experienced by 
the Irish.  According to Keogh, up to this point Irish civilians living in France travelled 
on British passports.2 Given German occupation and the German influence in the 
Unoccupied Zone, holding a British passport placed the holder in a potentially 
precarious position. This appears to have been the perception of Irish civilians in France 
as, according to Cremin, the main work of the Irish Legation after their arrival in Vichy 
in July 1940 related to the ‘issue and renewal of passports’.3 
 
Cremin referred to this passport work as a ‘very important question’.4 His designation 
of this task as a ‘question’ is insightful; the Irish Consulate placed a premium on 
ascertaining if applicants were genuinely Irish civilians. Keogh’s research highlights 
that members of the Irish Legation visited a number of internment camps in unoccupied 
France assessing passport applicants. Of the two hundred internees claiming to be Irish 
by birth or parentage, seventy were deemed ‘definitely Irish’.5 The results of Keogh’s 
research indicate that while the Irish Legation was pro-active in seeking the release of 
individuals, the Legation displayed a determination to ensure the ‘Irishness’ of those 
granted passports and to remain within this remit. 
 
                                                            
1 Account of escape of Major J.C. Windsor Lewis, 2 Bn. Welsh Guards, 20th Gds. Bde., 13 Dec. 1940 
(N.A., WO208/3300) & Account of escape of 37617 F/Lt. W.P.F. Treacey, 73 (F)Sqdn., No. 11. 
(F)Group, 10 Feb. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3301). 
2 Niall Keogh, Con Cremin: Ireland’s wartime diplomat (Cork, 2006), p. 22. 
3 Con Cremin quoted in Keogh, Con Cremin, p. 22. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., p. 25. 
131 
 
This assessment process may go some way to explaining their relatively limited use but 
certainly the two aforementioned British escapees appear to have acquired Irish 
passports. In Flight Lieutenant W.P.F Treacey’s case he obtained an Irish passport 
sometime after his arrival in Marseilles in October.6 Treacey gives no indication as to 
how he procured this passport only commenting that he ‘managed to get hold of an Irish 
passport and went to live as a civilian in a hotel in the town’.7 With his Irish passport, 
Treacey lived freely in Marseilles while drawing money from the unofficial British 
consulate in the city (see chapter two). This gave Treacey the ability to move about 
unimpeded, unlike many of his contemporaries who were living in Fort St Jean. 
Treacey’s report does not reflect on the implications of his Irish passport and the 
relative independence that came with it but other sources indicate that throughout the 
early autumn of 1940 Treacey continued to play a role in escape planning. As Treacey’s 
report does not go into detail on his escape activities, it is necessary to draw on other 
references to his activities. Two separate sources, Varian Fry’s autobiography and 
Lieutenant James Langley’s report refer to Treacey’s continued participation in escape 
activities.  
 
Fry, an American who arrived in Marseilles in August 1940 to help political refugees 
leave France, observed that Treacey was one of the chief organisers of British escape 
activities. Fry supplied Treacey with money and Treacey used this money to help men 
cross the Franco-Spanish frontier. According to Fry, Treacey 
 
Generally sent his men down to the frontier in threes and fours, and miraculously, 
never had an arrest that had serious consequences.8 
 
Beyond this assessment, Fry does not expand on Treacey’s activities. However, 
Treacey’s involvement in the escape scene in Marseilles is further highlighted by 
Langley. Langley’s report noted that in November 1940 Treacey was one of two men 
chosen by Langley to travel to Lyon and establish contacts with the American Consul in 
Lyon.9 Treacey succeeded in this objective, the implications of which will be discussed 
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later in this chapter. When Treacey eventually decided to leave Marseilles in January 
1941, his neutral passport facilitated his application for the necessary visa and his 
departure: 
 
I managed to get an identity card as a civilian, my visa de sortie and my visa for 
Portugal. I left Marseilles on 22nd January, arriving at Lisbon, via Narbonne, 
Barcelona and Madrid.10 
 
This easy passage to Portugal stood in sharp contrast to the bulk of British escapees, 
most of whom did not consider the visa application process a means of leaving France.  
 
Treacey, a native of Dublin, had the advantage that most men lacked: he could 
legitimately present himself as a neutral. There is at least one other case of a British 
escapee in Marseilles having a similar advantage to Treacey. A British serviceman, 
Bombardier George Melas, arrived in the Unoccupied Zone in the summer of 1940. 
Melas, coming from a Greek background, immediately on crossing the demarcation line 
went to seek the Greek Legation in Vichy. He then travelled to Marseilles, where he 
obtained a Greek passport. At this stage of the war, Greece was neutral and Melas 
successfully used his Greek passport to leave France in July 1940.11 
 
Though successes like Treacey’s and Melas’ were rare, this did not stop others from 
attempting to personally present themselves as neutral. This approach was successful in 
at least one case, that of Major James C. Windsor Lewis, who arrived in Marseilles in 
August 1940 and managed to obtain a neutral passport. It is not clear which neutral 
diplomatic service provided Lewis with a passport but there are indications that he 
received an Irish one as Lewis changed his name to ‘O’Brien’, a common name in 
Ireland.12 Lewis specifically referred to this name in his report as ‘being a neutral 
name’. Under this name and with these papers Lewis travelled freely to various places 
in the Unoccupied Zone including Perpignan, Marseilles, Cannes, Vichy and Nice and 
successfully obtained a Portuguese visa. Subsequently, with his French papers declaring 
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him neutral, Lewis obtained a neutral passport and with this neutral passport applied for 
a Spanish visa and the French visa de sortie, that is a visa to leave France. Lewis’ 
neutral passport allowed him to approach the French authorities for the visa de sortie 
which was entered into his passport by gendarmes in Nice. 
 
Equally, possession of a neutral passport enabled Lewis to approach the Spanish 
Consulate for a Spanish visa, permission for which could only be given through the 
Minster of the Exterior in Spain. It would have been virtually impossible for him to 
have requested this permission without a neutral passport. While waiting for his Spanish 
visa, Lewis continued to seek a means out of France, including at one stage a Brazilian 
visa for which he needed, and acquired, signatures from gendarmes in Marseilles. In 
this regard, Lewis’ assumed neutral identity enabled him to continually approach the 
French authorities and pursue legitimate means of departing France. However, the 
process was cumbersome and required a great deal of waiting. From the time Lewis 
began the process in August it was some three months before he was in a position to 
leave France. Permission did not come through for his Spanish visa until 22 November 
1940 and by that time Lewis had lost money on various failed escape schemes. In this 
respect, while Lewis’ determination to continue pursuing the passport route to leave 
France ultimately paid off, it required patience, perseverance and communication with 
various consulates and the French authorities, the latter of which was difficult for 
escapees. This was particularly the case considering the French were obliged to make an 
arrest if there was a suspicion the applicant was British. 
 
These difficulties may go some way to explaining why only a small number of 
individuals approached neutral diplomatic services and pursued legitimate means to 
leave the country. Others claimed ‘Irishness’ in order to receive special treatment. One 
incident, referred to in chapter one, involved a British officer, Wing Commander Basil 
Embry, who claimed to his German captors that he was an IRA man and heavily 
engaged in fighting the British for Irish freedom. On another occasion, in November 
1940, a British private arrested in Spain wrote to the Direction General de Securidad, 
Madrid presenting himself as Irish and asserting that his relations ‘had fought for the 
establishment of the Franco regime’.13 In both cases, these men were promptly released 
                                                            
13 Account of escape of 7603318 Pte. Patrick J. Harper R.A.O.C., 28 Nov. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3299). 
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and yet there is no evidence to suggest help was given in the knowledge that the men 
were escapees. Unfortunately, in Lewis’ case, he does not go into the details on how he 
obtained his passport or the reaction of the diplomatic service, and therefore, it is almost 
impossible to determine whether the diplomatic service involved in issuing his passport 
was aware if he was a British officer or not. Even if Lewis’ provided more information 
it must be also acknowledged that the scale of this help was relatively minimal though it 
does demonstrate a broader trend, namely, that diplomatic services from other countries, 
including those recently occupied, played a role in assisting men seeking to leave 
France. 
 
Non-neutral diplomatic services in the Unoccupied Zone 
In relation to help provided by the diplomatic services of occupied countries stationed in 
unoccupied France, help was given with the informed aim of returning men to Britain. 
In general, diplomatic services from Czechoslovakia or Poland proved useful and strove 
to assist not only their stranded civilians but also the British. Poland and 
Czechoslovakia already had the advantage of having an organisational structure in 
France after German occupation of their respective countries forced the setting up of 
governments in exile. With the departure of these governments to Britain in the summer 
of 1940, both countries still retained a diplomatic presence in France. In contrast, newly 
overrun and occupied countries like Belgium did not have a pre-existing organisational 
structure in France and therefore there was no strong diplomatic presence in the 
Unoccupied Zone which was in a position to offer assistance to escapees on par with 
that, which as will be illustrated, was offered by the Czechs and Poles. 
 
Despite the lack of an obvious Belgian diplomatic presence in unoccupied France, 
Belgian authorities in the Unoccupied Zone were attempting to deal with the problem of 
their armed forces being stranded in France and they had set up a number of Belgian 
repatriation centres. On at least two occasions, Belgian officers working in these 
repatriation centres proved amenable to British escapees and actively sought to assist 
them in an individual or personal capacity. In July/August 1940 Corporal J.R. Horsman 
recounted strategically approaching the Belgian Mission in Toulouse where he received 
food and train tickets to Marseilles which, according to Horsman ‘the Belgian Liaison 
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officer paid out of his own money’.14 Because Belgian repatriation centres could not 
provide official travel documents, assistance to the British was limited. Nevertheless, 
while Belgian officers may have been limited in their ability to provide direct practical 
assistance to escapees, as Captain C.F.P Mills discovered on his arrival in Marseilles, 
Belgian officers connected to the repatriation centre were a useful source of information 
on the situation along the Franco-Spanish frontier. A number of these Belgian officers 
provided Mills with information and contacts along the Pyrenees and he successfully 
used these connections to cross into Spain in November 1940.  
 
The Czech Consulate and its contribution to British escape activities 
The limited help from Irish and Belgian emissary services stood in sharp contrast to the 
assistance offered to British escapees by Czech and Polish organisations in the 
Unoccupied Zone. The Czechs and Poles benefitted from their ability to retain a 
diplomatic service for at least a number of months. However, Czech and Polish officials 
also held different legal positions in Vichy France and this had a direct impact on the 
type of assistance they could respectively offer the British. In relation to the Czech case, 
or the Czechoslovakian case, this was complicated by the fact that, as historian Vojtěch 
Mastný writes  
Prewar Czechoslovakia had been a state in which national identity was still a 
problem to be discussed, rather than a certainty to be taken for granted.15 
 
Compounding the internal problems faced by Czechoslovakia, the German occupation 
of the Sudeten lands in 1938 and the remainder of the country in 1939 effectively 
meant, according to Mastný, that Czechoslovakia ‘had become extinct before the war 
began’.16 Given the problems facing Czechoslovakia’s status as a nation state, Mastný 
further pointed out that ‘its restoration was not a foregone conclusion’.17 
 
Unlike Poland, the difficulties of defining Czechoslovakia undermined efforts to 
establish a government in exile, headed by former president, Edvard Beneš. Beneš 
resigned his presidency and left for Britain following the Munich Agreement and 
consequent German occupation of the Sudeten region in 1938. However, the German 
                                                            
14 Account of escape of 434244 Cpl. Horsman, J.R. 6/D.L.I., 30 Oct. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3299). 
15 Vojtech Mastný, ‘The Czechoslovak government in exile during World War II’ in Jarbücher für  
Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge  XXVII No. 4  (1979), pp 548-49. 




occupation of the whole country in March 1939 provided Beneš the opportunity of 
repudiating his resignation, an action he justified by claiming that German action 
‘rendered the Munich settlement with all its consequences [including Beneš resignation] 
null and void’.18 With this precarious legal argument Beneš attempted to establish a 
government in exile; Mastný noted that he received popular support for this claim in 
Czechoslovakia. 19 In contrast, the reaction of both Britain and France was more 
circumspect. As Mastný highlighted, even with the outbreak of war in September 1939 
the French consented only to the establishment of a Czech army and a National 
Committee in France, falling short on the issue of recognising a Czech government in 
exile.20 The British also refused to give full status or recognition to a Czechoslovakian 
government in exile. It was only with the collapse of France and the departure of Czech 
officials to Britain that a Czech government in exile was finally established, and even 
this was not granted full diplomatic recognition.21 
 
Rather ironically, for a number of months following French defeat the Czechs retained 
consular services in the Unoccupied Zone. The position of this consulate was unusual 
given that it was composed of Czech exiles though the Czech government in exile was 
in Britain and the current government in Czechoslovakia (then called the Protectorate of 
Bohemia and Moravia) operated under German control. It is difficult to establish the 
various connections of the Czech Consulate as almost no research has been carried out 
in this area. Indirect anecdotal evidence indicates that the Czech Consulate maintained 
strong ties to the government in exile. Fry noted that the goal of the Czech Consul based 
in Marseilles, Vladimir Vochoč, was to help smuggle ‘Czech volunteers out of France 
so they could fight again with the British’.22 There is further evidence, illustrated in 
Mastný’s research, which suggests that top level Czech government officials working 
under the German protectorate may have had sympathy with the aims of Vladimir 
Vochoč and the Czechs in exile. According to Mastný, Alios Eliáš, prime minister of 
the official government shortly after the formation of the Czech government in exile, 
sent word to London placing himself at Beneš’s disposal.23 
 




21 Ibid., p. 551. 
22 Fry, Surrender on demand, p. 18. 
23 Mastny, ‘The Czechoslovak government in exile during World War II’, p. 550. 
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Given the confusion surrounding the status of Czechoslovakia in international affairs, it 
is difficult to establish the exact nature and relationship that the Czech Consulate in 
unoccupied France maintained with either the government under the German 
protectorate or the government in exile, or indeed, if it acted autonomously and under 
French protection. In spite of this confusion, the important point remains that for a 
number of months following French defeat the Czech consulate retained and continued 
to exercise its right to issue passports to its civilians.24 This suggests that Vichy granted 
or recognised the legal status of the Czech Consulate. 
 
A British officer, Captain C.R.I. Besley, was one of the first British officers to make 
contact with the Czech Consulate in Marseilles. Besley approached the consulate in 
September 1940 requesting demobilisation papers for both his personal use and for a 
number of his colleagues. The Consulate recommended Mr Donald Lowrie to Besley, 
an American who appears to have been working closely with the Czech Consulate. It is 
perhaps odd to find, at this time, an American working for or with the Czech Consulate 
and in a position to provide British escapees with Czech demobilisation papers. 
However, Lowrie had already spent a considerable period of time in Czechoslovakia 
working on behalf of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA). According to 
archives on the YMCA held by the University of Minnesota, Lowrie helped expand the 
organisation in the 1920s before moving to Paris.25 However, it appears from Varian 
Fry’s autobiography that Lowrie continued to maintain close connections with 
Czechoslovakia and was in Prague at the time of the German invasion.26 According to 
Fry, before leaving Prague, Lowrie helped a number of individuals to escape the 
country and was therefore considered a friend of the Czechs on his arrival in France. 
 
Besley’s report also confirms the close connections maintained between Lowrie and the 
Czech Consulate as it was Lowrie who provided Besley with the necessary forged 
Czech demobilisation papers.27 In spite of the willingness of the Czech Consulate to 
                                                            
24 Fry, Surrender on demand, p.18. 
25 ‘YMCA International Work in Czechoslavakia: an inventory of its records’, University of Minnesota 
website available at (http://special.lib.umn.edu/findaid/xml/yusa0009x2x9.xml) (14 May 2015). 
26 Lowrie continued to remain interested in Czechoslovakia publishing a book on a Czechoslovakian 
president: Donald A. Lowrie, Masaryk of Czechoslovakia: a life of Tomas G. Masaryk, first president of 
the Czechoslovak Republic (London, 1937). 
27 Varian Fry’s book, Surrender on Demand gives a first-hand account of Lowrie’s work in Marseilles. 
However, for further information see also the work of researcher, Daniella Greene. Greene asserts that 
Donald Lowrie also engaged in relief efforts on behalf of Vichy’s Ministry of the Interior. Daniella 
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provide direct assistance to the British, Lowrie warned Besley that the French 
authorities had recently discovered some forged Czech papers and advised that the 
papers he gave Besley should not be used. Interestingly, the recent discovery of these 
papers by the French authorities did not curtail Lowrie’s willingness to help Besley and 
he still handed over these papers. This incident had an added significance when 
considered in the light of Varian Fry’s autobiography. After seizing a number of false 
Czech passports the French authorities complained to the American Consulate about 
both Fry and Lowrie. This complaint, as described by Fry, appears to have been 
relatively unofficial but its impact was almost immediate. Word of this meeting filtered 
through to Fry and Lowrie and was quickly communicated to the Czech Consulate. In 
late September or in early October 1940, its activities in terms of issuing false papers 
immediately ceased. 
 
Besley heeded Lowrie’s warnings and ceded his desire to use these papers, exploring 
alternative means of exiting France. While Besley’s communication was not the sole 
interaction between British escapees and the Czech Consulate, it is difficult to gauge the 
full extent of this connection. Captain D.B. Lang, arriving in Marseilles in autumn 
1940, established contact with ‘Polish, Belgian and Czech organisations’ but gave 
particular praise to the Czechs describing them as the ‘most stout hearted’ and 
commented that the Czech organisation went to ‘magnificent efforts’ to help both 
British and Czech reach British territory.28 In his escape endeavours Lang reported 
working ‘hand in glove with the Czech Legation’.29 Lang eventually left France by boat 
in November 1940 but he does not state if his connections with the Czechs facilitated 
his departure from France. Equally, although his account gives significant praise to 
Czech support, he does not expand on the nature or extent of this help or provide details 
of schemes involving the Czechs. This makes it difficult to assess the impact of Czech 
support on early British escape endeavours. However, Lang does give some indication 
of the Czech consulate’s value in terms of the information it provided, claiming that the 
situation in Marseille compelled him to work with the Czechs as there was no British 
organisation which ‘possessed any local knowledge of the situation’.30 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Greene, ‘Racial Motivations for French collaboration during the Second World War: uncovering through 
film and memoir’ (PhD thesis, Clemson University, 2008), p. 105. 





Lang’s comments may be perceived as a veiled criticism of the shortcomings of the 
British handling of the situation and the lack of assistance from its diplomatic services 
(see chapter two) but they also highlighted the importance of information to escapees. 
The Czech Consulate may have been unable to continue providing documents but the 
information it could convey was considered valuable to British officers like Lang. 
Equally, British contact with the Czech Consulate expanded the scope of British 
connections. Lowrie, as already mentioned, had established contact with Varian Fry and 
provided him with a number of passports for political refugees. On Besley’s arrival at 
the Czech Consulate in September, Lowrie not only gave him the demobilisation papers 
but also Fry’s details.  Although Fry does not refer to Besley in his autobiography, it 
would appear from the chronology of the escape reports that this was Fry’s first, albeit 
brief, contact with British officers.31 
 
Ultimately, this connection had long term consequences for British escape activities. 
Fry’s involvement gave added impetus in escape activities and as a result of his 
American nationality he was able to travel to Spain and act as an intermediary between 
the British diplomatic services in Spain and British escapees in Marseilles (discussed 
later in this chapter). This connection brought much-needed funds to the British escape 
efforts although the value of these funds is questionable given that much of it was spent 
on a number of failed boat schemes (see previous chapter). On the positive side, through 
this connection the British gained access to Fry’s contacts on the Pyrenees and in the 
winter of 1940 Fry established an escape route along the Pyrenees with the aid of Lisa 
and Jonanes Fittko.32 This couple were Jewish leftists who had fled Berlin in 1933; 
following the German invasion of France they planned to flee a second time and acting 
accordingly they made their way to the eastern Pyrenees with the aim of crossing into 
Spain. The Fittkos were shown a safe route across the mountains near Banyuls and 
assisted a number of refugees across including the famous historian and scholar Walter 
Benjamin. Fry heard of the Fittkos’ activities and convinced them to stay in Banyuls 
and pass other political refugees into Spain. Both stayed until late spring 1941 and in 
                                                            
31 Fry refers to Fitch as the first contact but Fitch did not arrive in Marseilles until September. Besley had 
been living in the city since July. Fry, Surrender on demand, p. 105.  
32 Interview with Lisa Fittko, 22 Jan. 1999 (University of South California Shoah Foundation Institute, 
Code 48643-2). See also Lisa Fittko, Escape through the Pyrenees (Evanston, 1991). 
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that time, according to both Fry’s and Lisa Fittko’s published memories, the Fittkos, 
with Fry acting as intermediary, continued to pass British escapees along this route.33 
 
In this respect, the connections with Fry, which appear to have been made first through 
the Czech Consulate, helped the British to expand escape efforts into Spain. Yet it must 
also be noted that while Fittko asserts a continued role in assisting British escapees 
throughout the spring of 1941, the majority of escape reports give relatively little 
information on guides assisting men across the Pyrenees. In addition, the Fittkos were 
not directly mentioned in these accounts.34 This, however, does not challenge the 
veracity of Fittko’s claim and there may be indirect support for her assertion that both 
she and her husband Johannes continued to help men escape up until March 1941 based 
on the fact that the escape reports continually refer to Banyuls as a crossing point into 
Spain. The escape reports also reveal, however, that as the organisation in Marseilles 
developed, the British leadership pushed to establish their own connections along the 
Pyrenees (discussed later in this chapter) and moved away from working through 
intermediaries such as Varian Fry. Equally, the Czech Consulate, which contributed to 
the British establishing contact with Fry, also appears to lose its importance to British 
escape organisers throughout 1941. None of the main British escape organisers, all of 
whom were dealt with in the last chapter, such as Fitch, Murchie or Garrow, refer to 
Czech officials in any detail in their reports leading researchers, including this author, to 
believe that the connection between the Czech and British escape organisers dissolved 
soon after the British managed to establish contact with Fry in autumn 1940. 
 
Only one report contradicts this assessment. Corporal J.A. Parker arrived in Marseilles 
in May 1942 and was taken to the Czech Relief Centre where he was cared for by M. 
Dubina.35 Whether this relief centre was, or at least was connected to, the Czech 
Consulate is almost impossible at this juncture to establish.36 Regardless of its actual 
status, through this centre Parker was passed directly to a safe house established by the 
British-led escape organisation. This is the only information in relation to the Czechs 
                                                            
33 Fry, Surrender on demand; Fittko, Escape through the Pyrenees; Interview with Lisa Fittko, 22 January 
1999 (University of South California Shoah Foundation Institute, Code 48643-2). 
34 Fittko, Escape through the Pyrenees, p. 159. 
35 Account of escape of NX. 3653 Cpl. Parker, J.A., 2/1 Field Coy A.I.F., 14/17 July 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3307). 
36 Oliver Clutton-Brock also noted that two escapees, Duncan and Rowan-Hamilton, went to the Czech 
Relief Centre in late 1941. However, Clutton Brock provides no further information on the Czech Relief 
Centre or possible prior connections to the Czech Consulate. Clutton Brock, RAF Evaders. 
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contained in Parker’s account of his escape. However, it highlights a continued 
connection between the British leadership of the fully-fledged escape organisation and 
the Czech presence in Marseilles. The Czech Consulate at this stage no longer had an 
official presence in unoccupied France and had been left in a particularly precarious 
position following the arrest of the Czech Consul, Vladimir Vochoč, in later spring 
1941. Yet Parker’s report indicates that the Czechs still managed to retain a semi-
official presence in Marseilles and that this ‘Czech Relief Centre’, in Parker’s case, was 
a contact point for the British-led escape organisation in the city. Beyond this 
assessment and indeed beyond Parker’s report, there appears to be no information 
currently available that gives further insight into the continued contact and scope of 
British relations with Czech officials and how they contributed to expanding escape 
activities in Marseilles. 
 
The Polish Consulate and British escape activities 
The relative silence in the escape reports respecting the developing relationship between 
the Czechs and the British stands in sharp contrast to British connections with the Polish 
Consulate in unoccupied France. The Poles did not have the same difficulties as the 
Czechs in establishing an official presence in France. According to historian Anita 
Prazmowska, the Polish government in exile was not only supported by the French but 
also by the Polish army, which on the eve of the German invasion consisted of 83,000 
men, was ‘equipped and maintained by the French government’.37 On the defeat of 
France, the head of the Polish government in exile issued radio instructions to the troops 
encouraging them to make it to the nearest port where they would be picked up and 
transported to Britain. 38  This instruction never translated into widespread action. 
Though Prazmowska noted that 27,614 men reached Britain, she also points out that 
16,092 men were taken as prisoners of war while a further 54,647 Poles were scattered 
across Switzerland and France or were making their way to Spain.39 
 
Effectively, this meant that in the summer of 1940 there was a Polish presence in 
various French port cities attempting to leave France for Britain. As Prazmowska’s 
focus shifts to the Polish contingent in Britain, she does not provide details on the scope 
                                                            
37 These figures, 83,000 men are also drawn from Prazmowska’s work. Anita Prazmowska, Britain and 
Poland: the betrayed ally 1939-1943 (Cambridge, 1995), p. 14. 
38 Ibid., p. 25.  
39 Ibid., p. 26. 
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or impact of this Polish presence but she makes one interesting point which is important 
in the context of this research. In relation to the Polish perspective, Prazmowska argues 
that 
 
Until June 1940 Britain was viewed as a secondary ally. Now she became the 
principal and only patron.40 
 
This change in perspective is particularly evident among Polish servicemen who arrived 
in the port city of Marseilles. The Poles had a strong and active presence in Marseilles 
where the French interned these men in the former English Hospital, not to be confused 
with the British Seamen’s Mission run by Reverend Donald Caskie and used by British 
internees. This perception of Britain as the ‘principal and only patron’ appears to have 
directed Polish activity in Marseilles. The Poles, through their officers and backed by 
their diplomatic services, within a month of their arrival in Marseilles initiated contact 
with the British interned in Fort St Jean with the aim of co-ordinating escape activities. 
 
Brooks Richards examined the role of the Polish diplomatic services in the Unoccupied 
Zone and their efforts to assist Polish military efforts to leave France for Britain.41 
Brooks noted the setting-up of a Polish Embassy in Vichy and points to an official 
Polish diplomatic presence in various cities in the Unoccupied Zone such as Lyon, 
Toulouse, Marseilles and Perpignan.42 However, the main interest of Richards’ study 
relates to the Poles in London or North Africa and as a result, Richards’ research does 
not fully assess the contribution of Polish diplomatic services to early escape activities 
in aiding Poles and for British efforts to leave France. This is important considering that 
British escapees in contact with Polish servicemen in unoccupied France frequently 
refer to the Polish Consulate in connection with Polish escape efforts. The focal point 
for these activities appears to have been the English Hospital with escape schemes 
centring around two main ideas: firstly, the issuing of Polish passports, which similar to 
Czech passports were accepted by the French authorities until November 1940;43 
secondly, Polish efforts to obtain ships.  
 
                                                            
40 Ibid., p. 27. 
41 Brooks Richards, Secret flotillas vol. II: clandestine sea operations in the Mediterranean, North Africa 
and the Adriatic 1940-1944 (London, 2004), p. 8. 
42 Ibid., p. 6. 
43 Ibid., p. 8. 
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The issuing of passports was the first recourse. As initially there were no concerns over 
the Polish Consulate’s ability to issue passports, the main concern for the Polish appears 
to have been their reception in their destination neutral countries such as Portugal, from 
which they hoped to reach Britain. This concern, as elucidated in an account provided 
by Second Lieutenant R.A.J. Newman, seems to have prompted one of the first Polish 
attempts to connect with the British. Newman arrived and was interned in Fort St Jean 
at the end of July or early August 1940, when after a fortnight 
 
A Polish padre appeared, who was then in charge of arrangements for evacuating 
Poles through Lisbon to England. Apparently he thought that the addition of some 
British would smooth the Poles’ path through Portugal.44 
 
Although Newman does not provide specifics, this scheme involved the use of Polish 
passports and by extension needed the Polish Consulate’s complicity to sign off on 
providing British escapees with false passports. While the British may have been 
provided with false passports without the knowledge of the Polish Consulate, this is 
unlikely to have been the case when considered in the light of similar British 
experiences of this Polish passport scheme. While the scheme ultimately failed to come 
to fruition, two British officers, including Captain C.R.I Besley (the same officer who 
had also approached the Czech Legation) attempted to use their fake Polish passports to 
cross into Spain.45 Seeking assurance that it was possible to use this passport, Besley, 
along with his colleague, directly approached the Polish officials at the consulate in 
Toulouse. Not only did the consulate approve the use of these fake passports but 
provided Besley with a renewed Portuguese visa and money in American dollars to 
bribe the Spanish Consulate (presumably for a transit visa).46  
 
Besley’s experience illustrates the resources and resourcefulness of the Polish Consulate 
officials and their willingness to directly aid escapes. Moreover, while the Spanish 
Consulate did not grant either Besley or his colleague’s visa, the Consulate continued to 
work on their behalf and arranged for them to join a group of Poles and cross into Spain 
                                                            
44 Account of escape of ARM/S/Sgt. R.A.J. Newman, R.A.O.C., Attd Highlanders. No: 7583169, 20 Sept 
1940 (N.A., WO208/3299). See also Account of escape of 6397485 L/Sgt. A. Tilling, 7/R. Sussex, 12th 
Div. Wounded, 5 Dec. 1940 (N.A.,WO208/3300).  
45 Besley reported that F/Lt Verity accompanied him to Toulouse, also with the intention of using his fake 
Polish passport. Account of escape of 37810 Capt. C.R.I Besley, 7/R/ Northumberland Fusiliers, 6 Dec. 
1940 (N.A., WO208/3300). 
46 In order to travel through Spanish territory the Spanish authorities required a transit visa. 
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illegally.47 In addition, Second Lieutenant R.A.J. Newman, also a participant in the 
original scheme, implies that he also used his fake Polish passport to gain entry to 
Spain. This same passport may have been the ‘fake Polish passport, which bore visas 
for China, Portugal and Spain’.48 Newman and a number of his colleagues also received 
an exchange order for third-class passage on a ship from Lisbon to Shanghai and twenty 
American dollars to cover expenses. This list marked the end of Newman’s account on 
his escape such that it is reasonable to assume he utilised the above and crossed the 
frontier into Spain as a Pole. 
 
Although the Polish scheme did come to fruition on the scale envisaged, the level of 
detail and planning demonstrates the ability of Polish officers in Marseilles to organise. 
This scheme, as it was revealed to the British in early autumn months of 1940, involved 
these men only in the final stages of planning. British officers and servicemen were 
presented with the plans as they existed and the numbers of places open to British 
escapees filled requirements already set by the Poles (two officers and four non- 
commissioned officers).49 Even when this Polish passport scheme was abandoned, 
Polish officers with the help of their Consulate in Toulouse were in a position to supply 
men with money and guides to cross the Pyrenees into Spain illegally. In this respect, 
the Poles based in the English Hospital displayed a level of organisation not yet reached 
or possibly not yet fully conceived by the British in Marseilles. This was likely achieved 
with the assistance, co-operation and know-how of their consular authorities. 
 
On other occasions help came directly from the Polish Consulate. For instance, when 
Lieutenant William Sillar and Captain F. Fitch first arrived in the Unoccupied Zone at 
the end of July 1940, the Polish Consulate in Toulouse directly attempted to help them 
to cross the Franco-Spanish frontier.50 Both men reached Salies du Salat, a small 
commune located near the western Pyrenees, where they met a Polish lieutenant who 
referred them to the consulate in Toulouse. They had previously attempted to make 
                                                            
47 Besley’s companion, F/Lt Verity left before the guide arrived and therefore did not join Besley on the 
Pyrenees crossing. Account of escape of 37810 Capt. C.R.I Besley, 7/R/ Northumberland Fusiliers, 6 
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49 Ibid. 
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contact with the American Consulate there with little success but found willing aid from 
the Polish Consulate. According to Sillar, the ‘officers’ at the Consulate in Toulouse 
 
Undertook to supply us with Polish passports issued to civilians of 16 years of age. 
The passports arrived 3 weeks later and we set off via Toulouse, by train, for 
Perpignan.51 
 
Sillar’s statement indicates that the Consulate provided fake passports under the military 
age in order that the men might enter into Spain without difficulty. At that time, men of 
military age had particular difficulty in travelling. In addition to this precaution, when 
applying for visas the Prefect in Perpignan insisted on a personal appearance of the 
applicants, the Polish Consul refused and arranged for Sillar and Fitch to stay in 
Banyuls ‘until the matter could be adjusted’.52 In so doing, the Consul indicated an 
intention to act and advocate on their behalf. This, combined with the Polish Consul’s 
ability to make arrangements for Sillar and Fitch to stay in Banyuls, further highlights 
the resources the Polish Consulate was willing to offer not only Polish, but British 
escapees.   
 
Despite their intentions, before the Polish Consul could act the Vichy authorities 
arrested him leaving Sillar and Fitch in Banyuls. While Polish contacts continued to 
attempt to help both men cross into Spain, Sillar and Fitch left for Marseilles where they 
later became heavily involved in British escape activities. At the end of September 1940 
Sillar again travelled to Banyuls in an attempt to help British escapees cross the frontier. 
It is unknown if Sillar used connections he had made through the Polish Consulate to do 
this but he had some success before he too crossed the frontier into Spain some weeks 
later. Interestingly, Sillar, once he crossed the Franco-Spanish frontier, used his Polish 
passport to travel safely through Spain reaching the British Consulate without being 
arrested. Sillar credits his fake passport with his ability to reach Barcelona without 
arrest, an assertion which is credible considering at this time most escapees fell into the 
hands of the Spanish authorities either en-route to Barcelona or at the British Embassy 
in Madrid (discussed later in this chapter). 
 





In considering the Polish Consulate’s role in facilitating escape, it is important to point 
out that even with the failure of the above scheme, Polish officials still continued to 
assist Sillar. The ability of the Polish diplomatic services to aid escape activities, 
provide passports, money, and in Sillar and Fitch’s case accommodation, was because 
their diplomatic services were remarkably well organised and financed from their Polish 
counterparts in London. Furthermore, the Polish in London channelled this funding to 
their diplomatic services in France with the intention that it should be used for escape 
activities. 
 
Two sources identify the nature of Polish funding, namely Besley’s account of Polish 
activities and an account given by Lieutenant A.D. McGregor. According to Besley’s 
account, Major Polakewitz informed him that in August 1940 the Poles were running 
short on funds. Polakewitz asked Besley if he would approach the British Consul in 
Marseilles, or more particularly, Major Dodds for help (see chapter two for details on 
Major Dodds). Dodds was reluctant to help and no money was forthcoming. According 
to Besley, on the 1 September Polakewitz informed Besley that Polish financial affairs 
had improved with the arrival of a Polish agent from London.53 This agent brought with 
him a substantial sum of money in American dollars. In fact, Besley benefitted from this 
cash injection and in total received two thousand five hundred francs from the Poles, not 
including the two hundred dollars he received from the Polish Consulate in Toulouse. 
 
Lieutenant A.D. McGregor confirms Besley’s claims.54 Similar to Besley, McGregor 
had personal contact with the Poles in Marseilles and through these connections met the 
agent bringing funds from London. Building on Besley’s knowledge, McGregor’s 
connections with the Poles gave him to understand that there was ‘considerable 
traffic’55 between the Poles in London and those in Marseilles. McGregor’s impression 
of the Poles in Marseilles was positive and in fact his description of their activities 
suggests he was somewhat envious of their organisational ability. McGregor’s report 
continues to illustrate the ongoing co-ordination between the Polish internees and their 
diplomatic services with McGregor not only receiving a false passport but also a letter 
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‘signed’ by the French Minister of the Interior and also a Brazilian visa ‘signed’ by the 
Brazilian ambassador in Vichy.  
 
Polish ambition went beyond passport escape schemes with the Poles also exploring sea 
routes. Richards’ research on the Poles in France focused on their efforts to obtain ships 
and make their way to North Africa or Gibraltar. According to Richards, almost all 
Polish efforts made inside France to evacuate men by sea stalled and ultimately failed. 
While this chapter does not seek to challenge the veracity of Richards’ assessment, in 
the context of this research Polish boat schemes are considered important in relation to 
their effect on escapees. British officers initially focused on boat schemes as the most 
effective way of getting as many men out of France as possible. Equally, Polish 
organisers also explored the possibility of a sea escape and in doing so continued to 
include the British in their plans. Thus, when, as Besley noted, the Polish passport 
scheme fell through he found he was included in one of these boat schemes. According 
to Besley, 
 
Very considerable sums were paid by the Polish authorities for the purchase of 
yachts and motor boats and I was myself aboard a steamer of some 1500 tons 
which I understand had been bought by the Polish authorities and fitted out to carry 
300 men in the holds.56 
 
Besley was not the only British escapee on board; he counted among the number two of 
his colleagues. While this is a relatively small number, it is important to remember that 
the entire plan was financed and organised by the Poles. Moreover, the Poles, sailing 
under a Panamese flag, were willing to pick up forty British escapees at an agreed 
rendez-vous point once the ship set sail. 
 
This scheme, also, in spite of the careful planning, ultimately failed to come to fruition. 
From this point on individual references to shared Polish and British escape schemes 
became less frequent. This pattern continued throughout early 1941 with few escapees 
mentioning contact with Polish officers or servicemen in their reports. However, there is 
some evidence to indicate, that while individual servicemen or airmen no longer 
interacted with the Poles, the British leadership namely Garrow and Pat, maintained 
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some degree of contact. Due to the nature of the evidence, it is impossible to ascertain 
the means or nature of continued Polish or British interaction in this period, the escape 
reports indicate that by late 1941 Polish consulates in the Unoccupied Zone and the 
English Hospital acted as gateways for the British escape organisation. 
 
This assertion is supported by a number of escape accounts particularly in late 1941 and 
into 1942. For instance that of Flight Officer M. Taras, who was shot down over Calais 
in November 1941, on reaching Marseilles Taras went to the English Hospital where he 
stayed until the 21 February 1941.57 In this time, he made one failed attempt to cross the 
Pyrenees alone in December but finding in his words that Perpignan was ‘full of 
Gestapo’58 he returned to the English Hospital. It is at this point and, presumably 
through connections established in the English Hospital, that he was ‘introduced into an 
organisation’ in January.59 This organisation, according to Taras, made all arrangements 
for his journey to Spain.60 The Polish Consulate, Lyon, also retained links with the 
British and in May 1941 when the British escape organisation in Marseilles was 
expanding in scope, the Polish Consulate passed a number of recently shot-down RAF 
pilots directly into the organisation. One of these pilots, Sergeant Edward Polesinki, 
actually sought out the ‘Old Polish Consulate’ as a result of a lecture he heard in 
England advising men that the Polish Consulate, Lyon was a particularly useful source 
of help.61 Interestingly and as already referred to, the Polish Consulate, while officially 
closed in November 1940, still maintained and staffed its former offices. More 
importantly, this consulate appears to have maintained connections with British escape 
activities and maintained contact with the emerging British escape organisation in 
Marseilles.  
 
However, further analysis on the nature of this communication, and how it developed 
and was maintained, is hampered by another long silence in the escape reports. From 
                                                            
57 Statement by P.0118 F/O Taras, M., 300 Polish Squadron, R.A.F., 9 May 1942 (N.A., WO208/3308). 
See also Account of escape of 543236 Bandsman Barrett, G.A., 2/D/C.L.I., 4 Div., 13 Apr. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303). 
58 Statement by P.0118 F/O Taras, M., 300 Polish Squadron, R.A.F., 9 May 1942 (N.A., WO208/3308). 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. See also the report of Major R. Challenor who made the journey with Taras. Account of escape of 
Major Challenor, R. R.E., 16 Apr. 1942 (N.A., WO208/3308). 
61 Statement by 792693 Sgt. Polesinki, E., 307 Polish (Bomber) Sqn., R.A.F., 13 July 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3309). Polesinki travelled with Sergeant A. Malecki. See also Statement by 793809 Sgt. Malecki, 
A., 300 Squadron, R.A.F., 13 July 1942 (N.A., WO208/3309). 
149 
 
May 1941 there are no substantial references to the role of the Polish Consulate or the 
English Hospital in relation to escape activities. At this time, the British escape 
organisation in Marseilles had developed a steady leadership until Captain Ian Garrow 
and Patrick O’Leary. Most references to escapees and their time in Marseilles refer to 
time spent in safe houses or plans made by the organisation for their departure across 
the Pyrenees. This long silence is broken by an account given by an RAF pilot in early 
September 1942 which suggests that there were continued links between the Polish and 
the British. This pilot, Sergeant F. Kula, went 
 
By train to Marseilles arriving there on 8 Sep. I went to the American Consulate 
where I was told that there was a Polish Office in the former Polish Consulate 
buildings. The Polish Officer directed me the Polish Hospital which is where the 
old rest house for British seamen used to be [that is, the English Hospital]. From 
the hospital I was taken over on 19 Sep by the organisation which arranged for my 
repatriation.62 
 
Kula was passed into the organisation relatively quickly and directly from the English 
Hospital in Marseilles. 
 
The Poles and English continued to communicate and in some cases co-ordinate escape 
schemes. Moreover, in spite of the official closures of Polish Consulates, the Consulate 
in Toulouse, Lyon and Marseilles continued to operate at an unofficial capacity and in 
some incidences to pass men directly or indirectly into the British-led escape 
organisation. Similarly, the role of the English Hospital and Polish Consulates in 
initially assisting British escapees and later passing men into the British-led escape 
organisation, contributed to both assisting individual escapes and extending British 
escape activities. Equally, while the evidence suggests that this was done on a relatively 
small scale, it must also be noted that the contribution of the Polish Consulate in Lyon 
was significant enough to be referred to in an RAF lecture as a safe place to contact. In 
this regard, the role of the Polish diplomatic services and their contribution to British- 
led escape activities merits acknowledgement and is further indication of the role of 
diplomacy in sustaining and maintaining escape activities. 
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American diplomatic services and British escape activities  
American diplomatic services, being initially a neutral power, took a more cautious 
approach to assisting the British. Nevertheless from the defeat of France in June 1940, 
British escapees arriving in the Unoccupied Zone made their way to the various 
American consulates in Lyon, Marseilles and Vichy. American acceptance of the role of 
protector of British interests in France further crystallised the perception of the 
American diplomatic services among escapees as a potentially friendly power or ally. 
This perception is reflected in the escape reports which indicate that, if the opportunity 
arose or a situation required it, the majority of escapees attempted to initiate contact 
with an American Consulate. 
 
Policy researcher and author Arthur L. Funk noted there was no ‘debate as to whether 
there should be a Vichy policy or not’ as the setting up of an American diplomatic 
presence and base in Vichy effectively meant that the American government recognised 
the authority of Pétain’s government.63 Against this backdrop, American diplomatic 
involvement in aiding the escape of British escapees was unthinkable given that such 
actions conveyed a disregard for Vichy and its responsibility under the conditions of the 
Franco-German Armistice to intern such men. Yet the escape reports and a number of 
autobiographies reveal a more complex picture of events and point to a rather different 
reality hidden under the veneer of American diplomacy. Funk’s research supports this 
assessment as he notes that by early 1941 American officials in Vichy began to give 
‘cautious’ aid to French resistance with the aim of supporting the British war effort.64 
While this cautious aid was given relatively early in the war evidence suggests that 
American diplomatic involvement in assisting the British began months earlier and not 
only involved officials in Vichy but also, to varying degrees, officials based in Lyon 
and Marseilles.  
 
One of the first actions common to each American diplomatic services in all cities 
(including the Embassy in Paris) was the establishment of a British section. Although 
America also assumed responsibility as protector for several other occupied countries, 
including Poland, there appears to have been no equivalent to a ‘Polish section’ and so 
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forth in the various American Consulate. In this respect, the American diplomatic 
services displayed a strong degree of flexibility in their interpretation of protector of 
British interests. In fact, as demonstrated in chapter two, with the presence of two 
British officials, Major Hugh Dodds and Mr Arthur Dean at the American Consulate in 
Marseilles, it would appear that British diplomats remaining in France were used to 
staff the British sections of the various American consulates. The American Consulate 
in Marseilles provides one of the best early illustrations of the lengths the American 
diplomatic services were prepared to go to in order to accommodate their British 
counterparts.  
 
Reports on the American Consulate in Marseilles indicate that the British working there 
were given offices in the consular building as early as June 1940. However, an account 
given by Captain C.F.P Mills indicates a change in this arrangement.65 Mills, on 
arriving in Marseilles in August 1940, was advised to and approached the old British 
consulate in Rue d’Arcole. Arriving there, he found three British consular officials who, 
according to Mills were ‘employed by the American Consulate to look after British 
interests’.66 Mills’ account is crucial in that it highlights that not only was the American 
Consulate in Marseilles maintaining a British section and employing British officials 
but that by August 1940 these officials had acquired the former British Consulate 
building. Documents from the National Archives, Washington reveal the role of the 
American Consul, Hugh Fullerton, in acquiring the building. The American Consulate 
in November 1940 officially took over the British lease of the building allowing British 
officials to retain a presence in their former consulate under the umbrella of American 
protection.67 
 
In taking over the lease, the American Consulate Marseilles went beyond what was 
expected of a neutral power. 68 This determination to offer assistance within legal limits 
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underscored direct dealings between the American Consulate and British escapees. The 
American Consulate appears to have played a daily role in the lives of British escapees 
up until their removal from Marseilles in January 1941 but it performed this role with 
careful regard to remaining within the law and diplomatic protocol. Lieutenant James 
Langley, who arrived in Marseilles in November 1940, noted that the American Consul 
 
Mr Fullerton does everything Mr Dean and Major Dodds ask, excepting aid to 
British Prisoners. He will on no account do this ... Major Dodds and Mr Dean, 
however willing, particularly the latter, may be to help, are completely 
handicapped by the present attitude of the American Consulate.69 
 
Langley’s statement is difficult to assess, especially in light of the previous chapter 
which addressed the negative attitude and lack of help experienced by escapees from 
their consular officers in Marseilles. Langley remains the only escapee to link the 
American Consulate and its reluctance to become directly involved in escape activities 
to the inability of Dodds and Dean to help these men. This may perhaps go some way to 
explaining why both Dodds and Dean recommended that men, instead of continuing to 
the Franco-Spanish frontier, give themselves up. In giving such advice, they were acting 
within the remits of the American Consulate which, once men were processed and 
interned by the French authorities, could then, as a protecting power, provide a stipend 
for each internee. In this regard, the payment of the stipend allowed the American 
Consulate to fulfil its obligations as a neutral power charged with protecting British 
interests, without outwardly undermining or challenging the Vichy government. By 
insisting men must first report to the French authorities the American diplomatic 
services displayed a determination to respect the authority of the Vichy government. 
 
On rare occasions American officials stepped beyond their remit and gave advice or 
sought to assist in individual escapes. For instance, Platoon Sergeant Major Charles 
Fullerton, on approaching the American Consulate, Marseilles in early autumn 1940 for 
help, found that the American Consul was more than willing to offer assistance. The 
consul directed Fullerton to the captain of a Norwegian ship who might help him leave 
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France.70 Although this lead dried up, passing on information which could have 
ultimately facilitated Fullerton’s escape was beyond the American Consulate’s 
diplomatic remit. This was not a singular incident. When Lieutenant William Sillar and 
Captain F. Fitch were attempting to cross the Pyrenees near Cerbère in August 1940, 
Sillar met a representative of the American Consulate, Marseilles. This representative 
informed Sillar that there was a British headquarters in Marseilles organising the 
evacuation of British soldiers.71 It is not certain if this representative exaggerated the 
position of the British in Marseilles or if at this stage there was genuine hope that men 
would be evacuated but the incident highlights the willingness or desire of American 
officials to offer assistance to individual escapees. On a number of occasions, when 
British escapees reached French colonial territory in North Africa, the American 
consulates in these colonies provided these men with material assistance. American 
consulates in Algiers and Casablanca forwarded money to, advocated for and 
accommodated a number of men who were smuggled aboard ships in Marseilles.72 For 
instance, on 28 October 1940 Captain B.C. Bradford stowed away on ship from 
Marseilles to Algiers with a colleague and on their arrival sought out the offices of the 
American Consulate.73 The consul provided Bradford and his colleague with money and 
they continued their journey to Oran in Algeria (a former French colony in North 
Africa). Curiously, Bradford felt that the American Consul did not go far enough to help 
them and appears unjustly critical of the American Consul when his account is cross 
referenced with Lieutenant Colonel F.A.A. Blake’s report. In the latter’s case, January 
1941, Blake was smuggled on board a boat bound for Algiers, also with a colleague and 
on their arrival in the city both men were arrested. Writing to the American Consul, Mr 
Felix Cole, Blake managed to obtain a monthly allowance and spending money which 
allowed them to live in a hotel. Blake also gained the support of the Swedish diplomatic 
official in Algiers.  
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According to Blake, both the American and Swedish consuls went to considerable 
efforts to petition the French authorities for the release of Blake and his colleague, 
Sergeant Clayton. In his praises of their efforts he wrote 
 
The French civilian administration is about as inefficient as it could possibly be, 
and we encountered delay and obstruction everywhere. Both Mr Gautray [the 
Swedish Consul] and Mr Cole [the American Consul] gave wholehearted support 
and the obstruction was eventually overcome.74 
 
Blake continued his escape machinations and widened his pool of supporters by writing 
to two American vice consuls based in Oran. Both agreed to help him and a letter was 
passed on with this help to the British Consul General in Tangiers, Morocco. With the 
combined support of the American vice consuls in Oran and particularly the American 
Consul in Algiers, Blake finally left Algeria, arriving in Tangiers in October 1941. In 
this respect, American commitment to assisting British escapees appears sincere, and, 
more particularly in Blake’s case, the help of the American Consul was crucial in 
overcoming serious obstacles preventing his onward journey through Algeria. Cole 
demonstrated commitment not only in ensuring Blake and Clayton were well treated by 
French authorities but also in continuing to advocate for both men during their nine 
month struggle to leave Algeria. Equally, while Cole appears to have gone to 
extraordinary lengths to secure the continued journey of Blake and Clayton to Tangiers, 
it must also be pointed out that this assistance remained within legal limits.  
 
American help in establishing connections with Spanish Republicans 
This appearance of neutrality and determination to pursue by the Americans a legal 
course is belied by a number of autobiographies which suggest that the American 
Consulate, Lyon attempted to connect British escape organisers in Marseilles to a 
support network in the Pyrenees. Escapees crossing into the Unoccupied Zone regularly 
sought out the American Consulate in Lyon given its close proximity to the demarcation 
line. The American Consulate in Lyon initially appeared to remain aloof from escapees, 
advising them to go to Marseilles but there is strong evidence to suggest that behind this 
official response the American Consul, George Whittinghill, was more actively engaged 
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in assisting British escape activities. In fact, it appears that Whittinghill’s efforts in 
November 1940 were crucial in facilitating the British in Marseilles to connect with 
Spanish Republicans willing to guide them across the Franco-Spanish frontier into 
Spain. The initiative for this came from Donald Darling, an MI6 agent working on 
behalf of MI9, the agency interested in prisoners of war. The American Consulate, Lyon 
acted as a conduit for this information and as a vital link between Darling who was 
based in Lisbon, Portugal and British escapees in the Unoccupied Zone.  
 
The evidence for this argument may be traced the flow of information via cross 
referencing a number of autobiographies and escape reports. The first relevant 
autobiography is that of Donald Darling. It was Darling’s mission to set up an escape 
line across the Pyrenees and he left London for Spain with that purpose in mind in late 
summer 1940.75 In order to achieve this, Darling hoped to re-establish connections with 
former colleagues in the French secret service in unoccupied France. 76  More 
particularly, Darling hoped to re-establish a connection with Michael Parayre, owner of 
a local garage in Perpignan. Parayre, according to the autobiography of French secret 
service agent Robert Terres, had close contacts with British intelligence. British 
intelligence maintained a presence along the western Pyrenees prior to the German 
invasion of France and had managed to connect with the Spanish Republican anarchist 
group led by Francisco Ponzàn Vidal. According to Terres’ autobiography, and also 
Vidal’s biographer Antonio Téllez Solá, as Parayre had been heavily involved with 
British efforts to establish contact with the Spanish, he ‘inherited’ these connections 
when British intelligence was forced to leave the region following French defeat in June 
1940.77 
 
Effectively, British departure meant that Parayre, based in Perpignan, was the main 
point of contact with Spanish Republicans already known to British intelligence. This 
was not lost on Darling. He, therefore, attempted to re-establish contact with Parayre 
and by extension make contact with the Ponzàn Vidal group.78 The first part of 
Darling’s scheme required an intermediary to travel to Perpignan and make direct 
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contact with Parayre. Darling achieved this with the help of a rich Armenian business 
man willing to work for him, Nubar Gulbenkian. As a neutral Armenian, Gulbenkian 
travelled relatively unimpeded in unoccupied France and therefore had little problem in 
meeting with Parayre in Perpignan in October 1940.79 In arranging this meeting, 
Gulbenkian rang him at a garage in Perpignan. This ‘garage’ will emerge as important 
later in this chapter when tracing the influence of the Darling-Parayre connection 
through the escape reports however, for the moment the focus remains on Darling’s 
attempts to connect with Parayre. It would appear that Darling’s plans met with success 
with Gulbenkian noting in his autobiography that Parayre willingly agreed to help and 
also that Parayre would make contact with the guides and work out the details on the 
French end.80 
 
Arguably, it is at this point, that the American Consulate, Lyon proved crucial in 
establishing the initial link between British escapees and British intelligence. After 
laying the ground work Darling needed to establish a link between British intelligence 
and British escape organisers in Marseilles in order to communicate this information. 
Darling’s autobiography falls silent on this point with no mention of any possible means 
of communicating his scheme to British escapees. This gap is bridged by the evidence 
from the escape report of Lieutenant James Langley. It is Langley’s account of his 
experiences that indicates the American Consulate, Lyon was the means by which news 
of Darling’s scheme reached British escape planners in Marseilles.  
 
According to Langley’s report, after crossing the demarcation line in the beginning of 
November 1940, Langley spent time in the American Consulate in both Lyon and 
Vichy. In fact, Langley spent three weeks in Vichy, living at the expense of the 
Americans, after which time he was encouraged to appear before the Mixed Medical 
Board in Marseilles. Langley noted that he left for Marseilles but on the way spent some 
time meeting with the American Consul in Lyon, George Whittinghill.81 In referring to 
this meeting in his escape report Langley wrote  
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On the way I talked to Whittinghill who told me of a plan of evasion through a 
garage in Perpignan, and I arranged to send up to Whittinghill from Marseilles, 
officers and in order of seniority.82 
 
This plan, including the reference to a garage in Perpignan, bears striking resemblance 
to that set in motion by Darling a few weeks earlier. This is further indicated by the 
relatively short time lapse between Darling’s efforts to connect with Parayre in October 
1940 and Langley’s hearing of the scheme through the American Consulate in 
November 1940. Furthermore, barring Langley’s account, no escape report refers to 
receiving intelligence of this plan via another route. Therefore, it would appear that the 
American Consulate, Lyon and notably the American Consul, George Whittinghill, was 
the only means by which Darling attempted to communicate the scheme to British 
officers in unoccupied France. 
 
However, difficulties arise in establishing the success and impact of Darling’s scheme. 
In Darling’s autobiography he not only neglected to mention American involvement but 
also claimed that the connection with Parayre fell through as the French authorities were 
watching him closely.83 Langley’s report also noted that the scheme ‘broke down’ and 
that the men Langley sent from Marseilles returned to the city84 and yet there are a 
number of contradictions to the overall assessment that the scheme was a failure. In 
Langley’s book on escape lines, co-authored with historian M.R.D Foot, he noted that 
British officer, Captain Ian Garrow, established contact with Parayre and while Parayre 
could not offer direct help, he did give him some information on guides.85 Foot and 
Langley did not provide dates for this connection but files held by the Service historique 
de la Défense, list a Spanish Republican closely associated with Ponzàn Vidal, Salvador 
Aguado, as working with the British in Marseilles from November 1940.86 The date for 
Aguado’s involvement with the British, circa November 1940, falls within Darling’s 
initial contact with Parayre in October 1940 and British officers in Marseilles hearing of 
the scheme after this meeting in November. This suggests the strong possibility that 
Darling was the source of this information. However, it must also be recognised that it 
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is unclear if Parayre, and by extension the American Consulate, were the channel for 
this information and also the means by which British escape organisers connected to 
Aguado. Solà, in his research on Ponzàn Vidal, noted that the British connection to 
Salvador Aguado came through a Spanish woman living in Toulouse, Madame Cathala 
and all arrangements were made through her.87 Solà does not expand on this point and 
therefore Parayre’s involvement in establishing this connection is still likely. If he was 
under surveillance it is most likely Parayre could not direct British escape organisers to 
Spanish Republicans. Therefore, as Foot and Langley asserted, Parayre knowing how to 
make contact with Spanish Republicans, simply directed British escape organisers to 
likely helpers. This appears the probable scenario especially considering that it would 
be unlikely that British escape organisers could have connected with Vidal or his 
colleagues without some prior knowledge of their activities and the means to make that 
connection.   
 
Whether the British found an alternative means to communicate with Spanish 
Republicans or not remains unclear but that did not necessarily undermine the 
willingness of the American Consulate to provide assistance to escapees. Furthermore, 
Langley’s report suggests that Whittinghill was not content with merely passing on 
information; he also personally initiated one of the first attempts to use Darling’s 
scheme to cross the Pyrenees. According to Langley, Whittinghill sent W.E. Clayton to 
Perpignan. This is confirmed in Clayton’s report, with his arrival in Perpignan dated to 
the 24 November. A few days later, Clayton was joined by another escapee, Private D. 
N. Peterson. It is unclear if Whittinghill also arranged Peterson’s passage to Perpignan 
but it is the most likely scenario given that Peterson arrived in Lyon at the end of 
November, from where he travelled directly to Perpignan and in Perpignan met 
Clayton.88 Yet in spite of Whittinghill’s enthusiasm and personal efforts, Clayton and 
Peterson’s escape was not a straight-forward one. According to Clayton, both men spent 
six weeks in the city ‘waiting in vain for a means of getting to Spain’.89 From their 
arrival in Perpignan it is difficult to ascertain if the American Consulate continued to act 
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on their behalf but at one point, in January 1941, both men returned to Lyon, and spent 
three weeks there excluding a short trip to Vichy.90 This suggests that their return to 
Lyon, although not explicitly stated, signalled a returned to the American Consulate.  
 
If this was the case, Clayton and his colleague’s trip to Vichy may also have involved 
visiting American diplomatic officials in that city. Ultimately, both men eventually left 
Lyon for Marseilles in March and a few days later crossed the Pyrenees.91 Clayton’s and 
Peterson’s accounts are important in that both reports indicate initial problems with the 
connections Darling attempted to establish through the American Consulate, Lyon. 
Nevertheless, in spite of their setbacks, there is evidence to suggest that connections 
established by Darling were ultimately successful. In order to illustrate this, it is 
important to refer back to an earlier point, that is, Gulbenkian’s first encounter with 
Parayre at a garage in Perpignan. In their history of escape lines Foot and Langley noted 
that Darling ‘secured’ a garage in Perpignan ‘where Michel Pareyre [also spelled 
Parayre] … could collect parties before they set out to tackle the nearby Pyrenees’.92 
This is the sole reference to this garage and taken with Darling’s statement that the 
connection with Parayre fell through it is unclear if the garage or Parayre had a lasting 
impact on escape activities. However, on three separate occasions throughout 1941, in 
March, June and August, a garage in Perpignan was referred to as a meeting point for 
British escapees and Spanish guides. The first of these involved Corporal W.F. Gardner 
who escaped St Hippolyte du Fort, journeyed to a contact in Nîmes and was taken to a 
garage in Perpignan with two colleagues.93 From there they met their Spanish guide and 
crossed the Pyrenees. The second reference comes from the account of Sgt P.R. Herbert 
who escaped French internment and also went to a pre-arranged contact. Herbert was 
taken to a flat in Marseilles where, on the 26 June, he was joined by three other men. 
All were taken to Perpignan, where, according to Herbert they ‘hid in a garage until 
called for by a guide who took us by car to Banyuls.94 In August 1941, the pattern was 
repeated and a group of five men were taken to a garage in Perpignan, introduced to a 
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Spanish guide and ‘driven up part of the way into the Pyrenees towards the Spanish 
frontier’.95 These three accounts indicate that ‘a garage’ in Perpignan was the contact 
point for British escapees and Spanish guides before crossing the Pyrenees. Moreover, 
these accounts add further credibility to the argument that the connection established 
through Whittinghill did in fact endure and made a significant impact expanding and 
crystallising escape activities along the Pyrenees.  
 
This argument is support by Airey Neave’s book Saturday at MI9.96 Neave, a young 
lieutenant and colleague of Langley, worked with the British secret service agency 
responsible for escape, MI9. Neave, similar to Langley, had a personal interest in escape 
and had the fame of being the first prisoner to make a ‘home run’ from Colditz, 
Germany.97 Neave was familiar with the working of the escape lines and also personally 
knew and worked with Darling. Commenting on Darling’s connection with Parayre and 
his efforts to contact Spanish Republicans, Neave noted that Darling’s plan to connect 
with Parayre ‘tied together the two ends of the original escape line’.98 Neave does not 
refer to the role of American officials in passing on this information but his work 
bolsters the importance of the Parayre connection. In doing so, Neave indirectly 
reinforces the importance of the American Consulate, Lyon in facilitating the initial 
contact between British escapees and Parayre. 
 
Taking the combined evidence into account it appears that the American Consulate, 
Lyon went beyond its diplomatic remit and acted as a willing participant in British 
efforts. The American Consul, Whittinghill, in particular, appears to have played a 
particularly active role in acting as the link Darling needed to connect escapees with 
Parayre and Spanish Republicans. Although it would take a number of months until the 
escape routes became relatively stable and secure, the connection with Spanish 
Republicans, notably Vidal’s group, was crucial in helping to underpin British escape 
activities in the Pyrenees. This remained the case, from late April 1941, the time Vidal 
officially began working with the British-led escape organisation, up until his arrest in 
April 1943. The Service historique de la défense files which date Vidal’s involvement 
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in British escape activities also list Whittinghill as a member of the organisation.99 
Whittinghill’s involvement in escape activities is formally dated to January 1942, 
following American entry into the war, however the evidence presented in this chapter 
suggests informal and disguised interest before then.  
 
Following American entry into the war, a shift occurred and the American consulates in 
the Unoccupied Zone appear to have acted as a direct gateway into the British-led 
escape organisation. This was certainly the case with American consulates in Marseilles 
and Lyon. In the case of Marseilles, the consulate still maintained its efforts to assist 
British escapees discretely and appears to have been reasonably effective in this goal. 
So much so that in one particular incident two men seeking help from the consulate in 
February 1941 did not realise they were being passed into an organisation. Officials at 
the consulate gave the men a doctor’s note and it wasn’t until their arrival at the doctor 
where they met one of the leaders of the escape organisation, that they realised the 
extent of the consulate’s assistance. In the case of the American Consulate, Lyon, in 
May 1942 two Polish RAF pilots, Sergeant E. Polesinki and Sergeant A. Malecki, were 
passed into the escape organisation.100 Polesinki made his initial contact with the Old 
Polish Consulate and from there was directed to the ‘British Consul’ in the American 
Consulate. 101  Polesinki’s account is interesting in that it illustrates not only the 
willingness of the American Consulate to help Polish RAF pilots but also indicates that 
the Polish Consulate was aware of this. In fact, in that same month, May 1942, the 
Polish Consulate passed a Polish escapee into the escape organisation along the same 
route as Malecki, without, it would seem, using the American Consulate as 
intermediary.102 This suggests that both consulates were aware of their counterpart’s 
involvement with and connection to the British-led escape organisation. Further 
compelling evidence that officials at the American Consulate, Lyon, notably 
Whittinghill, retained direct connections with British escape organisers is indicated in 
the report of Squadron Leader R.C. Wilkinson.103  That same month, May 1942, 
Wilkinson arrived at the consulate and, according to his account, stayed at 
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Whittinghill’s home before he was guided to Marseilles and to the home of a French 
member of the escape organisation, Louis Nouveau (see chapter two).104 
 
Maintaining escape activities: British diplomatic services in Spain   
While the American diplomatic services in unoccupied France may have proved pivotal 
in contributing to British ability to connect with guides along the Pyrenees, this exercise 
would have been fruitless if men arriving in Spain found they were unable to continue 
their journey to Britain. On the 26 November 1941, the British Embassy estimated that 
only twenty per cent of men crossing the Pyrenees arrived at either the British 
Consulate in Barcelona or the British Embassy in Madrid undetected. The rest were 
captured by Spanish authorities and interned in Spanish concentration camps. The 
responsibility fell on British diplomatic services in Spain to secure the release of these 
men. Moreover, the British diplomatic services zealously guarded their prerogative to 
advocate for British escapees interned in Spain. Minutes of a meeting held in late 
November 1941 not only defended but also pushed for continued diplomatic 
involvement in securing the release of British internees in Spain. These minutes 
declared that it was 
 
Desirable that this business [advocating for British prisoners] should be in the 
hands of a member of the Embassy staff, since he is more likely than anyone else 
to be able to conduct the negotiations with the minimum risk of friction with the 
Spanish authorities.105 
 
These minutes indicate that the British diplomatic services in Spain were willing to 
secure the release of internees, and more importantly sought to retain this role. 
 
In spite of the willingness of the diplomatic services to act on behalf of British 
prisoners, researchers have neglected or overlooked the role of the British Embassy in 
relation to escape activities, emphasising instead the role of British secret services such 
as MI6 or MI9. A number of autobiographies, including Donald Darling’s, criticised Sir 
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Samuel Hoare, the British ambassador to Spain.106 However, these criticisms must take 
into account the fact that Darling was based in Lisbon, Portugal and as a result was 
somewhat removed from the difficulties facing the Embassy in Spain. This sense of 
removal from British escape activities is slightly obscured in Darling’s autobiography 
which gives a stronger sense of his connection with British escape activities in the 
winter of 1940 than actually existed. While Darling helped the British establish a 
connection on the Pyrenees, it took time to come to fruition. Darling’s chronology is 
skewed, inserting no dates in relation to the emergence of an escape organisation and in 
general leaving the reader with the impression that events developed quicker than they 
actually did. This allows him to overlook the importance of the Embassy. Most histories 
have followed suit, including M.R.D. Foot’s, which even in its title, MI9 The British 
Secret Service that fostered escape and evasion 1939-1945 and its American 
counterpart makes special mention of the efforts of MI9.  
 
While historians, including Foot, refer to the work of the Embassy in securing the 
release of British internees, it is argued here that the work of British diplomatic services 
in neutral countries like Spain, but also Switzerland, was of greater importance than the 
current historiography allows for, that is, the release of internees. It is argued that in 
securing the release of these men, and thus aiding their continued journey to Britain, the 
British diplomatic services played a crucial role in maintaining, sustaining and even 
expanding and validating escape efforts for the British and their helpers. To better argue 
this point, the focus of this chapter now shifts to British diplomatic efforts in Spain, and 
also later in this chapter to Switzerland, to explore how the actions of the diplomatic 
services shaped, or worked in tandem with, British escape efforts in unoccupied France. 
Before continuing, it is important to point out that when escapees began arriving in 
Marseilles in the summer of 1940 it was not immediately obvious that crossing the 
Pyrenees would become the principle means of leaving France. The port was the city’s 
main attraction but with activities in the port under close surveillance, crossing into 
Spain increasingly became the only alternative. The main deterrent to crossing the 
Pyrenees was not fear of the French authorities or the physical demands of the 
mountains but the lack of knowledge in relation to the reception escapees would be 
likely to receive in Spain. 
                                                            




Men crossing into Spain, particularly in the early period 1940-41 were frequently 
arrested and subjected to harsh conditions in Spanish concentration camps. With 
approximately eighty percent of escapees arrested crossing into Spain, the poor 
treatment received in Spanish camps features in escape reports. Reported treatment 
includes beatings, forced labour, head shaving and handcuffing. Food was poor and 
accounts abound of cramped conditions. Commenting on one of the main internment 
camps, Private F.W. Brown noted that, ‘there were frequent beatings’ and men 
‘regularly worked for fourteen hours a day on very little food’.107 Brown made his 
report in October 1940 but conditions had not improved over two years later with a 
British officer complaining in January 1942 that, Miranda del Ebro held ‘4,000 people 
in a camp normally accommodating 1000’.108 The British ambassador, Sir Samuel 
Hoare, produced slightly more refined but no less startling statistics. According to 
Hoare, the camp at Miranda was originally built for seven hundred but accommodated 
numbers of up to three thousand.109 Against this backdrop, the prospect of detainment 
and harsh conditions in Spain for the duration of the war were strong discouragements 
to British escapees leaving France. Officers in Marseilles in early autumn 1940, such as 
Captain F. Fitch, Lieutenant W. Sillar, Captain C.R.I. Besley, went to considerable 
efforts to discover the situation in Spain.110 All were reluctant to travel, or encourage 
other men to travel, if circumstances were not favourable.  
 
The situation Spain remained unclear to officers in Marseilles until September 1940. At 
this time, according to the report of Lieutenant W. Sillar, 
 
We received a message to the effect that if British soldiers succeeded in crossing 
the Franco-Spanish frontier, they would be interned in Spain and later 
repatriated.111 
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This immediately re-directed Sillar and Fitch’s attention away from escape by boat to 
seeking a means to cross the Franco-Spanish frontier. It was only later, when Sillar 
successfully reached Spain, that he discovered that the message came from the British 
military attaché (M.A.) in Spain. Military attachés were connected to and worked within 
their diplomatic services. Sillar’s account of the military attaché, Brigadier Torr’s, 
actions is crucial as it indicates that not only were the British diplomatic services in 
Spain seeking to obtain the release of men already in Spain but that they were also 
filtering word back into France that men would be repatriated once in Spain. 
 
Unfortunately, Sillar does not refer to the source of the information he received in 
Marseilles. Establishing the source would be useful in determining if Torr intended to 
disseminate this information among as many men as possible and thus encourage men 
to continue a pattern of crossing into Spain. It is likely that this indeed was the case. 
Moreover, there is a strong possibility that the American Consulate, Marseilles was in 
fact the channel for this information. The main evidence for this relates to one particular 
communication discovered in the Foreign Office papers of the British Embassy in 
Madrid. This communication raised concerns over a confession given by British aviator, 
Bob Wilson, to Spanish authorities. Wilson informed Spanish authorities that he had 
been encouraged by the American Consulate in January 1941 to cross the Franco-
Spanish frontier clandestinely.112 Moreover, Wilson informed the Spanish authorities 
that not only had he ‘been advised by the United States Consulate at Marseilles to cross 
the frontier clandestinely’ but that the ‘Acting Consul [British] at Figueras was… 
expecting him’. 113  This communication indicates that there was some form of 
interaction between the British Embassy in Madrid and the American Consulate in 
Marseilles in relation to escape activities. In giving advice to cross the Pyrenees 
clandestinely, the American Consulate appears to have been acting on knowledge of the 
situation in Spain and the likelihood of repatriation. 
 
The British were aware of the importance of the American Consulate in advising men 
and sought to maintain this situation. When the War Office was alerted of the incident, 
it enquired through the Embassy in Madrid if a ‘hint can be given [to the] U.S. Consul 
                                                            




Marseilles to warn others of secrecy’.114 This query further emphasises the role of 
British diplomatic services in Spain in relation to escape activities. Not only was the 
Embassy required to trace men interned in Spain, but also in this case at least it was 
expected to maintain connections with the American diplomatic services in unoccupied 
France. Considering this, it is understandable that the Foreign Office was quite scathing 
as to the impact of Wilson’s confession on the prisoner of war situation in Spain. One 
Foreign Office official wrote  
 
It seems to me that the really unfortunate part of this is that the young officer 
mentioned the name of the United States Consulate at Marseilles. That he crossed 
the frontier clandestinely and that his papers were false does not, as far as I can see, 
alter the officer’s position of being an escaped prisoner-of-war. The means by 
which he crossed the frontier are not, I think anything new to the Spaniards. There 
have been others.115 
 
Yet despite the scathing tone adopted towards Wilson’s confession, this letter conveys 
confidence in the position of British prisoners of war in Spain. When this letter is 
coupled with the War Office’s encouragement that British diplomatic services in Spain 
should maintain contact with the American Consulate, Marseilles it can argued that it 
was likely that Sillar’s encouragement to cross into Spain came from Torr via the 
American Consulate in Marseilles and that this information, albeit with encouragements 
of added secrecy after the Wilson affair, was still intended to be disseminated to 
escapees in the Unoccupied Zone seeking a means out of France. 
 
This confidence was rooted in Britain’s economic leverage over Spain. Spain depended 
on Britain to maintain its supply of grain and consequentially, needed to concede to 
some British demands. In his autobiography, Hoare attributed Spain’s growing 
economic reliance on Britain as his primary bargaining tool in negotiating the release of 
British internees from Spanish concentration camps.116 In relation to the practical 
implications of these concessions there was still a drawback and one that lasted for the 
duration of the war; men entering Spain would face approximately three weeks 
internment after which they would be released. This was a significant coup, considering 
that Franco’s Spain favoured Germany. In his book reflecting on his experiences in 
Spain, Hoare wrote that the prisoner of war question remained one of the most decisive 
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issues in his dealings with Spanish ministers throughout his time in Spain and one 
requiring continual and persistent attention.117 The British Embassy, even with Spanish 
concessions, still faced severe difficulties in earning the release of prisoners of war. For 
instance, while British escapees entering Spain illegally were to be handed over to the 
military authorities, this was not always the case. In addition to arresting escapees for 
entering Spain illegally, matters were further complicated for the British Embassy, 
Madrid in that, extra civil charges were often added such as smuggling currency.118 In 
these cases, as a document compiled on British experiences from 1940-43 in Spain 
noted 
 
From start to finish it is highly unlikely that the British Authorities will be aware of 
the presence of the escaper, as the Spanish Authorities would not inform our 
Consuls of the case. The escaper would also have great difficulty in getting a 
message to his Consul, telling of his plight, as the prison authorities would balk his 
efforts in this direction.119 
 
Men were often unaware that such charges were pending against them and deprived of 
an opportunity of communicating with the Embassy could not challenge them. This is 
particularly evident in the case of Captain Charles Murchie. Murchie, one of the main 
escape organisers in Marseilles, crossed into Spain in April 1941 with ten other men. 
On reaching Spain the group were arrested and interned. In this particular incident, 
according to Murchie, it was not until August 1941, four months after his arrest that 
Murchie had opportunity to write to Hoare. In his letter, Murchie indicated that the 
associations, potentially political, of their Spanish guide, may ‘have had some bearing 
on the treatment’ they received at the hands of the Spanish authorities. On receipt of 
Murchie’s letter and following British enquires, a confidential document was compiled 
on Murchie’s case indicating that a ‘more serious charge, that of espionage was… 
formulated’ against Murchie and his colleagues, a number of whom had documents of a 
compromising nature.120 In this particular case, the Embassy faced many more months 
of political intrigue before finally managing to extricate Murchie and his colleagues 
from Spanish jails.121 This release, in February 1942, came almost a year after Murchie 
first entered Spain. 
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This incident highlights the precariousness of the situation in Spain and the difficult 
work facing British officials in securing the release of British escapees, particularly 
when men faced additional civil charges. Yet the Embassy’s responsibility did not stop 
there, British officials at the Embassy housed men after their release from camps. 
Numerous documents refer to growing concerns over housing space, sanitary conditions 
and disease. Sir Samuel Hoare labelled this growing concern in November 1941 as a 
‘crisis’. In a communication to the Foreign Office, dated the 29 November 1941, Hoare 
outlined the problem in the following terms 
 
Although every corner of the building is needed for office work I have at present 
22 men who have to live and sleep here for an indefinite time, during which I have 
to obtain exit permits. Already we have had two cases of typhoid, one of typhus, 
and two of diphtheria amongst the prisoners who have passed through. Living 
accommodation is quite unsuitable for these numbers.122 
 
The problem was compounded by the lack of a better alternative. Escapees had to stay 
at the Embassy and under diplomatic protection until exit permits were issued. The 
seriousness of the issue was recognised in London and funding was quickly approved 
for the erection of huts for the purposes of housing men.123 In taking these measures, the 
British diplomatic services moved beyond solely securing the release of British 
prisoners, extending its responsibilities to caring for the health and welfare of these 
men. 
In many respects, this work was further delayed not only by the health complications of 
men arriving from Spanish camps but also by men who had reached the British 
Consulate Barcelona or the British Embassy Madrid without detection. Although it is 
difficult to establish the numbers of men who reached British consulates without 
detection, it can be discerned that as the escape organisation in Marseilles became more 
efficient and increasingly connected with trustworthy guides, the number of men 
reaching the consulate in Barcelona rose. In a substantial number of cases, where men 
reached Barcelona without detection, guides contributed directly to this success by 
accompanying men to the consulate there. While these men avoided internment, British 
officials could not declare the presence of these illegals and therefore, in contrast to the 
cases where men were released from internment, they could not apply for exit visas for 
them. Overcoming this problem required, to use the wording of an official document, 
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‘the connivance of the Spanish authorities’.124 It is difficult to ascertain with certainty 
the nature of this ‘connivance’ but it is likely that bribery and other such persuasions 
went a considerable way to ensuring the Spanish authorities turned a blind eye to a 
number of extra men mixed in with those leaving the country for Gibraltar through 
official channels.  
 
In addition to this, the diplomatic services actively sought to extend the possibility of 
men reaching British consulates successfully. In March 1943, a training manual was 
produced, presumably for RAF crews, based on experiences of British officials in 
Spain.125 This document advised men not to take documents or money across the 
frontier. It also provided more practical advice in relation to the responsibilities of 
escapees and how they should act once in Spain. Men were advised never to approach 
British consulates directly but to either wait for the guide to do this, or if travelling 
alone, to approach a Spaniard with the request. The document was explicit about what 
‘type’ of Spaniard to approach and set out a description of ‘dependable types’.126 The 
‘dependable types’ were ‘lower grades’ of railway workers, poorer country people and 
smugglers. In order to find one of the above, escapees were advised to approach a 
‘poorer type of café’ and ask a working class man for help.127  Language barriers were 
also addressed and men were provided with a phonetic guide to asking for help which 
read as follows 
 
Soy in-glaze por favor averca Al Consulado Britanico yo esperaré ah-key. 
I am English please tell the English Consul I will wait here.128 
 
While the focus on the working class is interesting, the relevant point here pertains to 
the role of the British diplomatic services stepping up its commitments to helping 
escapees to identify potential support in Spain and their efforts to shape the behaviour 
of escapees accordingly.  
 
The British diplomatic services in Spain ran a tight gauntlet between negotiating the 
release of prisoners and ensuring the ‘connivance’ of the Spanish authorities in 
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overlooking ‘illegals’. The British Embassy sought to safeguard the welfare of escapees, 
and in undertaking this role acted as a bulwark against the Spanish authorities, not only 
in their efforts to secure the release of men from Spanish prison but also in their efforts 
to ensure men reached a British consulate without detection. Moreover, the British 
diplomatic services in Spain were crucial in planning the onward journeys of all 
escapees to British territory. 
 
Escape and the British diplomatic services, Switzerland 
In addition to the above responsibilities, diplomatic services in Spain also maintained 
communication with British officials in Switzerland. Officials in Switzerland were in a 
difficult position. Switzerland, as a neutral country, became an important destination for 
men escaping internment in Germany, Poland and Italy. However, it was also 
landlocked and as air routes appear to have been ruled out, smuggling escapees out of 
Switzerland was by no means easy. In the early days following French defeat, British 
officials in Switzerland sent at least two men through to Spain, in July and October 
1940 respectively, on falsified documents via the travel company Thomas Cook and 
Sons.129 This arrangement did not last and a month later, November 1940, another 
British officer, Lieutenant A. Cameron crossed into Switzerland and found the British 
diplomatic services there could offer little help.130 This situation continued until July 
1941 when he was repatriated via a Mixed Medical Commission131 (see chapter two). 
British diplomatic services in Switzerland appear to have been relatively isolated and 
apart from these initial successes did not contribute significantly to escape activities in 
this period.  
 
In December 1941, however, a Foreign Office communiqué indicates the British 
diplomatic services in Berne were taking a more pro-active interest in the issue of 
escaped prisoners of war. Arguably, the impetus for this sudden interest in organising an 
escape route was precipitated by the arrival of a number of escapees in autumn 1941 
from various camps in occupied Europe, two of whom, Second Lieutenant Rowan-
                                                            
129 Account of escape of No. 617217 A.C.2. Richard Clifford 13 Army Co-op, 28 Aug. 1940 (N.A., 
WO208/3299); Account of escape of 1020114 S/Sgt. Art. Garrett, W.J., 28 Dec. 1940 
(N.A.,WO208/3300). 





Hamilton and Lieutenant H.E. Stewart, were mentioned in the communiqué.132 The 
communiqué detailed an effort to establish an escape route from Berne to Spain and it 
noted that in order for the scheme to continue, co-operation from officials in Spain was 
crucial.133 Diplomats in Berne requested notification of certain arrivals in Spain to 
confirm success of their plans. The plan, which involved providing men with false 
French documents alongside proof of British citizenship once men reached Spain, 
required the complicity of British officials in Spain to continue. Once notified of the 
scheme’s initial success efforts would be made to ‘dribble’ others through.134 
 
While it is difficult to ascertain the nature and scope of this scheme given the lack of 
details in the communiqué, the involvement of British officials illustrates commitment 
to facilitating the journey of escapees, to the extent that these officials were willing to 
engage in illegal activities. With regard to the actual scheme, it was relatively shaky 
with no clear details on how men were to travel across France or indeed, into Spain.  
Success, as the communiqué noted, was ‘not by any means a certainty’.135 The plan 
appears to have centred on the use of false identity papers as the best means of  
guaranteeing a successful outcome and the first man to test the plan, Stewart, was 
chosen as he could ‘pass anywhere as a Frenchman’.136 
 
An examination of the escape reports, however, reveal the possible outcome of this 
communiqué. While men were passed into France, they were not passed in blind, armed 
only with French identity papers but rather into the hands of the British-led escape 
organisation in Marseilles. This is indicated in the report of Lieutenant H.E. Stewart, the 
officer mentioned in the communiqué. Details in his report suggest that the escape 
organisation not only waited for his arrival at the Franco-Swiss frontier at Annemasse 
but arranged his journey to Spain. While the reports of other escape officers in 
Switzerland at the time do not provide details of their onward journey, an officer who 
                                                            
132 Account of escape of Lieut. (war-subs) H.E. Stewart, M.C., Intelligence Corps, att 9 Australian Div., 
M.E.F., 1942 (N.A., WO208/3307); Account of escape of 2/Lt. A.D. Rowan-Hamilton, Black Watch, 
13/17/18 July 1942 (N.A., WO208/3307); Account of escape of Capt. Woolatt, H.A., 2 Lancs. Fusilliers, 
13 May 1942 (N.A., WO208/3307);  Account of escape of Capt. H.B. O’Sullivan, M.C., 3 Bn. Royal 
Tank Regt., 1st Armd. Div, 20/25/29 June 1942 (N.A., WO208/3307);  Account of escape of 65656 (War 
Subs.) Lieut. M.G. Duncan, H.C., 4 Bn. Ox and Bucks.L.I., 17 June 1942 (N.A., WO208/3307); Account 
of escape of 128199 Dvr. Bach, W.C., R.A.S.C., 14 July 1942 (N.A., WO208/3309). 






reached Switzerland in January 1942, Lieutenant Airey Neave, in his autobiography 
noted that he too was passed into Spain via the British-led escape organisation.137 
 
In the light of the above, it is likely that the British diplomatic services in Spain after 
receiving the communiqué in Berne highlighted the existence of the British-led escape 
organisations to the British officials there. The timing reinforces this assessment given 
that there appears to have been little communication between the British escape 
organisation and diplomatic services in Berne before December 1941. In fact, from the 
time of the communiqué until the end of the period under review in this thesis, British 
officials in Berne remained connected to the organisation in Marseilles. Moreover, 
where evidence is available this connection appears to have dominated the response of 
the British diplomatic response to men arriving in Switzerland from prison camps in 
occupied Europe, all of whom were passed into the British-led escape organisation in 
unoccupied France.138 
 
Against this backdrop, the British diplomatic services benefitted from the emergence of 
the escape organisation in Marseilles and also awareness of this organisation by British 
officials in Spain. Equally, by connecting with the escape organisation British 
diplomatic services in Berne were expanding the scope of British escape activities in 
unoccupied France, expanding its importance in a wider European context.  
 
In order to facilitate this expansion, British officials in Switzerland still needed to 
establish helpful connections in Switzerland to smooth the border crossing into France. 
The escape reports shed light on the procedures involved in preparing for a border 
crossing. Men were put up in hotels, guides were arranged and men expected to follow 
instructions given at various stages of the journey. Interestingly, a number of accounts 
indicate that British Swiss police were involved in helping to smuggle men out of the 
                                                            
137 Neave, They have their exits, p. 143.  See also Airey Neave’s report: Account of escape of P66519 Lt. 
Neave, A.M.S., 1 Searchlight Regt. R.A., 13 May 1942 (N.A., WO208/3308). 
138 Account of escape of NX. 3653 Cpl. Parker, J.A., 2/1 Field Coy A.I.F., 14/17 July 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3307); Statement by 37348 W/C Gilchrist, P.A., 405 Squadron, R.C.A.F., 7 Feb. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3308); Account of escape of Lieut. A.J. Deane-Drummond, Royal Corps of Signals (Seconded to 
11 S.A.S. Bn.), July-Aug. 1942, (N.A., WO208/3309); Statement by 1104336 Sgt. Beecroft, J. and 
958800 Sgt. Hanwell, H.P,. both of No. 101 Sqn. (Bomber) R.A.F., 31 July 1942 (N.A., WO208/3309); 
Statement by 580451 F/Sgt. Houghton, K.J.L., 207 (Bomber) Sqn., R.A.F., 25 July 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3309); Statement by 580451 F/Sgt. Houghton, K.J.L., 207 (Bomber) Sqn., R.A.F., 25 July 1942 
(N.A., WO208/3309); Account of escape of 7621381 Pte. Edwards, D.R., R.A.O.C, and VX 6693 Pte. 
Lang, D., 2/8 Bn, 6 Div, A.I.F., July-Aug. 1942 (N.A., WO208/3309). 
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country. Corporal J.A. Parker who arrived in Switzerland in November 1941 reported 
that 
 
Under the instructions of Mr. Farrell I went from Berne to Geneva on 30 Apr. 
There I met Pte Lang… and at 1530hrs we were taken by a Swiss policeman and 
two plain clothes men to a cemetery on the outskirts of the town, from which we 
could see across the frontier. Our guides pointed out a position where the said a 
man was waiting with a push bicycle.139 
 
Several accounts mirror Parker’s report, including that of Airey Neave who claimed in 
his autobiography that he was driven to the frontier by Swiss police.140 While not all 
these accounts refer to the involvement of Swiss police, it must be noted that in all 
accounts British officials organised guides to take men to the frontier.  
 
While British officials in Switzerland did not have the heavy workload burdening their 
counterparts in Spain, they still needed to arrange for the ‘connivance’ of the Swiss 
authorities in these schemes. Equally, similar to British officials in Spain, once an 
escapee crossed the Swiss frontier British diplomatic services in Switzerland were 
responsible for planning the next stage in an escapee’s journey and arrangements were 
made through these channels. Although, in the Swiss case, men were sent back to 
France, albeit unoccupied France, and into a potentially tricky situation, risk was 
minimised by passing them directly into the escape organisation. Thus, while it is 
argued here that British diplomatic services in both Switzerland and Spain contributed 
to maintaining and extending the viability of British-led escape activities in France, this 
was done on the back of the continued commitment to such activities displayed by 
British officers and civilian helpers in France. 
 
In essence, consular services from various countries across Europe and the American 
diplomatic services underpinned the emergence and expansion of the British-led escape 
organisation in Marseilles. While a neutral legation like Ireland perhaps played an 
                                                            
139 Account of escape of NX. 3653 Cpl. Parker, J.A., 2/1 Field Coy A.I.F., 14/17 July 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3307) see also Statement by 580451 F/Sgt. Houghton, K.J.L., 207 (Bomber) Sqn., R.A.F., 25 
July 1942 (N.A., WO208/3309); Statement by F/O Szkuta, A., 305 (Polish) Sqn. R.A.F., 25 July 1942 
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140 Neave, They have their exits, p.142. See also Account of escape of Lieut. A.J. Deane-Drummond, 
Royal Corps of Signals (Seconded to 11 S.A.S. Bn.), July-Aug. 1942, (N.A., WO208/3309); Account of 
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unwitting and minimal role in escape activities, consulates from occupied countries 
such as Czechoslovakia and Poland strove to actively assist the British, according to any 
means available to them. Admittedly, these early schemes often ended in failure and did 
not affect early British escape activities beyond a small number of individual successes. 
However, connections established with Czech and more particularly Polish officials in 
this period were important in that later, when the British-led escape organisation 
emerged in Marseilles, these unofficial consulates acted as gateways into the 
organisation. In this way, these connections facilitated the expansion of the escape 
organisation. 
 
More significantly, the willingness of the American diplomatic services in unoccupied 
France to co-operate with British intelligence and diplomatic services contributed to the 
success of British escape activities in terms of their connection with Spanish 
Republicans along the Pyrenees. This connection defined and underpinned escape 
activities for the following two years. Moreover, it is likely that the American 
Consulate, Marseilles was the means by which the British diplomatic services in Spain 
sent assurances to escapees that repatriation from Spain was possible. This message was 
crucial in focusing escape activities on crossing the Franco-Spanish frontier into Spain. 
 
Given the focus on crossing the Franco-Spanish frontier, the role of the British 
diplomatic services in Spain was significant. Their efforts in securing the release of 
internees, underpinned escape efforts in unoccupied France. Without this assurance and 
the prospect of an indeterminate period in Spanish concentration camps in dismal 
conditions, escape activities would have been futile and ultimately, unsustainable. 
Furthermore, by connecting the British diplomatic services in Switzerland to the escape 
organisation in Spain, officials at the Embassy in Madrid further expanded the 
importance of the organisation. Their work was supported by British officials in 
Switzerland who actively sought support among local authorities and helpers for this 
work. Effectively, by passing men arriving from camps across Europe, the British 
authorities in Switzerland expanded the scope of British escape activities in unoccupied 




Promoting an escaping culture: the attitude of French 
Military and Secret Services 
 
This chapter focuses on the impact of the Unoccupied Zone and the presence of a 
nominally ‘independent’ Vichy government on British escape activities. More 
particularly, the discussion centres on two key elements of the Vichy state apparatus 
namely, the French military authorities and the French secret services, both of which 
played a significant role in shaping British escape activities. At this time, support for 
British escape activities in French military and secret service circles ranged from 
toleration to actively assisting escape activities. 
 
The involvement of the Vichy authorities in British escape activities is remarkable 
considering the presence of German and Italian Armistice Commissions in the 
Unoccupied Zone. The Armistice Commissions monitored the French authorities and 
their adherence to the terms of the Armistice signed in June 1940. While the Franco-
German Armistice of June 1940 did not directly refer to British prisoners, Article Ten 
placed responsibility on the French government to ‘prevent members of its armed 
forces’ and ‘French citizens’ from leaving the country to join the war against Germany.1 
Given the position of the Unoccupied Zone, and the fact that the bulk of the British 
Expeditionary Force was captured at Dunkirk, Calais and St Valery, the British 
presence in unoccupied France was overlooked. This, however, did not remain the case 
for long and with the Armistice Commissions active in cities which also attracted 
British escapees, such as Marseilles, the British presence was difficult to ignore. If 
French citizens were forbidden to leave France, is unlikely that the German authorities 
would allow a situation where British escapees passed into Spain unheeded.  Thus, 
within weeks of the Armistice, many British escapees arriving in the Unoccupied Zone 
ended up in French internment camps.2 However, French application and German 
expectation in relation to British internment were not necessarily aligned. This theme 
was noted in chapter two in relation to the liberal interpretation of parole in the 
                                                            
1 Franco-German Armistice, June 25 1940 available at Avalon Project 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/frgearm.asp#art19 (1 Aug. 2015). 
2 Major W.C.W. Potts reported that on the 24 July 1940 French gendarmes received orders that they were 
to intern British military personnel. Up to this point, there appears to have been no clear policy in relation 
to how to deal with British escapees. Account of escape of 2144 Major W.C.W. Potts, 7/R/ 
Northumberland Fusiliers, 16 Dec. 1940 (N.A.,WO208/3300). 
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Unoccupied Zone. While chapter two focused on how the British used parole to 
organise escape activities, this chapter draws attention to the French authorities and 
their part in aiding British escape activities. Current research on escape activities fails to 
address this imbalance.3 In spite of frequent references to French military authorities 
and secret services in escape reports and autobiographies, little or no effort has been 
made to establish the extent and nature of this involvement and its impact on British 
escape activities. 
 
The bulk of the source material from this chapter comes from escape reports and 
autobiographies. A numbers of factors restricted the use of French archival sources such 
as access issues and financial and time constraints. This limits the capacity to fully 
assess the French authorities’ influence on British escape activities and the response to 
these actions. In order to counteract this constraint, there is a focus on direct interactions 
between the British and French authorities as recorded in the escape reports. This has 
proved an interesting approach as much of the direct British interaction with the French 
authorities in unoccupied France occurred around French internments. The picture that 
emerged in relation to officials responsible for the internment of the British was one that 
was unlikely to be reflected in documents produced by these officials. In relation to 
French secret services, several sources were used notably escape reports and 
autobiographies. In addition to this, files handed over to the British by the French 
authorities after the war relating to the betrayal of French helpers were also employed to 
gain insight into the perspective of the French authorities involved in this case. Where 
possible, all accounts were cross referenced with those other concerned parties in order 
to establish the veracity and authenticity of the claims made. The availability of source 
material on the British side highlighted areas that merit further research in the future; 
this will be addressed more fully in the concluding chapter of this thesis. 
 
It is also necessary to set this chapter in the context of existing historiography, which 
provides greater insight into the assistance given to British escapees by the French 
                                                            
3 See also Sherri Greene Ottis, Silent heroes: downed airmen and the French underground (Kentucky, 
2001) and Herman Bodson, Downed Allied airmen and evasion of capture: the tale of local resistance 
networks in World War II (North Carolina, 2005); John Nichol, and Tony Rennell, Home run: escape 
from Nazi Europe (London, 2007); Oliver Clutton Brock, RAF evaders: the comprehensive story of 
thousands of escapers and their escape lines, western Europe 1940-1945 (London, 2009), Kindle edition. 
All of the above may refer to some degree of sympathetic communication with French authorities, 
notably intelligence, but no attempt has been made to establish the impact of French intelligence on the 
developing escape organisation. 
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military and secret services. Robert Paxton’s book, Vichy France Old Guard and New 
Order, still remains a key text in any study of Vichy France. In it, he challenged the 
perception that Vichy acted as a ‘shield’ against German aggression. In Paxton’s words,  
 
Collaboration was not a German demand which some Frenchmen acceded… 
Collaboration was a French proposal that Hitler ultimately rejected.4 
 
Paxton’s research went on to illustrate the numerous ways in which the Vichy 
government actively worked with the Germans and how its efforts to promote 
collaboration exceeded German expectations and the original demands of the Armistice.  
 
Over forty years later, Simon Kitson appears to challenge Paxton’s work with his 
research on the French secret services and their efforts to curtail espionage activities in 
unoccupied France. Kitson’s research revealed that the Germans were the ‘main target’ 
of French counterespionage activities.5 Furthermore, Kitson’s text illustrated that not 
only were French intelligence active in the Unoccupied Zone but that they worked to 
arrest and detain German spies. In dealing with the question of the French secret 
services Kitson dispels the notion that this secret service work was ‘somewhat maverick 
and divorced from the government’ 6 ; rather, contemporary government archives, 
including the Ministry of the Interior and the Minister of Justice, indicate that the 
French government were aware of the activities of the French secret services.7 These 
two trends operating within the Vichy state apparatus of German collaboration and the 
targeting of German spies appear almost irreconcilable. However, Kitson points out that 
there is no such contradiction and that Vichy’s efforts at counter-espionage must be 
perceived in terms of its efforts to assert a degree of sovereignty. As Kitson writes, 
 
Rather what was happening here was that the French government was caught 
between the often-conflicting desires of asserting its own independence from the 
Germans whilst still promoting a policy of active co-operation.8 
 
In this regard, Kitson’s work is important in reinforcing Paxton’s idea that Vichy was 
not a ‘shield’ for resistance activities but that its efforts to stem German espionage were 
                                                            
4 Robert Paxton, Vichy France, old guard and new order 1940-1944 (New York, 1972), p. 51. 
5 Simson Kitson, The hunt for Nazi spies: fighting espionage in Vichy France (Chicago and London, 
2008), p. 59. 
6 Ibid., p. 2 
7 For the full list of the archives used by Kitson see Kitson, The hunt for Nazi spies, p. 4. 
8 Ibid., p. 6. 
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part of the attempt to pursue an independent policy. However, Kitson also illustrates 
that these conflicts between German collaboration and independence explain ‘why 
Vichy’s behaviour in the domain of counterespionage oscillated between firmness and 
compromise’.9 The same could be said of British escape activities both in terms of the 
French military authorities and the French secret services. There appears to have been a 
willingness to indulge and even on occasion engage in escape activities. This was 
coupled with a determination to remain aloof from direct involvement in such activities. 
 
French authorities and escape activities in the Occupied Zone 
In many cases, French civil authorities in the Unoccupied Zone appear to have been 
more willing to offer assistance than their counterparts in the north. This difference was 
noted by escapees. In one case, a British escapee, Driver W.B.A Gaze, singled out 
French gendarmes in the Occupied Zone for particular attention. Following his escape 
from a camp in Strasbourg in November 1940, Gaze encountered French gendarmes in 
both occupied and unoccupied France in his effort to reach Spain. Assessing his 
experience, Gaze made the general claim that, ‘In the Occupied Zone the Gendarmerie 
turn a blind eye to escapers’.10 Moreover, Gaze added that in relation to re-capture in 
occupied France, the danger came not from French gendarmes but from what he 
identified as German ‘policiers’.11 Gaze, in spite of spending nine days in the Occupied 
Zone, did not provide further details on his experiences beyond these comments. 
However, his experiences in the Unoccupied Zone appear to contrast sharply with those 
in the north. Not only was Gaze arrested and sent to Fort St Jean, Marseilles by the 
French authorities, but two escape attempts ended in his arrest by French gendarmes.  
 
It is important to consider the difference in Gaze’s reception in both the Occupied and 
Unoccupied Zones. In the north, despite encounters with gendarmes, Gaze avoided 
arrest and re-capture noting that they turned a blind eye to his presence. In doing so and 
allowing Gaze to continue his journey, gendarmes were effectively challenging the 
established status quo and indirectly undermining German authority. In contrast, the 
gendarmes arresting Gaze in the Unoccupied Zone acted within the status quo, 
accepting Vichy authority and their duty to make an arrest. This pattern of help from 
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gendarmes in the Occupied Zone followed by arrest in the Unoccupied Zone emerges 
throughout the period under review in this thesis 1940-42. One particularly remarkable 
example of gendarme willingness to turn a blind eye which occurred in October 1940 
has already been mentioned in chapter one but it is worth recounting in the context of 
this chapter. On two separate occasions in that month two groups of escapees arrived at 
what was termed by one of the men as a ‘police union’12 office in Paris. Helpers in Lille 
listed the office as a potential safe house. On both occasions, the shocked gendarmes 
asked the men to leave but interestingly did not seek to detain either group.13 The same 
cannot be said in relation to the arrival of these groups in unoccupied France where they 
were detained.14 
 
On rarer occasions gendarmes in the Occupied Zone moved beyond turning a blind eye 
and played an active role in assisting escapees. This was done at increased risk as the 
experience of two escapees in August 1940 illustrates. These men were harboured for a 
night by a gendarme in his house at Chasnay. Their departure the next day was 
facilitated by the presence of German troops training nearby. 15  On reaching the 
Unoccupied Zone, both men were arrested. That same month two British servicemen, 
Gunner E. Lloyd and Gunner H. Turnbull, who had been working on a farm near Marly-
le-Roi, were taken from the farm and driven to Paris by the chief of police of the town.16 
The chief of police not only supported Lloyd and Turnbull’s civilian helpers but proved 
instrumental in ensuring their safe passage into the Unoccupied Zone, putting them on a 
train where, according to the escape report, they hid in the post van and safely crossed 
the demarcation line.17 Similar to the above accounts, on arrival in unoccupied France, 
both Lloyd and Turnbull were arrested by the French authorities there. In other cases, 
gendarmes engaged in aiding escapes also shielded civilian helpers from the Germans 
                                                            
12 Account of escape of Lt. J.M. Langley, M.C. 2nd Bn. Coldstream Guards, 1st Division, 22 Mar. 1941 
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15 Account of escape of 6288414 Pte. F. Hills, The Buffs and 6288414 Pte. V.H. Caldicott, The Buffs, 17 
Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300). 
16 Account of escape of 933657 Gnr. Lloyd, E., 1 Regt. R.H.A. and 863963 Gnr. Turnbull, H. 1 Regt., 




and there is at least one account where gendarmes used their privileged position to pass 
on updates on the German response to a mass breakout in Rouen in January 1942.18 
 
There is also evidence to suggest that on occasion in the Occupied Zone French 
gendarmes acted as gateways into French communities. For instance, when Polish RAF 
Pilot Officer Z. Groyecki bailed out north of Lille in November 1941, desperate for help 
he directly approached a gendarme and asked him to take him to his house. Incredibly, 
Groyecki’s tactic worked and the gendarme not only took Groyecki into his home, but 
allowed him to stay for three days. In addition to this practical assistance, through the 
gendarme’s machinations Groyecki was passed through a network of safe houses and 
aided to the Unoccupied Zone. It is not known if the gendarme would have engaged in 
escape activities if he had not been directly approached. However, in other incidences, 
the reports suggest that gendarmes were pro-active in seeking men to help. In several 
cases, gendarmes were first on the scene of a bail out or crash with the aim of spiriting 
men away.19 
 
One particularly interesting example of this is provided in an account given by an RAF 
sergeant, A. Pietrasiak. Pietrasiak was shot down in August 1941 and was almost 
immediately approached by two gendarmes near to where he landed after bailing out of 
his aircraft. They provided him with clothes from a nearby farm house and helped him 
to leave the area. Before leaving the Occupied Zone, Pietrasiak had a second encounter 
with a different group of French gendarmes in occupied France in September 1941. 
Pietrasiak and a colleague were, to use his words, ‘challenged’ by a gendarme. On 
discovering both men were recently shot down RAF pilots the gendarme informed them 
                                                            
18 Account of escape of Major Challenor, R. R.E., 16 Apr. 1942 (N.A., WO208/3308).  
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WO208/3310); Statement by 1256129 Sgt. Ainger, S.R.J., 49 Sqn., R.A.F., 29 Aug. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3310); Statement by Aus. 402258 P/O Silva, G., and 1168872 Sgt. Whicher, A.J., both of 24 
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R.A.F., 16 June 1941 (N.A., WO208/3309). (These references do not take into account help given by 
Belgian gendarmes which, according to escape reports, was also quite significant). 
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that they ‘were lucky there were no Germans about that day’ and let both men proceed 
with their journey. 20 While, as Pietrasiak’s experience highlighted, such help was given 
in a private capacity and without the knowledge of the German authorities, this does not 
take from the fact that it was done to undermine the German authorities and the status 
quo. 
 
In contrast, this was not the case within the Unoccupied Zone where arrest happened as 
a matter of course. In point of fact, the majority of men crossing the demarcation line in 
the hope of reaching Spain were arrested and spent some time in French custody. Rather 
ironically, it would appear even gendarmes in unoccupied France were aware of the 
difference in attitude towards British escapees to their counterparts in the north. One 
British pilot on crossing the demarcation line in May 1942 unwittingly approached a 
gendarme for help and was advised to be 
 
Very careful, as it was much more dangerous in Unoccupied France, where 
gendarmes would pick up any Englishman.21 
 
In contrast to the north, maintaining the status quo was crucial for the French authorities 
(namely, the French police and army) in the Unoccupied Zone.22 Vichy was accepted as, 
according to Paxton, the lawful successor of the old regime.23 Historian Dominique 
Veillon reinforced Paxton’s observation arguing that although Vichy officials, and 
Veillon suggests specifically army officers, may have held out hope of liberating 
France, few wanted to become what she termed ‘dissidents’.24 Moreover, Veillon points 
out that in relation to those working for the state in institutions like the army, many 
considered ‘it was not their proper place to call into question the authority of the state, 
and therefore their own legitimacy’.25 This tension within the army is also witnessed in 
the attitude of gendarmes some of whom declared themselves pro-British but also 
accepted the authority of the Vichy government. 
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Considering the willingness of gendarmes to make arrests, it is difficult to see how the 
French authorities in the Unoccupied Zone supported or were complicit in an escaping 
culture. Yet, rather ironically, this was exactly what British escapees experienced once 
interned. Moreover, there is evidence from the report of Flight Lieutenant K. Barnett 
which suggests that gendarmes arresting British escapees were aware of this escape 
culture and, in Barnett’s case, actively endorsed it. According to Barnett, on his arrest in 
June 1942 two gendarmes informed him that ‘escape from a French Internment Camp 
was a matter of no difficulty whatever’. 26  Remarkably, Barnett noted that this 
information was nothing less than what he expected having been informed that this was 
the case from lectures he received in England.27 
 
Culture of escape: British internment camps in the Unoccupied Zone 
Barnett’s report is important in that it illustrates two important points in relation to this 
escaping culture: firstly, the appearance of maintaining the status quo was crucial; 
secondly that within that status quo there was an implicit sympathy for British escape 
efforts. This is visible in one of the first internment camps, or more correctly army 
barracks, specifically set aside for the British, Fort St Jean in Marseilles. French Foreign 
Legion officers at the camp performed their appointed tasks as guards. Yet the first 
discernible impressions of the camp related to the pro-British attitude of the guards. 
Several accounts refer to this pro-British attitude28 with two internees reporting ‘being 
extremely well treated’.29 One internee went so far as to observe that the Foreign Legion 
officers guarding Fort St Jean ‘without exception were pro-British and very hostile to 
the Germans’30 with another British internee, Captain D.B. Lang, adding that the guards 
were ‘all charming’.31 This anti-Germanism which Foreign Legion officers did not hide 
from internees quickly manifested itself in implicit support for escape activities or, as 
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Lang observed, these ‘charming’ French Foreign Legion officers ‘did not ask questions 
if small numbers of British tried to escape at a time’.32 Lang’s description is revealing 
of the general attitude to escape among guards in the camp. To put it bluntly, escape 
was tolerated, even encouraged but only when it did not attract undue attention and 
therefore, might reflect badly on or draw the attention of the authorities to Fort St Jean. 
 
In the case of Fort St Jean, this anti-German attitude and toleration of escapes 
occasionally boiled over to actively aiding such activities. Between August and 
November 1940 some Legionnaires guarding Fort St Jean were actively involved in a 
number of escapes. Escapes involving Legionnaires were by ship and facilitated by the 
protracted re-deployment of these officers to North Africa throughout autumn and 
winter 1940. British internees obtained Legionnaire uniforms, left Fort St Jean and 
boarded ships bringing these officers to North Africa. Two internees, Major W.C.W 
Potts and Captain C.R.I Besley, left Fort St Jean in August dressed in Legionnaire 
uniforms.33 According to Besley,  
 
One of the Legion officers supplied us with uniforms and said he would do his best 
to get us to Casablanca if we could get undetected on to the ship.34 
 
Potts and Besley were joined by another internee but it is unclear from Besley’s report if 
that internee too benefitted from a Legionnaire uniform. Legionnaire transports appear 
to have been particularly popular among British internees with another internee 
successfully boarding a ship carrying Legionnaires bound for Oran a few weeks later.35 
In October, this was followed by two privates boarding another ship heading to Oran 
dressed as Legionnaires.36 
 
There were over twenty successful escapes by sea crossing in the period between 
August-November 1940. It is difficult, however, to establish the number of sea 
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crossings which were facilitated by Legionnaires. Accounts referring to the use of 
uniforms are relatively general. For instance, one internee Private W.D. Young simply 
reported, ‘From Marseilles I crossed over to Oran, with others, disguised as a 
Legionnaire’.37 In such cases, it is difficult to determine if Young obtained the uniforms 
directly from a Legion officer or acquired it by more resourceful means during his time 
in Fort St Jean. Moreover, Young refers to other internees on board the ship but does 
not provide details in relation to the use of uniforms by these ‘others’. Young’s account 
at least indicates he acquired and used a Legionnaire uniform; some accounts note 
boarding a ship but do not provide details outside of this fact. Given the lack of detail in 
some accounts it is difficult to determine the extent of Legionnaire involvement in 
escape activities. However, it is unlikely that men like Young were able to obtain 
Legionnaire uniforms without the complicity of Legionnaires. Even if obtaining 
uniforms was possible without the direct involvement of the guards, in remaining silent 
guards were complicit in such escape efforts. Perceived in this light, Legionnaires not 
only indulged or turned a blind eye to escapes but also, during phases of redeployment 
to North Africa, they assisted the British in their escape endeavours.  
 
The help was given by individual Legionnaires but it is likely that their superior officers 
were aware of it. In her research on the French army, Veillon noted that not only was 
there room for anti-Germanism but that in cases where a ‘few’ French soldiers engaged 
in assisting various resistance networks, their involvement often met with the ‘tacit 
agreement of their superiors’.38 The tacit agreement of superiors was crucial to the 
promotion of an escaping culture as it created a situation where help given discreetly 
and without drawing attention or outwardly challenging the status quo met with 
approval or at the very least was ignored.  
 
Nevertheless, balancing an openly acknowledged anti-Germanism with maintaining the 
status quo and sympathies with British internees in Fort St Jean was a challenge. The 
escape of Major W.C.W. Potts and Captain C.R.I Besley from Fort St Jean in August 
1940 best illustrates how these contending factors played out and had an impact British 
escape activities. The Legionnaire officer providing Potts and Besley with the uniforms 
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did so with the intention of helping them to escape but informed both men that their 
actual escape from Fort St Jean depended on their personal endeavours. In this way, the 
Legionnaire did not participate in the actual escape effort or directly compromise his 
role as guard. In addition to this, Potts and Besley were expected to make their way and 
board the ship without help and it was only when this was achieved that the Legionnaire 
would guarantee to do all in his power to facilitate their journey to North Africa. In 
laying down these conditions, the Legionnaire sought to both aid Potts and Besley’s 
passage to North Africa but also to remove himself from direct involvement in their 
escape. Direct action of that nature would have challenged the authority of his superiors 
and met with disapproval. Arguably, in acting this way, the Legionnaire reconciled his 
duty to the Legion with his sympathy for the escape attempts of Besley and Potts.  
 
More importantly, Potts and Besley’s experience illustrates the awareness of superior 
officers and their complicity, by non-action, in these types of escapes. In this case, an 
inspection on board the ship by the French authorities led to Besley’s discovery and his 
prompt return to Fort St Jean. According to Besley, on his return the camp guards noted 
Potts’ absence that same night and some hours before the ship sailed and yet ‘no 
attempt’ was made to find him. 39 Equally, Besley’s return to the fort in Legionnaire 
uniform does not appear to have raised any questions. This is an important 
consideration as Potts’ absence and Besley’s Legionnaire attire were not likely to go 
unnoticed by the camp’s superior officers and yet no ramifications were reported in 
relation to either point. It can be argued that although Legionnaires remained reluctant 
to give direct assistance to internees, once Legionnaires provided aid without 
challenging their superiors, their actions gained implicit approval. 
 
These intentional oversights and a ‘no questions asked’ policy were significant in 
reinforcing an escaping culture. Furthermore, this was not confined to members of the 
Foreign Legion; regular members of the army responsible for interning the British also 
adopted this attitude. This was particularly evident from January 1941 when the French 
authorities transferred British internees from Fort St Jean, Marseilles to St Hippolyte du 
Fort, an action which was likely part of a wider effort to stem British escape efforts 
which by January 1941 were prolific and centred around Marseilles. Indeed, this is 
                                                            




confirmed by the choice of location which was an army barracks located near a small 
village and over seventy miles from the nearest major city, Nîmes. The first British 
impressions of the move also reinforce this point with rumours in December 1940 of the 
transfer and ‘stricter conditions’40 awaiting internees in St Hippolyte prompting Driver 
W.B.A Gaze’s speedy escape from Fort St Jean. There is little doubt that the geography 
of the new camp was a culture shock for internees accustomed to life in Marseilles, with 
one internee summing up his impression of St Hippolyte du Fort as ‘wild isolated 
country’.41 
 
Significantly, although the move to St Hippolyte was part of a wider policy to stem 
escape activities, there is evidence for a continued sympathy for, and even an 
appreciation of, British escape efforts. While outwardly, camp authorities at St 
Hippolyte did not indulge British activities on the same level as that witnessed in Fort St 
Jean and went to greater lengths to be seen to be tougher on escapes, there is evidence 
for a high tolerance for such activities. In one remarkable incident, three RAF sergeants 
on being returned to the camp by gendarmes after an escape were informed by the camp 
commandant that he was  
 
Not annoyed that we had tried to escape but rather that we had not gone out by a 
gate and at a time when internees in the camp were normally allowed out.42 
 
This incident illustrates that the main concern of the camp authorities was not 
necessarily escapes per se but rather when an escape drew attention or raised questions 
in relation to the ineffectiveness of camp security. 
 
In this regard, the commandant’s concern remained not so much in discouraging escape 
but in maintaining the appearance of doing one’s job. In the case referred to above, the 
commandant’s advice was taken at face value and Willis, Vivian and Blaydon left the 
camp by the gate that afternoon. The Willis, Vivian and Blaydon escape occurred within 
days of the transferral to St Hippolyte but by the summer of 1940, the camp authorities 
expected internees to show an implicit understanding of what was expected when it 
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came to escape attempts. A breach of this sense of fair play, more so than the escape, 
had the potential to create tension between the authorities and internees. This is 
elucidated in an escape attempt initiated by internee, Patrick O’Leary (the eventual 
leader of the British escape organisation). O’Leary, like most men in St Hippolyte, had 
given his parole not to escape and received privileges including being able to leave the 
camp for a few hours a day. In summer 1940, O’Leary handed his parole back to the 
commandant, signalling his intention to escape. This procedure in itself is rather 
remarkable but what happened subsequently in even more so. On leaving the 
commandant’s office O’Leary made a dash for the wall. Reaction was quick with 
guards dragging him away; within moments O’Leary was back before the commandant. 
O’Leary’s biographer, Vincent Brome drawing on O’Leary account of the situation, 
provides a vivid description of the interview with the commandant and it is perhaps 
worth quoting his description in full. According to Brome,  
 
The interview that followed was ferocious…. Normally very polite, the 
commandant’s threats were more ominous because delivered quietly, but above all, 
some sense of outraged morality drove him to say: ‘It just isn’t fair”. 
“What’s unfair about it?” O’Leary asked. 
“The way you rushed off two seconds after seeing me”. 
“It’s our duty to try to escape,” O’Leary said. 
“Not by a trick,” snapped the commandant.43 
 
If Brome’s account is accurate then the commandant’s assertion that it was important 
not to escape ‘by a trick’ highlights the notion that there was a set of implicit principles 
surrounding escape activities that were understood by both sides, which when breached 
created tension. Brome’s account suggests that the commandant was not annoyed at the 
escape attempt nor was he even seeking to discourage it but as in the case of Willis, 
Vivian and Blaydon, the commandant was annoyed by the method employed.  
 
It would appear therefore that in both Fort St Jean and St Hippolyte the camp authorities 
implicitly endorsed an escaping culture, merely taking measures to keep it low key. 
Some researchers such as Brome note that the authorities issued punishments to 
escapees but do not go beyond this observation.44 Yet an assessment of punishments 
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issued to men who escaped and were re-captured further draws into question the 
seriousness with which camp authorities attempted to deter escapes. 
 
Under the terms of the Geneva Convention 1929 the maximum penalty that could be 
imposed on prisoners of war for various infringements, including escape activities, was 
thirty days’ confinement. The majority of men who successfully passed into Spain 
between 1940-42 spent time in French internment, some escaping multiple times before 
they finally managed to cross the Franco-Spanish frontier. In spite of these multiple re-
captures, camp authorities were slow to impose punishments. In relation to Fort St Jean, 
with the exception of two individuals, there were no references to punishments for serial 
escapees. The two individuals that were punished, Besley and Bombardier J. Sennett, 
received a penalty for the escape mentioned earlier in this chapter. This escape was 
attempted in the company of Major Potts with all three boarding a ship. Rather 
ironically, in relation to this escape it is known that Potts and Besley were assisted by a 
Legionnaire at Fort St Jean; it is uncertain if the same help was extended to Sennett. The 
French authorities returned Besley and Sennett to the fort where Besley was confined to 
his room for four days and Sennett received seven days solitary confinement and 
reduced rations.45 
 
Considering the maximum penalty allowed was thirty days, the punishment enforced 
was relatively light. Moreover, it is likely that in this case a penalty was imposed 
because of the nature of the escape. Both men were returned to Fort St Jean from the 
ship raising the profile of the escape and the need to be seen to deal with such escapes. 
In fact, the push to curtail escapes does not appear to have come from camp authorities 
in either Fort St Jean or St Hippolyte but only emerges as a problem when direct 
attention is drawn to an escape by the men involved. For instance, in the case of Willis, 
Vivian and Blaydon, the commandant’s annoyance may easily have been down to the 
fact that six men were returned to the camp that day by local gendarmes.46 Yet in spite 
of the commandant’s annoyance, all involved received no penalty for their escape 
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attempt, with Willis, Vivian and Blaydon escaping a second time later that day. On the 
20 February 1941 all three men were again re-captured and returned to the camp for the 
second time. Remarkably, this second attempt also appears to have earned no penalty 
and eleven days later all three were once again at large. This time only Blaydon was re-
arrested. On his third return to St Hippolyte, Blaydon went unpunished. On 2 April, 
Blaydon made his final successful escape from the camp, crossing the Pyrenees some 
time later. Each of these escape attempts were only hours or days apart signalling that 
there was little or no penalty and therefore, no real effort made by the camp authorities 
to seriously deter even serial escapees. 
 
This was a recurring theme with one particular internee making five escape attempts 
over a three month period from March until June 1941; his report does not refer to any 
penalties or punishment imposed on him during his time in St Hippolyte.47 In cases 
where punishment details were recorded, solitary confinement ranged from between 
four to fifteen days.48 These confinements, similar to punishments in Fort St Jean, 
remained notably shorter than that allowable and therefore not a deterrent to continuing 
such activities. From this perspective, the French military authorities responsible for 
British internees consistently displayed sympathy for the British position in unoccupied 
France to the point of indulging an escaping culture.  
 
In making this assertion, it is necessary to turn the spotlight on the British as their 
actions challenged French ability to maintain this sympathetic line. The British were 
aware of the presence of both the German and Italian Armistice Commission in the 
Unoccupied Zone. The German Commission, in particular, maintained an active 
presence in Marseilles including keeping a close watch on the port. Yet, far from 
seeking to maintain a low profile, there are indications that British officers in Marseilles 
in the autumn and winter of 1940 used their relatively liberal internment condition to 
bait members of the Commission. James Langley in his autobiography recalls such an 
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episode noting that British officers sought out the offices of both the German and Italian 
Armistice Commission. The goal was to provoke representatives of the Commission, 
particularly the Italian Commission, into some kind of action with the Italians being 
considered ‘easy meat’. According to Langley, 
 
It became a routine practice to chant out to the sentries… The officer officiating 
always wore as a buttonhole a large stick of macaroni, decorated with an oversize 
black mourning ribbon, and at the termination of his act he offered 50francs to 
anyone in the admiring crowd who could name an Italian victory since 1900. The 
results were always the same; the guard was turned out, the French police 
summoned, the British officer was arrested and marched out of sight, only to be 
released to continue the performance when next he had the energy.49 
 
Langley recounts these memories as humorous anecdote but this type of behaviour had 
repercussions. The nuisance value of such behaviour drew German awareness to an 
open British military presence in Marseilles. Moreover, such actions as recounted by 
Langley made it impossible for the British presence in the city to remain low key. The 
‘admiring’ crowds, the dramatic arrests, the release and the follow-up performance 
while entertaining, directed attention to rather than from the British. 
 
In another incident in Vichy, Langley and a colleague although under curfew arrived 
drunk at their residence two nights in a row and were ‘lucky not to be arrested’.50 
Considering that Langley arrived in the city to meet French officials willing to help him, 
this behaviour was not conducive to maintaining the necessary low profile. Escape 
reports are peppered with references to the British meeting civilians in various cafés. 
Varian Fry, an American working to help political refugees trapped in unoccupied 
France, is a useful source of information on early British escape activities. Fry gave one 
particular account of an incident in a café where Captain Charles Murchie, one of the 
early organisers of British escape activities, became quite drunk and indiscreet, openly 
discussing escape plans with a man Fry suspected, and later confirmed, worked for the 
Germans.51 
 
Without access to French sources, one can only guess at the impact of this type of 
behaviour on the French authorities and their attempts to contain the visible British 
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presence in France. It may have underpinned the necessity of transferring internees to St 
Hippolyte. Although this is also supposition, it is interesting to note that Polish 
servicemen, who were it must be pointed out in a similar position to the British in 
Marseilles and also engaged in escape activities, remained in the city for the whole 
period under review 1940-42. While this may be explained by the stricter internment 
conditions imposed on the Poles, it could also be argued that this worked in their favour. 
By keeping a low profile, and as of yet there are no reported cases of Polish servicemen 
singing outside the offices of the German or Italian Armistice Commission, the Poles 
maintained their position and continued their escape activities from Marseilles. From 
this location, which they maintained from summer 1940, Polish officers had 
successfully continued to connect with Polish forces working for the British managing 
to set up an escape line by sea to North Africa.52 Delving deeply into the activities of 
the Poles is outside the remit of this thesis but it is noteworthy as a point of contrast in 
relation to the British.  
 
The behaviour of some British internees undermined the capacity of the French to 
continue a lenient policy towards them. Moreover, during the spring of 1941 when 
internees were moved to St Hippolyte, there is evidence that the Germans were growing 
increasingly concerned by British activities along the Pyrenees. In April 1941 two 
British escapees, Captain Charles Murchie and serial escaper Sergeant R.W. Blaydon, 
travelling separately into Spain, had similar experiences with Spanish authorities.53 
Murchie, in a letter to the British ambassador Sir Samuel Hoare, informed Hoare that 
the Spanish interrogation was based on his activities in France.54 Murchie wrote that the 
focus of this interrogation was 
 
Directed to finding out what I was doing in Marseilles, by what means I arrived 
there, by whom I was hidden when in Occupied France, etc. etc. I admitted 
absolutely nothing and refused to disclose the names of persons who had rendered 
me individual service’.55 
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In Murchie’s opinion, this information ‘could hardly be any concern of the Spanish 
authorities.’56 Blaydon’s report sheds further light on Spanish interest in British escape 
activities. According to Blaydon he was  
 
Interrogated by a German in civilian clothes who asked my name, birth place and 
age, and expressed an interest in the organisation which had got us into Spain, as 
too many had been getting over. I said there was no organisation and that if there 
had been I would not have been before him. He mentioned various names but I 
denied knowing any of them.57 
 
The Spanish, therefore, had an added interest in escape activities in that this information 
was passed on to the Germans. Furthermore, the questions directed at Murchie and 
Blaydon indicated that the Germans had knowledge of the presence of an escape 
organisation and were attempting to establish its extent. In taking trouble to connect 
with the Spanish on this issue, the Germans revealed an interest in, and a desire to 
closely monitor, the situation of British escapees passing into Spain.  
 
This German interest in British escapees passing into Spain coincided with a tightening 
of security measures at St Hippolyte in April 1940. This did not go unnoticed by the 
British, who perceived, not that the French were behind tightened security measures, but 
that it was the Germans. According to internee Corporal F. Royston, in April ‘the 
French were tightening their control at St Hippolyte at the instigation of the German 
Commission’.58 Royston does not specify if this conclusion was the result of his 
personal observations or based on information provided by camp guards but, in light of 
Murchie and Blaydon’s experiences during their interrogation in Spain, his report has 
credibility. It would appear that German pressure as opposed to French initiative lay 
behind efforts to curtail British escape efforts. 
 
Interestingly, the French military authorities at St Hippolyte displayed a continued 
reluctance to impose even basic security measures to foil escapes. When men first 
arrived in the camp in January 1940, there was no barbed wire on the walls.59 
Considering that it was the duty of British prisoners to escape, and that many of the men 
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in the camp were serial escapees, the lack of a simple security and deterrent measure 
such as barbed wire appears remarkable. Awareness that this may reflect badly on the 
camp officials may go some way to explaining why the camp commandant in the case 
of Willis, Vivian and Blaydon was eager to ensure men did not escape over the walls 
but by the gate! However, this awareness does not appear to have prompted action and 
while Royston observed tighter security measure in April 1940, O’Leary’s escape 
attempt over the wall over in summer 1940 suggests that in the interim the French had 
done little to address this problem. In fact, evidence from the report of British sergeant, 
S.M.F. Parkes, suggests that the Germans were not satisfied with these tightened 
security measures and as a result the French commandant was dismissed, ‘a German 
had taken his place and barbed wire put up’.60 
 
Parkes did not witness these events personally as he had left France a few months 
previously, in January 1941. The commandant’s removal and replacement by a German 
official remains unsubstantiated and must be acknowledged as unlikely; such a drastic 
measure would surely have been noted in other reports. Nevertheless, there is no 
doubting the French were under increased pressure to curtail British escape activities. 
Around this time there were also increased penalties for escape activities. For instance, 
a private, J. Farrell, received no punishment for his first escape attempt in April 1941. 
Farrell’s second attempt in May earned fourteen days’ imprisonment and in a third 
attempt in June 1941 Farrell received a maximum penalty of thirty days imprisonment.61 
Notably, the gendarmes who captured Farrell in June tried to force a confession that he 
escaped from St Hippolyte with the help of a guard and addresses he ‘was making 
for’.62 The attempts of the gendarmes to link Farrell’s escape with guards in St 
Hippolyte is indicative of the pressure experienced by the French military authorities, 
pressure that goes some way to explaining the transferral of British internees to Fort de 
la Revère in March 1942. The move to Fort de la Revère was the first time since the 
creation of the Unoccupied Zone in 1940 that the French authorities took basic steps to 
reinforce security. Unlike Fort St Jean or St Hippolyte, Fort de la Revère was not 
located in close proximity to French inhabitants. Furthermore, British internees lost 
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privileges such as liberal parole terms (see chapter two) and therefore, access to 
surrounding areas.  
 
The move to Fort de la Revère represented a significant shift in the dynamics of escape 
in the Unoccupied Zone. There is no evidence to suggest that the camp officials 
guarding Fort de la Revère displayed the same sympathies as the Foreign Legion in 
Marseilles or the commandant in St Hippolyte. The change in attitude had a marked 
impact on escape activities. Before the move to Fort de la Revère, the bulk of escapees 
assisted by the British-led escape organisation and reaching Spain consisted of men who 
had successfully escaped French internment. With the substantial drop in prison escapes 
the focus shifted to men who managed to make their way from the north and now had 
the added pressure of avoiding arrest in the Unoccupied Zone.  
 
The significant point here relates not to those involved in escape activities but to the 
role of the French authorities in sustaining escape. The attitude of guards and their 
officers in both Fort St Jean and St Hippolyte had effectively sustained escape activities 
for over a year. Historians such as Foot place the focus for success on British 
organisation and it is not the intention of this chapter to undermine this perspective. 
However, it is equally important to recognise that the success of the British-led escape 
organisation was reinforced by the continued escapes from French internment. In fact, 
as mentioned in chapter two, the escape organisation went to some lengths to establish 
connections with St Hippolyte, setting up at least one safe house in Nîmes, the nearest 
city to St Hippolyte with access via train to Perpignan. Yet these connections would 
have been relatively pointless if it were not possible for internees to escape St Hippolyte 
on a regular basis. The escaping culture and lack of any real deterrent in relation to 
escape activities facilitated these regular escapes. From January 1941 to 17 March 1942, 
when the British were transferred again (discussed later in this chapter) a modest 
estimate suggests that of the men returned to Britain between 1940-42 over a hundred of 
these men escaped St Hippolyte.63 In addition to this, during their time in St Hippolyte 
the British constructed three tunnels, albeit none of which were ultimately used.64 
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The seriousness of the situation and the sense that the French were coming under 
increasing pressure with regard to British prisoners fuelled rumours among internees in 
Fort de la Revère. In August 1942, for the first time British officers were separated from 
ordinary ranks and sent to a camp near Lyon, a city close to the German occupied zone. 
In Fort de la Revère rumours abounded that the camp, which was close to the Italian 
frontier, was on the verge of being taken over by the Italians. These rumours illustrate 
the British sense that the French were losing their authority in relation to British 
internees. The situation was not helped by a mass break out of prisoners from Fort de la 
Revère in September 1942. This breakout had been closely co-ordinated with the escape 
organisers in Marseilles. Fifty-six men escaped. A number of these reached safe houses 
near and in Marseilles. Throughout the summer of 1942 a number of successful 
attempts had been made to pass men to North Africa with the help of a number of small 
trawlers. 65  Some of the escapees from Fort de la Revère benefitted from this 
arrangement. However, if the German authorities were unaware of the ability of escape 
organisers to achieve this feat, they could not remain in the dark about the mass 
breakout. 
 
The breakout is another example of the British drawing attention to their presence in the 
Unoccupied Zone. Regardless of British objectives, this type of action once again 
redirected the focus on the French capacity to guard the British. This breakout is 
particularly noteworthy as its repercussions were experienced in other areas of the 
Unoccupied Zone. British Flight Lieutenant G.C. Fisher who had recently arrived in the 
Unoccupied Zone from the north noted the impact of the breakout on travel. According 
to Fisher 
 
I caught the train to Marmande and on the way the train was controlled three times. 
There was at this time some excitement about Jews and the men who had broken 
out of Fort de la Revère.66 
 
This type of action only added to the pressure already on the French to get to grips with 
the British situation. Within days of the breakout the entire camp at Fort de la Revère 
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was moved again, this time to Chambarand where they were re-joined by their 
officers.67 
 
The move to Chambarand marks the end of French attempts to balance efforts to retain 
a semblance of independence in terms of dealing with the British alongside their efforts 
to placate German interests. Each previous internment ‘camp’ was in reality an army 
barracks but Chambarand was a purpose-built internment camp. British captain, George 
Alleyne Browne described Chambarand in stark terms writing that  
 
There were double rows of barbed wire, machine-guns and searchlights at the new 
camp, which was guarded by a squad of Gardes Mobiles. The camp was not 
completed, huts for the winter being still under construction.68 
 
Browne’s observations are interesting in that not only did the appearance of the camp 
conform to prisoner-of-war camps in Germany but the French military also seem to 
have been relieved of their responsibilities. To what extent the military lost control is 
unclear but Browne’s report is particular in noting that Gardes Mobiles as opposed to 
the regular military were in charge of the camp. Moreover, the camp had not been 
completed leaving the suggestion open that the mass breakout did merit a strong 
response and that the authorities had to been seen to act quickly. Browne’s visual 
description of the camp and the seriousness with which the French were at this point 
treating escape was reinforced by their response to such activities. One of the first 
escape attempts made by Lieutenant Commander Redvers Prior, was ‘met with a 
barrage of rifle fire’69 a tactic that not been employed before.  
 
Notwithstanding the physical descriptions and response of the guards to escape, there is 
evidence to suggest that the French camp authorities were still inclined towards 
sympathy. This claim is supported by the first-hand experiences of Reverend Donald 
Caskie. Caskie had been reprimanded by the French authorities for the support he gave 
to British escapees (examined later in this chapter). In response to this reprimand Caskie 
moved to Grenoble, near Chambarand. When the British were moved to this new camp 
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Caskie sought to visit the men in a religious capacity. In spite of a long track record of 
aiding escapes and suspicions he may have helped in a number of prison breaks Caskie 
received permission to continue his visits to Chambarand. The irony of this was not lost 
on Caskie and in his observations of Chambarand he noted that it was 
 
Not a bad camp. True, the lads were held behind barbed wire; the French kept them 
prisoners and went through the motion of strict discipline but they gave their 
charges an easy time. Live and let live was their motto. Their attitude to the 
Germans was cynically correct.70 
 
Caskie’s comments when combined with the observations of British internees on the 
double barbed wire, searchlights and barrage of rifle fire illustrate French attempts to 
address a much bigger dilemma. As in Fort St Jean and St Hippolyte, efforts were made 
in Chambarand to both remain loyal to a collaborationist Vichy while also expressing 
sympathy to the British war effort. Indeed, the formidable appearance of Chambarand 
paid lip service to this collaborationist policy. Though no longer able to convey tacit 
approval in relation to escape activities, antipathy towards the situation was, as Caskie 
illustrated, indicated by going through the ‘motion of strict discipline’ but in reality 
giving ‘their charges an easy time’.  
 
The tension of balancing German interests, loyalty to Vichy and sympathy to British 
reached new heights on the 11 November 1942. In response to the invasion of North 
Africa by the allies a number of days earlier the Germans crossed the demarcation line 
and occupied the remainder of France. The Italians too gained more French territory, 
territory they had sought and been denied by the Germans in June 1940. This action 
removed any remaining illusions of Vichy independence and the impact of this was 
notable in the actions of the authorities in Chambarand. Outwardly, Chambarand 
continued to function as a British prison camp. However, there was one crucial 
difference; with the German invasion, loyalties to Vichy were severely shaken. In 
Chambarand, shaken loyalty was highlighted not only in the willingness of guards to 
turn a blind eye to escape but in their readiness to actively assist such endeavours. This 
is not to say that all guards participated in these endeavours or supported them but for 
the first time there was a willingness to take greater risks in offering such support. This 
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is suggested in the report of Flight Lieutenant Robert Milton.71 On the 16 November, 
four days after the occupation, a French guard walked Milton and a colleague past the 
sentry and out the main gate. Not only was the guard willing to do this but he may have 
done so with the knowledge of his superiors. Milton goes on to report that once outside 
the camp they were driven to the train station in the commandant’s car. It is not known 
if the commandant was complicit in the escape but it is unlikely that his car could be 
used without his prior knowledge. 
 
More direct proof of high level involvement in escape activities comes from an account 
of an escape which took place a few days later. According to one of the participants, 
Captain George Alleyne Browne, a British senior officer in the camp, Lieutenant 
Commander Redvers Prior, wrote to a local French military commander. No details of 
the content of the letter are provided in Browne’s report but he asserted that ‘as a result 
of this letter Lt-Cdr Prior, myself, and some other internees were liberated, on 27 
November’.72 Prior’s report is circumspect on this point only reporting that 
 
A group of us managed to get round one of the guards who allowed us to get over 
the wire and out of the camp. There were seven in the party.73 
 
Prior’s account does not include Browne’s reference to a local French military 
commander but only that he managed to get round one of the guards.74 Therefore, it 
cannot be established with certainty that a local military commander was involved. 
Nevertheless, the incident illustrates the willingness of guards to help, a situation which 
would not have occurred before 11 November of that year. 
 
Equally, the German and Italian authorities were disinclined to rely on the continued 
loyalty of the French as evidenced by the arrival of Italian troops at the camp in early 
December 1942 and followed by the removal of the internees to camps in Italy. This 
marked the end of the French authorities’ control over the internment of British military 
personnel. Reflecting on the French military authorities’ relationship with British 
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internees from 1940-42, it would appear that they continually made efforts to mitigate 
German demands towards the British. British prisoners were, where possible, given 
relative freedom and serial escapees were dealt with leniently. 
 
French Intelligence and British escape activities 
The French military authorities were not alone in indulging British escape activities. As 
with the military authorities, the French secret service, among them a number of high 
profile agents, displayed a sympathy and even a willingness to help British escapees.75 
However, before assessing the French secret services’ contribution to British escape 
activities, it is necessary to establish the context for this assistance. In order to do this, it 
is important to provide a brief outline of the position of the secret services following the 
defeat of France. As one researcher noted, one of the leading figures in French 
intelligence, Colonel Louis Rivet, forbade French intelligence agents dealing with pro-
British (Allied) intelligence and then set up an organisation to do just that.76 While 
Rivet established the secret Cinquième Bureau to deal with espionage, it is somewhat of 
an overstatement to argue that this organisation was working purely for the British. 
Kitson’s extensive research on French intelligence in Vichy France noted that the 
Cinquième Bureau was not necessarily interested in the British war effort per se but 
rather with maintaining the integrity of Vichy’s sovereignty. 77  In this capacity, 
according to Kitson, intelligence agencies acted against all Axis and Allies agents in 
unoccupied France.78 
 
The Cinquième Bureau was subdivided into the Service de Renseignments (gathering 
intelligence) and the Section de Centralisation du Renseignment which centralised 
intelligence. This latter was further subdivided into the Travaux Ruraux (TR) and the 
Bureaux for Anti-National Affairs (BMA).79 The Travaux Ruraux or Rural Works owes 
its rather mundane name to camouflaging its intelligence activities.80 According to 
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Kitson the Travaux Ruraux had offices in Annemasse, Limoges, Clermont, Lyon and 
Toulouse, including a branch in Paris.81 In relation to escape activities, as British 
escapees were not necessarily aware of the subtleties of French intelligence, the escape 
reports usually refer to French intelligence by the better named Deuxième Bureau. 
There is some evidence to suggest that agents from the Cinquième Bureau including 
both the TR and BMA were also in contact with British escapees. It is sometimes 
difficult to establish if agents interacting with the British were Deuxième Bureau or 
Cinquième Bureau, particularly considering that the British were fond of applying 
‘Deuxième Bureau’ as a generic term to cover all intelligence. However, where these 
distinctions can be established with a degree of certainty they will be flagged in the 
course of this chapter. 
 
A small number of men reported being directly assisted by the Deuxième Bureau in 
their escape activities. In autumn 1941, a French man guided Private John Morton to the 
Unoccupied Zone from the north. According to Morton, the French man, acting on 
advice he received in the north, brought Morton to the Deuxième Bureau in 
Chateauroux. Morton’s account is interesting as he noted that the Deuxième Bureau 
were suspicious of both men and unwilling to render assistance until Morton confessed 
to being an escaped prisoner of war. On receiving this news, the Deuxième Bureau in 
Chateauroux promptly recommended that they try the Deuxième Bureau in Toulouse for 
help. In fact, the Bureau in Chateauroux informed Morton and his guide how they could 
contact the Bureau there and allowed both men to continue their journey unimpeded. 
Morton and his guide followed up on this advice, went to Toulouse and directly 
approached members of the Deuxième Bureau in Toulouse, informing agents there that 
they wanted to ‘get to England to fight for General de Gaulle’82 Incredibly, these agents 
directed Morton and his French companion to a priest who could help them cross the 
Pyrenees. In this respect, not only were members of the Deuxième Bureau in 
Chateauroux willing to allow Morton and his French companion to continue their 
journey through unoccupied France but they were confident in recommending the 
assistance of the Deuxième Bureau in Toulouse.  
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While Morton’s experience may have been a singular case, it does lend support to 
Dominique Veillon’s position, referred to earlier in this chapter, that anti-German 
activities were often carried out with the tacit knowledge of superiors.83 While Veillon’s 
observations referred to the French Armistice army, this principle is also applicable to 
the French secret services. In Morton’s case, given the open nature of his encounter with 
the Deuxième Bureau, it is doubtful that this would have gone unnoticed by superior 
officers. Arguably, instructions given to him in Chateauroux on how to contact the 
Deuxième Bureau in Toulouse appear quite informal. Agents there told him to get in 
touch with the Deuxième Bureau ‘through the barracks there’.84 Essentially, from 
Morton’s account it would seem that he would make contact with the Deuxième Bureau 
by openly approaching an army barracks and asking to be pointed in the right direction. 
Given the open nature of these enquires it is unlikely that superior officers remained 
unaware of the situation. 
 
Morton was not alone in his encounters with French secret intelligence. Furthermore, 
other accounts provide more direct evidence of the involvement of senior intelligence 
agents in British escape activities. A particular relevant illustration of the level of 
involvement of secret service agents and their superiors is the case of Lieutenant 
Richard Broad. Broad’s escape from the Occupied Zone with seven British servicemen 
has been discussed at various points in this thesis, however, in the context of this 
chapter, the connections he established within the French secret services come under 
scrutiny. 
 
Broad’s journey to the Unoccupied Zone was facilitated by French secret service agent 
Pierre d’Harcourt. Contact with d’Harcourt had been established through Broad’s 
French helpers but in order to give assistance to Broad and his men, d’Harcourt had to 
clear it with his superiors.85 D’Harcourt, based in Paris, worked for the Cinquième 
Bureau under Major d’Autrevaux.86 Information was passed to the Cinquième Bureau in 
Vichy. Given that the primary concern of the Cinquième Bureau was intelligence 
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gathering adding extra risk by aiding escapees was a serious concern. Nevertheless, as 
Broad’s biographer pointed out, French men like d’Harcourt were ‘desperate to do 
something’. 87  Whatever the actual circumstances, Moore noted that approval for 
d’Harcourt’s scheme to take Broad and his men across the demarcation line came from 
his superior, d’Autrevaux. D’Harcourt’s autobiography lacks details in relation to the 
help he rendered to the servicemen and therefore it is difficult to corroborate Moore’s 
claim. Moore’s source of information, which presumably came from Broad is not clear 
nor is it clear if Broad met d’Autrevaux or received this information second hand. Yet 
there is no reason to doubt Moore’s claim as undertaking such as a task required 
d’Harcourt’s departure from Paris and this, given the nature of his intelligence work, 
would require an explanation. 
 
On crossing the demarcation line, d’Harcourt met Broad in Marseilles and introduced 
him to his connections in Vichy. These connections included Raoul Beaumaine, a 
member of the Cinquième Bureau and d’Harcourt’s superior. Beaumaine had already 
been in contact with a British escapee, Lieutenant James Langley, during Langley’s 
time with the American Consul in Lyon (see chapter three) and he had attempted to 
assist Langley’s companion to Switzerland.88 Furthermore, it would appear that Broad 
also made connections with Colonel Leon Simoneau, a senior figure in the Cinquième 
Bureau. This is not referred to in Broad’s contemporary escape report but during 
Moore’s research for his book on Broad’s escape Moore received a letter from 
Simoneau. In his synopsis of this letter Moore writes 
 
He [Simoneau] remembers providing facilities (e.g. identity cards) for Pierre 
d’Harcourt and, in particular, putting him in touch with Commandant Jonglez de 
Ligne, head of the counter-espionage service in Marseilles.89 
 
The provision of identity cards is confirmed in Broad’s contemporary account. 
However, it is impossible to confirm Simoneau’s claim in relation to Commandant 
Jonglez de Ligne, the head of the counter-espionage in Marseilles. There is no evidence 
that this connection was followed up by Broad or other escape organisers in Marseilles 
at the time such as Murchie and Garrow. In a letter to the British ambassador in Spain, 
Sir Samuel Hoare, Murchie claimed a highly-placed official in Marseilles knew of his 
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activities and attempted to protect him.90 Yet, as Murchie provided no further details, it 
is impossible to ascertain if this official was Commandant Jonglez de Ligne. 
 
In spite of these missing gaps, it can be established that highly-placed officials in 
Cinquième Bureau knew about British escape activities and the participation of their 
agents in such activities. Broad’s account gives some insight into the reasons behind the 
interest of these officials in connecting with British escapees. According to Broad, one 
intelligence agent complained that 
 
There was now absolutely no co-operation between the British and French 
Intelligence services and he was most anxious that this should be renewed. If I 
would help he was prepared to give me identity papers of a French Canadian.91 
 
Moore’s biography also illustrates this point and expands on Broad’s impressions of his 
encounter with French intelligence. The ‘pro-British element’ of Vichy was willing to 
employ Broad but ‘had no particular interest in the fate of his men’.92 Moore also claims 
that before meeting Broad, d’Harcourt had high hopes Broad might prove useful in 
aiding his superiors to establish firmer connections with British intelligence.93 In this 
respect, Moore noted, d’Harcourt was disappointed but it is possible in making these 
assertions that Moore may have overextended his claims. D’Harcourt’s autobiography 
does not indicate that he entertained any hopes of recruiting Broad, only stating that he 
agreed to help Broad as a personal favour to an acquaintance.94 
 
However, while Broad received a false identity card,  the seven men (all rank and file) 
he crossed into the Unoccupied Zone with did not. All were detained in St Hippolyte du 
Fort and no attempts were made by the Cinquième Bureau to assist them. These actions, 
perhaps, give credibility to Moore’s argument that the Bureau’s intention was not to 
assist an escape but to recruit Broad’s services. Yet while French intelligence expected 
Broad to work with them, Broad personally had no intention of doing so. Instead he 
used his position to successfully plan his escape and that of his men as an indirect result 
of his interaction with the French secret services. Using identity papers provided by the 
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Cinquième Bureau, Broad went to St Hippolyte du Fort to make arrangements with his 
men, plan their escape from the fort and their journey to the Pyrenees. In fact, Broad 
arranged the escape of twelve men from the camp, successfully reaching Spain on the 
17 February 1941. Broad’s priority was on reaching Spain and although benefitting 
from the perks of his French intelligence connections he does not appear to have 
engaged in intelligence work. Interestingly, Broad may have been unwilling to work 
with French intelligence but Pierre d’Harcourt appears to have introduced another 
member of the Cinquième Bureau, André Postel-Vinay to escape organisers in 
Marseilles until his arrest by the Germans in December 1941.95 Based in Paris, Postel-
Vinay, along with his intelligence work, assisted in British escape activities. In this 
regard, the involvement of Cinquième Bureau agents such as d’Harcourt illustrates the 
admittedly small but nonetheless direct contribution of the Bureau in extending escape 
activities.  
 
Equally, Broad’s relationship with French intelligence had a direct impact on British 
escape activities in unoccupied France. In addition to receiving personal identity papers, 
Broad also obtained passes compliments of the Cinquième Bureau for British escape 
organisers, Captain Charles Murchie and Captain Ian Garrow.96 As both men did not 
move to St Hippolyte with British internees in Fort St Jean, Murchie and Garrow were 
living illegally in Marseilles and in danger of arrest. These passes allowed them to 
remain in the city. However, while these passes eased concerns of arrest in the short 
term, it is difficult to assess their longer-term impact. They needed to be renewed 
monthly which meant approaching the French authorities. Given the nature of the work 
carried out by Murchie and Garrow, this was not possible. 
 
In point of fact, neither Murchie nor Garrow refer to these papers in the available 
accounts of their activities in Marseilles. Moreover, as noted earlier, Murchie, despite 
claiming he was protected by a French official, was continually harassed by French 
authorities in Marseilles.97 These experiences ranked high on Murchie’s reasons for 
departing France in April 1941. Therefore, although Broad may have obtained passes 
from the Cinquième Bureau for Murchie and Garrow, their value was limited. Not only 
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did both men have to depend on French authorities to renew the visas in order to stay in 
Marseilles but even with the passes Murchie and Garrow still needed to keep a low 
profile and as Murchie suggests they continued to be vulnerable to arrest. 
 
This continued vulnerability to arrest conveys the difficulties facing escape organisers 
and helpers. Receiving help from Vichy secret services did not necessarily guarantee 
safety. This was particularly evident in July 1941 when a number of helpers attending a 
meeting at the Hotel de Noailles were arrested by French police. Among the arrested 
was helper Elizabeth Haden Guest and one of the main organisers, Pat O’Leary (who 
had at that time been with the organisation for just one month). O’Leary successfully 
talked his way out of the situation but Guest was taken into custody and charged. In her 
autobiography, Guest noted that the police who approached her identified themselves as 
‘B.M.A.’98 or Bureaux for Anti-National Affairs. The Cinquième Bureau set up the 
B.M.A and therefore, the B.M.A actions were carried out under the auspices of the 
Bureau. This incident, preceded as it was by previous assistance to British officers, adds 
a layer of complexity to the relationship between escape organisers and the French 
secret services. 
 
In attempting to understand these arrests, it is necessary to draw on the work of Kitson 
who, as noted earlier in this chapter, argued that in order to maintain the veneer of 
French sovereignty agents of the Cinquième Bureau were just as likely to arrest Allied 
as well as Axis agents working in unoccupied France. Efforts to clamp down on 
espionage may go some way to explaining the sudden arrests in July 1941. There is 
evidence to suggest that as early as January 1941 Garrow was gathering intelligence.99 
The French were well aware of this and given that French intelligence was keen to 
curtail the activities of both Axis and Allied intelligence agents operating in unoccupied 
France, it could be argued that this prompted Garrow’s arrest.  Yet there are problems 
with putting these arrests down to French efforts to clamp down on Garrow’s activities. 
Garrow’s activities had been indulged by the Cinquième Bureau; according to Kitson, 
on one occasion Garrow passed on information concerning a German spy active in a 
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resistance network to the Cinquième Bureau.100 Given this degree of co-operation it is 
unlikely that the French acted on their own initiative in making these arrests.  
 
What is likely is that German or Italian pressure lay behind these sudden arrests. 
According to an escape report written in December 1940, Hotel Noailles was the home 
of the Italian Armistice Commission.101 Whether this was the case at the time of the 
July meeting is unlikely but it appears foolhardy to call a meeting at a hotel known to 
the Italian Armistice Commission, a place where as a result of the Commission’s time 
there, members had most likely established connections. Interestingly, Guest suspected 
one of the hotel’s concierge of tipping off the authorities. Given the connections at the 
hotel and possible links to members of the Italian Armistice Commission, it may have 
been prudent for the authorities to make the arrest. Pressure on French authorities is 
reinforced by Guest’s account of the incident. According to Guest, after being taken to 
Fort St Nicholas for interrogation, two officers informed her that it was ‘vital’ to locate 
Captain Ian Garrow in order to warn him of his ‘imminent arrest’.102 On failing to gain 
information from Guest on his whereabouts the interrogating officers asserted that, ‘No 
Frenchmen betrayed you, no Greek, nobody but one of your own’.103 This may have 
been a ruse, and a poor one at that, to gain information on Garrow’s whereabouts. 
However, it is also possible, considering the French authorities were aware of Garrow’s 
activities and had held back from arresting him, that members of the Cinquième Bureau 
involved in the arrest of Guest did seek to warn Garrow. If this was the case, then it is 
likely that the French authorities were forced to act as a result of a betrayal. And yet this 
is also a problematic assessment. On the one hand the French secret services inform 
Guest of their desire to warn Garrow and followed this up with the release of three 
arrested helpers; at the same time, others including Guest were charged with aiding 
British escapees.  
 
These incidents make it difficult to ascertain the position of the French secret services in 
relation to escape activities. Questions arise such as: Were these arrests the result of 
German pressure and a betrayal? If so, in making these arrests were the French secret 
                                                            
100 Kitson, The hunt for Nazi spies, p. 77. 
101 Account of escape of 56146 Capt. Mills, C.F.P., 97th Kent Yeomanry Field Regiment, Attd. 1st R.H.A 
50th Div., 31 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300). 
102 Furse and Barr, Dream weaver, p. 122. 
103 Ibid., p.123. 
207 
 
services seeking to shield the main players involved in escape activities? Or, were these 
arrests the result of a French initiative? In this respect, the involvement of members of 
the Cinquième Bureau in escape activities, and as demonstrated in some cases with the 
implicit approval of superiors, did not guarantee protection and safety from arrest, even 
in the Unoccupied Zone. This was exemplified with Garrow, who, in spite of the fact 
that he had previously provided information to the Cinquième Bureau, was arrested in 
October 1941 (discussed in more detail later in this chapter).  
 
Yet there were incidences where the French secret services appear to have taken action 
to protect those engaged in escape activities. One case of particular interest in this 
respect is, that of Sergeant Harold Cole. Cole had been working for Murchie and 
Garrow since early 1941 guiding escapees from Lille to Marseilles. In addition to this 
work, Cole also helped extend the organisation in the north and numbered among his 
connections there, Cinquième Bureau agent André Postel Vinay who was introduced to 
British escape activities by Pierre d’Harcourt104 and another Deuxième Bureau agent 
identified as Commandant Bernaerd. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1941, 
suspicion of Cole’s motivation increased,  and it soon came to Garrow and O’Leary’s 
attention that Cole was using money given to him by Garrow to bankroll a high 
lifestyle. Considered a threat to those engaging in escape activities, Cole was confronted 
in Marseilles in October 1941 but managed to escape returning to Lille where he was 
arrested by the Germans. 
 
Shortly after Cole’s arrest, helpers in the Forbidden and Occupied Zone were also 
arrested including, on the 13 December 1941, the Cinquième Bureau agent Postel 
Vinay. These betrayals were engineered by Cole who was personally involved in a 
number of these arrests.105 There has been much speculation on when exactly Cole first 
betrayed the organisation. It is interesting to note that autobiographies of various helpers 
refer to their immediate distrust of Cole and one of Cole’s biographers, Brendan 
Murphy, suggests that Cole was most likely working for the Germans yet there remains 
no concrete evidence as to exactly when Cole became an informant.106  Equally, 
speculation on Cole’s activities has centred on attempts to establish the number of 
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helpers Cole betrayed. While this discussion is important it is not relevant to the subject 
matter of this chapter. Instead, in relation to the Cole case, the focal point is the reaction 
of the Vichy authorities to the betrayal and their efforts to curtail Cole’s activities. This 
was evident in June 1942 when Cole on crossing the demarcation line was arrested by 
Vichy police. Cole was accompanied by his wife Suzanne Warenghem who was also 
arrested. There is much speculation as to the reasons behind Cole’s arrest and Murphy, 
in his biography on Cole noted that the French secret services most likely arrested Cole 
as a German spy. This point, when taking into account Kitson’s work on the French 
Secret Services, is a logical conclusion. Murphy’s research, however, lacked the benefit 
of Cole and Warenghem’s contemporary interrogation statements provided by the 
French to the British after the war which reveal not only details of Cole’s activities but 
also the primary concerns of officials interrogating him.  
 
An examination of two statements taken from Cole during his interrogation by French 
officials indicate that the primary concern of the French authorities was not his work 
with the British escape organisation in the Unoccupied Zone but his dealings with the 
Germans in the Occupied Zone. Following his arrest in June 1942, Cole was 
interrogated on the 9 June 1942 by George Stemart, the Commissioner of Police of the 
City of Lyon, Judicial Police and Assistant to the Public Prosecutor.107 Cole provided a 
relatively superficial and cautious account of his affairs. On the subject of his arrest by 
the Germans he does not mention giving away any names blaming an acquaintance for 
feeding information to the Germans. The interesting aspect of Cole’s statement relates 
to the nature of French questioning. The first questions put to Cole referred to 
individuals Cole was believed to have betrayed to the Germans. This included a direct 
question in relation to Cinquième Bureau agent Postel-Vinay and Deuxième Bureau 
agent Commandant Bernaerd. Cole had given both names to the Germans but the latter, 
Bernard, had managed to avoid arrest.108 In response to this, Cole denied knowing 
Postel Vinay. In relation to Commandant Bernaerd he admitted working with him 
against the Germans but gave no indication he betrayed him. In this interview, Cole 
does not appear to have been pushed on any particular point and avoided directly 
implicating himself in providing names to the Germans.  
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This is not the case in the follow-up interrogation, dated 12 June 1942. In the three day 
period between the first interrogation and the one on the 12 June, it appears that Cole 
confessed to working with the Germans, even claiming to be a German agent. It is not 
clear why he did this but this confession shaped the direction of this interrogation. 
Having admitted to providing the Germans with information, establishing who was 
betrayed became one of the focal points of interrogation. In fact, the first demand put to 
Cole was the following: 
 
Give us the names of the members of this organisation [Garrow’s escape network] 
which you divulged to the Gestapo?109 
 
This interest was followed up by a demand for the names of individuals working with 
the Gestapo. The rest of the interrogation was dominated by Cole’s time with the 
Gestapo and obtaining the names of Gestapo agents. 
 
Cole provided cursory information on British escape activities but the interrogation 
report suggests that this was of little interest to the authorities. Rarely was Cole asked to 
expand on the activities of the escape organisation. However, the authorities did push 
Cole in relation to German knowledge of these activites. Interrogators continued to 
return to this point and this line of questioning. In light of this, it would appear that 
French interest lay not in the activities of the escape organisation but what the Germans 
knew about such activities and the individuals involved. 
 
This is reinforced in a rather extraordinary letter Cole wrote to the Commissaire de 
Police dated 15 June 1942 in which he pleaded his case. Cole wrote in relation to his 
interrogation 
 
I did not tell them [the police] the truth because I was with my wife (who did not 
know of my activities until my arrest), and I was afraid that I should be re-
conducted to the Line of Demarkation and handed over to the German authorities. I 
now believe that you (Vichy) are contre [against] the Reich and have now told the 
truth. My desire is to work as much against the Germans as I did when I was a 
good soldier.110 
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In sending such a letter Cole was acting upon impressions he received during his 
interrogation. This emerges in various points during his interrogation where he made 
various claims from being a British intelligence agent which involved on one occasion 
in 1930s acting as a bodyguard to ‘Mrs Simpson, the wife of the Prince of Wales’ to 
also claiming he was a German officer working with the Armistice Commission.111 This 
letter was part of another attempt made by Cole to gain support for his position yet it is 
significant in illustrating that at this point in time, after Cole had admitted his guilt and 
the main points of his statements had been clarified, Cole felt it expedient to gain favour 
for his position by recognising Vichy as ‘contre Reich’ and express a desire ‘to work 
against the Germans’. 
 
Although Cole’s interrogators overlooked his involvement in escape activities, focusing 
instead on his work with the Germans and recognising a ‘contre Reich’ sentiment 
throughout his interrogation, this was not necessarily to protect those involved in British 
escape activities. Arguably, Cole’s betrayals had a direct impact on the French Secret 
Services, notably the Cinquième Bureau. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that Cole’s 
initial arrest was personal. On crossing the demarcation line, Cole’s wife Suzanne 
Warenghem, unaware of her husband’s activities, persuaded him to visit an 
acquaintance in Lyon, Captain Biche.112 Warenghem, in a statement given to British 
authorities in 1944, noted that she believed Biche to be behind the arrest. Murphy’s 
research also identifies Biche as one of the men behind the arrest but apart from stating 
he was a Vichy official does not provide background information on him. Biche, 
according to Warenghem, was a friend of the Cinquième Bureau agent denounced by 
Cole, André Postel Vinay.  
 
In addition to this, Cole’s relationship with Deuxième Bureau agent, Commandant 
Bernaerd, was also a concern. Substantial parts of the interrogation focused on 
Bernaerd. According to Cole’s statement the Germans had informed Cole that it was 
‘most important that this man should be arrested’.113 Cole, not knowing Bernaerd’s 
address, provided details of one of his acquaintances who was arrested. Cole also told 
French interrogators that the Germans considered Bernaerd a ‘very important 
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personage’114 and that he was ‘possibly, in view of his position … protected by French 
police.115 After Cole outlined his dealings with Bernaerd, Cole’s interrogators returned 
to him on two more occasions. In light of the interrogations focus on gaining as much 
intelligence as possible on German agents and information passed on to the Germans by 
Cole, the Cinquième Bureau had powerful motivations for arresting Cole. 
 
In this respect, it is a gross overstatement to argue that Cole was arrested to protect 
British escape activities. This was not the case. Cole’s work with the Germans had 
threatened the Cinquième Bureau and Cole’s arrest was an attempt to reduce that threat, 
preventing him from falling into German hands again. Cole’s actions, and perhaps 
potential to cause future damage if in German hands, were taken seriously by the 
French, seriously enough that he was tried and sentenced to death, albeit a sentence 
which was ultimately never carried out. 
 
However, Cole’s arrest did potentially benefit helpers engaged in escape activities and 
not yet betrayed by Cole. The possibility of future betrayals was not lost on escape 
organisers and plans, according to researchers Brome and Murphy, had been laid to kill 
Cole before his arrest by French police.116 Moreover, French response to Cole’s betrayal 
highlighted British sympathies in French secret services which in turn had a favourable 
impact on individuals engaged in escape activities. This is particularly evident in French 
treatment of Cole’s wife, Suzanne Warenghem. Warenghem who was at that time 
pregnant was also unaware of her husband’s betrayal. Cole’s statement exonerated her 
from all involved with the Germans. In order to convince Warenghem of her husband’s 
betrayal, the interrogators confronted her with Cole. In doing so, the French authorities 
also informed Warenghem that Cole 
 
Had already denounced her to the Germans and that he was to have met certain 
Germans at Lyon who would most certainly have had her arrested.117 
 
While it is difficult to ascertain with any certainty, if this assertion is correct 
Warrenghem’s arrest by the French secret services may have spared her this fate.  
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In fact, Warrenghem’s experiences with the French secret services offer an interesting 
point of contrast with that of Cole. As was the case with Cole, Warrenghem also faced a 
trial but she was ‘questioned very little’118 and acquitted of all charges and released. 
Furthermore, on her release Captain Biche, the man behind Cole’s arrest, found her a 
room in a hotel and according to Warenghem  
 
The 2eme Bureau provided her with legal identity documents in her own name. She 
was able to keep herself for the time being as Cole have given her Frs 10,000 at the 
time of their arrest which was refunded to her after her acquittal.119 
 
Moreover, the Bureau forbade her to return to the Occupied Zone as she ‘would 
certainly be arrested there’.120 This was in spite of the fact that Warenghem was known 
to the Germans and had during her interrogations with the French confessed and 
provided details of her involvement in British escape activities. 
 
This was not the only incident where individuals detained or arrested for helping British 
escapees appear to have received favourable treatment. Guest, whose arrest in July 1941 
was referred to earlier, was also released on grounds that merit further research. 
According to Guest, Garrow contacted a Vichy official Captain Dutour and arranged to 
present himself in Dutour's office signing a document clearing Guest of any 
involvement in escape activities, in return for a two hour period to allow Garrow to get 
away.121 Guest claims Dutour, whom she knew personally, agreed and that everything 
appeared to be going to plan until Garrow left the Fort and was arrested. Interestingly, 
Guest did not doubt Dutour’s integrity and instead of blaming him for the arrest laid 
blame on ‘one of his clerks’ who must have been ‘in the pay of the Germans and had 
betrayed the agreement’.122 However, shortly after this event Guest was released. 
Recognising that there was much speculation surrounding her release and that some 
attributed it to giving away names or the interference of the American Consulate, Guest 
wrote,  
 
I remember what Ian Garrow signed about me, and I believe that his statement 
allowed Dutour to release me, as Dutour wanted.123 




121 Furse and Barr, Dream weaver, p. 136. 
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This is speculation on Guest’s part but it does not take from the fact that she was 
released, and if what she states was true, it was on the word of a man wanted by the 
Vichy and German authorities.  
 
Garrow’s arrest and subsequent sentence also merits some consideration. The French 
authorities knew of his involvement in escape activities and of his working for British 
intelligence. As French intelligence acted against both German and British agents 
operating in unoccupied France, Garrow’s arrest is not that unusual. Nevertheless, when 
Garrow’s sentence of ten years is compared with that of Cole who received the death 
penalty for working against the external security of the state, there are further 
indications of a certain implicit sympathy for the British war effort. Reverend Donald 
Caskie’s arrest and two-year prison sentence for connections with British intelligence 
and aiding escape activities, is a further example of the lenient approach taken by the 
French authorities. Moreover, Caskie did not serve his sentence. Instead, he received 
probation and was required to leave Marseilles which he promptly did.124 Taking up 
residence in Grenoble, Caskie continued to visit British military personnel interned in 
the Unoccupied Zone.  
 
The treatment of individuals such as Warenghem, Guest and Caskie suggests that the 
Vichy authorities, or more particularly French intelligence, exercised considerable 
flexibility and discretion in relation to their dealing with individuals engaged in escape 
activities. More importantly, the willingness on the part of French intelligence to turn a 
blind eye to individuals engaged in escape activities was crucial to the emergence of the 
British-led escape organisation in Marseilles. While French intelligence was not 
engaged in assisting escape activities, apart from a small number of intelligence agents 
such as d’Harcourt, the willingness to tolerate such activities once they remained low- 
key allowed the organisation to expand and develop not only in the Unoccupied Zone 
but also in the Occupied and Forbidden Zone.  
 
The final testimony to the importance of the Unoccupied Zone in the protraction of 
escape activities 1940-42 is illustrated when the vestiges of Vichy independence 
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dissolved with the German occupation in November 1942. Within three months of the 
occupation of the Unoccupied Zone most of the major organisers working for the 
British-led escape organisation had been arrested and the organisation, except for a 
small rump section in Toulouse that still retained contact with guides in the Pyrenees, 
had been all but dissolved. Significantly, the initiative to stem British escape activities, 
including those in the Unoccupied Zone, came not from the French but the Germans. A 
French man working for the Germans, Roger Le Neveu established an acquaintance 
with Louis Nouveau, one of the leading French figures in the organisation. Nouveau had 
recently moved to Paris from Marseilles where he met Le Neveu. As Le Neveu’s 
credentials checked out, Nouveau engaged him in escape activities. Le Neveu relatively 
quickly orchestrated Nouveau’s arrest and, supported by the Germans, travelled 
unimpeded to the Unoccupied Zone where he made contact with O’Leary along with 
other helpers in Toulouse in March 1943.125 All were arrested by men O’Leary 
identified as Gestapo.126 
 
M.R.D. Foot pointed out that a number of arrests and Le Neveu’s betrayals effectively 
decimated the British-led escape organisation. In order to provide further insight into 
Foot’s synopsis of the situation, it is necessary to point out that Le Neveu’s ability to 
cross the demarcation line and organise the arrests of members of the organisation there 
without any apparent difficulty was facilitated by the German presence in the former 
Unoccupied Zone. Before November 1942, the Germans had to act through the French 
authorities, which in light of the evidence presented in this chapter, was not necessarily 
a reliable means of keeping a check on escape activities. 
 
Furthermore, after the initial occupation in November 1942 there is evidence to suggest 
that a number of French intelligence agents sought to warn and protect individuals 
involved in escape activities either by providing a direct warning of danger of arrest or 
by keeping files back from the German authorities. The first example is reported by 
Vincent Brome, O’Leary’s biographer. Brome noted that Louis Nouveau’s departure 
from Marseilles to Paris was the result of a tip off. As Brome writes, 
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Towards the end of 1942 two agents indicated that Louis Nouveau’s name might 
be known to the Gestapo headquarters in Marseilles.127 
 
The identity of these ‘two agents’ remains unknown but apparently these agents had 
access to intelligence from the Gestapo headquarters and used this information to tip off 
the escape organisations leadership in order to avoid arrest. 
 
The second indication of intelligence officers protecting individuals involved in escape 
activities is suggested by Suzanne Warenghem. Warenghem, in a statement given to the 
British, indicated that French intelligence held back or destroyed information on her 
activities following the occupation of the Unoccupied Zone. When Warenghem was 
released from French custody after her acquittal she remained in contact with a British 
prisoner, Lieutenant Shepherd. Two months after the German occupation, Warenghem 
attempted to visit Shepherd in prison but was denied access. Coincidentally, Shepherd 
escaped the following day. As Warenghem had tried to visit Shepherd suspicion 
immediately fell on her. Yet her interview with police Warenghem assumed that the 
‘police knew all about her previous activities’.128 This was not the case.  This raises the 
question as to what exactly happened to Warenghem’s files and why the authorities had 
no record of her prior serious charge, namely, a threat to the external security of the 
state. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Warenghem suspected that on her arrest 
and detention in Castres prison, the French authorities were careful to keep her from 
falling into the hands of the Germans. According to Warenghem, she believed Castres 
prison was for those the ‘French did not wish to fall into the hands of the Germans’.129 
 
At this point and time, there is no evidence to corroborate the veracity of Warenghem’s 
claim in relation to Castres prison. The case for Castres prison rests on Warenghem’s 
testimony yet it may be relevant to point out that at this time a key figure in the 
Cinquième Bureau, Robert Terres, was remanded in Castres on suspicion of 
collaborating with the Germans. Terres was arrested by the Germans following their 
invasion in November but was released soon after, an event which gave rise to these 
suspicions. Terres was later re-arrested and this time by the French. This appears a 
bizarre set of events but it is in keeping with research undertaken by Simon Kitson. 
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Kitson noted that up to the summer of 1941 the French had moved individuals they 
intended to keep out of German hands to North Africa. The Germans put an end to this 
practice but, according to Kitson, the 
 
French authorities continued to keep certain places of internment secret. This was 
the case with a section of the Castres prison in the southwest of France.130 
 
This adds credibility to Warenghem’s claim that during her time there Castres remain 
was still used as a prison to hold individuals in whom the French had a particular 
interest in and did not want to fall into German hands. Interestingly, on the 16 
September 1942, a number of individuals took over Castres prison and escaped. Among 
the escapees were Warenghem and Robert Terres.131 Details surrounding the escape are 
sketchy. Warenghem reported that a fellow prisoner, a Yugoslav, informed her that the 
prison was in the hands of the prisoners for two hours. Terres identified one of the 
organisers as a Yugoslav prisoner.132 Beyond this, little is known of this particular 
escape and more importantly, if the authorities were complicit. 
 
The exact nature of the Castres breakout remains one of the unanswered questions 
surrounding the clandestine world of escape activities. Yet in spite of some efforts made 
by individual French intelligence agents to protect civilians like Warenghem, it must be 
recognised that this was the exception rather than the norm. The invasion of the 
Unoccupied Zone in 1942 had huge ramifications for helpers who were now dealing 
with the German rather than the French authorities. The danger of these activities 
shifted and increased from French internment to German concentration camps.  
 
Throughout 1940-42, the French military authorities continued to pursue an internment 
policy that implicitly favoured the British. This support not only benefitted the British 
in terms of lenient internment conditions but was also witnessed in the tacit approval for 
British escape efforts. In many ways, although the military authorities were responsible 
for interning the British, little was done to stem escape activities. Escapees often went 
unpunished or received minimal penalties and the camp authorities neglected for some 
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time to impose basic security measures. In this way, the French authorities contributed 
to the promotion of an escaping culture. 
 
This is not to argue that in doing so the French military authorities sought to challenge 
Vichy. On the contrary, camp officials continued to maintain camp routines, 
inspections, minimal security measures and a determination not to actively engage in 
escape activity which all suggests loyalty to Vichy. Efforts to pursue a lenient policy 
towards the British were more anti-German than anti-Vichy. It is only with the German 
occupation of the Unoccupied Zone in November 1942 and with it the last illusions of 
Vichy independence that guards and their superior officers engaged in escape activities. 
 
Equally, the French secret services, notably the Cinquième Bureau, engaged in assisting 
British escape activities. Yet this help was far from altruistic. The goal of the 
Cinquième Bureau was often at odds with that of men engaged in escape activities, with 
secret service agents keen to establish their ends. However, the Cinquième Bureau, 
although knowing of the whereabouts and activities of men like Garrow and Murchie, 
turned a blind eye to their actions, allowing them to remain at large for a considerable 
period of time and to continue their work. Moreover, some members of the Cinquième 
Bureau including Pierre d’Harcourt and André Postel Vinay undertook considerable risk 
to help the British. In Vinay’s case, he was betrayed by a British helper, Sergeant 
Harold Cole, and arrested by the Germans. 
 
Harold Cole’s arrest by French intelligence when he crossed the demarcation line in 
June 1942 also worked to the advantage of the British-led escape organisation. The 
arrest prevented Cole falling back into German hands (until the Germans occupied all of 
France in November 1942) and from giving away more members of the organisation. 
French intelligence may have been interested in Cole for his betrayal of some of their 
members but his arrest showed the crucial importance of the Unoccupied Zone in 
relation to British escape activities. Cole’s trial illustrated that the priority of French 
intelligence was not preventing escape activities but curtailing espionage. Cole’s death 
sentence indicated the seriousness with which the French considered the charges against 
him. In contrast, his wife, Suzanne Warenghem, was released in spite of her admission 
that she had helped British servicemen to escape. Lenient sentences for those engaged in 
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such activities were witnessed in other cases such as those of Reverend Donald Caskie 
and Elizabeth Haden Guest. 
 
The importance of the Unoccupied Zone in relation to escape activities was acutely 
realised in November 1942. The German invasion meant that German authorities 
investigating escape activities no longer had to run their investigations in the 
Unoccupied Zone through the French authorities. The Cinquième Bureau’s willingness 
to turn a blind eye to such activities no longer offered any degree of protection as the 
German authorities could now openly investigate escape activities in both zones and 
arrest French helpers in the former Unoccupied Zone. This was exactly what happened 
and when a traitor was introduced into the organisation in Paris, the German authorities 
could trace his activities and make the relevant arrests all the way to Toulouse, an action 
which had eluded them prior to November 1942. Within months of the occupation the 






The emergence and protraction of the British-led escape organisation, known after the 
war as the ‘Pat Line’, relied on both the organisational ability of British officers and the 
willing participation of civilians. This is particularly evident in the north of France in 
regions such as Pas de Calais which had high concentrations of British soldiers left 
behind after the evacuations of Dunkirk. In these areas British soldiers became a focal 
point of resistance. Initially, the first acts of resistance were spontaneous and relatively 
passive such as gestures of kindness to British prisoners marching to prison camps 
following the defeat of France. Yet these gestures of kindness could, and did, lead to 
more committed acts of resistance with British prisoners assisted in escaping these 
marching columns. Those who did so and successfully remained at large, making their 
way to the Unoccupied Zone, were sustained by individuals they met along the way. 
 
As the occupation took root and British prisoners were no longer as visible to the 
French public, the continued British presence in the war against Germany acted as a 
galvanising force for individuals seeking to engage in anti-German activities. Resistance 
propaganda and early newspapers counteracted the collaborationist press and defended 
British actions, on occasion directly contradicting claims made in German-controlled 
newspapers. German destruction of monuments commemorating individuals who hid 
Allied soldiers in the First World War also drew public attention, generating a muted 
but equally pointed response. German targeting of these monuments indicates the power 
of these traditions. Indeed, some of the first civilians engaged in hiding British soldiers 
such as the Widow Samiez had been reportedly involved in similar activities during the 
First World War.1 
 
The influence of the First World War was also evident in the influence of the marraine 
de guerre movement. This movement was primarily philanthropic but equally some 
civilians used philanthropy to connect with wounded British prisoners. While these 
connections could be relatively innocent, for others connecting with British prisoners 
acted as a gateway into more committed resistance. Supplying food gave way to 
providing clothes or other necessities to assist a prisoner escape. In some cases, safe 
houses were provided and in this way marraines often acted as a gateway into a local 
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community and a wider support network. This conscious action later led to actively 
aiding escape. Equally, in other cases aid workers, such as Red Cross agents, through 
the course of their work, encountered British soldiers in hiding and rather than report 
their presence supported those hiding them. In these incidences, aid workers may not 
have consciously sought out the presence of British soldiers but by choosing to help 
members of the community in their endeavours to support these men were equally 
complicit in early anti-German activities. 
 
This is not to argue that all marraines or Red Cross workers engaged in resistance but 
that some civilians seeking to connect with the British took on philanthropic roles in 
order to fulfil this purpose. Yet at the same, in the Forbidden and Occupied Zone, 
philanthropy appears to have been an important means by which civilians connected 
with the British. Tracing connections is often overlooked in the current historiography 
but it is crucial in order to best understand how early improvised escape organisations 
developed. Connections established within the first months of occupation between 
civilians and British officers such as Captain Charles Murchie laid the ground work for 
the emergence of the British-led organisation, later known as the ‘Pat Line’. Murchie, in 
his arrival in Marseilles, retained his connections in the Pas de Calais region and 
through these pre-existing contacts managed to extent the influence of British escape 
activities in the Unoccupied Zone into the Forbidden Zone.2 
 
This research indicates the importance of these early connections. In fact, resistance as a 
whole needs to take into account the early connections and responses to occupation in 
order to better appreciate the development of escape organisations and other resistance 
networks. In the case of escape, connections were the key component to moving an 
escapee beyond one’s locality and assisting these men to safety. Focusing on these early 
connections makes it possible to see not only how the local families responded to the 
situation but also how the family in turn interacted with the local community. 
Individuals approached by escapees actively sought out other members of the 
community to assist them. Families hiding these men needed help to pass them on. In 
the cases discussed in this thesis, Red Cross workers, school teachers, doctors and 
                                                            
2 Statement by Capt. C.P. Murchie, R.A.S.C. (Headquarters, E.F.I., Arras), 10 Mar. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3308) & Account of escape of 939118 A/Sgt/ Interpreter Clayton, H.K., Air Ministry Works 
Area No.1 (France) R.A.F., 13 Mar. 1942 (N.A., WO208/3308). 
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priests were pivotal in assisting helpers move men outside the community into safe 
houses elsewhere, often in bigger cities.3 
 
This thesis has highlighted that in many cases poorer farmers and workers were the first 
point of contact for escapees. At the same time, it is interesting to note that members of 
the middle class came to occupy positions of leadership in local escape organisations 
and ultimately the ‘Pat Line’. By tracing how connections were made, this research 
argued that poorer farmers and the working class recruited this leadership. As first point 
of contact, poorer farmers identified leaders within their community and individuals in 
positions of trust such as priests, doctors and school teachers. Viewed from this 
perspective, not only were peasants and working class individuals acting as a gateway 
into the community but they were also key to identifying and selecting certain 
trustworthy individuals to participate in escape activities. Effectively, this research 
indicates that peasants and working class were crucial in shaping the structure and 
development of early improvised escape organisations. 
 
In this respect, while class may not have determined if an individual engaged in escape 
activity or not, it could and did determine how an individual became involved and their 
role within these early improvised escape organisations. In stating the above, it must 
also be recognised that while this research has begun the process of examining this 
issue, more research is needed to establish the scope of the impact of class on escape 
organisations. Yet such research would face a number of difficulties. For instance, there 
are relatively few autobiographies written by peasants or working class individuals 
involved in these early escape activities. Most autobiographies were written by those 
belonging to the middleclass. Thus, there is a missing voice in relation to the study of 
escape organisation. In the context of this thesis, this ‘missing voice’ has been filled in 
part by the contemporary escape reports and the War Office records. While the escape 
reports provide first hand accounts, it must be acknowledged that they come from the 
perspective of the escapee and thus the voice of the ‘first point of contact’, namely 
peasants and working class, is still missing from the record. In this respect, historians 
may never learn why particular priests, school teachers or doctors were chosen or the 
qualities that placed them in positions of trust. 
                                                            
3 Detailed Report by Captain DB Lang, Jan/Feb. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3301). 
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Yet at the same time it is only through the escape reports that historians can gain any 
kind of insight into the actions of early helpers and help historians to discern how 
organisations expanded the question of and why this was so. Equally, just as this 
research has delved into class issues in relation to escape, this thesis has also illustrated 
numerous other nationalities, besides French, contributed to the protraction of British 
escape activities in both the Forbidden and Occupied Zone. The involvement of other 
nationalities, most notably the Poles, in assisting escapees challenges the notion that 
escape activities was part of a French resistance. More correctly, it formed part of a 
Europe wide resistance to German aggression. For instance, Polish civilians in the 
Occupied Zone assisting RAF crews could easily have perceived their actions not only 
connected with France but also a Polish resistance to German occupation.4 
 
Any extensive study of non-nationals and their contribution to escape must also go 
beyond the Forbidden and Occupied Zone, as this research had done, and embrace the 
numerous refugees and non-nationals in the Unoccupied Zone. This thesis has also 
illustrated that the unique political climate of the Unoccupied Zone was crucial to the 
development of escape activities. This is perhaps another way in which this study 
pushed the boundaries of traditional resistance research which tends to study resistance 
activities in various zones as separate entities. Escape is unique in this respect as the 
political conditions and reception in the Unoccupied Zone underpinned the expansion 
and protraction of such activities in the occupied zones. 
 
This is not to say that the Unoccupied Zone acted as a buffer for resistance. This theory 
has already been refuted by Paxton’s extensive research on this point. However, there 
also needs to be an acknowledgement that certain conditions such as lenient parole 
terms existed in unoccupied France that worked to the advantage of the British. In 
asserting this, the research presented in this thesis did not challenge Paxton’s work but 
alligns closely to that of Kitson. Kitson pointed out that French counter espionage 
activities directed at the Germans must not necessarily be perceived as resistance but as 
part of Vichy policy to assert independence.5 In relation to Vichy reaction to the British 
presence, the first point of interest relates to internment conditions. British officers and 
                                                            
4 Robert Gildea has recently published a book dealing with various nationalities including the Polish in 
France and their concept of resistance, see Robert Gildea, Fighters in the shadows: a new history of the 
French Resistance (London, 2015). 
5 Kitson, The hunt for Nazi spies, p. 143. 
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servicemen were interned under lenient terms. French interpretation of parole was, to 
say the least, extremely generous right up until March 1942 when the men were moved 
to Fort de la Revère. 
 
Lenient internment conditions did not mean that Vichy supported British escape 
activities. It is more likely that in imposing liberal conditions the authorities were 
asserting their independence to do so. Regardless of the motivation behind allowing 
such conditions to exist, it has been demonstrated in this research that liberal parole 
terms were crucial in giving the British, based mainly in Marseilles, opportunities to 
establish contacts and to organise. The British took advantage of the opportunity offered 
by parole, including a small number of British officers such as Murchie and Garrow 
who began organising escape activities. 
 
Yet as this research highlighted, establishing a support base proved difficult. Histories 
on escape activities tend to overlook this point but it is crucial in understanding the 
complexities in developing an escape organisation. The difficulty confronting the 
British in attempting to overcome their isolation has broader implications for research 
on resistance in France. In research on escape activities such actions are usually 
categorised as an aspect of resistance but in Marseilles in early 1940 this was not 
necessarily the case.  The majority of British officers and ordinary ranks were simply 
trying to return home. Few would have labelled their actions as acts of resistance. 
Equally, the individuals and groups connecting with British officers in Marseilles in 
early 1940 were quite often motivated by financial gain. For such individuals, assisting 
the British was an extension of subversive criminal activities rather than a commitment 
to the war effort. Investigating British efforts to overcome their isolation in Marseilles 
and connect with a support network has shed light on various aspects of escape history 
which do not fit comfortably with the existing research. 
 
Yet it is crucial, in order to fully understand how escape organisations developed, that 
researchers go beyond civilian or British activities as the success of escape lines did not 
solely depended on civilian activities in the north or British organisational ability in the 
Unoccupied Zone. Other factors such as Vichy’s willingness to maintain liberal 
internment conditions and early British connections with criminal gangs operating in the 
port at Marseilles all need to be considered. In addition to this, Vichy’s attempt to 
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maintain diplomatic independence also contributed to the development of British escape 
activities in unoccupied France. 
 
British officers such as Captain F. Fitch took advantages of these circumstances and 
connected with various diplomatic agencies, including several Polish consulates in the 
Unoccupied Zone.6 It is noteworthy that the Poles retained a diplomatic presence in 
France considering Poland had been occupied in 1939. Not only did the Poles have a 
diplomatic presence, albeit for a short time, but this diplomatic service represented the 
Free Polish in Britain. The Polish diplomatic presence was extensive with at least three 
consulates, at Toulouse, Lyon and Marseilles. Moreover, as this research demonstrated, 
the Polish Consulate was heavily engaged in escape activities, including assisting the 
British to escape. The Polish involvement in British escape activities further 
complicates previous escape histories. In this particular case, Polish motivation went 
beyond simply remaining connected to the war. Polish assistance to the British rested on 
efforts to smooth the passage of Polish servicemen through Spain and onto Britain. This 
research has also illustrated, despite the official closing of Polish consulates in October 
1940, that they continued to operate in an unofficial capacity and on occasion when the 
British established their escape organisation the Polish consulates acted as a gateway 
into the organisation. 
 
In fact, the presence of foreign diplomatic missions proved pivotal to the emergence and 
success of British escape activities. This is particularly the case when one takes into 
account the American consulates in Lyon and in Marseilles. This thesis has 
demonstrated that both these consulates acted as the conduit between British officers in 
Marseilles and British diplomats in Spain. It is most likely through assistance from this 
source that British officers were in a position to connect with the Spanish Republican 
group led by Francisco Ponzàn Vidal. In order to fully comprehend the expansion of the 
British-led escape organisation in Marseilles it is necessary to take the research beyond 
France. The support of the British diplomatic mission in Spain was crucial not only in 
channelling information through the American Consulate but for its role in connecting 
with its counterpart in Switzerland. In so doing, the British diplomatic service in Spain 
underpinned the emergence of the ‘Pat Line’ and made it one of the important British 
                                                            
6 Account of escape of Capt. F. Fitch, Royal Norfolk Regt. H.W. 4 Inf. Bde. Attached 2 Div., 17 Feb. 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3301). 
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escape networks in Europe during the period 1940-42. Escapees reaching Switzerland 
from camps in German or Italian-occupied territory were now passed into unoccupied 
France and the hands of escape organisers there. 
 
Current research has overlooked the role of the British diplomatic services in Spain and 
its importance to the development of escape organisations in France.7 G.R. Berridge’s 
diplomatic history briefly deals with the role of British consulates in neutral territory but 
does not go beyond noting that these consulates assisted men home. Berridge, therefore, 
does not examine the instrumental role of the British consulates in Spain or Switzerland 
in relation to sustaining and extending escape activities in France. Yet as this thesis 
illustrated, the British diplomatic services in Spain was instrumental in encouraging 
escape activities. British escapees in Marseilles were unlikely to cross the Pyrenees and 
swop relative freedom in unoccupied France for Spanish concentration camps. Equally, 
civilian assistance to these men centred on the idea of returning them home to Britain 
and to the war. Therefore, the role of the British diplomatic services in Spain proved the 
lynchpin in both the expansion and protraction of British escape activities in France.   
 
Yet while this thesis has demonstrated the importance of the British diplomatic services, 
it has only begun to open the discussion on the contribution of the various diplomatic 
services to the development of escape activities. There is scope for future and more 
focused studies on British diplomatic services in Spain and their efforts to extract 
various prisoners throughout the period 1940-45. Such a study would greatly benefit 
from access to Spanish archives, which to date have been relatively unexplored. In 
addition to this, it would be interesting to see if the Polish consulates in unoccupied 
France retained correspondence with the Polish administration in Britain. The Armistice 
Commission, the Commission responsible for ensuring the French upheld the terms of 
the Armistice, may also prove instrumental to future research. It is unlikely the presence 
of Polish consulates and their involvement in escape activities went unnoticed by the 
Commission. In considering the above, it would also be worth investigating 
correspondence between the Commission and Vichy officials in order to establish if 
Commission members were aware that British escapees received aid and suppport from 
diplomatic sources. 
                                                            




Such research would build on this thesis. However, such studies, particularly in relation 
to the presence of the Polish and American consulates need to take into account the 
unique position of the Unoccupied Zone. This returns the research to one vital point, 
that is the importance of unoccupied France to the development of the British-led 
escape organisation in Marseilles. Certain French state institutions such as the military 
and secret service may have helped to foster an escaping culture. This was evidenced 
particularly in daily interactions between military officials guarding British prisoners in 
the Unoccupied Zone. As military officers, guards understood the concept of duty to 
escape and once escapes remained low key few questions were asked. On numerous 
occasions guards appear to have indulged British escape efforts as for instance in the 
case of a number of French Foreign Legion officers in Fort St Jean, Marseilles. These 
men aided the passage of a number of British internees to North Africa. Even when 
moved to the stricter conditions of St Hippolyte du Fort in January 1941, escapes were 
tolerated. Men were still allowed to leave the prison and therefore, in a position to 
maintain contact with escape organisers in Marseilles. Moreover, instead of French 
guards actively seeking to deter potential escapees basic security measures such as 
barbed wire were almost non-existent for a number of months. Punishments for escapes 
were minimal (if at all). In this respect, although guards may not have participated in 
British escape efforts, little was done to undermine an escaping culture. 
 
However, this attitude in the face of increased German pressure was unsustainable. In 
March 1942, British prisoners in unoccupied France were transferred to Fort de la 
Revère near Nice where, for the first time, they were denied interaction with French 
civilians. Yet even this move came relatively late in the war and appears to have been 
the result of German pressure rather than French initiative. Moreover, at the same time 
the French military authorities were making visible efforts to restrict prison escapes, the 
French secret service continued to maintain links with the British-led escape 
organisation, now led by Albert Guerisse (Pat O’Leary). Indeed, on occasion the secret 
services appear to have acted within the interests of the organisation. One particular 
case in point relates to the French arrest of Harold Cole, a British servicemen turned 
German agent when he crossed the demarcation line in June 1942.8 Contemporary 
                                                            
8 Statement of Harold Cole, 12 June 1942 (N.A., KV 2/416). 
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statements taken from Cole suggest that the French interrogators were not interested in 
establishing the details of British escape activities but in information given to the 
Germans. Following his confession he was tried and sentenced to death. Interestingly, 
Cole’s wife was released on the basis she did not know of Cole’s activities and yet she 
had confessed to engaging in British escape activities. 
 
In this way, the French secret services may have appeared to have acted as a ‘shield’ to 
British escape activities but such an assessment would be simplistic. An examination of 
French motivation must take into account the work of two historians, Robert Paxton and 
Simon Kitson. Paxton dispelled the notion that Vichy acted as a buffer against German 
proving evidence that the French government actively sought to collaboration with the 
German authorities. Vichy pursued collaboration with the aim of asserting some form of 
independent policy in a German dominated Europe. Kitson, however, highlighted that at 
the same time the government pursued collaboration French intelligence also arrested 
spies, including German agents, in unoccupied France. According to Kitson, there is no 
discrepancy between his research and that of Paxton as both government collaboration 
with Germany and the activities of French intelligence were two sides of the same coin, 
that is, they represented Vichy efforts to assert some form of independent policy.9 
 
Considering the above, Cole’s arrest was part of a wider French intelligence effort to 
curtail German espionage activities. Prior to his arrest, Cole had worked with a number 
of French intelligence agents in Paris and had betrayed a number to the German 
authorities. In this respect, French intelligence were not so much interested in Cole’s 
escape activities as they were his intelligence work. In fact, as demonstrated in chapter 
four, French intelligence appear to have tolerated, turned a blind eye to and in some 
cases assisted British escape activities most likely because such actions, unlike 
monitoring foreign intelligence agents, were not their primarily concern. Assistance to 
escape activities, as in the case of Richard Broad, appears to have fitted this pattern with 
help given to him in an attempt to extend French intelligence and connections abroad. 
Yet it was only when British escapees in unoccupied France went beyond escape 
planning and engaged in intelligence gathering as in the case of Ian Garrow that the 
French authorities appear to have acted harshly. 
                                                            




Nevertheless, Garrow’s ten year jail sentence paled in comparison with Cole’s death 
sentence indicating that, at the very least, there was a bias in favour of Allies in certain 
Vichy circles. Arguably, the tipping point for this bias came one the 12 November 1942 
with the German occupation of the entire country. The occupation sparked a number of 
escapes in which some Vichy officials were willing participants. The occupation 
removed the last vestiges of Vichy independence which appears to have had an equally 
dramatic impact on the attitude of French officials in charge of British internment. As 
the Italians moved to take over, this prompted the removal of British prisoners with a 
number of French officials, including it would seem the French camp commandant, 
actively assisting a number of escapes. Equally, official assistance was not confined to 
British prisoners but included civilians. French secret service agents warned escape 
organisers in Marseilles that one of their members, Louis Nouveau, was in danger of 
German arrest. Arguably, the German occupation and the visible German presence in 
the former Unoccupied Zone changed the dynamics of escape. Arguably, in this 
particular case at least, the German presence appears to have undermined any remaining 
sense of loyalty to Vichy prompting the guards and French secret service officials 
actively aiding British escapees or warning helpers of arrest. 
 
Yet it is still important to place these actions in context. Such actions were relatively 
minimal and their impact limited to a few isolated cases. Only a handful of men escaped 
with the vast majority of men being transferred to Italian camps. Equally, although 
French officials may have warned or sought to protect certain civilians involved in 
escape this assistance was also relatively restricted. In early 1943, a betrayal led to the 
arrests of a number of key escape organisers in both the Occupied and former 
Unoccupied Zones which effectively broke up the British-led escape organisation and 
its contacts in the north. In this respect, although after the German occupation certain 
guards or secret service officials were willing to assist in escape or pass on information 
of an imminent arrest the impact of such help, outside a few isolated cases, was 
relatively minimal. 
 
This research offers insight into the development of early resistance activities and how 
in the case of British escape activities such actions moved beyond the initial phases of 
occupation to a more co-ordinated organised escape network. This thesis demonstrated 
229 
 
that research on escape activities needs to move beyond an assessment of individuals 
involved but take into account communities, diplomatic services and state institutions, 
all of which were in some way drawn into such activities in an attempt to respond to the 
trauma of defeat and occupation. Yet there remains a paucity of research on this topic. 
This thesis represents the beginning of more serious study in this field by encouraging 
researchers to move beyond popular histories and understand escape activities in the 
context of the societies that produced them. In this respect, this thesis contributes to 
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Account of escape of No. 1883402 Spr. J.R. Garbett and No. 1875829 Spr. J.E. 
Williams 26th Field Coy. R.E., 5 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300/97). 
Account of escape of 1063771 Bdr. Leonard Goddard, 23rd Field Regiment Royal 
Artillery, 51st Division, 16 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300/137). 
Account of escape of 1873335 Spr. L. Hartley, Royal Engineers, 17 Dec. 1940 (N.A., 
WO208/3300/147). 
Account of escape of 6288414 Pte. F. Hills, The Buffs and 6288414 Pte. V.H. Caldicott, 
The Buffs, 17 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300/148 & 149). 






Account of escape of 1058955 Sgt. Hughes, I.T. 60/100 Fld. Bty. 23rd Fld. Regt., R.A., 
51 (H)Div., 16 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300/155). 
Account of escape of 5254069 Pte. Reginald Franks Jones, Worcestershire Regiment, 
att’d Sherwood Foresters, 5 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300/124). 
Account of escape of 3599849 Pte. W.H. Lee, 5th Border Regt., 42nd Div., 5 Dec. 1940 
(N.A., WO208/3300/105). 
Account of escape of 2928033 Cpl. T. Lennon, 4/Cameron Highlanders, 51st (H) Div., 5 
Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300/127). 
Account of escape of No. 2757367 Pte. F Lindsay 1st Bn. Black Watch (R.H.R.) 51st 
(Highland) Division, 16 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300/143). 
Account of escape of 6090162 L/Cpl. Joseph Llewellyn-Jones, 1/7th Queen’s Royal 
Regt., 6 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300).  
Account of escape of escape of 6339038 Pte. A.G.J. Martin and 6341439 Pte.R.J. Betts 
1st Bn. Royal West Kent Regiment, 17 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300/138 & 140). 
Account of escape of 3191176 Cpl. J.A. Martin, 8/D.L.I., 50th Div., 27 Dec. 1940 (N.A., 
WO208/3299). 
Account of escape of 1439369 Dvr. W.J. Martin 140th Fld Regt., 367 Battery, 3rd Div., 
17 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300/136). 
Account of escape of No. 819254 Dvr. E. McAngus and No 821017 Dvr. F Tull 89/90th 
Bty. 23rd Fd. Regt. R.A. 51st Div., 5 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300/99 & 100). 
Account of escape of 2931814 Pte. Donald McKenzie, 4/Camerons, 51st Div., 5 Dec. 
1940 (N.A., WO208/3299/114). 
Account of escape of 2819862 Cpl. Norman Miller 2nd Bn. Seaforth Highanders, Div., 5 
Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300/106). 
Statement by 6142501 Pte.William Miller, 2/6th Bn. East Surrey Regt., 6 Dec. 1940 
(N.A., WO208/3299/118). 
Account of escape of 56146 Capt. Mills, C.F.P., 97th Kent Yeomanry Field Regiment, 
Attd. 1st R.H.A 50th Div., 31 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300/157). 
Account of escape of 2870129 A/C.S.M. A. Moir, 1/Gordon Highlanders, 153 Bde., 51st 
Div., 5 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300/109). 
Account of escape of 3518831 Pte. Hugh Gallacher Monaghan, 5/Gordon Highlanders, 
5 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300/102). 
Account of escape of 2917945 Cpl. George Shepherd Newton, 2/Seaforth Highlanders, 
5 Dec. 1940 (N.A., WO208/3300/123). 
Account of escape of No. 545177 Sgt. D.L. Phillips R.A.F. No. 150 Squadron, 6  Dec. 
1940 (N.A.,WO208/3300/133). 
Account of escape of 2144 Major W.C.W. Potts, 7/R/ Northumberland Fusiliers, 16 
Dec. 1940 (N.A.,WO208/3300/134). 
Account of escape of 2753595 Pte. Alexander Sangster, 1/Black Watch (R.H.R.), 5 Dec. 
1940 (N.A.,WO208/3300). 
Account of escape of 7636718 Cpl. H.Seecombe, C.M.P., 17 Dec. 1940 
(N.A.,WO208/3300/145). 
Account of escape of Lieut. William Sillar, R.A.M.C. Att.d 178th Lancashire Fusiliers. 
2nd Division, 6 Dec. 1940 (N.A.,WO208/3300/122). 
Account of escape of T127129 Dvr.  W. Steers, R.A.S.C., 152 (H)Fld Amb. and 8071 







Account of escape of 2319499 Sgmn. Sutton, A.C.2. Signals, and 2577618 Sgmn. 
Christie, J.F., R. Signals (H. Section No. 2 Coy. Attached 51st Division, 16 Dec. 1940 
(N.A.,WO208/3300/142 &144). 
Account of escape of 6285098 Pte. Arthur Taplin, 1/Buffs, att’d 111 Coy. A.M.P.C., 6 
Dec. 1940 (N.A.,WO208/3300/119). 
Account of escape of 6397485 L/Sgt. A. Tilling, 7/R. Sussex, 12th Div. Wounded, 5 Dec 
1940 (N.A.,WO208/3300/125). 
Statement by No. 967923 Sgt. E. Watson, R.A.F. No 40 Squadron, 6 Dec. 1940 
(N.A.,WO208/3300/132). 
Account of escape of Major J.C. Windsor Lewis, 2 Bn. Welsh Guards, 20th Gds. Bde., 
13 Dec. 1940 (N.A.,WO208/3300/159). 
Account of escape of 1712731 Pte. J. Witton, 5/King’s Own Royal Regt., 42 Div., 5 
Dec. 1940 (N.A.,WO208/3300/108). 
Account of escape of 2873535 Pte. Young, W.D., 1/Gordon Highlanders, 51st Div., 16 
Dec. 1940 (N.A.,WO208/3300/135). 
 
WO208/3301 
Account of escape of 2360831 Sgmn. Adams D.H. R. Signals, 1/Arm. Div., 17 Jan. 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3301/162). 
Account of escape of 898751 L/Bdr. J.M. Archer, H.W. R.A. 44 Div., 17 Jan. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3301/165). 
Account of escape of 4075343 Pte. W.J. Brooks, South Wales Bdrs. Attd.“R” Bn. 
A.M.P.C., 17 Jan. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3301/168). 
Statement by Harold Ronald Capel, Able-Seamen DJX 152283, 31 Jan. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3301/173). 
Account of escape of 816485 Sergt. A.J. Cole 23 Fd. Regt. R.A. attached 51 Div., 17 
Feb. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3301/178). 
Account of escape of 13011069 Pte. A. Colville, A.M.P.C., attd 51 Div., 17 Feb. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3301/186). 
Account of escape of 7751 Jemadar Jehan Dad, R.I.A.S.C., 51 Div., 19 Feb. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3301/214). 
Account of escape of 78491 Dvr. Dundas, R., R.A.S.C., 51 Div., 24 Feb. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3301/192). 
Account of escape pf 6910320 Pte. Edward Farrell, R.E. transferred to A.M.P.C., 17 
Feb. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3301/182). 
Account of escape of Capt. F. Fitch, Royal Norfolk Regt. H.W. 4 Inf. Bde. Attached 2 
Div., 17 Feb. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3301/181). 
Account of escape of 6283740 Cpl. Frankham, M., 2/The Buffs R.E.K., 51st Div., 17 
Jan. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3301/164). 
Account of escape of 7618141 Dvr. Gaze, W.B.A., R.A.O.C., 25 Feb. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3301/188). 
Account of escape of 6288221 Cpl. Hood-Crees, G., 5/The Buffs, 18 Mar. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3301/219). 
Account of escape of 1868860 Spr. Howes, A.H., 26th Fld Coy. R.E., 51st Div., 7 Jan. 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3301/163). 
Account of escape of 69673 Lieut. C.D. Hunter, Cameron Hldrs, 51st Div., 24 Jan. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3301/172). 
Account of escape of Capt. A. Irvine-Robertson, 7/A/. &S.H., 51 Div. and Lieut. 




Account of escape of 4456436 Pte. Kerr, T.G., 1/Black Watch, 51 Div., 25 Feb. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3301/210).  
Detailed Report, Jan/Feb. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3301/174). 
Account of escape of 814935 Pte. A.A. Lang, 8/A/. & S.H., 51 Div., 17 Jan. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3301/167). 
Account of escape of Lt. J.M. Langley, M.C. 2nd Bn. Coldstream Guards, 1st Division, 
22 Mar. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3301/213). 
Account of escape of 13007854 Pte. G. Lee, 10 Salvage Unit, A.M.P.C., 17 Feb. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3301/184). 
Account of escape of No. 2823041 Pte. J. McAbeer, 2nd Bn. Seaforth Highlanders 51 
Div. 152 Bde. And No. 2879425 Pte. J.M. McLean, 5th Bn. The Gordon Highlanders 51 
Div., 25 Feb. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3301/207-208). 
Statement by 2nd Lt. A.D. McGregor, R.A. 51 Division, 22 Feb. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3301/183). 
Statement by 2975287 Sergt. J. Montrose, 5/Gordons, 51 Div., 17 Feb. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3301/187). 
Account of escape of 3525734 Pte. Morton, John, 1/Black Watch, 51st Div., 19 Jan. 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3301/171). 
Account of escape of 13009065 Pte. F.F. Noonan, A.M.P.C. attached 51 Div., 17 Feb. 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3301/179). 
Account of escape of 2932610 Pte. Park, S.G.C., 7/A/ & S.H. 51 Div., Mar. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3301/218). 
Statement by 4608720 Fus. A.E. Peacock, 7 R.N.F., 51 Div., 17 Feb. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3301/185). 
Account of escape of 5109863 Bdsm. R.W. Poole, 2/R. Warwicks Regt. 48 Div., 17 Jan. 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3301/166). 
Statement by 2981581 Pte. Savage, J.,A. & S.H., 51st (H) Div., 17 Jan. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3301/161). 
Account of escape of 2519794 Bdr. J.Sennett, R.A. 51 Div., 17 Jan. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3301/169). 
Account of escape of 2876101 Cpl. M. Straughan, 1/Gordon Hldrs. 51 (H)Div., 17 Jan. 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3301/170). 
Account of escape of 2196023 Sergt. F.J. Taylor, R.E. attached 51 Div., 17 Feb. 1941 
N.A., WO208/3301/180). 
Account of escape of 37617 F/Lt. W.P.F. Treacey, 73 (F)Sqdn., No. 11. (F)Group, 10 
Feb. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3301/175). 
Account of escape of Sapper Osborne, G.S. 1889848 R.E., 19 Mar. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3301/216) 
Account of escape of 7607864 Pte. Tuite, A.J., R.A.O.C., 51 Div., 25 Feb. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3301/190). 
Account of escape of 6199571 T.S.M. Wheeler, J.E., R.A. attached 38 Div., 24 Feb. 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3301/189). 
 
WO208/3302 
Account by M.105712 Sgt. Boyle, T., R.A.S.C.(E.F.I), 19 Mar. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3302/246). 






Account of escape of 2930432 Sgt. Fraser, S.W., 4/Cameron Hldrs, 51 Div., 19 Mar. 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3302/247). 
Account of escape of 3054176 Cpl. Gardner H.G., 1/Royal Scots, 2 Div., 19 Mar. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3302/245). 
Account of escape of 5726306 Pte. Graham J., 2/Dorsets, 2 Div., 19 Mar. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3302/244). 
Account of escape of 2756171 L/Cpl. Grimmond, J.M., 1/Blackwatch, 51 Div., 21 Mar. 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3302/265). 
Account of escape of 747947 Sergt. Hillyard, E.G., 150 Bomber Squadron, R.A.F., 30 
Mar. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3302/266). 
Account of escape of 7615429 Pte. Laming G.A.E., R.A.O.C., “G” Forces, 19 Mar. 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3302/225). 
Account of escape of 129470 L/CPl. Melville, K., R.A.S.C., 51 Div. 126386 Pte. 
Quickenden, R.W.J, R.A.S.C., 51 Div. 130802 Pte. Petrie-Ritchie, J.A., R.A.S.C, 51 
Div., 127451 Pte. Crowe, A., R.A.S.C., 51 Div., 19 Mar. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3302/230-233). 
Account by 7616881 Pte. Tym, F.S., R.A.O.C., 19 Mar. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3302/251). 
Account of escape of 7357758 Pte. Park, W., 153 Fd. AMB., R.A.M.C., 51 Div., 19 
Mar. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3302/255). 
Account of escape by 111851 Cpl. Radford, H., R.A.S.C., 51 Div., 19 Mar. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3302/224). 
Account of escape of 3058442 Pte/ Rankine, R.W., 4/Seaforths, 51 Div., 19 Mar. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3302/229). 
Account of escape of 6135552 Sgt. G. Roskell, 226 Bmbr. Sqdn., R.A.F. and B/73568 
Pte. Thompson, G., 1 Can. Inf. H.W., 1 Can. Div., 1 Apr. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3302/234-235). 
Account by Pte. Seymour J., R.A.S.C. Saar Region H.Q., 19 Mar. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3302/221). 




Account of 3533122 Pte. Abrahams, H. 2/Manchester Regt., 15 June 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/325). 
Account of escape of 331096 Pte. Adams, G., 1/Glasgow, 18 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/303). 
Account of escape of 3241523 Pte. Alexander, J., 4/Seaforths, 18 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/304). 
Account of escape of 543236 Bandsman Barrett, G.A., 2/D/C.L.I., 4 Div., 13 Apr. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3303/276). 
Account of escape of 3130690 Fus. Baird, J.R., R. Scots Fus., 15 June 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/331). 
Account of escape of 2931825 Pte. Bernardi, S., 4/Camerons, 18 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/297). 
Account of escape of 3185936 L/Sgt/ Bell, J.K. 2/Royal Scots Fus., 18 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/308). 





Account of escape of 7881318 Sgt. Bevan, C.W. 5/Innis. D.G., 15 June 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/326). 
Account of escape of 10020186 Pte. Borst, M., R.A.S.C., 18 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/313). 
Summary of a report by Lieut. R.L. Broad, 2/Seaforths, 51 Div., 18/25/26 May 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3303/284). 
Account of escape of 4534198 Pte. Cammidge, E., 7/R/ Norf. Regt., 18 May 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3303/311). 
Account of escape of 450326 Gnr. Castle, F., R.A., 18 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/310). 
Account of escape of 891868 Gnr. Chandler, L/C/. 98 Fd. Regt., R.A., 15 June 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3303/334). 
Account of escape of 4692011 Spr. Charlotte, S., R.E., 13 Apr. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/276). 
Account of escape of 838212 Dvr. Currey, G.E. 1/R.H.A. , 18 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/318). 
Account of escape of 2750365 Pte. Dickson, J. Black Watch, 15 June 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/332). 
Account of escape of 772473 L/Bdr. Enock, J.G., 1/R.H.A., June 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/320). 
Account of escape of 4262925 L/Cpl. Forster, H.L., 9/R.H.F., 18 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/295). 
Account of escape of 7686045 L/Cpl. Fryer, E., F.S.W. (Sec.21), 18 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/301). 
 Statement by 3857959 L/Cpl. Gardner, A. Loyals, 18 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/312). 
Account of escape of 5181966 Pte. Goldstein, E.W., 2/Gloucesters, 15 June 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/336). 
Account of escape of 3596685 Pte. Hall, J., 1/Border Regt. 18 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/305). 
Account of escape of 1492768 Gnr. Hall, S.R., 6th/2nd S/L Regt. R.A., 18 Apr. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3303/279). 
Account of escape of 2879108 Pte. Harper, A.F.D. 1 Gordons, 18 May 1941(N.A., 
WO208/3303/302). 
Account of escape of 2817545 Pte. Hawksley, E., 2/Seaforths, 51 Div., 18 May 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3303/294). 
Account of escape of 1509075 Gnr. Hillier, C., 2 S/L Regt. R.A., 51 Div., 13 Apr. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3303/272). 
Account of escape of 45117 Cpl. Hubbard, A.V., 2/Seaforths, 18 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/306). 
Account of escape of 2052279 Mech: Instone, G.E., 1 S/L Regt. R.A., 13 Apr. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3303/268). 
Account of escape of S/830419 Sgt. Jackson, S.T., R.A.S.C., 51 Div., 13 Apr. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3303/275). 
Account of escape of 4386259 Dvr. Jewitt, W.R., 1/R.H.A., 18 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/315). 






Account of escape of 2759608 Pte. Lamont, W.J., 1/Tyneside Scottish, 15 June 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3303/333). 
Account of 4540274 C.Q.M.S. Lepper D.T., 2/5 W/ Yorks., 46 Div., 13 Apr. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3303/269). 
Account of escape of 3049461 C.Q.M.S. Lindsay, G., 2/Seaforths, 15 June 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/321). 
Account of escape of 755548 Sgt. Observer Lonsdale, R.W., 107 Bomber Sqdn. R.A.F. 
R.A.F.V.R., 18 Apr. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3303/278). 
Account of escape of T/146103 Dvr. Mack, T.S., R.A.S.C., 1 Div., 13 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/271). 
Account of escape of 2932654 Pte. MacKay W.D., 4/Cameron Hldrs. 51 Div., 13 Apr. 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3303/270). 
Account of escape of Capt. A.M.K. Martin, D.L.I., C.S.O.3 (S.D.L.T.) G.H.Q., B.E.F., 
18 May 1941 (N.A., WO208/3303/292). 
Account of escape of 7109625 C.Q.M.S. McLear, M.J., 2/The South Wales Borderers, 
18 Apr. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3303/277). 
Account of escape of 7585804 Sgt. Newell, S.F., R.A.O.C., 18 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/307). 
Account of escape of 1448984 Bdr. Owens, R.G., 101/L.A.A.R.A., 15 June 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/330). 
Account of 5385023 Pte. Perkins, I., 15 June 1941 (N.A., WO208/3303/335). 
Account of escape of 561185 Sgt. J.W. Phillips, R.A.F., 54 Fighter Sqdn., 15 May 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3303/283). 
Account of escape of 7587028 S/Sgt/ Porter, J., R.A.O.C., 18 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/298). 
Account of escape of 5381653 Pte. Pusey, J.B., 1/Ox & Bucks, 13 Apr. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/273). 
Account of escape of 352427 Sgt. Richardson, J.G., 2/Manchester Regt., 15 June 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3303/324). 
Account of escape of 2816962 Cpl. Ritchie, D., 1/Seaforths, 15 June 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/322). 
Account of escape of Lieut. G.W. Rogers A.M.P.C. attached Q Bn., (N.A., 
WO208/3303/291). 
Account of escape of 2823770 Pte. Taggart, R., 1/Seaforths, 18 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/300). 
Account by Capt. A.R. Thackrah att. 13 (Foreign) G.P., A.M.P.C., 18 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/295). 
Account of escape of 2876553 Sgt. Shaw, M. 1/Gordons,15 June 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/327). 
Account of escape of 1491069 Gnr. Smeed, E.F., R.A., 18 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/317). 
Account of escape of 808757 Gnr. Stephenson, G., 23 Fd. Bde., R.A., May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/319). 
Account of escape of L/Sgt. Verity, F.W.E., 1/East Lancs., 18 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/309). 
Account of escape of 3521749 L/Cpl. Wadesone, T. Grenadier Guards, 15 June 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3303/329). 





Account of escape of 856967 Dvr. Watkins, C.F., R.A., 18 May 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/316). 
Account of escape of 7594015 Pte. Wight, K.J.N., R.A.O.C. D.A.D.O.S. attd troops 
S.Q, 18 May 1941 (N.A., WO208/3303/299). 
Account of escape of: 2818600 Pte. Wright, S.R., 2/Seaforths, 15 June 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3303/323). 




Account of escape of 5107581 L/Cpl. Andrews, A.J.T., 2 Royal Warwicks, 17 July 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/386). 
Account of escape of 806161 Gnr. Bainbridge R.S., 23 Fd Regt., R.A., 51 Div., 15 July 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/359). 
Account of escape of 100220324 Gnr. Barham, H.J., R.A.,, att’d 2 Fd Bakery, R.A.S.C., 
15 July 1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/370). 
Statement by T/55304 Dvr. Barwick, S.Y., R.A.S.C., 17 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304/392). 
Account of escape of 790682 L/Sgt. Batho, W.H., 23 Fld. Regt., R.A., 15 July 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3304/363). 
Account of escape of Captain B.C. Bradford, Adjutant, 1/Black Watch, 51st Division, 
13 July 1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/382). 
Statement by 755503 Sgt. H.W. Bratley, 9 Squadron, R.A.F., 24 June 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304/351). 
Account of escape of Capt. R.N. Brinckman, 3/Grenadier Guards, 1st Div., 3 July 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3304/352). 
Account of escape of 4034140 Pte. Brown, F.S., 6 Durham Light Infantry, 17 July 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3304/397). 
Account of escape of 818091 Gnr. Brown, G., 23 Fld Regt., R.A., 15 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304/368). 
Account of escape of 2/Lt. Buckingham, 23 Fd. Regt., R.A., 51 Div., 15 July 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3304/355). 
Account of escape of 2931810 Pte. Cairney, J., 4 Camerons, 20 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304/410). 
Account of escape of S/94435 Pte. Clarke, J.J., E.F.I., R.A.S.C., 1 Corps, 17 July 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3304/388). 
Account of escape of 5382080 Gdsmn. Collett, H., Grenadier Gds., 15 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304/366). 
Account of escape of 6082710 Pte. Coshall, H., Queen’s Royal Regt. Att. 11 A.M.P.C. 
6082585 Pte. Breagan, J., Queen’s Royal Regt, att. 11 A.M.P.C., 17 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304/383). 
Account of escape of 13009540 Pte. Crabini, A., Pioneer Corps (10 Salvage Unit), 14 
July 1941(N.A., WO208/3304/381). 
Account of escape of 914391 Dvr. Dawkins, A.E., 97 Fd Regt., 51 (H) Div., 15 July 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/369). 
Account of escape of 7349171 Sgt. Deall, L.J. 182 Fd. Amb., R.A.M.C., 17 July 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3304/400). 
Account of escape of 6896198 Rifleman Dowding, F., 1 Queen Victoria’s Rifles, 




Account of escape of 5773078 Pte. Eastwood.A.C., 7 Royal Norfolk Regt., 18 July 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/407). 
Account of escape of 787243 Gnr. Elbro, G.E., 1 Regt. R.H.A., 15 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304/360). 
Account of escape of 5182841 Pte. Fagan, J., 2 Royal Warwickshire Regt. 31090824 
Pte. Sheldon, W.A., 2 Royal Warwickshire Regt., 17 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304/390). 
Account of escape of 5772875 L/Cpl. Farrow, E.E., 2 Royal Norfolk Regt. 5771840 and 
Cpl. Chamberlain, L. 2 Royal Norfolk Regt., 18 July 1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/405-
406). 
Account of escape of 3311964 Pte. Galloway, F., H.L.I., 17 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304/385). 
Account of escape of 3447922 Cpl. Gill, J.A, 1/8 Lancashire Fusiliers.2 Div. 18 July 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/403). 
Statement by 968161 Sgt. L.D. Goldingay, 9 Squadron, R.A.F.,  24 June 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304/349). 
Account of escape of 3056437 Pte. Goldthorpe, A.G.R., 1 Royal Scots, 18 July 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3304/404). 
Account of escape of 4533720 Cpl. Hepworth, D., 7 Royal Norfolk Regt., 18 July 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3304/408). 
Account of escape of 1056408 Sub-Conductor Hexley, T.W.P., 15 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304/356). 
Account of escape of 790816 Gnr. Hilditch A.E., 23 Fd. Regt. R.A. and 1507776 Gnr. 
Hills, 23 Fd. Regt R.A., 15 June 1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/340). 
Statement by 33408 F/O. L.M. Hodges, 49 Squadron, R.A.F., 16 June 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304/345). 
Statement by 745228 Sgt/Pilot Houghton, S.J., 220 (G.R.) Squadron R.A.F., 14 July 
1941(N.A., WO208/3304/373). 
Account of escape of 6896836 A/L/Cpl/ Illingworth, H.R., Q.V.E. (now 7/K.R.R.), 19 
July 1941 (N.A., WO208/330/409). 
Account of escape of 580400 Sg.t Ingram, N.J., D.F.M., 82 Squadron, R.A.F., 4 July 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/375). 
Account of escape of 73603 2/Lt. Jeffrey, J.C.S., 56 Med. Regt., R.A., 16 June 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3304/353).  
Account of escape of 822158 Dr. Jones, J. 1 Regt. R.H.A., 15 June 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304/344). 
T/106085 Cpl. Lister, E.E., R.A.S.C., 51 Div., 16 July 1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/394). 
Account of escape of 2735607 Gdsman. Logan, A., Welsh Guards, 15 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304/367). 
Statement by:- 817203 Sgt. MacCallumn D., 83 Bomber Squadron, R.A.F., 14 July 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/374). 
Account of escape of 3245405 Pte. MacCauley, J., 5 Gordon Hrs. 2883238 Pte. Carroll, 
J. 5 Gordon Hrs., 17 July 1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/396&397). 
Account of escape of 3650967 Pte.  McKenna, A., South Lancs Regt., 17 July 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3304/389). 
Account of escape of 427—95 Fus. McQueen, J.W., 7 Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, 
17 July 1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/399). 
Account of escape of Captain McPartland, J.J., 153 (H) Fd Amb., 51 (H) Division, 14 




Account of escape of 1065366 Gnr. Moffit, J., 23 Fd Regt., R.A.,51 Div., 15 July 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3304/361). 
Account of escape of 341877 L.A.C. (Nursing Orderly) Morement, H.A., 73 Squadron, 
R.A.F., 25 June 1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/380). 
Statement by 742649 Sgt. S.M.F. Parkes, 9 Squadron, R.A.F., 19 June 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304/346). 
Account of escape of 6288354 Pte. Peterson, D.N., 5 Buffs, 15 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304/364). 
Account of escape of 52401 Capt. Plant, F.W.M., 152 (H) Fd. Amb. 51 (H) Div., 14 
July 1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/377). 
Account of escape of 4268910 Fus. Robinson, A., 7 Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, 17 
July 1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/387). 
Account of escape of No. 812356 Dvr. i/c Rodgers, R.M., 23 Fd. Regt., R.A. and No. 
777195 Sig. Rodiguez, A., 23 Fd. Regt., R.A., 15 July 1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/357-
358). 
Account of escape of 3446487 Gnr. Rothwell, J., 23 Fd Regt., R.A., 51 Div., 15 July 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/362). 
Statement by 6144709 Pte. Small, E.J., 2/6 East Surrey Regt, 15 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304/372). 
Account by:- 3655673 Pte. Southern, H., South Lancs.Regt., 17 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304/393). 
Account of escape of 6284682 Cpl. Surridge, H.W.C., 111 A.M.P.C., 15 July 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3304/365). 
Account of escape of 779316 Gnr. Sweeten, J.A., 1 Regt., R.H.A., 15 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304/371). 
Account of escape of 933657 Gnr. Lloyd, E., 1 Regt. R.H.A. and 863963 Gnr. Turnbull, 
H. 1 Regt., R.H.A.  15 June 1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/343&345). 
Account of escape of 2932391 L/Cpl. Watson, J.S., 4. Cameron Hrs., 18 July 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3304/402). 
Account of escape of S/128916 Pte. Westhead, A., 4 Fd Bakery, R.A.S.C., 17 July 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3304/391). 
Account by 41888 F/O. Whitecross J.A., 50 Sqdn. 5 Gp. R.A.F., 14 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3304/379). 
Account of escape of 94831 Capt Wilkins, L.A., 2/5th West Yorks., 46 Div., 16 July 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3304/354). 
 
WO208/3305 
Account of escape of 5435681 Cpl. Bell, B., 4 Royal West Kent Regt., 23 July 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3305/412). 
Account of escape of 554vr. i/c Berry, A.W., 23 Fd. Regt., R.A. 51 (H)Div., 15 Aug 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3305/470). 
Account of escape of 370358 Pte. Brown, E., King’s Own Rifle Regt. Att. Gordon Hrs., 
23 July 1941 (N.A., WO208/3305/420). 
Account of escape of 101044 Cpl. Carnell, B., 41 Coy., A.M.P.C., att. Adv. Air Striking 
Force, 20 Aug. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3305/487). 
Account of escape of 7897550 L/Cpl. Clayton, W.E., F.S.P., (Saar Force. Metz), 23 July 





63092 Pilot Officer Duval, H.P., R.A.F.V.R., 258 Squadron, 27 Aug. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3305/489). 
Account of escape of 2752615 Cpl Gare, F.H., 1 Black Watch, 23 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3305/421). 
Account of escape of 19275551 Dvr. Hall, W.T., 107 Army Fd. Coy., R.E. 1 Corps 
Tps., 12 Aug 1941 (N.A., WO208/3305/453). 
Account of escape of 2877677 Pte. MacQueen, A., 5/Gordon Hldrs., 51 Div., 16 July 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3305/425). 
Statement by 758069 Sgt. Miller, F.H., 82 Squadron, No. 2 Group, Bomber Command, 
R.A.F., 15 Aug. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3305/482). 
Account of escape of 3318402 Pte. M’Phillips, A., 5 Gordon Hrs., 24 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3305/441). 
Account of escape of 780196 Pte. Price, G., 1 Black Watch, 23 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3305/423). 
Statement by P/O Marian Rytka, 302 (Polish) Squadron, R.A.F., 16 Aug. 1941(N.A., 
WO208/3305/483/483). 
Account of escape of 6913697 Spr. Shears R.W., 26 Fd. Coy. R.E. 51 Div.,  11 Aug. 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3305/452). 
Account of escape of 2928762 Pte. Stevenson, D., 4 Cameron Hldrs., 23 July 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3305/563). 
Account of escape of 2752154 Cpl. Wadsley, G., 1 Black Watch, 23 July 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3305/424). 
Most Secret (1) Dvr. Walsh H.H. and (2) 1864098 Spr. Burgess R.- 26 Fd. Coy. R.E., 
51 Div., 11 Aug. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3305/450-451). 
 
W0208/3306 
Account of escape of: Capt. H.B. Burn, 7/R/N/F/. 51 Div., 18 Sept. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3306/502). 
Account of escape of 798252 Cpl. Carter, C., Military Police, 51st Division, 7 Oct. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3306/558). 
Account of escape of 793956 Pte. Clark, W.J., 5/Gordon Hldrs., 51 Div., 7 Oct. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3306/513). 
Account of escape of: 2879013 Pte. Cromar, J., 1/Gordon Hldrs., 51 Div., 7 Oct. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3306/514). 
Account of escape of 2822056 Pte. Cross, J.D., 4/Seaforth Hldrs., 51 Div., 7 Oct. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3306/506). 
Account of escape of 6139545 A/Cpl Dean, J., 1 Bn. East Surrey Regt., att. 4 Div. 
R.A.S.C., 7 Oct. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3306/531). 
Account of escape of 2932916 Pte. Deas, A., Cameron Highlanders, 12 Oct. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3306/570). 
Statement by 41526 F/O. Forde, D.N. 145 Squadron, R.A.F., 12 Oct. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3306/569). 
Account by S/Ldr. E/P.P. Gibbs, R.A.F., No. 616 Sqdrn., No. 11 Group, Fighter 
Command, 18/19 Sept. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3306/501). 
Account of escape of 846425 Gnr. Hooper, E.A., 6 Bty., 2 A.A. Regt., 7 Oct. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3306/522). 
Statement of 755447 Sgt. Humphris, R.H.P. No. 3 Group Bomber Command, R.A.F. 





Account of escape of 2033960 Spr. Kemp, D. R.E. Postal Section. 51 Div., 7 Oct. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3306/539). 
Account of escape of 1069538 Gnr. Kenny, C.F., 97 Fd. Regt. R.A., 7 Oct. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3306/521). 
Account of escape of 7592731, Pte. Lake, H.W., R.A.O.C., 7 Oct. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3306/531). 
Account of escape of 5568272 L/Cpl. Maddock, J.W., 6 Royal West Kents. 12 Div., 7 
October 1941 (N.A., WO208/3306/549). 
Account of escape of 3387615 Pte. Nicholson, G.A., 1/E.Lancs., 51 Div., 7 Oct. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3306/553). 
Account of escape of: 736237, Pte. Tobin, J. Pte. Tobin, J., 153 Fd. Amb., R.A.M.C., 51 
(H)Div. 7 Oct. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3306/532). 
Account of escape of 937660 Sgt. Willis, F.G., “B” Flight, 75 Squadron, R.A.F. (with 
A. 391847 Sgt. Falcon-Scott R.A.F.), 6 Sept. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3306/494). 
 
WO208/3307 
Statement by P/O Allen, P.F., 101 Squadron, R.A.F., 24 Nov. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/56). 
Account of escape of 1525033 Gnr. Badman, A.V. 53 A.A. & C.D., R.A., 27 Oct. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3307/67). 
Account by 74661 A/FL./Lt/ Barclay R.G.A., D.F.C., 611 (Fighter) Squadron, R.A.F., 
11 Dec. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3307/50). 
Account of escape of 2880258 Pte. Beattie J.S.  5/Gordon Hldrs., 51 Div., 25 Oct. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3307/59). 
Statement by 915544 Sgt. Bell, P.H., 602 Squadron, R.A.F.,  6 Jan. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/35). 
Report by Lieut. Colonel F.A.A. Blake, R.A., Military Attaché Brussels, on events 
subsequent to the 9th May, 1940, resulting in his capture by the German army, scape and 
hiding, and eventual arrival at Gibraltar after passing through unoccupied France and 
French North Africa, Nov. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3307). 
Further notes by Lt-Col. F.A.A. Blake, R.A. formerly M.A. Brussels, Nov. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/63). 
Account of escape of B 38585755 Pte. Brown, R., 8 Bn The Loyal Regt. (Now 321 
L.A.A. Bty, R.A.), 26 Nov. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3307/54). 
Account by 33223 S/Ldr. Bufton, H.E., 9 Sqdn. R.A.F., 22 Dec. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/46). 
Statement by 68806 P/O Carroll, H.B., 207 Squadron, Bomber Command, R.A.F., 22 
Jan. 1942 (N.A., WO208/3307/3). 
Account of escape of 2755185 Pte. Clarke, J.T., 1 Black Watch, 51 (H) Div., 7 Jan. 
1942 (N.A., WO208/3307/11). 
Account by P/O. Coen O.H., 71 (Eagle) Squadron R.A.F., 27 Dec. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/44). 
Account of escape of 3319526 Pte. Conville, B., 1 Glasgow Highlanders, 51 (H) Div., 7 
Jan. 1942 (N.A., WO208/3307/8). 
Account of escape of 2927284 Sgt. Cowan, A.G., 4 Cameron Hrs., 51 (H) Div., 7 Jan. 
1942 (N.A., WO208/3307/10). 






Account of escape of 57206 Pte. Davis, W., and 93033 Cpl. Lochrie, D. O’D., 4 Div. 
Petrol Coy.(57th Coy.), R.A.S.C., 27 Oct. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3307). 
Account of escape of 798626 L/Bdr, Dimes, E.W., B/O Bty, 1 Regt., R.H.A. 51 (H) 
Div., 7 Jan. 1942 (N.A., WO208/3307). 
Account of escape of 7884013 Dvr. Dolan J.D., 38 Fd Coy., R.E., 7 Nov. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/62). 
Account of escape of 2879107 Pte. Dunbar, R., 1 Bn. Gordon Highlanders, 51 Div., 27 
Oct. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3307/72). 
Account of escape of 65656 (War Subs.) Lieut. M.G. Duncan, H.C., 4 Bn. Ox and 
Bucks.L.I., 17 June 1942 (N.A., WO208/3307/26). 
Account of escape of 2819021 Pte Farrell, J., 2 Seaforth Hrs., 51 (H) Div., 7 Jan. 1942 
(N.A., WO208/3307/12). 
Account of escape of 2931262 Pte. Fraser, A.C., 4 Cameron Hrs. 51 (H) Div., 7 Jan. 
1942 (N.A., WO208/3307/13). 
Statement by 5567722 Cpl. Gardner, W.F., 2 Wiltshire Regt., 7 Jan. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/18). 
Statement by 946016 Sgt. Graham, A.H., 53 Squadron, R.A.F., 6 Jan. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/21). 
Account of escape of 2930402 Pte Grig, D., 4 Cameron Hrs., 51 (H) Div., 7 Jan. 1942 
(N.A., WO208/3307/9). 
Statement by P)325 P/O Groyecki, Z., 300 Polish Squadron, R.A.F., 22 Jan. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/2). 
Statement by 82511 L/Bdr. Heather, J., 10/26 Bty., 17 Field Regt. R.A. 51 (H) Div. & 
828422 Gnr. Fryer, H., 10/26 Bty., 17 Field Regt. R.A. 51 (H) Div., 7 Jan. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/7). 
Statement by 959970 Sgt. Herbert, P.R. 15 Squadron, R.A.F., 6 Jan. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/34). 
Statement by R-62735 Sgt. Ives, J.R., R.C.A.F., 51 Squadron, R.A.F., 6 Jan. 1942 
(N.A., WO208/3307/31). 
Account of escape of 6145479 Pte. Janes, P.S., 2/6 East Surrey Regt., Att. 51 (H) Div., 
7 Jan. 1942 (N.A., WO208/3307/14). 
Statement by 782276 Sgt. Kowalski, M., 305 Polish Sqdn., R.A.F., 6 Jan. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/32). 
Statement of 748117 Sgt/Pilot Lockhart, W.G., Squadron, R.A.F., 22 Oct. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/75). 
Statement of 903288 Sgt. Pilot McKee, L.M. 616 Squadron, 20 Dec. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/48). 
Account of escape of 18441 Pte. McLauren, J., and 2818481 Pte.Williamson, T., 2 
Seaforth Highlanders, 7 Jan. 1942 (N.A., WO208/3307). 
Statement of 787663 Sgt/Pilot Mensik, J., 312 Czech Squadron, R.A.F., 22 Oct. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3307/74). 
Account by 78274 F/Lt. Douglas Crowley-Milling, D.F.C., R.A.F. 610 Fighter 
Squadron, 3 Dec. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3307/52). 
Account of escape of 2872609 Pte. Milner, D., 1 Bn., Gordon Highlanders, 51 Div., 27 
Oct. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3307/71). 
Account of escape of 2750391 Cpl. Monaghan, H., 1 Bn. Black Watch, 51 Div., 27 Oct. 
1941 (N.A., WO208/3307/70). 





Account of escape of 2876964 Pte. Mumme, P.G., 1 Gordon Hrs., 51 (H) Div., 7/8 Jan. 
1942 (N.A., WO208/3307/16). 
Account of escape of 742570 Sgt. Newton, J.L., 12 Squadron, R.A.F., 15/16 Jan. 1942 
(N.A., WO208/3307). 
Account by 87699 P/O Nitelet, A.E.J.G., 609 Squadron, R.A.F., 27 Dec. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/43). 
Account of escape of Capt. H.B. O’Sullivan, M.C., 3 Bn. Royal Tank Regt., 1st Armd. 
Div, 20/25/29 June 1942 (N.A., WO208/3307/28). 
Ower, D.,  Account of escape of 87474 Dvr. Ower, D. R.A.S.C., 152 F.A.D. 51 Div, 27 
Oct. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3307/64). 
Account of escape of NX. 3653 Cpl. Parker, J.A., 2/1 Field Coy A.I.F., 14/17 July 1942 
(N.A., WO208/3307/41). 
Account by 88070 2/Lt. Parkinson, R.E.H., 4/R Sussex, 44 Div., 22/23 Dec 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/45). 
Statement by R69544 Sgt. Paton, J.S., 504 Squadron, R.C.A.F., 10 Jan. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/20). 
Statement by 784763 Sgt. Pilot Pietrasiak, A., 308 Squadron, R.A.F., 6 Jan. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/23). 
Statement by 787437 Sgt. Ptacek, R., 222 Czech Squadron, R.A.F., 6 Jan. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/22). 
Statement by 625743 Sgt. Read,  K.B., 9 Squadron, R.A.F., 6 Jan. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/37). 
Account of escape of 7603667 Cpl. Rennie, I.H.C., 14th Army Field Workshop, 
R.A.O.C., 27 Oct. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3307/66). 
Account of escape of 2364654 Sig. Ritchie, J.M., 27 Oct 1941 (N.A., WO208/3307/65). 
Account of escape of 2/Lt. A.D. Rowan-Hamilton, Black Watch, 13/17/18 July 1942 
(N.A., WO208/3307/25). 
Account of escape of T/95011 Dvr. Smith, J. 3 G.H.Q. R.A.S.C., attached 51 (H) Div., 
7 Jan. 1942 (N.A., WO208/3307). 
Account of escape of Lieut. (war-subs) H.E. Stewart, M.C., Intelligence Corps, att 9 
Australian Div., M.E.F. (N.A., WO208/3307/29). 
Account of escape T. 110158 Dvr. Strachan J., No. 9 Sub-Park Amm.Column, R.A.S.C. 
51 (H) Div., 7 Jan 1942 (N.A., WO208/3307/6). 
Statement by 782361 Sgt. Tomicki, S. 305 Polish Sqn, R.A.F., 6 Jan. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/33). 
Account of escape of: 1421708 L/Cpl. Warnett, H.J., C.M.P., attd. 11 Army Corps 
H.Q., 27 Oct. 1941 (N.A., WO208/3307/68). 
Statement by 1866982 Cpl. Wilkinson, F., R.E., att 4 S/L bty. R.A.G.H.Q. Troops 
B.E.F., 7 Jan. 1942 (N.A., WO208/3307/15). 
Statement by 84702 F?Lt. Winskill, A.L., 41 Squadron, R.A.F., 25 Nov. 1941 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/55). 
Account of escape of 4693383 Pte. Winslade, W., K.Y.L.I., 46 Div., 27 Oct. 1941 
(N.A., WO208/3307/69). 
Account of escape of Capt. Woolatt, H.A., 2 Lancs. Fusilliers, 13 May 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3307/27). 
Statement of 909369 Sgt. Worby, J.R., 101 Squadron, R.A.F. 974095 Sgt. Campbell, 
G., 101 Squadron, R.A.F. & Aus. 402224 Sgt. Christensen, J.R.W., Royal Australian 









Statement by P/66863 Captain R.C.F. Aston, T.A., General List, C.M.P., 31 March-1 
Apr. 1942 (N.A., WO208/3308/701). 
Statement by Aus. 402634 Sgt. Birk, H.E., R.A.A.F., 13 Mar. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3308/695). 
Statement by 789405 Sgt. Budzynski J., 300 Polish Squadron, R.A.F., 13 Mar. 1942 
(N.A., WO208/3308/686). 
Account of escape of Lieut. Cameron, A.R.P.P.K., 4 Cameron Hrs., 51 (H) Div., 2 Feb. 
1942 (N.A., WO208/3308/671). 
Account of escape of Major Challenor, R. R.E., 16 Apr. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3308/711). 
Account of escape of 939118 A/Sgt/ Interpreter Clayton, H.K., Air Ministry Works 
Area No.1 (France) R.A.F., 13 Mar. 1942 (N.A., WO208/3308/701). 
Statement by 1251523 Sgt. Cox, G.T., R.A.F., 13 Mar. 1942 (N.A., WO208/3308). 
Statement by 10263 A Sgt. Day A.D., R.C.A.F., 13 Mar. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3308/693). 
Statement by 1381730 Sgt. Dyer W.H., 99 Squadron R.A.F., 13 Mar. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3308/692). 
Statement by 37348 W/C Gilchrist, P.A., 405 Squadron, R.C.A.F., 7 Feb. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3308/672). 
Statement by 125661 Sgt. Haley V.C., 218 Sqn., R.A.F., 13 Mar. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3308/691). 
Account of escape of 344749 Cpl. Hogan, N.J., R.A.S.C., 2 Division., 13 Mar. 1942 
(N.A., WO208/3308/698). 
Account of escape of 745340 Sgt.  James O.B., 23 Squadron R.A.F., 13 Mar. 1942 
(N.A., WO208/3308/682). 
Account of escape of 2752713 L/Cpl. Kincaid, 9 Feb. 1942 (N.A., WO208/3308/679). 
Account of escape of 581464 Sgt. Observer MacGrath W.J., 82 Sqn., R.A.F., 13 Mar. 
1942 (N.A., WO208/3308/683). 
Statement by 910402 Sgt. MacKenzie N.W., R.A.F., 13 Mar. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3308). 
Account of escape of 154718 F/Sgt. McCairns, J.A., 616 Sqn., Fighter Command, 
R.A.F., Apr.-May 1942 (N.A., WO208/3308/717). 
Account of escape of 569019 Sgt. M’Farlane, V.T. 12, Sqdn., 29 Apr. 1942 (N.A., 
WO208/3308/715). 
Statement by 87670 F/O Milroy Gay, T., 53 Squadron, Bomber Command, R.A.F., 7 
Feb. 1942 (N.A., WO208/3308/674). 
Statement by Capt. C.P. Murchie, R.A.S.C. (Headquarters, E.F.I., Arras), 10 Mar. 1942 
(N.A., WO208/3308/681). 
Account of escape of P66519 Lt. Neave, A.M.S., 1 Searchlight Regt. R.A., 13 May 
1942 (N.A., WO208/3308/676). 
Account of escape of 2883173 Pte  Neill, A., 5 Gordon Hrs., and 69239 Gnr Clapham, 
J.H., 1 Regt. R.H.A. (52 (H) Div.),  9 Mar. 1942 (N.A., WO208/3308/677-78). 
Account of escape of P/99109 Major P.H. Newman, D.S.O., 12 C.C.S., R.A.M.C. (III  





Account of escape of 2880285 Pte. Philips, W. 6 Gordon Hrs. 51 Div., 9 Mar. 1942 
(N.A., WO208/3308/680). 
Account of escape of 2883214 Pte. Pow, A. 5 Gordon Hrs. & 3318412 Pte. Ross, J. 5 
Gordon Hrs., 13 Mar. 1942 (N.A., WO208/3308/689). 
Statement by P.1006 P/O Radwanski. W., 300 (Polish) Squadron, Bomber Comd., 
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